Jamil Khan Vs The State etc

JUDGMENT SHEET

IN THE PESHAWAR HIGH COURT,

PESHAWAR

JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

Cr. A No. 650-P of 2025

Jamil Khan Vs The State etc

Date of hearing: 25.02.2026.

Mr. Muhammad Jehangir Khan, Advocate, for the appellant.

Mr. Ayub Zaman, AAG, for the State.

Nemo for the complainant.

JUDGMENT

INAM ULLAH KHAN, J-. Through this judgment we intend to decide the instant criminal appeal as well as the connected Cr.R No.158- P/2025 “Abdul Karim Vs The State” and Cr.A No.713-P/2025, as all the cases are arising out of one and the same judgment dated 24.06.2025, passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge Sadda at Kurram, delivered in case FIR No.66 dated 06.06.2024 under section 302/ 34 PPC r/w 15-AA, Police Station Central Kurram, whereby the appellant was convicted and sentenced in the following manner:

i. under section 302 (b) PPC the appellant was convicted and

sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for life as Tazir with payment of compensation of Rs.20,00,000/- (rupees Twenty lac) to the legal heirs of deceased Mst. Fazila within the meaning of Section 544-A Cr.P.C and in case of non-payment of the compensation amount the appellant/accused shall suffer simple imprisonment for a period of six months.

ii. Under section 15-AA the appellant was convicted and sentenced for imprisonment of five years with fine of Rs.50,000/- and in case of default of payment of fine he has to further undergo simple imprisonment for two months. All the sentences shall run concurrently. Benefit of Section 382-B Cr.P.C was extended to the appellant.”

2.The concise facts, as set out in the FIR, are that the complainant, Abdul Karim, while present in the Trauma Room of Tehsil Headquarter Hospital Sadda along with the dead body of his daughter, Mst. Fazila, reported the occurrence to the local police. He stated that his daughter had been married to Muhammad Sadeeq (son of accused Muhammad Akbar and brother of accused Jamil) about 8/9 years prior to the occurrence. According to the complainant, accused Muhammad Akbar informed him that his

daughter was unwell and asked him to come and take her for medical treatment. Acting upon the said information, the complainant reached the house of the accused where he found his daughter lying dead with firearm injuries. He further alleged that both the accused were standing near the dead body, duly armed with firearms. Holding them responsible for the commission of the offence, he lodged the present FIR.

3.On arrest of the appellant and completion of investigation, challan was submitted to the Court of competent jurisdiction, charge was framed against the accused to which he did not plead guilty and claimed trial. As such the learned trial Court was pleased to direct the prosecution to produce its evidence. In order to prove its case, prosecution produced and examined as many as 10 witnesses, whereafter statement of the accused was recorded under section 342 Cr.P.C, where he denied the allegations and claimed innocence, however, did not opt to record his statement under section 340 (2) Cr.P.C. On conclusion of the trial, the learned trial Court found the appellant guilty of the charge and whilst recording his conviction, sentenced him as mentioned above, hence, this appeal.

4.Despite service the complainant is not in attendance, so being appeal against conviction the same cannot be kept pending for indefinite period and as such the case was heard with the assistance of worthy AAG for the State as well as learned counsel for the appellant and the record was scanned through.

5.The tragic occurrence resulted in the loss of a precious human life. The deceased was immediately shifted to the hospital, where the matter was formally reported and the machinery of law was set into motion. The Investigating Officer prepared the inquest report and recorded the nature and seat of injuries observed on the person of the deceased. Thereafter, the dead body was dispatched for postmortem examination to ascertain the cause of death. On receipt of copy of the FIR, the Investigating Officer proceeded to the place of occurrence, inspected the scene in the presence of the complainant, and prepared the site plan. During inspection, blood through cotton was secured from the place of the deceased, and two empties of 7.62 bore were taken into possession.

On the following day, the accused were arrested.

From the possession of the present appellant, a Kalashnikov was recovered, which was

subsequently sent to the Firearm Expert along with the collected empties. The report received from the Forensic Expert confirmed that the empties had been fired from the recovered weapon. Upon completion of investigation, the accused were sent up to face trial. After recording the evidence and hearing the parties, the learned trial Court convicted and sentenced the appellant, while extending the benefit of doubt to the co- accused and acquitting him of the charge. The trial Court, upon appreciation of the material brought on record, concluded that the prosecution had succeeded in establishing the involvement of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt; however, it found the case of the co-accused distinguishable, primarily on account of non- recovery of the weapon of offence from his possession.

