Qayyum Jan Vs Jehangir Khan & another

JUDGMENT SHEET

PESHAWAR HIGH COURT, PESHAWAR

(Judicial Department)

Cr. A No. 234-P/2025

Qayyum Jan Vs Jehangir Khan & another

JUDGMENT

Date of hearing: 17.03.2026

Appellant by: Mr. Yasin Ullah, Advocate.

The State by: Mr. Ayub Zaman, AAG Respondent/Complainant in person.

SAHIBZADA ASADULLAH, J.- Through this criminal appeal, appellant Qayyum Jan has questioned the judgment of the learned Additional Sessions Judge-IV, Charsadda dated 15.02.2025 rendered in case FIR No. 158 dated 17.05.2022 under section 302 PPC read with section 15 AA registered at Police Station Khanmai, District Charsadda whereby, the appellant was convicted and sentenced as under: - “U/s 302(b) PPC to life imprisonment as Tazir and to pay

a fine of Rs.500,000/- (rupees five lac) to the LRs of deceased Mst. Saeeda within the meaning of section 544-A CrPC recoverable as arrears of land revenue and in default whereof, to further undergo simple imprisonment for six months.

Under section 15 AA KPK to suffer rigorous imprisonment for three years and pay a fine of Rs. 50,000/- and in default whereof, to further undergo simple imprisonment for three months.

All the sentences shall run concurrently and benefit of section 382-B CrPC is extended in favour of the appellant.

2.The allegations against the accused is that on 17.05.2022, he committed the murder of his wife Mst. Saeeda by firing at her hence, the present FIR.

3.Complete challan was submitted to the court. Provisions of section 265-C CrPC were complied with and, the appellant was charge sheeted, to which he pleaded not guilty and

claimed trial. In order to prove its claim, the prosecution produced and examined as many as 10 witnesses. After closure of prosecution evidence, statement of the appellant was recorded under section 342 CrPC, wherein he posed innocence, he wished to be examined on Oath as required under section 340 (2) CrPC, however, did not want to produce evidence in defence. The learned trial Court, after full-fledged trial, convicted the appellant vide the impugned judgment hence, the instant appeal.

4.Arguments heard and record scanned through.

5.In the present lis, this Court is confronted with a matter of profound sensitivity, wherein competing narratives seek to ascribe a distinct character to an unfortunate and tragic occurrence. The learned counsel for the appellant has endeavoured to persuade this Court to view the episode through the prism of suicide, while the learned Additional Advocate General has, with equal vehemence, maintained that the occurrence constitutes a case of homicide, squarely implicating the appellant. Thus, the

controversy, in its essence, revolves around the true nature of the death in question and the legal consequences that must inevitably flow therefrom.

6.At the very threshold, it becomes the solemn duty of this Court to undertake a careful, dispassionate, and comprehensive appraisal of the rival submissions, for it is only through such judicious scrutiny that the truth may be discerned from the surrounding uncertainties.

The first and foremost question that arises for determination is whether the deceased had, in fact, taken her own life. The resolution of this foundational issue is pivotal, for upon it rests the entire edifice of the prosecution case. Should the occurrence be found to fall within the domain of suicide, the inquiry does not end there. The Court must then proceed to examine, with equal care, the subsequent conduct attributed to the appellant. In this regard, it is to be considered whether the alleged non-reporting of the occurrence and the absence of the appellant, being the husband of the deceased from the funeral rites, are circumstances of such

incriminating value as to independently sustain a finding of guilt. Parallel to this inquiry is the question of motive, namely, whether the prosecution has been able to satisfactorily establish the existence of a strained relationship between the spouses, of such intensity as could reasonably give rise to the commission of the alleged offence. The presence or absence of such motive assumes particular significance in a case resting upon circumstantial considerations.

