Abdur Rehman Vs The State & another

Judgment Sheet

PESHAWAR HIGH COURT, PESHAWAR

(Judicial Department)

Criminal Appeal No. 975-P/2025 Abdur Rehman

VS

The State & another

JUDGMENT

Date of hearing: 08.04.2026.

Appellant by: Barrister Amir Khan Chamkani.

State by: Mr. Mushtaq Rahim, AAG.

Respondent No. 02 by: Nemo.

SAHIBZADA ASADULLAH, J. Through the instant criminal appeal, the appellant Abdur Rehman, has questioned the legality and validity of judgment dated 27.09.2025 rendered by learned Additional Sessions Judge-III/MCTC, Nowshera, delivered in case FIR No. 431 dated 15.05.2022 under sections 302, 324, 337-F(i) PPC, read with section 15-AA, registered at Police Station Akora Khattak, District Nowshera, whereby

the learned Judge has convicted and sentenced the appellant as under:

i. Under section 302-B PPC for committing Qatl-i-amd of deceased Farhan Ali, to imprisonment for life as Tazir, and to pay a compensation amount of Rs. 2,000,000/- (Twenty lac) to be paid to the legal heirs of the deceased under section 544-A Cr.P.C. recoverable as arrears of land revenue from the person and estate of the accused or in default, to undergo six (06) months simple imprisonment. ii. Under section 324 PPC to rigorous imprisonment for five (05) years and to pay a fine of Rs. 100,000/-, and in default of payment of fine, to further undergo simple imprisonment for one month.

iii. Under section 337-F(i) PPC to simple imprisonment for one (01) year with compensation of Rs. 50,000/- to be paid to the injured Mst. Sumera, under section 544-A Cr.P.C. for causing injury on her person.

iv. Under section 15-AA to imprisonment for three (03) years.

All the sentences shall run concurrently. Benefit of section 382-B Cr.P.C. is also given to the appellant.”

2.Brief facts of the case are that on 15.05.2022, the complainant, Mst. Sumera, in an injured condition and present along with the dead body of her husband, Farhan Ali, at the casualty ward of Qazi Hussain Ahmad Medical Complex, Nowshera, reported to the local police that while her husband was present at the spot, the accused, Abdur Rehman, a drug addict, arrived there and demanded drugs from him;

upon refusal, the accused took out a knife and inflicted multiple blows upon her husband, and on hearing the commotion, she came out of her house whereupon the accused also attacked her with the knife, causing an injury to her thigh, while her husband sustained severe injuries on various parts of his body, resulting in his death; the motive behind the occurrence was stated to

be the refusal to provide drugs to the accused, hence the instant FIR.

3.After completion of investigation, complete challan was put in court. Provisions of section 265-C Cr.P.C. were complied with and the appellant was charge sheeted, to which he denied pleading his guilt and claimed trial. In order to prove its claim, the prosecution produced and examined as many as 12 witnesses. After closure of prosecution evidence, statement of appellant was recorded under section 342 Cr.P.C, wherein he posed innocence, however, neither he wished to be examined on oath as required under section 340 (2) Cr.P.C, nor wanted to produce evidence in defence. The learned trial Court, after full-fledged trial convicted and sentenced the appellant vide the impugned judgment, hence, this appeal.

4.Heard. Record perused.

5.The occurrence, indeed, sent tremors through the collective conscience and shocked all who came to know of it. It is an admitted position on record that the

deceased was brutally stabbed to death, while the complainant also sustained an injury during the course of the same episode.

Immediately after the incident, the deceased along with the injured complainant was hurriedly shifted to the hospital, where the matter was reported. At the hospital, the necessary medico-legal formalities were set into motion, the injury sheets, the inquest report with respect to the deceased were prepared, and the complainant was medically examined by the attending doctor, who subsequently issued her medico-legal certificate. Meanwhile, the dead body of the deceased was dispatched for post-mortem examination in order to ascertain the precise cause and nature of death. Following the registration of the FIR, the Investigating Officer proceeded to the place of occurrence and, on the pointing out of the eye- witnesses, prepared the site plan of the spot.