6.The moot question before this Court, therefore, is that what prompted with the learned trial Court in drawing a line of distinction between the two accused. Whether the mere absence of recovery from the co-accused was sufficient to extend him the extraordinary concession of acquittal, and conversely, whether the sole circumstance of recovery of the weapon

from the appellant, even when supported by a positive forensic report, was by itself adequate to fix the liability upon him for the commission of the offence. To resolve these questions and to ensure that no miscarriage of justice occurs, it becomes imperative for this Court to carefully re- examine the entire record, evaluate the evidence in its true perspective, and determine whether the findings recorded by the learned trial Court are sustainable in law and on facts.

7.It is an admitted position on record that the unfortunate deceased had been married to the brother of the appellant, namely Muhammad Sadiq, and that the marriage had hardly lasted seven or eight days when the tragic occurrence took place. The proximity of the marriage to the incident is a circumstance of considerable significance. It obviously invites judicial scrutiny as to what could have provoked the accused to take the life of a young bride within such a short span of matrimonial union, and, equally, why the husband of the deceased maintained silence from the inception of the case till its culmination.

Keeping in view the close and intimate relationship between the parties, and the peculiar manner in which the occurrence is alleged to have

taken place inside the house, this Court deems it essential to examine the attending circumstances with utmost care. The prosecution case, in essence, rests upon circumstantial evidence, for no person has been produced who claims to have actually witnessed the act of firing. The complainant, who is the father of the deceased, was examined as PW-9. He is admittedly not an eyewitness of the occurrence itself. His claim is that on receiving information, he rushed to the house of the deceased and found her lying dead inside the room, while both accused were standing near the dead body, duly armed. This Court is required to examine whether the complainant was indeed present at the spot at the time alleged, and whether his assertion that he saw both accused armed with the dead body inspires confidence. It is not disputed that the complainant reached the house after the deceased had already been done to death. Therefore, his testimony is confined to what he allegedly observed on arrival. The defence subjected him to cross-examination on material aspects, attempting to shake his credibility and to test the veracity of his presence at the relevant time. An important feature of his version is that the acquitted co-

accused allegedly sent a message through a messenger regarding the illness of the deceased.

However, the complainant failed to disclose the identity of that messenger or to explain satisfactorily why his name was not mentioned in the report. His explanation that the omission was deliberate to save the messenger from enmity, does not appear convincing. The non-mentioning of such a material witness, particularly when the receipt of information is the very base of his presence at the spot, casts a shadow on the prosecution story. In criminal jurisprudence, omissions of this nature are not to be brushed aside lightly; rather, where doubt arises, it must lean in favour of the accused. If it is assumed that a message was indeed conveyed to the complainant calling him to the house, it would be against normal human conduct to suppose that the accused, having committed the offence, would remain present at the spot, armed with the weapons of offence, awaiting his arrival.

Ordinarily, after the commission of such a grave offence, the accused would attempt to decamp from the scene, rather than expose themselves to immediate identification and implication. The conduct attributed to the accused, therefore, does

not appeal to a prudent mind. Had the complainant merely stated that he reached the house and found the deceased lying dead, without asserting the presence of the accused armed at the spot, the complexion of the case might have been different. However, by claiming that he saw both accused standing armed near the body, he has assumed the burden of establishing that fact convincingly. The Court must therefore examine whether his testimony withstands careful evaluation and whether it is free from material contradictions and improbabilities.

8.Another important aspect is the absence of a clearly established motive. The prosecution has not brought on record any convincing reason which would explain why, within a week of marriage, the father-in-law and brother-in-law would join hands to commit the murder of the deceased. In cases resting on circumstantial evidence, proof of motive, though not always crucial, assumes added importance where the chain of circumstances is otherwise not complete.

Furthermore, if the complainant’s assertion regarding the presence of both accused armed at the spot is accepted, it would logically suggest participation of both in the firing. Yet, the

forensic report reveals that the collected empties were fired from a single weapon, which was recovered from the possession of the appellant alone. This creates an inherent inconsistency.

Either the complainant exaggerated the presence and role of both accused, or the co-accused, being the father-in-law, was falsely implicated due to suspicion or strained relations. Thus, when the doubtful presence of the complainant at the crucial time, the unexplained omission regarding the messenger, the unnatural conduct attributed to the accused, the absence of a compelling motive, and the forensic evidence pointing towards a single weapon are collectively considered, the prosecution case requires careful re-appraisal. In criminal law, suspicion, however grave, cannot take the place of proof. The circumstances must form an unbroken chain leading only to the guilt of the accused. If any reasonable doubt emerges from the evidence, the benefit thereof must favour the accused.

