Aman Ullah Khan Vs The State etc.

JUDGMENT SHEET

IN THE PESIIAWAR HIGH COT]RT,

BAIINUBENCH

(Judicial Department) Cr: Misc: BCA No. 87 5

AmanUllahKhan.

V.

The State etc.

IUDGMENT

Date of hearing 16.03.2026.

For petitioner:- Mr. Faqir Mehbub-u1-Hamid, advocate (Via Video Link).

For State:- Mr. Najibullah Khan Marwat, Asstt: A.G.

For respondent:- Messrs. Muhammad Ashraf Khan Marwat and Masood Adnan, advocate.

SABIT ALLAH KHAN,I.-

1.Through the instant bail cancellation application, Aman Ullah Khan, petitioner/ complainant, has assailed the order dated 10.11.2025 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-I, Lakki Marwat, whereby post-arrest bail was granted to the respondent/accused Afnan, in a criminal case vide { F.I.R No.250 dated 27.08.2025 registered ulss 302134 P.P.C registered at Police Station, Ghazni Khel, District, Lakki Marwat.

2.Briefly stated, the prosecution case, as reflected from the murasila and the contents of the FIR, is that on 27.08.2025 the complainant, Amanullah, reported

that he along with his brother Arab Khan (deceased) had gone to Shera Hotel situated at Adda Tajazai near DHQ Hospital, Lakki Marwat for taking meals. After taking meals, the deceased proceeded to the verandah of the hotel to offer Zohar prayer. In the meanwhile, at about 14:20 hours, the present accused/petitioner Afnan, who was driving a motorcycle, accompanied by co-accused Rehmafullah, seated on the rear seat, both allegedly armed with Kalashnikovs, arrived at the spot and, with the coflrmon intention to commit murder, allegedly opened indiscriminate firing upon Arab Khan with their respective weapons. As a result of the firing, the deceased sustained firearm injuries and fell to the ground. The complainant immediately shifted the injured to DHQ Hospital, Lakki Marwat, where he succumbed to the injuries. The motive behind the occrrrrence has been alleged to be a previous blood feud between the complainant party and the co-accused Rehmatullah alias Lappu' On the basis of the aforesaid murasila report, the instant FIR was registered against the accused/petitioner and his co-accused.

3.Leamed counsel for the petitioner/complainant contended that the learned trial Court, while granting post-arrest bail to the respondent/accused, failed to

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properly appreciate the material available on record and passed the impugned order in a mechanical manner. It is argued that the respondent/accused has been specifically nominated in the FIR with a direct and active role of firing, which resulted in the death of the deceased. According to the learned counsel, the case of the respondent squarely falls within the prohibitory clause of section49T Cr.P.C, therefore, the concession of bail was not warranted. He further submits that the leamed trial Court has misread and non-read the available evidence, particularly the ocular account and other attending circumstances of the case, and has recorded findings which are not supported by the record. On these premises, learned counsel prayed for acceptance of the instant application and cancellation of the post-arrest bail granted to the respondenVaccused.

4.Conversely, learned counsel appearhg for the respondent/accused supported the impugrred order and argued that the leamed trial Court, after tentative assessment of the available material, rightly concluded that the case of the respondent calls for further inquiry within the meaning of section 497(2) Cr.P.C. It is contended that the prosecution version suffers from certain inherent inconsistencies, and no recovery has

been effected from the respondent. It is further argued that the leamed trial Court exercised its discretion judiciously while granting bail, therefore, the same does not call for interference by this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under section 497(5) Cr.P.C.

5.Leamed Assistant Advocate General, while adopting the arguments advanced by leamed counsel for the petitioner/complainant, submitted that the learned trial Court has not properly appreciated the gravity of the offence and the role attributed to the respondent, therefore the impugned order is liable to be set aside.

6.I have given my anxious consideration to the arguments advanced by learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the available record with their valuable assistance.

7.A tentative assessment of the material on record reveals that the respondenUaccused has been specifically nominated in the F.I.R. with a direct and active role in the commission of the offence.