During the course of the spot inspection, a blood-stained stone was taken into possession and secured as part of the case

property, however, the accused had fled the scene immediately after the occurrence.

Upon his eventual arrest, a .30 bore pistol was recovered from his possession, and subsequently the knife allegedly used for stabbing the deceased and causing injury to the complainant was also recovered at his instance. Both the recovered articles were sent to the forensic laboratory for analysis, wherefrom a report was received indicating that the blood detected thereon belonged to the same group. On completion of the investigation, the accused was sent up to face trial. The learned trial Court, after recording the statements of the prosecution witnesses and considering the documentary as well as the circumstantial evidence placed on record, found the accused responsible for the commission of the offence and consequently convicted and sentenced him through the impugned judgment.

6.The task now before this Court is to examine whether the learned trial Court had correctly appreciated the evidence

available on the record and whether the prosecution witnesses remained consistent on the essential and material aspects of the case. It is indeed true that, apart from the deceased, the complainant herself sustained an injury during the incident. The presence of an injury on the person of a witness may, in ordinary circumstances, lend assurance to her presence at the place of occurrence at the relevant time. The nature, seat, and character of the injury may serve as an indication that the witness was indeed present during the happening of the occurrence. However, the mere presence of an injury on the body of a witness cannot, by itself, be regarded as conclusive proof that the incident occurred precisely in the manner alleged by the prosecution or that the accused nominated in the case was necessarily the perpetrator of the offence.

The law is well settled that the evidentiary value of a witness does not rest solely upon the fact of injury but upon the intrinsic worth, consistency, and credibility of the testimony

rendered before the Court. It is ultimately the reliability and trustworthiness of the witness which determines how the occurrence unfolded and whether the accused can safely be held responsible for its commission. In these circumstances, and in order to satisfy ourselves that the conclusions drawn by the learned trial Court were firmly rooted in the evidence available on record, and that no miscarriage of justice has occurred, we consider it necessary to revisit the statements of the witnesses and to reappraise the entire body of evidence. Such a careful re-examination alone would enable this Court to ascertain whether the prosecution has succeeded in establishing the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt and whether the impugned judgment can be sustained in the eyes of law.

7.The points which arise for

determination before this Court are as to whether the occurrence transpired in the very mode and manner alleged by the prosecution and at the time as stated in the

report; whether the complainant was indeed present at the place of occurrence and witnessed the incident along with the other eye-witnesses, and whether the injury sustained by her was received during the same transaction. This Court is further required to consider whether it was the complainant who promptly reported the matter to the authorities, thereby setting the criminal law into motion. Another important aspect which calls for determination is whether the medical evidence brought on record lends corroboration to the version of prosecution, and as to whether the prosecution has been able to establish, through reliable, consistent, and confidence- inspiring evidence, the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt so as to sustain the conviction recorded by the learned trial Court. These questions collectively form the core issues which this Court must resolve in order to arrive at a just and lawful conclusion in the present appeal.

8.In order to appreciate the

peculiar circumstances of the present case, it becomes imperative for this Court to carefully examine the situation that prevailed at the time of the occurrence, the relationship inter se between the parties, and the alleged cause which culminated in the tragic death of the deceased and the injury said to have been sustained by the complainant. The task before the Court is not merely to recount the prosecution narrative but to judicially scrutinize whether the witnesses cited by the prosecution were, in fact, present at the place of occurrence at the stated time, whether they truly witnessed the incident, and whether it was with their assistance that the deceased, along with the injured complainant, was shifted to the hospital. For this purpose, we consider it essential to closely examine the testimony of the material witnesses, particularly the complainant who appeared as PW-02, the alleged eye-witness Muhammad Jameel examined as PW-03, and Farhad, the brother of the deceased,

who was examined as PW-04. The

complainant, while appearing before the Court, attempted to narrate the circumstances in which the unfortunate incident allegedly took place. According to her, upon hearing cries emanating from the house, she rushed towards the place of occurrence and there witnessed the accused repeatedly stabbing the deceased. She further deposed that when she attempted to intervene, the accused also attacked her and inflicted an injury upon her thigh. She went on to explain that after sustaining the injury she proceeded to the house of her parents in order to inform her father and brother and thereafter returned to the spot in their company, whereupon the deceased and the injured complainant were shifted to the hospital. Muhammad Jameel, examined as PW-03, stated to be the father of the complainant, though generally lending support to the version advanced by the complainant, asserted that he himself was already present at the place of occurrence at