9.It is pertinent to note that when the dead body was brought to the hospital, the scribe, allegedly on receiving information of the occurrence, proceeded to the hospital and recorded the report on the basis of which the

formal proceedings were set in motion. He prepared the injury sheet, drafted the report, and thereafter the dead body was dispatched for postmortem examination. However, a material inconsistency emerges from his testimony. In cross-examination, he disclosed that he received information regarding the occurrence at 12:00 noon. Yet, in the same breath, the time of his arrival at the hospital was stated to be 11:30 a.m.

This discrepancy strikes at the root of the prosecution narrative. If he received information at 12:00 noon, it is unbelievable how he could have reached the hospital at 11:30 a.m., that is, thirty (30) minutes prior to the receipt of such information. On the other hand, even if it is assumed that the information was received at 11:30 a.m. and the report was recorded at 12:00 noon, the witness was under the legal obligation to reasonably reconcile these timings. His failure to do so creates a dent in the credibility of the prosecution version. It is also noteworthy that the prosecution sought his re-examination in an attempt to cure the defect regarding the inconsistency of time. Although during re- examination he endeavoured to explain the discrepancy, he had already admitted in his earlier

statement that it was he to whom the report was made and that he recorded the same. Once such an admission stands on record, any subsequent attempt to rectify the timeline assumes a defensive character and cannot destroy the contradiction already created. The deficiency in the sequence of events, therefore, remains a circumstance which cannot be lightly brushed aside. The place of occurrence is situated at a distance of approximately 20/22 kilometers from the hospital. The time of occurrence is stated to be 10:00 a.m., whereas the time of report is recorded as 2:30 p.m., indicating a delay of about four and a half hours. This delay, significantly, has neither been satisfactorily explained by the complainant, nor by the Investigating Officer. In cases involving homicidal death, prompt reporting of the occurrence lends assurance to the prosecution version, whereas unexplained delay often gives rise to the possibility of deliberation, consultation, or embellishment. If, as suggested, the scribe received information and could reach the hospital within thirty minutes, it becomes difficult to comprehend how the shifting of the dead body from the place of occurrence to the hospital consumed such an inordinate period. The

transportation of a body over a distance of 20/22 kilometers would not ordinarily require four and a half hours, particularly in circumstances of urgency. Two plausible inferences, therefore, emerge: either the dead body was first collected and shifted to the hospital by persons from the locality and the presence of complainant was procured thereafter to formalize the report, or the complainant himself reached the house of the deceased after a considerable lapse of time and only then arranged for the shifting of the body and the lodging of the report. Both scenarios introduce an element of doubt in the prosecution story as initially planned. When this unexplained delay is examined in juxtaposition with the contradictory statement of the scribe (examined as PW-06), it constitutes a material infirmity. These inconsistencies are not minor or trivial discrepancies attributable to lapse of memory;

rather, they pertain to the very genesis of the case and the promptness of its reporting. In criminal jurisprudence, where the liberty of a person is at stake, such contradictions assume significance.

Accordingly, these deficiencies in the prosecution evidence, particularly regarding the timing of information, arrival, and lodging of the report, are

circumstances which this Court cannot overlook.

They cumulatively diminish the certainty required for sustaining a conviction and must, therefore, be considered carefully in favour of the accused, when assessing whether the prosecution has succeeded in proving its case beyond reasonable doubt.

10.Another intriguing aspect of the case, which this Court cannot afford to overlook, is the complete non-appearance and silence of the husband of the deceased. Though it is now suggested at the bar that on the day of occurrence he was present in his school, being a school teacher by profession, no such evidence was collected during investigation, nor was any documentary proof produced to substantiate this assertion. The Investigating Officer did not secure his attendance record, nor was any statement brought on record explaining his absence at the relevant time. This omission assumes importance in the peculiar facts of the case. The marriage had lasted only seven or eight days when the unfortunate bride died, allegedly at the hands of her father-in-law and brother-in-law. In such circumstances, the conduct of the husband would naturally be of paramount relevance. One would

expect that, upon learning of the homicidal death of his wife, he would either step forward as a complainant or at least record a statement narrating the circumstances within his knowledge.