Furthermore, even in a scenario where the death is adjudged to be suicidal, this Court is required to determine whether the subsequent conduct of the appellant can be elevated to the status of substantive evidence, or whether it remains merely a weak link, incapable of bridging the gaps in the prosecution case. In undertaking this exercise, due regard must be had to the principles enunciated by the august Superior Courts in “Nazir Ahmed vs the State” (2018 SCMR 787) and “Saeed Ahmed vs the State” (2015 SCMR 710), at first glance, it may appear that a different approach has been adopted in the case law regarding the application, and at times

the non-application, of subsequent conduct. On that basis, readers have tended to place these judgments into two separate categories: one treating subsequent conduct as substantial evidence, and the other placing less reliance upon it, with greater emphasis on the evidence collected by the prosecution. However, in our considered view, such a classification does not accurately reflect the true intent of the Superior Courts. It was never the purpose of the Courts, while pronouncing these judgments, to lay down conflicting or competing principles. Rather, both lines of authority are to be read together. They do not deny the status of one another; instead, they supplement each other, with only a difference in emphasis. In one set of cases, greater weight is given to subsequent conduct, whereas in the other, the emphasis shifts more towards the prosecution’s evidence. Yet, even in the latter, the responsibility remains where it always lies upon the shoulders of the prosecution to prove its case. Thus, the underlying legal position remains unchanged: subsequent conduct may serve as a supporting circumstance, but it

does not alter or reduce the prosecution’s burden, which must be discharged through reliable and substantive evidence, which caution against placing undue reliance upon post- occurrence conduct in the absence of independent and cogent incriminating material.

In ultimate analysis, the task before this Court is to ascertain whether the prosecution has succeeded in discharging its burden of proof beyond reasonable doubt, or whether the circumstances, when examined in their totality, give rise to such doubt as would entitle the appellant to the benefit thereof. It is in this backdrop that the evidence on record is to be examined.

7.In order to enable ourselves to meaningfully appreciate the attending circumstances of the present case, we consider it both appropriate and necessary to reproduce, in extenso, the contents of the First Information Report, which set the criminal law into motion and form the foundational narrative of the prosecution case.

8.The contents of the murasila are that on 17.05.2022, complainant Jehangir Khan reported the matter at DHQ Hospital, Charsadda, stating therein that at about 01:30 hours, he received information regarding the death of his sister, Mst. Saeeda. Upon receipt of such information, he alongwith other relatives, proceeded to the house of his said sister, situated at Kharyano Kaley, Khanmai, where they found her lying dead. It was alleged that she had been done to death by her husband, namely Qayyum Jan son of Mashoo. The motive attributed to the occurrence was stated to be domestic discord between the spouses. On the basis of these allegations, the accused was nominated for the commission of the offence, culminating in the registration of the instant FIR.

9.Having thus laid the groundwork, this Court shall proceed, with measured deliberation, to examine the matter step by step, so as to reach the very substratum of the controversy and to determine, with clarity and precision, where the liability, if any, truly lies and upon whose shoulders it may justly rest.

10.In the present case, this Court is called upon to address and resolve certain crucial issues which lie at the very heart of the controversy. The inquiry, though delicate, must be undertaken with clarity of thought and firmness of approach, so as to reach the very bottom of the matter without being swayed by conjecture or superficial impressions. While embarking upon this exercise, due guidance shall be drawn from the principles laid down by the Superior Courts in a series of authoritative pronouncements rendered in analogous circumstances. At the same time, this Court remains mindful of the settled canons of criminal jurisprudence, particularly that where an inference of guilt is sought to be drawn, the chain of circumstances must be so complete, coherent, and compelling as to exclude every reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence.

It also calls for careful consideration whether, in a situation where the occurrence tends towards suicide, the subsequent conduct attributed to the accused can be accorded determinative weight, or whether such conduct, standing alone, is too

fragile a circumstance to sustain a finding of guilt. In this regard, the Court must be cautious not to elevate suspicion into proof, nor to allow moral considerations to overshadow legal standards. The path before this Court is, indeed, akin to a tightrope walk, requiring a fine balance between competing probabilities. The Court must guard against the temptation of hastily embracing a third, speculative conclusion merely to reconcile uncertainties, and instead remain anchored to the evidence on record, proceeding only upon such footing as the law firmly permits.

