Muhammad Shah Nawaz Vs The State and another

JUDGMENT SHEET

IN THE PESHAWAR HIGH COURT,

D.I.KHAN BENCH

(Judicial Department)

Cr.A.No.26-D/2025 with Murder Reference No.01-D/2025 & Cr.Misc.No.08-D/2025.

Muhammad Shah Nawaz Versus The State and another

JUDGMENT

For appellant: M/s Saif-ur-Rehman Khan and Attiq Ullah Baloch, Advocates.

For State: Mr. Ghulam Muhammad Sappal, Addl: A.G.

For complainant: M/s Ahmad Ali Khan and Nawaz Khan Marwat, Advocates.

Date of hearing: 02.12.2025.

INAM ULLAH KHAN, J.- The appellant, Muhammad Shah Nawaz, filed the present criminal appeal under Section 410 Cr.P.C., calling in question the legality and propriety of judgment, dated 05.05.2025, rendered by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-IV, D.I.Khan, in case FIR No.162, dated 30.03.2024, registered under Sections 302 and 34 PPC, at Police Station Saddar, D.I.Khan. Vide the impugned judgment, the appellant was convicted under Section 302(b) PPC and sentenced to death as Tazir, with a direction to pay Rs.1,000,000/- as compensation under Section

544-A Cr.P.C., recoverable as arrears of land revenue, and in default to undergo six months S.I.

Benefit of Section 382-B Cr.P.C. was also extended.

2.The learned trial Court, through the same judgment, makes a reference under Section 374 Cr.P.C. for confirmation of the sentence of death (Murder Reference No.01-D/2025). Since the appeal and the murder reference arise out of the same judgment, these are being decided through this consolidated judgment.

3.The prosecution’s case, as narrated in the crime report, is that on 30.03.2024, at about 1950 hours, the complainant Liaqat Ali Khan brought his unconscious injured brother, Nisar Ali Khan, to Civil Hospital, D.I.Khan. He reported that after offering Maghrib prayer in the mosque, he and his brother Muhammad Ishaq were proceeding home and when reached near their cattle-shed at about 07:00 p.m., they saw that the accused Siffat (now acquitted) and the appellant/convict allegedly had caught hold of his brother Nisar Ali Khan and were beating him. During the scuffle, it is alleged that accused Siffat, with intention to commit Qatl-i- Amd, inflicted blows on the abdomen of his

brother with sharp-edged weapon, who collapsed.

Besides, the complainant, his brother Muhammad Ishaq has seen the the occurrence. The complainant stated that they were empty-handed, therefore, unable to intervene. Motive alleged was a dispute over womenfolk. Later on, on the same day, the injured Nisar Ali Khan succumbed to his injuries in the hospital.

4.PW-11 Muhammad Asif, IHC, recorded the complainant’s report in the shape of murasila. PW- 5 Dr. Rasheed Ahmad examined the injured, found him in Grade-IV shock and noted the following injuries:

i. The patient is in shock with feeble pulse; BP unrecordable.

ii. A 3 cm deep stab wound on left axilla.

iii. A 3 cm deep stab wound on left lateral chest.

iv. A 5 cm deep stab wound on right lateral chest.

He prepared MLC Ex.PW-5/1. The injured later succumbed to injuries, and PW-5 conducted the postmortem examination (Ex.P-M). PW-10 SI Mukhtiar Akhtar conducted investigation.

5.Upon completion of investigation, challan/ report under Section 173 Cr.PC was submitted against both the accused Siffat Ullah and Muhammad Shah Nawaz. The learned trial Court

after providing copies of relevant documents to the accused, framed formal charge against them to which they pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. At trial the prosecution examined thirteen (13) witnesses. At the conclusion of prosecution evidence, the accused were examined under Section 342 Cr.PC. They professed innocence and false implication in the case. However, neither they wished to be examined on Oath as required under Section 340(2) Cr.PC nor wanted to produce evidence in his defence. On conclusion of trial, the learned trial Court, after hearing both the sides, convicted both the accused and sentenced to death vide judgment, dated 05.5.2025. Feeling aggrieved, the appellant/convict filed the instant appeal while the learned trial Court sent the Murder Reference for confirmation.

6.We have heard the arguments of learned counsel for the parties as well as learned Addl:

A.G. appearing for the State and have gone through the record of the case.

7.The specific role assigned to the appellant/ convict is that he was “beating” the deceased, while the principal role of inflicting knife blows is attributed to co-accused Siffat Ullah. It is

noteworthy that such alleged “beating” finds no corroboration from either the MLC or the postmortem report. No blunt-weapon injury is noted anywhere on the deceased’s body. This discrepancy strikes directly at the core of the allegation against the appellant/convict.

8.Co-accused Siffat Ullah was acquitted by this Court in Cr.A.No.25-D/2025 vide judgment dated 02.10.2025 on the basis of compromise with the legal heirs of the deceased. The major legal heirs waived their right of diyat, while certain properties were transferred for the benefit of minor heirs. Once the main accused, the alleged actual assailant, stands acquitted, the vicarious liability of the present appellant must be scrutinized with heightened caution.

