Syed Mustajab Shah and another Vs Syed Hussain Shah

JUDGMENT SHEET

IN THE PESHAWAR HIGH COURT

ABBOTTABAD BENCH

(Judicial Department) C. R No. 144-A/2015

Syed Mustajab Shah and another.

(Petitioner/s)

VS

Syed Hussain Shah.

(Respondent/s)

Present: Muhammad Shoaib Khan, Advocate, for petitioners.

Muhammad Ilyas Khan, Advocate, respondents.

Dates of hearing: 30.03.2026

JUDGMENT

AURANGZEB, J.- Through the instant civil revision petition, the petitioners/defendants have challenged the judgment & decree of learned Additional District Judge, Battagram dated 16.03.2015, whereby, appeal filed by the present petitioners was dismissed and thereby maintained the judgment and decree of the trial Court dated 25.07.2012 who vide the same had decreed the suit of respondent/plaintiff.

2.Precisely stated, the facts leading to the filing of the instant civil revision petition are that the respondent/plaintiff instituted a suit for declaration,

recovery of possession, and permanent injunction, the details whereof are duly reflected in the heading of the plaint. Upon issuance of summons, the

petitioners/defendants entered appearance and contested the suit by filing their written statement.

After completion of pleadings, the learned trial Court framed the necessary issues and directed the parties to adduce their respective evidence, which they accordingly produced. Upon proper appraisal of the oral as well as documentary evidence available on record, and after hearing learned counsel for the parties, the learned trial Court decreed the suit of the respondent/plaintiff vide judgment and decree dated 25.07.2012. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioners/ defendants preferred an appeal before the learned appellate Court, which, however, met the same fate and was dismissed vide judgment and decree dated 16.03.2015. Consequently, the petitioners/defendants have assailed both the aforesaid judgments and decrees through the instant civil revision petition.

3.Arguments advanced by the learned

counsel for the parties were heard and the record was perused with their able assistance.

4.The record of the case has been examined with the able assistance of learned counsel for the parties. It transpires that the respondent/plaintiff laid claim to the suit property on the basis of his status as the sole successor of Imam Hussain Shah, asserting that the latter had remained unheard of for the last about thirty years and was, therefore, legally presumed to be dead. It was further his consistent stance that the present petitioners/defendants had no lawful concern or interest in the suit property. From the available material, it is not disputed that the original ownership of the suit property vested in Imam Hussain Shah. The respondent/plaintiff, in order to establish his entitlement, specifically pleaded and deposed that he was the real paternal cousin of the said Imam Hussain Shah, tracing his lineage from a common ancestor, namely Bahadur Shah. This assertion finds support from the pedigree table (Exbt.PW-1/3), which was duly brought on record.

5.A careful reading of the deposition of the respondent/plaintiff shows that he furnished a detailed account of his relationship with Imam Hussain Shah during his examination-in-chief. Significantly, this aspect of his testimony was not effectively challenged in cross-examination. The mere suggestion put to him

regarding non-production of independent oral evidence to prove such relationship cannot, in the peculiar facts of the case, be treated as sufficient to discredit his statement, particularly when the same stands corroborated by documentary evidence in the shape of the pedigree table as well as the relevant revenue record. In contrast, the petitioners/defendants failed to produce any convincing evidence to rebut this assertion. In such circumstances, the learned trial Court was justified in drawing the inference that the respondent/plaintiff had successfully established his relationship with Imam Hussain Shah as his real paternal cousin.

6.Before adverting to the factual aspect of the controversy as to whether Imam Hussain Shah had in fact remained unheard of for a sufficient length of time, it would be appropriate to first advert to the settled legal position governing the presumption of life and death under Articles 123 and 124 of the Qanun-e- Shahadat Order, 1984. Article 123 embodies the general rule that where a person is shown to have been alive within the preceding thirty years, the burden of proving that he is dead lies upon the person who asserts his death. This general principle, however, is expressly made subject to Article 124, which carves

out an exception and provides that when it is shown that a person has not been heard of for seven years by those who would naturally and ordinarily have heard of him had he been alive, the burden shifts to the person who affirms that such person is still alive. Thus, after the lapse of the statutory period of seven years, the law raises a presumption of death, not as a matter of conjecture, but as a rule of evidence intended to resolve disputes where direct proof of death is unavailable. In the case of “Mst. Akhtar Sultana vs.

Major Retd. Muzaffar Khan Malik through his legal heirs and others” reported as PLD 2021 Supreme Court 715 wherein it has been held as under;

“25. Coming to the next main controversy in the present case, the statutory presumption of death of Bashir Khan Malik, we note that Article 123 and Article 124 of the Qanun-e- Shahadat regulates rules of evidence relating to the presumption of a person, in given circumstances, to be alive or dead. Article 123 provides that where a person is shown to have been alive within thirty years, the burden of proof is on the party that seeks to prove the contrary. This is subject to Article 124, which provides that the burden of proof shifts on the party that claims that the person not heard of for seven years is alive. Therefore, the party who asserts that a presumption of death as per Article 124 should not apply, bears the burden of proving the same. In Mansoor Akbar v. Fazal-e-Rab, this Court observed:

"The provisions of Article 123 of the Qanun- e Shahadat Order 1984, speak about the burden of proof of the fact about a person known to have been alive, which Article is subject to the Article 124 of the said Order, in which it has been provided that when the question arises as to whether a man is alive or dead, and it is proved that he has not been heard of for seven years by those who would naturally have heard of him, the burden of proving that such person is alive is shifted to the person who affirms it. The Article 124

clearly shifts the burden on the petitioner to establish that (a) the respondent No.1 is alive and (b) he intentionally has avoided to contest and or participate in the suit proceedings."