11.The appellant stands convicted by the learned trial Court for the commission of the tragic occurrence; however, it is incumbent upon this Court to examine, with utmost care, whether such conclusion was justified in the light of the evidence available on record. The primary question, therefore, is whether the material brought forth by the prosecution was, in itself, sufficient to fasten criminal liability upon the appellant, and whether the learned trial Court properly appreciated the same in accordance

with settled principles of law. It is, no doubt, a case where the husband has been charged with the murder of his wife; yet, such a relationship, by itself, cannot be treated as determinative of guilt. The prosecution remains under a bounden duty to produce independent, reliable, and confidence-inspiring evidence in support of its accusation. The mere existence of a matrimonial bond does not absolve the prosecution of its obligation to establish, through cogent material, that the occurrence was the direct result of any alleged discord or strained relationship between the spouses. At the same time, this Court cannot remain oblivious to the common pattern observed in cases of this nature, where, upon the unnatural death of a married woman within the confines of the matrimonial home, the husband is often nominated by the complainant, frequently a close relative of the deceased, such as her parents or siblings. Such reactions, though understandable in the backdrop of emotional trauma and the irreparable loss suffered, nonetheless require the Court to remain vigilant, cautious, and circumspect in evaluating the

evidence so produced. While it is equally true that direct evidence of occurrences taking place within the privacy of a household may not always be readily available, and that the subsequent conduct of the accused may assume evidentiary significance, yet such conduct, standing alone, cannot be elevated to the status of conclusive proof. It may, at best, serve as a supporting circumstance, but cannot substitute the foundational requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, even in cases of this nature, the prosecution must discharge its burden to the fullest extent by establishing a coherent and convincing chain of circumstances, whereas the accused is only required to create a reasonable doubt in the prosecution case. The scales of justice cannot be tilted merely on the basis of suspicion, however strong, nor can liability be imposed in the absence of substantive and independent corroboration.

12.The circumstance that the house was jointly owned and inhabited by the deceased, the accused, and his co-wife is not an incidental feature of the case; it is a circumstance of

profound legal consequence that permeates the entire evidentiary framework. In such a shared domestic setting, where more than one adult occupant enjoyed equal proximity to, and access over, the place of occurrence, the matter cannot be reduced to an evaluation of the subsequent conduct of the accused in isolation. Such an approach, by its very nature, would be myopic and legally unsustainable. It is here that the doctrine of equal access assumes a position of central importance. This doctrine, rooted in fairness and rational adjudication, postulates that where multiple individuals stand on an equal footing in terms of opportunity and access, the law demands that the possibility of involvement of each be fairly examined and reasonably excluded before fastening criminal liability upon any one individual. The co-wife, being an admitted co-occupant of the house, was not a remote or peripheral figure; rather, she stood in equal spatial and situational proximity to the occurrence. Her presence, therefore, furnishes an alternative hypothesis, neither fanciful nor far-

fetched, which the prosecution was duty-bound to address with clarity and conviction.

13.The investigative obligation in such circumstances is neither perfunctory nor selective; rather, it is exacting and demands a fair, impartial, and comprehensive inquiry. Such an investigation is expected to extend to all individuals who stood on an equal footing of access and opportunity, ensuring that no plausible line of inquiry is prematurely foreclosed. The absence of any meaningful investigation into the role of the co-wife, or a satisfactory explanation for her non-implication, assumes significance in this context. This omission, when viewed within the broader evidentiary framework, may give rise to a discernible gap in the chain of circumstances, one that warrants careful judicial scrutiny while assessing whether the prosecution has been able to present a complete and coherent case.

Criminal law does not countenance conjecture where proof is required, nor does it permit conviction on the basis of a narrative that leaves reasonable possibilities unresolved. Where the

evidentiary landscape admits of an alternative explanation consistent with innocence, and such explanation remains unexcluded, the edifice of the prosecution case becomes inherently unstable. The doctrine of benefit of doubt, which is the golden thread running through criminal jurisprudence, is then not an act of concession, but a mandate of justice. In the totality of the attending circumstances, what emerges is the necessity of a comprehensive and integrated reappraisal of the entire record, commencing with an objective evaluation of whether the occurrence could be a case of suicide, proceeding to a cautious and context-sensitive assessment of the evidentiary worth of subsequent conduct, and culminating in a rigorous application of the doctrine of equal access. It is only through such a layered and judicious scrutiny that the Court can arrive at a conclusion that is both legally sound and morally defensible. Should the prosecution fail to dispel the reasonable doubts arising from these considerations, the only conclusion consonant with law would be that it has not succeeded in

establishing the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.