9.This Court observed that when the principal accused Siffat Ullah has already been acquitted on the basis of compromise, the liability of a secondary accused under Section 34 PPC becomes inherently doubtful unless independent and unimpeachable evidence is available. No such evidence exists here. The ocular account was furnished by PW-12 and PW-13, the real brothers of the deceased. Mere relationship is not a ground

for discarding testimony, yet their presence must be proved through reliable corroboration. Upon scrutiny their initial statement is that both accused were “beating” the deceased then injured and thereafter co-accused Siffat inflicted blows with sharp edge weapon. In the Court statements, they improved their previous version by specifying “stab-blows with knife”, evidently to align their testimony with the medical evidence. This material improvement casts serious doubt on the truthfulness of their account. The site-plan shows their position at a distance of 17 paces. Knife is a common object easily recognizable from such distance; yet both PWs initially fail to identify it, a circumstance incompatible with natural conduct.

Further, both PWs admitted that blood stains smeared their clothes and soiled the rear seat of the vehicle used to shift the injured to the hospital;

however, the I.O. neither secured the clothes nor seized the vehicle. This omission deprived the prosecution of vital corroborative evidence.

10.Section 34 PPC incorporated the principle that when several persons intentionally commit an act jointly, each is vicariously liable. However, it is essential that an overt act, participation, or conduct manifesting common intention must be established

against each accused. The recovery of a household knife (Ex.P-3) from the house of the appellant/convict becomes insignificant because the FSL report states “blood not detected”. The appellant/ convict neither led to discovery nor made any inculpatory statement. No independent evidence establishes his participation in a manner attracting Section 34 PPC. Thus, there is no legal basis to uphold vicarious liability.

11.Motive alleged is a dispute over womenfolk.

No evidence substantiateed this. Instead, PW-12 admitted that the widow of the deceased is niece of co-accused Siffat, which itself undermines the alleged motive. Reliance is placed on Muhammad Bilal v. The State (2025 SCMR 1580), wherein it was held:

“No cogent evidence was produced to prove the alleged motive. We are, therefore, of the view that the motive alleged by the prosecution also has not been proved in this case.”

Reliance is also placed on the case of Khizar Hayat v. The State (2025 SCMR 1339), wherein it was held:

“Once the motive is set up, it must be established. In case of failure, the prosecution must suffer the consequences and not the defence.”

The prosecution, having chosen to alleged motive, utterly failed to substantiate it.

12.The foregoing discussion highlights material contradictions and omissions which create serious doubt regarding the presence of the eyewitnesses, the correctness of the prosecution story, the involvement of the appellant/convict, and the applicability of Section 34 PPC. Where such doubts exist, acquittal must follow as a matter of right. Reference is made to Muhammad Hassan v.

The State (2024 SCMR 1427), Abdul Samad v.

The State (2025 SCMR 639), Tariq Parvez v. The State (1995 SCMR 1345), Muhammad Akram v.

The State (2009 SCMR 230), Muhammad Imran v. The State (2020 SCMR 857), which consistently hold that a single reasonable doubt is sufficient to acquit, not as concession but as a right.

13.It is a foundational principle of our criminal administration, rooted in Islamic jurisprudence, that:

“It is better to acquit a hundred guilty persons than to convict a single innocent one.”

This principle, well-recognized in Pakistani jurisprudence, reinforces the duty of Courts to extend benefit of doubt whenever possible.

14.Reliance is placed on Ghulam Haider v.

Muhammad Nadeem Sajid (2006 SCMR 1251), wherein the Supreme Court upheld the acquittal in circumstances closely resembling the present matter. In the said case, the Court held that the accused had not played any active role in the occurrence, was not carrying any weapon, and the prosecution had failed to establish that he shared the common intention. It was further observed that an acquittal delivered through a well-reasoned judgment reinforces the presumption of innocence.

15.Resultantly, for the reasons recorded above, this appeal is allowed. The conviction and sentence recorded by the learned Additional Sessions Judge- IV, D.I.Khan, vide judgment dated 05.05.2025, against the appellant Muhammad Shah Nawaz, are set aside. He is acquitted of the charge by extending benefit of doubt. He shall be released forthwith if not required in any other case. Murder Reference No.01-D/2025 is answered in the NEGATIVE. The sentence of death is NOT CONFIRMED. Cr.Misc.No.08-D/2025 seeking

suspension of sentence and release on bail has become infructuous in view of the present judgment and is accordingly disposed of.

16.These are the detailed reasons for our short order announced earlier today.

Announced.

Dt:02.12.2025. –Sd/- Imran/* JUDGE

-Sd/-

JUDGE

(D.B)

Hon’ble Ms. Justice Farah Jamshed Hon’ble Mr. Justice Inam Ullah Khan