the relevant time and claimed to have witnessed the accused stabbing the deceased and thereafter attempting to assault the complainant. Likewise, Farhad, the brother of the deceased who appeared as PW-04, also maintained that the occurrence took place in his immediate presence and that he personally witnessed the accused attacking the deceased. He too sought to corroborate the account rendered by the complainant and by PW-03 regarding the manner in which the incident allegedly unfolded. These witnesses were subjected to searching cross-examination on the material aspects of the case with the object of testing their veracity and extracting any circumstance favorable to the defense. In such a situation, it becomes the duty of this Court to determine whether the cross- examination succeeded in exposing any inherent infirmities in the prosecution case and whether the evidence produced on record, when viewed as a whole, inspires sufficient confidence to bring home the guilt

of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt.

There can be no denial of the fact that the complainant claims herself to be both an eye-witness and a victim of the occurrence, having allegedly sustained an injury at the hands of the appellant during the same transaction. Yet the Court cannot overlook the surrounding circumstances which bear directly upon the credibility of the prosecution narrative. It therefore becomes necessary to determine whether the other witnesses i.e., the father of the complainant, her brother, and her brother-in-law Farhad, were indeed present at the place of occurrence at the stated time and whether the unfortunate incident truly unfolded in their immediate presence. When the matter is examined from this vantage point, a significant circumstance emerges. While reporting the occurrence and setting the criminal law into motion, the complainant did not mention the presence of these witnesses at the spot. The report lodged by her, despite the fact that she claimed to be both the injured and the eye-

witness of the occurrence, remains silent regarding the presence of her father Muhammad Jameel, her brother Akmal, and her brother-in-law Farhad, at the time when the incident allegedly took place. This omission assumes considerable importance, particularly when the site plan was later prepared on the pointing out of these very individuals who subsequently projected themselves as eye-witnesses of the occurrence. In these circumstances, it becomes incumbent upon the Court to reconcile the statement of the complainant with those of the other witnesses in order to ascertain whether the prosecution version rests upon a firm and dependable foundation. When the testimony of the complainant is read in its entirety, both in her examination-in-chief and in her cross- examination, it becomes apparent that after witnessing the deceased being repeatedly stabbed, she came out of the house and, after sustaining an injury herself, proceeded to the house of her parents to inform her

father and brother. According to her own account, it was only after informing them that she returned to the place of occurrence in their company. This explanation stands in plain and irreconcilable contrast with the statements of the other witnesses. Both Muhammad Jameel and Farhad categorically asserted that they were already present at the place of occurrence at the relevant time and that they had witnessed the incident with their own eyes. When their testimonies are juxtaposed with that of the complainant, it becomes evident that the two versions cannot be harmonized, rather, the statements of the witnesses directly contradict the narrative advanced by the complainant herself. Had these closely related witnesses, one being the father of the complainant and the other the brother of the deceased, actually been present at the place of occurrence at the relevant time, it would have been both natural and expected that their presence would have been disclosed by the complainant at the very first available

opportunity while reporting the matter to the authorities. The silence of the complainant in this regard inevitably gives rise to a reasonable inference that these witnesses were not present at the time of the occurrence and were, in all probability, attracted to the spot only after the fatal assault had already been committed. Even otherwise, assuming for the sake of argument that the witnesses were indeed present at the place of occurrence as claimed by them, another circumstance of considerable importance cannot be overlooked. According to the prosecution case, the accused repeatedly stabbed the deceased and thereafter also attacked the complainant. In such a situation, if these closely related witnesses were truly present at the spot, it would have been expected of them to make at least some attempt to rescue the deceased or to overpower the assailant while the assault was in progress, yet the record is silent regarding any such attempt. Nothing has been brought on record

to suggest that any effort was made by these witnesses to intervene, to restrain the accused, or even to raise an alarm capable of preventing him from escaping. Instead, the prosecution evidence suggests that the accused was able to leave the place of occurrence without encountering any resistance or intervention from the witnesses who now claim to have been present throughout the incident. Such conduct appears wholly unnatural, particularly when the witnesses were closely related to both the complainant and the deceased and would ordinarily be expected to react instinctively in order to protect their kin. In the face of these contradictions and the unexplained conduct of the witnesses, this Court finds it exceedingly difficult to place implicit reliance upon their testimony. The complainant herself did not initially assert that these witnesses had witnessed the occurrence, rather, according to her own version, she first went to inform her father and brother and only thereafter returned to

the place of occurrence in their company.