14.In order to resolve the present controversy in a structured and judicious manner, it is considered essential to first delineate the questions that arise for determination. Such formulation is not a mere procedural exercise; rather, it serves as a guiding framework, enabling the Court to navigate the diverse facets of the case with clarity, coherence, and analytical precision. By compartmentalizing the issues, each aspect can be examined in its proper perspective, ultimately leading to a focused and definitive adjudication of the core question involved. Accordingly, the points for determination are as under:

i. Whether, on the basis of the medical evidence available on record, it can be conclusively determined that the deceased committed suicide, and whether the absence of a definite opinion from the medical officer permits such inference.

ii. Whether, in the absence of clear and independent proof excluding the possibility of suicide, the prosecution has discharged its burden of establishing that the death was homicidal beyond reasonable doubt.

iii. Whether the subsequent conduct of the appellant, in the prevailing circumstances, is legally sufficient to sustain a conviction for murder in the absence of corroborative evidence.

iv. Whether the non-association and non- investigation of the co-wife, in the context of the doctrine of equal access and her apparent interest in the matter, creates a reasonable doubt as to the exclusive involvement of the appellant.

v. Whether the prosecution has produced independent and credible evidence demonstrating strained relations between the deceased and the appellant, and whether such evidence forms a complete and unbroken chain consistent only with the guilt of the appellant.

15.In determining whether the deceased committed suicide, this Court must carefully consider multiple facets of evidence and circumstance. Central to this inquiry are the medical findings, the testimony of the doctor who conducted the autopsy, the conditions prevailing at the time of the occurrence and immediately thereafter when the investigating officer visited the scene, as well as the presence or absence of any struggle marks. The doctor appeared before this Court as PW6 and confirmed that the injury was sustained on the

chest, exiting at the back, accompanied by charring. During cross-examination, the doctor was examined on all material aspects to ascertain the nature of the injury and whether it could have been self-inflicted. While the doctor was categorical regarding the location, trajectory, and charring of the injury, no definitive opinion was rendered as to the suicidal nature of the act. The absence of a specific medical opinion on suicide, however, does not preclude this Court from evaluating the totality of circumstances to draw a lawful inference. Even in the absence of explicit expert opinion, the Court is empowered to assess the surrounding circumstances, provided that such inference aligns consistently with the evidence on record. In this exercise, established principles of medical jurisprudence assume critical importance. It is well-recognized that, in cases of firearm-related suicide, certain sites such as the skull, temple, and chest, are commonly chosen. The chest, in particular, is a site frequently selected for self-inflicted firearm injuries, and this Court, upon consideration of the medical evidence, finds that the injury

sustained in the present case is consistent with such patterns. Further, the Court must examine whether the accused could have physically carried out the act, and whether, given the proximity and circumstances, the deceased would have permitted it or attempted to resist.

The absence of struggle marks, defensive injuries, or any sign of physical confrontation, as well as the lack of disturbance at the scene, assumes considerable significance. Taken together, these factors suggest that the incident may have occurred without external resistance.

This consideration, in conjunction with the medical findings and the overall circumstances, renders it a matter of lawful inference that the possibility of suicide cannot be excluded. In the assessment of such grave matters, the Court remains mindful that the conclusion drawn must rest upon reasoned analysis of evidence, circumstance, and human conduct, balancing both the gravity of the incident and the rights of the accused.

16.A further circumstance of

considerable significance that merits the Court’s

meticulous attention is the presence of the weapon of offence, the pistol, lying in proximity to the body of the deceased. In cases of suicide, it is not uncommon for the firearm, along with the spent cartridge, to remain at the scene, forming an intrinsic part of the factual matrix.