According to the prosecution version, the respondent along with his co-accused arrived at the place of occrrrrence while armed with Kalashnikovs and opened fring upon the deceased, which resulted in the fatal injuries leading to his death. Thus, the respondent

is directly charged with the act of fring upon the deceased, which prima facie connects him with the commission of the alleged offence falling within the prohibitory clause of section 497 Cr.P.C.

8.Furthermore, the medical evidence in the shape of the post-mortem report coupled with the site plan of the place of occurrence also lends support to the prosecution version regarding the manner and place of occurrence. The injuries noted in the post-mortem report appear to be consistent with the prosecution's ocular account and the attending circumstances of the case, thereby providing corroborative support to the allegation of fring attributed to the respondent. At this tentative stage, the material available on record cannot be brushed aside lightly.

9.In somewhat similar circumstances, the Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan n Jahanzeb Khan v. Umer Zahid (2022 SCMR 726) held that where an accused is specifically nominated in the FIR with a direct role of causing firearm injury which resulted in death of the deceased, and the occlrrrence took place in broad daylight between known parties leaving no chance of misidentification, while the medical evidence supports the prosecution version, the grant of bail would not be justified and such order, if

passed on conjectures and surmises, is liable to be set aside in the interest of safe administration of criminal justice. The Honourable Supreme Court further observed as under:-

"There is no denial to this fact that the respondent is nominated in the crime report, which is promptly lodged against him wherein a specific accusation of causing firearm injury to the brother of the complainant which resulted into his death. Admittedly, the occurrence has taken place on the roofiop of the house of the complainant and the matter was reported to the Police after lapse of 1 hour and 45 minutes whereas the inter se distance between the place of occurrence and the Police Station was 18-19 kilometers. This aspect lends support to the fact that the matter wds reported to the Police without any inordinate delay. Previous enmity between the parties is not denied- The instant occurrence has taken place in broad daylight whereas the parties are knon)n to each other, therefore, there is no chance of any mis-identification, which further gives strength to the prosecution case. The locale of injury ascribed to the respondent is fully supported by medical evidence. We have noticed that the reasoning advanced by the learned High Court while granting bail to the respondent is artificial in nature, which does not imprint any second thought in the mind of a prudent man that the occurrence has taken place in another manner not disclosed while lodging the crime report. The drgument of the learned counsel for the respondent that the considerations for the grant of bail and cancellation whereof are entirely on dffirent footings has no second thought. However, we are under obligation to dttend to the facts and circumstdnces of the lis, which is brought before us and to evaluate the same in the mdnner so that no injustice is done to either of the party. In the instdnt case, the learned High Court has not given any iusticiable redsoning to bring the case of the respondent within the ambit of section 497(2), Cr.P.C. calling for further probe into his guilt rather based its order upon assessment of the facts, which does not have any nexus with the guidelines enunciated by the suryrior courts from time to time with reference to grant of bail. In our opinion, in the instant case the learned High Court while granting bail to the

reslnndent has erred in law and fact and has passed an order which is based upon conjectures and surmises, therefore, the same is not sustainable in the eyes of law."

10.Likewise, in Aurangzeb v. The State and olherc (2022 SCMR 1229), the Honourable Supreme Court reiterated that where an accused is specifically nominated in the crime report with a definite allegation of causing firearm injuries, the occurrence takes place in broad daylight, the injuries attributed to the accused are corroborated by medical evidence, and the alleged offence falls within the prohibitory clause of section 497 Cr.P.C, the grant of bail by the courts below in disregard ofsettled principles governing bail amounts to a perverse exercise of discretion, warranting cancellation of bail. It was observed as under:-