This circumstance casts a serious shadow over the claim of these witnesses that they had actually witnessed the occurrence and significantly weakens the evidentiary worth of their testimony.

9.According to the complainant, after sustaining the injury inflicted by the appellant, she proceeded to the residence of her parents, which, according to her own account, required a journey of approximately twenty to thirty minutes. There, she purportedly apprised her father and brother of the tragic occurrence, and subsequently returned to the scene of the incident in their company, whereafter the deceased and the injured complainant were transported to the hospital, and the matter was formally reported to the authorities. However, upon a meticulous examination of the statement of her father, it is apparent that it offers no corroboration of this account. Had the sequence of events unfolded as described by the complainant, it would have been both

natural and expected that the father would have acknowledged his arrival at the place of occurrence as the direct result of the information communicated by his injured daughter. His conspicuous omission on this critical point significantly undermines the credibility of the prosecution narrative. If the version advanced by the complainant is taken at face value, the Court would be compelled to question the presence of the other witnesses at the stated time and place.

Conversely, should the claims of the witnesses, that they were already present at the scene, be accepted, the Court is duty- bound to exercise heightened scrutiny in assessing the evidentiary weight of the complainant’s testimony, particularly when reliance is placed upon witnesses whose very presence was omitted in the initial report. A holistic reading of the witnesses’ statements reveals that they assert their presence at the scene even before the complainant emerged from the house and maintain that, in their immediate presence,

the accused was engaged in stabbing the deceased. Their narrative further implies that the complainant emerged only after the assault was well underway. Accepting this version, even provisionally, leads inevitably to the conclusion that the complainant neither heard the initial altercation between the accused and the deceased nor observed the purported demand for drugs that allegedly precipitated the assault. In essence, she arrived only after the deceased had already been grievously assaulted. This discordance renders the alleged motive attributed by the prosecution, that the accused demanded drugs from the

deceased and, upon refusal, committed the fatal assault, entirely speculative. No tangible evidence has been adduced to suggest that the deceased was engaged in drug trafficking or suffered from addiction, nor has any credible explanation been offered as to why the accused would make such a demand. In the absence of such proof, the circumstances leading to the tragic incident

remain enshrouded in uncertainty. The prosecution has thus failed to present a coherent and verifiable account of the events preceding the occurrence, which might otherwise have elucidated the chain of causation culminating in the fatal act. When the genesis of the occurrence remains veiled in ambiguity, and the alleged altercation was not witnessed by the complainant, the purported motive cannot, with any degree of assurance, serve as a reliable link connecting the accused to the commission of the offence. On the contrary, this very uncertainty serves to diminish the evidentiary weight of the complainant’s testimony. The residential location of the witnesses further compounds this concern. During cross- examination, the witnesses admitted to residing in distinct Mohallas. Under such circumstances, their claimed presence at the scene at the precise moment of the incident appears neither natural nor credible. They failed to offer any satisfactory rationale for their presence at the location, nor could they

convincingly account for their actions, or inactions, at a time when, according to their own testimony, a close relative was under imminent threat of fatal injury. It is particularly noteworthy that the witness Farhad, recognizing the vulnerability of the prosecution case in light of their omission from the initial report, offered an alternative narrative that he and the other witnesses were positioned in darkness at the time, and hence their presence may not have been observed or reported by the complainant.