The Court must carefully examine whether there exists any evidence to suggest that the weapon was forcibly wielded or discharged by another, or whether the circumstances reasonably support the inference that it was in the exclusive possession of the deceased at the time of discharge. Equally, the possibility that the pistol may have fallen following the act must be evaluated, having regard to distance, positioning, and the totality of forensic findings. Upon a deliberate and holistic assessment of these factors, this Court finds that the injury could plausibly have been self-inflicted. When these factors are considered in cumulative conjunction: medical evidence, the nature and trajectory of the injury, the absence of struggle marks or defensive wounds, and the positioning of the weapon, the Court is brought close to the

inference that the deceased may have committed suicide. In circumstances where the preponderance of evidence points more persuasively towards self-infliction than to homicide, the Court must consider whether the mere possibility of suicide suffices to absolve the appellant, or whether the prosecution retains a residual obligation to adduce further evidence in a case that transpired without direct witnesses.

Simultaneously, a limited burden may shift to the appellant to demonstrate that his subsequent conduct was consistent with the obligations incumbent upon a husband; whether he fulfilled immediate responsibilities, accompanied the deceased for medical attention, or reported the occurrence to authorities, before any benefit may be judicially extended in his favour. In the final analysis, the resolution of such matters must rest upon a careful, reasoned appraisal of evidence and circumstance, tempered with due regard for both the gravity of the incident and the principles of justice.

17.Before we venture to hold the

subsequent conduct as a relevant factor so as to

fasten liability upon the shoulders of the appellant, we deem it imperative to first take into consideration the most important aspect of the case. Apart from the accused and the deceased, his co-wife was also residing in the same house.

When the house stood jointly occupied by the appellant, the deceased, and his co-wife, and when the interest of the co-wife and the motive so alleged cannot be taken out of consideration, then this Court would, with due circumspection, apply a few tests before resting solely upon the subsequent conduct of the appellant. If the prosecution is able to qualify those tests, then, in the peculiar facts of this case, the subsequent conduct would assume the position of the most relevant factor, which this Court would then revisit to determine whether there exists substantive evidence connecting the appellant with the commission of the offence, or whether it remains evidence which still requires corroboration for imparting to it the sanctity necessary to the extent of solely holding the appellant responsible for the commission of the offence. At the very threshold, the evidentiary

worth of subsequent conduct must be measured against the indispensable touchstone of exclusivity: exclusivity of opportunity, of access, and of control. Such conduct may assume an incriminating complexion only where the prosecution, with unerring clarity, establishes that the accused stood alone at the scene: his presence singular, his access unshared, and his dominion complete and undisturbed. It is in this narrow and well-defined compass that subsequent behavior may begin to acquire probative force. Conversely, where the place of occurrence is not sealed to others, where access is common rather than exclusive, and where multiple individuals stand upon equal footing of possibility, the evidentiary sheen of such conduct fades into uncertainty. In such a milieu, what may appear, at first glance, as suspicious or telling conduct loses its decisive character, for it ceases to point with certainty toward a solitary hypothesis of guilt. Suspicion, however grave, cannot be permitted to crystallize into proof. In the absence of this foundational element of exclusivity, post-occurrence conduct, no matter

how seemingly suggestive, remains inherently fragile. It cannot, by its solitary force, be elevated to the pedestal of conclusive proof, nor can it safely sustain the weight of criminal liability. To do so would be to trespass upon the cardinal principle that conjecture must never be allowed to usurp the place of evidence. This principle draws its enduring strength from the luminous authority of the United Kingdom’s House of Lord in case of Woolmington v Director of Public Prosecutions [1935 AC 462], where the “golden thread” of criminal jurisprudence was laid bare, that the burden of proof rests wholly and immutably upon the prosecution. The same doctrine was reaffirmed with equal clarity by the Supreme Court of United States in In re Winship 397 U.S. 358 (1970), which enshrined the rule that guilt must be proved beyond reasonable doubt, a standard of such exacting rigor that it admits no dilution, and certainly none founded upon equivocal conduct in the absence of exclusive opportunity.

