Sher Wali & 07 others Vs Deputy Commissioner Khyber (Land Acquisition Collector), Khyber & 03 others

JUDGMENT SHEET

PESHAWAR HIGH COURT, PESHAWAR

JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

W.P No.39-P/2026 Sher Wali & 07 others Vs. Deputy Commissioner Khyber (Land Acquisition Collector), Khyber & 03 others.

Date of hearing 01.04.2026.

Mr. Muhammad Arsalan Afridi, Advocate, for the petitioners.

Mr. Asad Jan Durrani, AAG, for the respondents.

JUDGMENT

MUHAMMAD NAEEM ANWAR, J: - Sher Wali Khan with 07 others have questioned the validity and correctness of the order of the learned Deputy Commissioner/Collector dated 25.11.2025 whereby, their objection application filed under Section 18 of Land Acquisition Act, 1894, was dismissed being not maintainable.

2.Arguments heard; record perused.

3.It appears from the record that pursuant to the Award issued on 18.05.2025 under Section 11 of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Land Acquisition Act, 1894, read with the Rules, 2020, the property owned by the petitioners was acquired for the public purpose of “Rehabilitation and Improvement of Bara–Mastak Road in District Khyber, Phase-I, Shin Kamar Road (25 Km)”, under the Merged Districts FATA Infrastructure Program (Non-ADP), a USAID-funded project. Subsequently, the petitioners, being dissatisfied with the compensation assessed in the Award, submitted objections on 02.10.2025 under Sections 18 and 22-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, seeking reference of the matter to the Referee Court for determination of the proper value of the land acquired. The said objections were filed within the period of limitation prescribed under Section 18 of the Act through the Collector. However, the impugned order dated 25.11.2025 reveals that the Collector declined to make the reference and instead adjudicated the matter on the grounds of alleged non-maintainability and application of the principle of estoppel. It is pertinent to observe that Part III of Section 18 of the Act of 1894 provides a statutory remedy to any person interested who has not

accepted the Award to require the Collector to refer the matter to the Court for determination, whether the objection relates to the measurement of land, the amount of compensation, the persons to whom it is payable, or the apportionment thereof among the persons interested. The function of the Collector under Section 18 of the Act is ministerial in nature, confined to forwarding the reference to the competent Court once the application is made within the prescribed period of limitation. In this regard, the Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case of Gul Zaman vs. Deputy Commissioner/Collector, Gwadar and others (2024 SCMR 481) has authoritatively held that:

“The matter goes to Court only upon a reference made by the Collector. It is only after such a reference is made that the Court is empowered to determine the objections made by a claimant to the award. In fact, it is the order of reference which provides the foundation of the jurisdiction of the Court to decide the objections referred to it. The Court is bound by the reference and cannot widen the scope of its jurisdiction or decide matters which are not referred to it. It is thus, not within the domain of the Court to entertain any application under the Act pro interesse suo (that is, according to his interest) or in the nature thereof1 because whenever jurisdiction is given by a statute and such jurisdiction is only given upon certain specified terms contained therein, it is a universal principle that those terms should be complied with in order to create and raise the jurisdiction, and if they are not complied with, the jurisdiction does not arise.”

4.Furthermore, with regard to the jurisdictional scope of the Collector, it is well settled that while making a reference under Section 18 of the Act, the Collector is required to examine the question of limitation. However, once the reference is accepted as being within time and is transmitted to the Court, the issue of limitation ceases to remain within the domain of the Collector and becomes redundant. This principle has been conclusively settled by the august Supreme Court in Province of Sindh through Collector, District Dadu and others v. Ramzan and others (PLD 2004 SC 512). Reliance may also be placed on the authoritative pronouncements in Government of West Pakistan through Collector, Peshawar v. Arbab Haji Ahmed Ali Jan and another (PLD 1981 SC 516) and Government of West

Pakistan (Now N.W.F.P.) v. Asmatun Nisa and others (PLD 1983 SC 109), wherein it has consistently been held that the Collector cannot assume adjudicatory powers beyond the statutory mandate prescribed under Section 18 of the Act of 1894.