This explanation appears to be a deliberate attempt to reconcile the glaring discrepancies in the prosecution’s account, rather than strengthening the case, it alerts this Court to the need for rigorous scrutiny of both the credibility of the witnesses and the authenticity of their claimed presence. When the witnesses are unable to satisfactorily explain either the purpose of their presence at the scene or the conduct they allegedly displayed during the occurrence, particularly when two resided in one Mohalla and

another in a different locality, their claimed presence assumes the character of mere chance. In such circumstances, they must be regarded as chance witnesses, and even this classification is subject to serious doubt in light of the manifest contradictions, inconsistencies, and improbabilities permeating their statements. We are benefited from the judgment of Apex Court titled “Muhammad alias Ahmad Vs The State” (2025 SCMR 2052) which reads as follows: -

“He being a chance witness has not plausibly explained the purpose of his presence at the spot, hence, his presence at the crime scene is highly doubtful.”

10.It is further significant to note that the incident was reported to the police at the hospital only after a delay of approximately two hours and twenty-five minutes. The prosecution has failed to offer any plausible or satisfactory explanation for this considerable lapse. This delay assumes

heightened importance, particularly in light of the prosecution’s own case that the witnesses were present at the scene and had ample opportunity to ensure the immediate transfer of both the deceased and the injured complainant to medical care. In these circumstances, such an unexplained gap in initiating criminal proceedings casts a substantial shadow over the prosecution narrative and demands the most rigorous judicial scrutiny. Equally pertinent is the statement of the complainant regarding her physical condition at the time of reporting.

She asserted that she had been unconscious prior to lodging the report, regained consciousness only at the moment of reporting, and lapsed into unconsciousness shortly thereafter. To assess the veracity of this claim, it is essential to consider the testimony of the medical officer, examined as PW-09. The medical evidence is

unequivocal. The doctor recorded the Glasgow Coma Scale (GCS) of the complainant as 15/15, unequivocally

indicating full consciousness, orientation, and responsiveness at the relevant time.

This clinical observation stands in stark contradiction to the complainant’s account of intermittent unconsciousness, a divergence that cannot be lightly dismissed. Where a witness’s ocular account so sharply diverges from objective medical evidence, the Court is compelled to examine the surrounding circumstances with heightened vigilance.

These circumstances suggest either a deliberate concealment of material facts or a reasonable doubt as to the complainant’s actual presence at the scene at the critical juncture. It is indisputable that the complainant sustained an injury during the occurrence. Yet, the mere presence of a wound on a witness’s body, in isolation, cannot be treated as conclusive proof of truthfulness or a determinative basis for attributing criminal liability to the accused.

Criminal jurisprudence has consistently recognized that even an injured witness may offer a selective or incomplete account of

events. A careful examination of the nature and location of the injury, when juxtaposed with the complainant’s narrative, raises serious doubts. According to her account, the accused fatally assaulted the deceased before inflicting an injury upon her. Had this sequence occurred as alleged, some evidence of struggle or resistance would reasonably be expected, yet the record is silent on any such intervention. Furthermore, if the accused, after committing the fatal assault, had the opportunity to attack the complainant without interruption, it is more probable that the injury would have been inflicted on the upper portion of her body, particularly if both parties were standing face to face. The injury documented, however, does not align with such a scenario. Even if the complainant sustained an injury, the surrounding circumstances suggest that she did not disclose critical aspects of the occurrence. The subsequent conduct of the complainant further undermines her account.

If the incident had unfolded in her immediate

presence, and she herself had been injured, the natural course would have been to seek immediate assistance from neighbors or other local residents. Instead, she chose to proceed to her parents’ residence before reporting the matter. Such conduct appears incongruous, particularly when close relatives of the deceased resided in the vicinity. The medical evidence corroborates this analysis. The injury sustained by the complainant was medically classified as simple. If the injury was indeed minor, there is no logical basis for her purported loss of consciousness either before or after the occurrence. It cannot be ruled out that this narrative was introduced primarily to reinforce her claimed presence at the scene.