18.The second and profoundly exacting test is that of the completeness and integrity of

the circumstantial chain. In cases resting wholly upon circumstantial evidence, the law does not seek fragments, conjectures, or isolated hints; it demands a lattice of circumstances so interwoven, so coherent, and so inescapably consistent that, when apprehended in its totality, it points with unerring force to one and only one conclusion: the guilt of the accused. Each link must be firmly anchored; each circumstance must reinforce and illumine the next; and the chain, in its seamless continuity, must present a narrative so unbroken, so compelling, that it admits neither hiatus, leap of imagination, nor the faintest shadow of conjecture. It is in this luminous context that the five golden principles of circumstantial evidence, so authoritatively enunciated by the Indian Supreme Court in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v State of Maharashtra (1984) 4 SCC 116, demand rigorous application. First, the circumstances upon which the conclusion is predicated must be fully and unequivocally established, leaving no gap or uncertainty. Second, these facts must be inherently and exclusively consistent with the

hypothesis of guilt, and with no other. Third, the circumstances must possess a conclusive and irresistible tendency, compelling the mind to the inevitable conclusion. Fourth, they must exclude every rational or possible hypothesis except the one sought to be proved. And fifth, the chain must be so complete, so unbroken, and so coherent, that it leaves no room for any reasonable inference consistent with innocence.

Together, these principles elevate circumstantial evidence to the apex of judicial scrutiny, ensuring that conviction rests not on suspicion, intuition, or probability, but upon proof of moral and logical certainty. In this regard, reference may also be made to Barkat Ali v. Karam Elahi Zia (1992 SCMR 1047); Sh. Muhammad

Amjad v. The State (PLD 2003 SC 704);

Muhammad Sharif v. State (PLD 2009 SC 709); & Naveed Asghar and others v. The State (PLD 2021 SC 600). The corollary is equally exacting: wherever any rational, plausible alternative explanation survives, particularly in circumstances of shared access or equal opportunity, the chain is fractured in the eyes of

law. In such a scenario, even the most meticulously constructed edifice of circumstances cannot attain the standard of completeness required to sustain a conviction.

The law, in its austere wisdom, interposes this safeguard to prevent the peril of convicting where doubt real, rational, and legally consequential, endures. This doctrine, luminous in its precision, finds its classical articulation in Hanumant Govind Nargundkar v State of Madhya Pradesh (AIR 1952 SC 343) and its apotheosis in Sharad Sarda (supra). The five golden principles enshrined therein continue to stand as the immutable touchstone of judicial rigor, guiding courts toward the solemn imperative that guilt must be established, not presumed; proved, not inferred; and demonstrated beyond the shadow of reasonable doubt.

19.The third test is the doctrine of equal access. In cases where two or more persons share equal opportunity to access the scene of occurrence, the law enjoins upon the investigative agency a duty not of perfunctory

investigation, but of measured, impartial, and penetrating inquiry. Each potential avenue of involvement must be examined with deliberate care; each shadow of suspicion weighed, tested, and either substantiated or reasonably dispelled.

To omit scrutiny of a person placed on an equal footing, particularly one residing in close proximity to the locus of tragedy, is to leave a void in the edifice of evidence, a lacuna that undermines the very credibility of the prosecution’s case. In the exercise of appellate or revisional jurisdiction, this Court is bound to probe beyond superficialities, to discern whether such omission corrodes the integrity, coherence, and reliability of the collected evidence, for the gravest suspicion, however alluring, can never assume the mantle of proof. As expounded in Sharad Sarada (supra) and reiterated by the Supreme Court of India in State of Rajasthan v.

Kashi Ram (2006) 12 SCC 254, the law commands certainty; it refuses to erect criminal liability upon conjecture alone. Justice, in its austere and impartial majesty, demands evidence

that speaks with unambiguous clarity, leaving no shadow of doubt to cloud the scales.

20.Fourth, the test of motive and comparative interest. Motive, though often illuminating the contours of circumstantial evidence, can never assume the role of a surrogate for direct proof. Its probative force is inherently conditional upon corroboration and contextual alignment. Where the prosecution seeks to anchor motive exclusively upon the accused, without interrogating whether another individual, similarly situated in access, opportunity, and interest might share comparable motive, the evidentiary canvas remains incomplete and legally precarious. When two persons occupy an identical sphere of opportunity and circumstance, the exclusive attribution of culpability demands not mere conjecture, but compelling and unmistakable proof. As reiterated by the Supreme Court of India in State of U.P v. Babu & Others 2003 Supp (3) SCR 1079, motive, while relevant in circumstantial cases, can never substitute for substantive evidence. In the present factual