"There is no denial to this fact that the respondent is speciJically nominated in the crime report wherein a speciJic accusation of causing firearm injuries on the abdominal region of the petitioner/complainant ,s alleged against him. The matter was reported to the Police with inordinate delay but it is an admitted fact that the instdnt occurrence has taken place in the broad daylight and there is no chance of any misidentiJication especially when the parties are htown to each other. The injuries ascribed to the respondent are supported by medical evidence. The mode and manner of the occutrence is fully established from the record. The offence alleged against the respondent do fall within the prohibitory clause of section 497, Cr.P.C. So far as the argument of the learned counsel for the responfunt that the considerdtions for grdnt of bail and cancellation whereof are entirely on dffirent footing is concerned, we are conscious of this concept. However, in the

instant case the bail has been granted to the respondent against the merits and ignoring the well established principles for grant of bail and when it is clear from the record that the case of the petitioner is fully established leaving no room and the material placed before the Court is such which does not attrdct the provision of further inquiry, the Trial Court while assessing the material tentdtively had to refrain from passing such an order. In the instant case, the learned Trial Court while granting bail has gone beyond its scope, which leads to the conclusion that the order passed is not sustainable in the eyes of law. The Courts of law are supposed to keep balance while adjudicating the matter arid dre not supposed to act hypotheticdlly rvithout any concrete reasoning, which is attire of judicial order, which is clearly missing in. this case"

ll. In a similar context, this Court in llaheed Murad v. Aimal Khan and another (2000 P Cr.LJ 1951) has held that mere minor discrepancies such as non-recovery of empties or slight inconsistency regarding the place of occurrence do not bring the case within the ambit of further inquiry, particularly where the accused are directly nominated in the F.I.R. and there is sufficient ocular account connecting them with the commission of the offence.

It was further held that hypothetical or inconsequential aspects which can only be resolved after recording of evidence during trial cannot be made basis for grant of bail in offences falling within the prohibitory clause. The relevant portion is reproduced as under:-

"The simple non-recovery of the empties from the spot and presence of the accused on another point than the jungle of dates (which has also been explained by the complainant, but escaped the dttention of the learned lower Court) are not of that fficacy which could give the effect of outweighing the evidence of the prosecution and, as such, it was incorrectly concluded by the learned lower Court that the case of the respondents fell within the scope of further inquiry. We may observe that every ltypothetical question which may creep into the mind and which co ld be resolved only after recording the evidence during the trial would not mdke the case that oJ /urther inquiry. The case of further inquiry would only be made out y,hen the data collected by the prosecution is not suffrcient to provide reasonable grounds for believing that d prima facie case existed against the accused. In such circumstances, we hold that the discretion exercised by the learned lower Court in releasing the accused/respondents on bail is not coruect. "

12.It is also significant to note that the co-accused nominated in the F.I.R. is still at large, which further reflects that the matter requires proper adjudication after recording of evidence during hial. In such circumstances, the learned trial Court, while granting post-arest bail to the respondent, appeaxs to have misdirected itself in the tentative assessment of the available material and failed to properly appreciate the gavity of the allegation and the speciflc role attributed to the respondent.

13.Since the respondent has been directly nominated with a specific role of hring which resulted in the death of the deceased, and the available material prima facie connects him with the commission of the

l0 of hearing offence, the impugned order granting post-arest bail petitione r: Mr. Farooq Nawaz, Khattak, advocate. does not appear to be sustainable in the eyes of law and is thus liable to be recalled in exercise of powers respondents: Nemo (in motion)' under section 497(5) Cr.P.C.

't'****rt:t 14.

For the foregoing reasons, the instant bail Vide detailed cancellation common application is allowed. Consequently, the impugned order dated 10.11.2025 passed by the ment of today placed on B.A. No, 99-8/2025 leamed Additional Sessions Judge-I, Lakki Marwag whereby post-a:rest bail was granted to the hammad Sher Vs The State etc), the tnstarfi respondent/accused Afrian, in case F.I.R No.250 dated l cancellation application, No.10- 1,€, registered 27 .08.2025 under sections 302/34 P.P.C. at Police Station Ghazni Khel, District Lakki Marwat, is 025 is hereby dismissed nlbninie.

hereby set aside. As a result thereof, the post-anest bail granted to the respondenUaccused stands is hereby 1.202s. recalled.

ulldh PS'

15.These are the detailed reasons ofthe short order (S,B) Hon'ble Mi lastlcc Abdal Fayaz ofthe even date.

Announced.

{or* -Sd- Judge *Imranullah PS* JI]DGE (S.B) Hon'ble Mt Justice SsbltUllah Nhon v/ ^--r) ,- ii*: ..'N\ 9u',.r . .l,N

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