Yet, the record reveals neither his accusation against the present accused, nor his appearance as a witness explaining the occurrence or his own whereabouts. His silence, from the inception of the case till its conclusion, creates an unexplained void in the prosecution story. Had the husband been implicated as an accused, or had he appeared to give a coherent account of events, the complexion of the case might have been altogether different. His subsequent conduct whether of grief, infuriation, or accusation, could have furnished valuable perception into the truth of the matter. In criminal jurisprudence, subsequent conduct, both of the accused and of closely connected persons, can legitimately be taken into consideration. However, such conduct must be proved through reliable evidence. In the present case, the absence of any version from the husband deprives the Court of an important link in the chain of circumstances. The complainant, who is the father of the deceased, has projected himself as having reached the house soon after the

occurrence and having seen the accused present there, duly armed. It is settled that such a claim cannot be discarded summarily merely because he is not an eyewitness of the actual firing. However, before acting upon it, the Court must be satisfied that he has convincingly established his presence on the spot at the stated time and that his version is consistent with normal human conduct and surrounding circumstances. Here, the house of the complainant was situated at a considerable distance. If, as alleged, the acquitted co-accused had sent information to him through a messenger, then it would be contrary to ordinary prudence to assume that the accused, after committing so grave an offence, would remain stationed at the scene, armed with the weapons of offence, awaiting his arrival. Ordinarily, persons conscious of guilt seek to avoid detection and apprehension, rather than expose themselves to immediate implication. When these aspects are considered cumulatively, the unexplained silence of the husband, the absence of independent verification of his alibi, the doubtful presence of the complainant at the crucial time, and the improbability of the accused lingering at the spot armed, an element of ambiguity certainly arises. It

raises the possibility that the complainant did not in fact witness the accused immediately after the occurrence, but rather arrived at the scene upon receiving information of the tragic death and, thereafter, formed his own suspicions.

11.The prosecution carries the burden of establishing not only that the deceased met a homicidal death, but also that it was the accused who committed the offence. Mere assertion by the complainant that he saw the accused standing armed near the body, without independent corroboration and without satisfactorily establishing his own presence and prompt arrival, would hardly constitute a complete chain of circumstantial evidence. The law is well-settled that in cases resting upon circumstantial evidence, the circumstances proved must be consistent only with the suggestion of guilt and must exclude every other reasonable suggestion. In the present case, where the complainant is admittedly not an eyewitness of the occurrence and where vital links, particularly the role and conduct of the husband remain unexplained, his solitary testimony, unsupported by independent and convincing corroboration, would hardly serve to sustain the conviction of the appellant.

Accordingly, these essential aspects must ponder with this Court while determining whether the prosecution has succeeded in proving its case beyond reasonable doubt or whether the benefit of doubt must, as a matter of right, be given to the accused.

12.It is an admitted position that no independent witness from the house or locality was examined in support of the prosecution claim.

No person has come forward to depose that it was the appellant and the acquitted co-accused who, in fact, caused the death of the deceased. The prosecution case, therefore, hinges primarily upon the testimony of the complainant and the recoveries effected during investigation. Once this Court reaches the conclusion that the complainant has failed to convincingly establish his presence at the spot immediately after the occurrence, and that his assertion of having seen the accused standing armed near the dead body, does not inspire confidence, then that crucial portion of his statement cannot safely be relied upon. His subsequent arrival at the house and his role in shifting the dead body to the hospital may well stand proved on record, but that circumstance alone does not advance the prosecution case

regarding the identity of the assailant. If this essential claim, that he saw both accused armed at the spot, is excluded from consideration, the prosecution is effectively left with a single incriminating circumstance: the arrest of the appellant on the following day and the recovery of a Kalashnikov from his possession, which allegedly matched the empties collected from the place of occurrence. The question, therefore, is whether such recovery, even when coupled with a positive forensic report, is by itself sufficient to sustain a conviction for murder. It is settled law that recovery of a weapon, though relevant, is merely a corroborative piece of evidence. It cannot substitute for proof of participation in the crime. Where the ocular account is doubtful or unreliable, a forensic report matching empties with a recovered weapon cannot independently establish that it was the accused who fired the fatal shots, particularly when the prosecution has failed to complete the chain of circumstances.

Undoubtedly, the incident occurred inside the house. Definitely, the dead body was recovered from the room and shifted to the hospital.

Undeniably, blood-stained material and two empties of 7.62 bore were secured from the spot.

These facts establish that the deceased met a homicidal death. There is no ambiguity on that score. The real question that persists is: who was the culprit. The prosecution has not brought on record any convincing motive explaining why, within seven or eight days of marriage, the father- in-law would join hands with the brother-in-law to eliminate the deceased. Similarly confusing is the silence of the husband, who neither came forward to accuse the present appellant nor was implicated as an accused. If the husband had been charged, or if there had been evidence showing his involvement or ill-will, the nature of the evidence might have been different. But in the present configuration, where only the father-in- law and brother-in-law are charged, the burden lay heavily on the complainant to convincingly establish their presence and participation. In cases resting upon circumstantial evidence, the circumstances must form a complete and unbroken chain leading only to the suggestion of guilt of the accused and excluding every other reasonable possibility. Here, while the factum of homicide stands proved, the identity of the accused remains shrouded in doubt. The possibility, however remote, that the offence may

have been committed by another person, including the husband, has not been excluded by the prosecution through cogent and independent evidence.