matrix, both wives, the deceased and the surviving co-wife, resided within the same household, each enjoying equivalent access to the premises. Here, the doctrine of equal access transcends abstraction, acquiring heightened evidentiary significance. Subsequent conduct, such as delayed reporting or apparent indifference cannot, in isolation, be elevated to determinative proof unless the prosecution first establishes the accused’s exclusive opportunity, thereby decisively eliminating all reasonable alternative hypotheses. The Irish Court of Appeal in DPP v. Macken [2018] IECA 75, has emphasized that judicial scrutiny must rest upon reasoned analysis anchored in evidence, not upon speculation, assumption, or conjecture. In exercising appellate oversight, the Court must examine whether the trial court properly applied the burden of proof, judiciously weighed the circumstantial evidence, and conscientiously excluded scenarios compatible with innocence.

Where investigations fail to meaningfully interrogate the role of a similarly situated co- occupant, the evidentiary chain remains

fractured, and the prosecution’s narrative loses its claim to exclusivity. Absent reliable, independent, and corroborative proof establishing that the accused alone possessed the opportunity and responsibility, mere inferences drawn from subsequent conduct cannot sustain a conviction. Where parity of access persists and alternative investigative avenues remain unexplored, the benefit of doubt is transformed from a discretionary judicial indulgence into a doctrinal imperative, rooted in the immutable principles of criminal jurisprudence and the cardinal maxim that the law must ever favor the innocent where certainty falters.

21.In the extraordinary domestic circumstances of the present case, wherein the accused occupied the singular position of husband to both the deceased and the surviving co-wife, the evidentiary significance of motive and its necessary corollary, comparative interest, assumes exceptional weight. Shared domestic spaces are rarely governed by linear or simplistic relational dynamics; they are instead characterized by emotional entanglement,

competing expectations, and overlapping claims of intimacy and exclusivity. In such contexts, where two spouses inhabit the same household and maintain equal access and relational proximity to the accused, it cannot be assumed, without compelling evidentiary foundation, that motive resided exclusively on one side. The possibility that the surviving co-wife, equally situated within the domestic sphere, may have harbored independent motive or interest cannot be summarily excluded absent rigorous investigative inquiry. Motive, when deployed as a corroborative circumstance, must be subjected to comparative and objective evaluation;

selective attribution, devoid of examination of alternative hypotheses, risks the very integrity of the evidentiary assessment. Courts in other common law jurisdictions have repeatedly underscored this principle. In the United Kingdom’s jurisdiction, the England and Wales Court of Appeal in R v. Turnbull (Raymond) [1977] Q.B. 224 emphasizes careful scrutiny of circumstantial evidence to avoid partial or unjust inference. Where two individuals occupy

equivalent positions in terms of access, opportunity, and relational proximity, the inference of motive must reflect such parity.

Exclusive attribution of culpability in these circumstances demands not mere conjecture but robust, corroborated evidence. Absent such analysis, any conclusion risks being partial, one- sided, and analytically incomplete. Judicial determination, therefore, must rest upon a comprehensive and balanced evaluation of all reasonably available hypotheses, ensuring that no individual, equally situated within the domestic matrix, is excluded without due investigative inquiry. Thus, when motive is invoked as a supporting circumstance, it must withstand the test of objective, comparative, and contextually informed scrutiny. Particularly within a household marked by multiple spouses with shared access, failure to undertake such comparative evaluation renders any attribution of exclusive culpability legally tenuous and evidentially fragile. Justice, in such a nuanced human setting, demands both meticulous analysis and intellectual humility, a recognition

that the complexities of shared domestic life often defy simplistic, unilateral explanations.

22.On one hand, the complainant is not an eyewitness to the occurrence; yet, on the other, he unhesitatingly singles out the appellant for the alleged murder while conspicuously exonerating the co-wife. This selective attribution, in the absence of direct perception, is not a mere lapse but bears the imprint of a calculated omission.

