Niaz Ahmad and another Vs Federation of Pakistan

PESHAWAR HIGH COURT, PESHAWAR

(JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT)

Writ Petition No. 9663-P/2025

Niaz Ahmad and one another

.........Petitioners.

Federation of Pakistan etc.

Versus

..........Respondents.

For the Petitioners: M/s Faisal Naqvi, Advocate and Barrister Qasim Wadud.

For the Respondents: Mr. Bilal Ahmad Durrani, Assistant Attorney General for Federation.

M/s Mohammad Aftab Alam Rana & Amad Nasir Kundi, Advocates for NTC.

Mr. Waqas Amir, Advocate for respondents No. 4 to 7.

Date of Hearing: 26.2.2026

JUDGMENT

WIQAR AHMAD, J.- Through this single judgment this court proposes to decide this and connected Writ Petition No.

9772-P/2025 as both petitions involve identical facts and common questions of law.

2.The brief facts of instant and the connected petition are that in November 2022, the Ministry of Commerce advertised multiple full-time positions for Members of the National Tariff Commission (“NTC”). In August 2023, Respondent

No. 3 was appointed to a full-time statutory post at the Competition Commission of Pakistan (CCP), and shortly thereafter, was also notified as a Member of the NTC. The Petitioners aver that since both positions were full-time jobs, respondent No. 3 could not legally hold both. That respondent No.3 opted to oin CCP and never resigned therefrom. He failed to assume charge at the NTC for nearly two years, leaving the post effectively vacant. The grievance of the Petitioners in both matters is that despite this lapse, the Federal Government, via a letter dated 25.07.2025, directed Respondent No. 3 to join the NTC without initiating a fresh recruitment process. Furthermore, following a September 2025 judgment by the Islamabad High Court declaring the then-Chairman’s appointment illegal, the Federal Government issued a notification in December 2025 appointing Respondent No. 3 as Acting Chairman. The Petitioners, who are interested parties in NTC anti-circumvention proceedings, challenge these actions as unlawful, asserting that Respondent No. 3 was never a validly serving Member and that his appointment as Acting Chairman bypassed the senior-most member in violation of the National Tariff Commission Act, 2015 (NTC Act).

3.Arguments heard and record perused.

4.Perusal of record reveal that cases of petitioners have been pending before NTC. They may have a stake in rendering

the commission non-functional. In such circumstances their bonafide could not be demonstrated. Their interest in the instant litigation may be gauged from the interim relief prayed for in the instant writ petition which was to the following effect;

“By way of interim relief, the respondent No.3 may kindly be restrained from passing any final order in any proceedings pending before the NTC, including specifically in relation to the Anti-circumvention proceedings, till the final disposal of the instant writ petition.”

5.The instant petition seeks to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court through a writ of quo warranto, challenging the legality of the appointment of Respondent No.

3 as a Member and subsequently as the Acting Chairman of the NTC. It has been brought to the Court’s attention that Respondent No. 3 concurrently held the position of a Member of the CCP, both roles being characterized as full-time statutory positions. The Petitioners, who identify themselves as importers affected by the proceedings of the NTC, contend that such an appointment and dual charge are contrary to law, thereby raising fundamental questions regarding the lawful tenure of a public office.

6.The writ of quo warranto is a fundamental tool in public law jurisdictions, designed to scrutinize the legal authority by which a person claims or exercises a public office or franchise. As elaborated in Halsbury’s Laws of India, the writ of quo warranto is “issued against a person who claims

or usurps an office or franchise, to inquire by what authority he supports his claim, in order that the right to the office or franchise may be determined.” (Halsbury’s Laws of India, First Edn., Vol. 35, p. 145.) Similarly, Halsbury’s Laws of England describes it as “a remedy or proceeding whereby the legality of the tenure of any office or franchise is enquired into, and the usurper or wrongful holder is ousted from such office or franchise.” (Halsbury’s Laws of England (Third Edition), Volume 11, p. 145.) This concept finds resonance in American Jurisprudence, which characterizes it as an extraordinary legal remedy employed to determine the right of an individual to hold a public office or exercise a public franchise (American Jurisprudence (Second Edition), Volume 16, p. 578). The primary objective of this writ is not merely to address private grievances, but to protect the public from the usurpation of public offices, ensuring that only those legally qualified and appointed hold positions of public trust.

7.In the Pakistani legal landscape, the Supreme Court has consistently elucidated the broad and overarching scope of the writ of quo warranto. In the seminal case of Jawad Ahmad Mir v. Prof. Dr. Imtiaz Ali Khan (2023 SCMR 162), it was definitively held that scope of writ of quo warranto extends beyond mere removal of an individual from an office. Rather, its fundamental purpose is “to ensure that public offices are held by individuals who are legally entitled to hold them, thereby safeguarding the public interest.” The present petition

invites an inquiry into the legal entitlement of Respondent No.

3 to hold both an NTC membership and the acting chairmanship concurrently with a full-time position at the CCP, thereby determining if the appointment safeguards the public interest as mandated by law. Notwithstanding the broad scope of quo warranto, it remains an extraordinary and discretionary remedy. The Honourable Supreme Court, in Muhammad Hanif Abbasi v. Jahangir Khan Tareen (PLD 2018 SC 114), unequivocally established that while the writ of quo warranto is designed to address a public wrong, its grant is not a matter of right but lies within the sound discretion of the Court. A paramount condition for the exercise of this discretion in favour of a petitioner is the demonstration of bona fides. The Court meticulously examines the motive, intent, and interest of the petitioner seeking such relief, emphasizing that the petition must be rooted in genuine public interest and not in private vendetta, political motivations, or veiled personal gains.