13.When such vital gaps persist, absence of independent witnesses, doubtful presence of the complainant at the crucial moment, unexplained delay in reporting, lack of motive, and silence of the husband, the cumulative effect is that the prosecution case does not attain the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt. Suspicion, however strong, cannot take the place of proof.

The benefit of every reasonable doubt must go to the accused, not as a matter of concession, but as a matter of right. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, this Court is inclined to extend that benefit to the appellant. Reliance is placed on the judgment of apex court titled “Azhar Iqbal and 3 others vs The State through P.G Punjab, Lahore and others” (2026 SCMR 182), wherein, it has been held as under:

“Keeping in view all the aforementioned facts, we have come to this irresistible conclusion that the prosecution has failed to prove its cases against the petitioners beyond the shadow of doubt. It is by now well settled that if there is a single circumstance, which creates doubt in

the prosecution story then the same is sufficient to acquit the accused, whereas the instant case is replete with number of circumstances, which have created serious doubts in the prosecution story.”

14.The alleged motive behind the occurrence has neither been specifically pleaded, nor substantiated through reliable evidence. The Investigating Officer did not bring on record the statement of any independent witness to establish prior ill-will, dispute, or circumstance that could have prompted the father-in-law and brother-in- law to eliminate the deceased within seven or eight days of her marriage. It is correct that absence of motive, by itself, is not always fatal to the prosecution case, particularly where direct and unimpeachable ocular evidence is available.

However, where the case rests entirely upon circumstantial evidence, motive assumes greater significance. In such cases, it often provides the missing link that lends coherence and probability to the prosecution story. Here, nothing has been brought on record to show any grudge, discord, or compelling reason that could explain the alleged act. The silence of the record on this vital aspect leaves the Court with an unanswered question:

what prompted the accused to commit so grave an

offence? Although the FSL report returned a positive finding that the recovered weapon matched the collected empties, such evidence remains circumstantial in nature. Forensic corroboration can strengthen a prosecution case, but it cannot independently sustain a conviction unless the foundational facts establishing participation of the accused in the crime are otherwise proved. Where the primary evidence regarding presence and involvement is doubtful, a positive forensic opinion cannot, by itself, bridge the evidentiary gaps. Since the entire case hinges upon circumstantial evidence, it was incumbent upon the prosecution to establish a chain of circumstances so complete that its one end would touch the dead body of the deceased and the other would firmly encircle the neck of the appellant, excluding every possibility except that of his guilt. Upon careful reappraisal of the record, including the recoveries from the spot, the forensic report, and the testimony of the complainant, we are unable to find such compactness or continuity in the chain. Instead, we find missing links, unexplained delay in reporting, doubtful presence of the complainant at the crucial time, absence of independent

corroboration, silence of the husband, and lack of motive. Once the chain of circumstantial evidence is found to be incomplete, conviction cannot be sustained on the strength of conjectures or probabilities. Criminal jurisprudence demands proof beyond reasonable doubt, not mere suspicion, however strong. The cumulative effect of these deficiencies leads us to the inescapable conclusion that the prosecution has failed to prove its case against the appellant. The learned trial Court, with due respect, fell into error in appreciating the evidence and in recording the conviction. The impugned judgment suffers from inherent defects, and the reasons assigned therein are insufficient to hold the appellant responsible for the commission of the offence.

15.Accordingly, the instant criminal appeal is, therefore, allowed. The impugned judgment is set aside, and the appellant is acquitted of the charge.

He shall be released forthwith, unless required to be detained in connection with any other criminal case.

16.Consequent thereto, the connected Cr.A No. 713-P/2025 titled “Abdul Karim vs The State etc” filed by the complainant challenging the acquittal of respondent/accused Muhammad

Akbar, stands dismissed, in view of the observations and conclusions recorded herein.

17.Now diverting to the Criminal Revision No. 158-P/2025 titled “Abdul Karim vs The State” which has been filed by the complainant for enhancement of the awarded sentence, as the accused succeeded in earning acquittal and the impugned judgement is set aside, so the instant criminal revision has lost its utility, the same is dismissed as such.

Announced

*Ihsan PS*

JUDGE

JUDGE

(DB)Mr. Justice Sahibzada Asadullah & Mr. Justice Inam Ullah Khan