Had the complainant witnessed the occurrence, such an imputation might have carried a different evidentiary complexion; however, being admittedly removed from the scene, the very foundation upon which this distinction has been erected remains shrouded in uncertainty, rendering it not only unexplained but inherently suspect. This circumstance, standing on its own strength, irresistibly suggests that the complaint was conceived with a preoccupied and predisposed mind. The appellant appears to have been implicated in a reflexive manner, merely upon receipt of information regarding the death, without any earnest endeavour to ascertain the true genesis of the occurrence. More

significantly, no role whatsoever has been attributed to the co-wife, who, at least prima facie, stood on an equal footing in terms of access, proximity, and possible motive. Such deliberate selectivity is not an innocuous omission; it speaks volumes of mala fide and casts a long shadow over the credibility of the accusation itself. Indeed, the selective attribution of guilt assumes a character of inherent suspicion.

To single out one accused while excluding another, equally placed in opportunity and circumstance, without the benefit of direct observation, is a conscious and telling deviation.

Such selection, resting on no disclosed or rational basis, undermines the very impartiality expected of the prosecution’s narrative and reflects a case shaped more by conjecture than by credible evidence. Where the foundation itself is uncertain, the superstructure cannot stand with confidence. If such a premise is accepted, it would inevitably lead to the conclusion that the appellant has been singled out merely on account of his status as the husband of the deceased. This, in essence, substitutes legal proof with a

presumption rooted in relationship, an approach wholly alien to settled principles of criminal jurisprudence. It is trite that suspicion, however grave, cannot take the place of proof. Criminal liability must flow from cogent, independent, and legally admissible evidence, not from the mere fact of matrimonial association. More particularly, in a case where the co-wife could just as readily fall within the zone of suspicion, the prosecution’s failure to address or even acknowledge this equally plausible hypothesis renders its case fundamentally deficient. The law does not permit such arbitrary narrowing of inquiry. Where two views are reasonably possible, or where suspicion may equally attach to another, the benefit must necessarily enure to the accused. To proceed otherwise would be to convert suspicion into proof and assumption into adjudication, an exercise wholly impermissible in law. In these circumstances, the selective implication of the appellant, coupled with the unexplained exoneration of another equally situated individual, is by itself sufficient to expose the inherent infirmities of the prosecution

case, warranting its cautious and indeed, skeptical appraisal. Even assuming, arguendo, that some marital strain existed, the prosecution bore the responsibility of demonstrating between whom such strain operated: whether exclusively between the accused and the deceased, or whether the co-wife was also implicated in the domestic discord. In households where multiple wives resided, equal access and shared proximity acquire critical legal significance. The failure to investigate the co-wife, an equally situated occupant, leaves a significant evidentiary lacuna.

This principle aligns with the doctrine of reasonable doubt reaffirmed in re Winship (supra), which mandates that due process requires proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact essential to constitute the crime. In the absence of independent corroboration of alleged marital discord, and where the co-wife’s role was neither investigated nor examined despite equal access to the premises, a material gap emerges in the prosecution narrative. Such omission fundamentally undermines the exclusivity and integrity of the circumstantial chain.

Consequently, the evidentiary material, when rigorously tested against the settled standards laid down by superior courts, falls short of the certainty requisite to sustain a conviction.

23.In the present circumstances, the evidentiary record remains inconclusive. Key investigative gaps, including the unexamined role of an equally situated co-occupant and the absence of independent corroboration of purported marital discord, prevent any rational inference of exclusive culpability. The law does not permit conviction on conjecture or suspicion.

Accordingly, having rigorously evaluated the totality of the evidence, this Court finds that the prosecution has not discharged its burden of proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In deference to settled principles of criminal jurisprudence, the accused must, therefore, benefit from the doubt. The attending circumstances of the present case lead us nowhere but to hold that the prosecution has failed to adduce independent evidence in support of its claim. The learned trial court overlooked the settled principles of criminal jurisprudence.

The judgment is therefore flawed, marred by inherent defects, and calls for interference. In consequence, the instant criminal appeal is allowed, the appellant is acquitted of the charge, and he shall be released forthwith, unless required in connection with any other criminal case.

Above are the detailed reasons of

short order of even date.

Announced

JUDGE

JUDGE

*Muhammad Fiaz* *D.B* Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sahibzada Asadullah, J Hon’ble Mr. Justice Kamran Hayat Hayat Mian Khel, J