8.The requirement of bona fides serves as a crucial threshold, ensuring that the valuable time and resources of the superior courts are not consumed by applications driven by ulterior motives. A consistent stream of the verdicts of Superior Courts affirm that a petition lacking in bona fides or propelled by personal interest is liable to be dismissed. As articulated in Dr. Muhammad Naseem Khan v. Dr. Shahzad Ali Khan (2023 PLC(CS)N 8), any petition tainted with

personal interest or malafide intent disentitles a petitioner from obtaining the desired relief. Similarly, in Dr. Khalil Ur Rehman v. Government of Punjab (2015 PLC(CS) 793), the principle was reaffirmed that even if there are discernible flaws in an appointment, discretionary relief may be refused if the petitioner approaches the Court without clean hands or with motives other than pure public good. This principle was also crystallized in Muhammad Sadique v. Muhammad Hussain (1983 CLC 2734), which affirmed that a court is not obligated to interfere where a petition is not filed in good faith or is not genuinely aimed at serving the public interest. These precedents firmly establish that the Court’s discretion will not be exercised in favour of those whose applications are merely a façade for personal grievances or commercial advantage.

Reference in this regard may be made to the judgments in the cases of Tariq Mehmood A. Khan v. Sindh Bar Council (2011 YLR 2899); Muhammad Shahid Akram v.

Government of Punjab (2016 PLC (C. S.) 1335); Mirza Luqman Masud v. Government of Pakistan (2015 PLC (C.

S.) 526); and Dr. Y.S. Rajasehara Reddy and others v. Sri Nara Chandrababu Naidu and others (AIR 2000 A.P. 142).

9.In light of the established principles regarding bona fides, this Court must critically assess the motives underlying the present petitions. The Petitioners have explicitly identified themselves as “importers affected by NTC proceedings.” This direct assertion of being “affected” by the NTC proceedings

raises a pertinent question regarding the nature of their interest in challenging respondent number three’s appointment. Such an interest, being directly linked to their commercial activities and the potential outcomes of NTC decisions, prima facie appears to be a personal one rather than a purely public- spirited endeavor. Furthermore, the timing and context of this challenge following the previous de-seating of the NTC Chairman by the Islamabad High Court, may suggest a pattern or an ulterior motive. This indicates that the petitions might not be solely for upholding the rule of law in public appointments but could be aimed at influencing the composition or functioning of the NTC to achieve specific commercial advantages. Therefore, the sincerity and genuineness of the petitioners’ motives warrant careful scrutiny before any discretionary relief can be considered.

10.The Petitioners place heavy reliance on a judgment dated 05.09.2025 passed by the Hon’ble Islamabad High Court, under which the then-incumbent Chairman of the NTC was ordered to be removed. It has been brought to our attention that an appeal against said judgment is currently pending before a Division Bench of the Hon’ble Islamabad High Court. While this Court possesses jurisdiction in matters involving the Federal Government, it is noted that the Hon’ble Islamabad High Court has already actively assumed jurisdiction over the core controversy and passed an effective order. In pursuance of that order, the permanent Chairman was

removed and the interim arrangement, now under challenge, was initiated. Furthermore, the present petitions have been filed by the same counsel who previously agitated these issues before the Islamabad High Court. In such circumstances, judicial propriety suggests that these challenges should have been lodged before the same forum. Aside from the issue of propriety, the impugned notification is temporary in nature, having been passed for a limited duration. Learned counsel for the Petitioners raised a significant grievance that adhocism in appointments to a body performing quasi-judicial duties where the rights of parties are determined, should not be permitted to persist. At the same time there is an apprehension that the interim arrangements might be extended through successive temporary orders, thereby prejudicing the rights of the Petitioners in pending litigations before the NTC. This aspect requires primary consideration at the level of the Federal Government, because the phenomena has not yet happened but is an apprehension at this stage. A temporary arrangement should not be dragged on for years; the Commission performs critical quasi-judicial functions and makes determinations of substantive rights, and such an office must not be left to be run on an ad-hoc basis for an indefinite period.

11.Consequently, while we do not find the Petitioners’ motives to be purely pro bono publico, we are cognizant of the need for stability in statutory regulatory bodies. In the circumstances discussed above, this Court exercises judicial

restraint and declines to test the vires of the interim order at this stage; we neither uphold the same nor set it aside.

However, to ensure the statutory mandate of the National Tariff Commission Act, 2015, is fulfilled, we direct that the process for the appointment of a permanent Chairman of the NTC shall be initiated by the Secretary of the concerned Ministry within 30 days of receipt of copy of this judgment.

The appointment process shall be finalized within a period of three months positively.

12.Both Writ Petition No. 9663-P/2025 and Writ Petition No. 9772-P/2025 are disposed of in the above terms.

Announced on;

26th of February, 2026 *Zarshad*

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SENIOR PUISNE JUDGE

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JUDGE

(DB)Hon’ble Mr. Justice Ijaz Anwar and Hon’ Mr. Justice Wiqar Ahmad WP No. 9663-P2025