Taken in their totality, these circumstances compel the Court to conclude that the complainant has not presented a fully truthful account. Simultaneously, the presence of other witnesses at the scene is cast into substantial doubt. In such a scenario, if the version of one set of witnesses is accepted,

the credibility of the other is inevitably undermined. Since the complainant did not identify these witnesses in her earliest report, the veracity of both the complainant and the alleged eye-witnesses stands gravely compromised. Upon a comprehensive assessment of the evidence, this Court finds itself unable to separate the grain from the chaff. The contradictions, inconsistencies, and unexplained circumstances so thoroughly link the prosecution’s narrative that reliance upon it to sustain a conviction would be manifestly unsafe. In such a situation, the cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence, the benefit of doubt must accrue to the accused, must operate with full force. Reliance is placed on the judgment of Apex Court titled “Ghulam Mustafa Alias Raja Buledi vs The State” 2025 SCMR 1633 wherein, it has been held as under:

“We have already concluded that the facts and circumstances of this case show that the prosecution eye-witnesses were

not present at the spot at the relevant time and there are glaring contradictions in the statements of the prosecution eye-witnesses, hence their evidence is highly doubtful and unreliable.”

11.The nature and location of the injury sustained by the complainant further undermine the credibility of the prosecution witnesses. A careful scrutiny of the testimonies, particularly that of the complainant herself, reveals that the ocular account is fraught with material inconsistencies and does not inspire confidence. While the eye-witness narratives are internally contradictory, the medical evidence regarding the injury’s character and position does not correspond with the complainant’s description of the events. This divergence between ocular testimony and medical findings is not a matter to be lightly disregarded, it bears directly upon the reliability of the witnesses, the sequence and manner of the alleged occurrence, and even

the presence of the complainant at the scene at the material time. It is a settled principle of criminal jurisprudence that medical evidence generally serves to corroborate ocular testimony. Yet, where the eye-witness account itself is rendered doubtful or is disbelieved due to glaring contradictions, medical evidence alone cannot be relied upon as the sole basis for establishing criminal liability. In the instant case, the conflict between the ocular account and the medical record is so pronounced that it has irreparably compromised the prosecution’s case. Applying well-established legal principles, this Court is compelled to conclude that the prosecution’s version has been divested of its reliability beyond repair.

As is held in case titled Najaf Ali shah Vs the State (2021 SCMR 736), wherein it is held that:

“The same view was reiterated in Abdul Jabbar v. State (2010 SCMR 129) when this court observed that once a single

loophole is observed in a case presented by the prosecution, such as conflict in the ocular account and medical evidence or presence of eye-witnesses being doubtful, the benefit of such loophole/lacuna in the prosecution's case automatically goes in favour of an accused.”

12.Equally significant is the question of motive. The alleged motive remains shrouded in uncertainty. No independent witness from the locality has been examined to substantiate the prosecution’s narrative.

The complainant sought to explain the motive by asserting that the accused demanded drugs from the deceased, and that upon refusal, the fatal assault occurred.

However, a careful reading of the other witnesses’ statements belies the complainant’s presence at the time of the alleged demand. Accordingly, the purported motive remains unproven, and even the investigating officer has failed to adduce independent or credible evidence in this

regard. It is true that the absence or weakness of motive alone may not invariably justify the acquittal of an accused. However, where the prosecution itself advances a specific motive as the genesis of the occurrence and relies upon it as the principal cause of the killing, it becomes the bounden duty of the prosecution to establish that motive through cogent and convincing evidence. Failure to do so entitles the accused to the benefit of doubt. Reliance is placed on case of the apex court titled “Muhammad Khan alias Mithu versus The State and others” (PLD 2025 Supreme Court 425), wherein, it has been held as under:

“So far as motive part of the prosecution's case is concerned, we have observed that the same has not been established by the prosecution through cogent and confidence inspiring evidence.”

13.The cumulative effect of the attendant circumstances leaves this Court

with no safe conclusion other than that the prosecution has failed to prove its case against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. The learned trial Court, in delivering the impugned judgment, appears to have overlooked several essential aspects of the evidence, thereby falling into error.

Consequently, the impugned judgment is manifestly flawed and calls for interference.

In view of the foregoing, the appeal is hereby allowed. The conviction and sentence recorded by the learned trial Court are set aside. The appellant is acquitted of the charge, the benefit of doubt being extended to him. He shall be released forthwith, unless required to be detained in connection with any other case.

Announced

Naqqash Haider

JUDGE

JUDGE

Division Bench.

Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sahibzada Asadullah, J. Hon’ble Mr. Justice Inam Ullah Khan, J.