5.The Collector is not vested with authority under the law to invoke or determine the applicability of the doctrine of estoppel. The principle of estoppel, as embodied in the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, is a rule of evidence which precludes a person from denying the truth of a statement formally made by him or her. The question whether compensation has been received under protest or otherwise, and the legal consequences arising therefrom, constitutes a matter requiring adjudication on evidence in accordance with the procedure prescribed under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, which falls exclusively within the jurisdiction of a Court of competent jurisdiction. The Collector or Deputy Commissioner, while acting under the Land Acquisition Act, does not possess adjudicatory authority to determine the merits of the claim, interpret legal consequences of acceptance of compensation, or decide the applicability of evidentiary doctrines affecting substantive rights of landowners.

6.Likewise, the determination of what constitutes just and adequate compensation for the acquired land is not within the domain of the Collector once the Award has been issued under Section 11 of the Act. It would be contrary to the settled principles of natural justice to permit the same authority that assessed the compensation to sit in judgment over the legality, correctness, or adequacy of its own determination. This principle is encapsulated in the well-established maxim Nemo Judex in Causa Sua, meaning that no person should be a judge in his or her own cause. This doctrine forms a foundational pillar of natural justice and ensures fairness, impartiality, and institutional integrity in judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings. It prohibits any authority from acting simultaneously as both decision- maker and adjudicator in matters where its own decision is under challenge. The doctrine has deep roots in classical legal traditions and has been consistently recognized in modern administrative jurisprudence. Its application extends not only to judicial bodies but also to administrative and quasi-judicial authorities exercising statutory

powers. Accordingly, once an objection is raised against an Award, the proper course for the Collector is to transmit the reference to the competent Court for independent adjudication, rather than to undertake evaluation of the merits of the dispute.

7.In the present case, the determination of whether compensation has been received by the landowners, either under protest or otherwise, and the consequent entitlement of the landowners to additional compensation or relief, are matters involving disputed questions of fact and law. Such questions fall squarely within the jurisdiction of the Referee Court and not within the administrative competence of the Collector. The statutory role of the Collector in relation to a reference under Section 18 of the Act of 1894 is limited to examining whether the application has been filed within the prescribed period of limitation. Even in cases where the question of limitation itself involves complex or disputed issues of fact or law, the Collector is required to forward the matter to the Court for determination rather than to dismiss the reference on technical grounds. It has been observed in several instances that references purportedly filed under Section 30 of the Act have been rejected by Collectors on the ground of limitation, despite the absence of any statutory limitation prescribed for such references. Such practice is inconsistent with the scheme of the Act and undermines the jurisdiction of the Referee Court, which alone is competent to adjudicate upon entitlement, apportionment, and adequacy of compensation on the basis of evidence produced before it.

8.Moreover, the question regarding the transfer of possession in terms of Section 34 of the Act of 1894, the payment or deposit of compensation, and the legality of the proceedings culminating in the Award are all matters involving factual and evidentiary determination. These issues require judicial scrutiny by a Court of competent jurisdiction on the basis of evidence and applicable law. The evidentiary record, including the relevant acquisition proceedings and documentation forming the basis of the Award, must likewise be evaluated by the Referee Court rather than by the Deputy Commissioner or Collector. When confronted during the proceedings, learned Assistant Advocate General candidly conceded

that the aforesaid matters indeed require adjudication by a Court of competent jurisdiction and that the decision rendered by the Collector on such issues exceeded the scope of his lawful authority.

9.Consequently, for the reasons recorded hereinabove, the instant petition is allowed. The impugned order dated 25.11.2025 is hereby set aside. The reference filed by the petitioners under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 shall be deemed to be pending before the Deputy Commissioner/Collector, who is directed to transmit the same to the Court of competent jurisdiction within ten (10) days from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this judgment. No order as to costs.

Announced.

JUDGE

JUDGE

Haider Shah, SSS (DB) Hon’ble Mr. Justice Muhammad Naeem Anwar and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Wiqar Ahmad.