(Emphasis provided) Therefore, Article 123 requires a party to provide evidence of death, unlike Article 124, which raises a presumption of death. In Perveen Shoukat v. Province of Sindh, this Court held:

"[I]n terms of Article 123, it is to be proved for a fact before a court of law that a person who was alive in the last thirty years has actually died on the basis of positive evidence. This rule of evidence has an exception which is contained in Article 124 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 ................................................ So, without the proof of actual death as envisaged under Article 123, a missing person in terms of the legal fiction contained in Article 124 is to be presumed dead, if he is not heard for seven years by those who would have definitely heard of him had he been alive.

In the case of Lal Hussain v. Sadiq Khan, the brother of the petitioner disappeared in the year 1947 and was never heard from again. The Court, applying Article 124 of the Qanun-e- Shahadat, held that the inheritance of the disappeared individual opened in the year 1954, seven years from the date of his disappearance. It was held:

The point can be conveniently determined in the light of the provisions of Article 124 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order and its interpretation made in Muhammad Sarwar and another v. Fazal Ahmad and another PLD 1987 SC 1. Article 124 of Qanun-e- Shahadat Order clearly spells out that where a person has not been heard of for seven years by those who would naturally have heard of him if he had been alive the burden of proving that he is alive is on the person who affirms it. In the case of Muhammad Sarwar and another (supra) it was held that section 108 of the Evidence Act, 1872 (Article 124 of Qanun-e-Shahadat Order) merely creates a presumption that the person who has not been heard of for seven years is dead 'at the date of the tiling of the suit and does not refer in any way as to the date of his death which was to be proved by positive evidence............................ In the absence

of positive evidence about the date of death of Roshan Din the period of seven years envisaged by Article 124 of the Qanun-e- Shahadat Order is to be reckoned from the undisputed year of disappearance of Roshan Din Le, 1947. It would thus follow that the inheritance of Roshan Din had opened in the year 1954.

(Emphasis provided) It is important to note that the Article 124 only raises a presumption of death without actually determining the exact date of death which, if required to be proved, would have to be proved by positive evidence. In Muhammad Sarwar v. Fazal Ahmad, his Court held: [I]f a person has not been heard of for seven years there is a presumption of law that he is dead but this presumption does not extend to the date of death. Indeed, there is no presumption that he died at the end of the first seven years, or at any particular date. This fact has necessarily to be proved as a fact because section 108 does not direct the Court to presume that the person who has not been heard of for the last seven years had, in fact, died at the expiry of seven years. It only provides that such a person is presumed to be dead without fixing the time of death. It is for this reason that where it is necessary to establish that a person died at any particular time such a fact must be proved by positive evidence. Thus, notwithstanding the presumption of death it would be possible for the Court to give a finding that it occurred after the expiry of the period of seven years since the time when he was last heard of, if the evidence so warrants”.

(Emphasis provided)

Similarly, in the case of “Parveen Shoukat vs.

Province of Sindh and others” reported as PLD 2019 Supreme court 710 it has been held that;

“The question that arises is whether Article 124 of Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 has any application with regard to visualizing the probable time of death of a missing person, is the question that needs to be answered. In this regard the meaning and scope of Articles 123 and 124 of Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 need to be briefly explored. For convenience sake these

Articles are reproduced below:-

"123. Burden of proving death of person known to have been alive within thirty years: Subject to Article 124, when the question is whether a man is alive or dead and it is shown that he was alive within thirty years, the burden of proving that he is dead is on the person who affirms it.

124.Burden of proving that person is alive who has not been heard of for seven years. When the question is whether a man is alive or dead, and it is proved that he has not been heard of for seven years by those who would naturally have heard of him if he had been alive, the burden of proving that he is alive is shifted to the person who affirms it."

It has further been elaborated that;

"It is to be observed that the words "when the question is" occurring in both sections 107 and 108 (Articles 123 and 124 of Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984) have reference only to question of the burden of proof at the trial and not at any antecedent point of time. Thus, if a person has not been heard of for seven years there is a presumption of law that he is dead but this presumption does not extend to the date of death. Indeed there is no presumption that he died at the end of the first seven years, or at any particular date. This fact has necessarily to be proved as a fact because section 108 does not direct the Court to presume that the person who has not been heard of for the last seven years had, in fact, died at the expiry of seven years. It only provides that such a person is presumed to be dead without fixing the time of death. It is for this reason that where it is necessary to establish that a person died at any particular time such a fact must be proved by positive evidence. Thus, notwithstanding the presumption of death it would be possible for the Court to give a finding that it occurred after the expiry of the period of seven years since the time when he was last heard of, if the evidence so warrants.

The upshot is that section 108 of the Evidence Act merely creates a presumption that the person, who has not been heard for seven years, is dead, at the date of the suit, and does not refer in any way as to the date of his death, which has to be proved in the same way as any other relevant fact in the case."

9.By presuming a person dead in terms of Article 124 of Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, it

does not mean that this Article is of any help in determining when he actually died in those seven-year period. He is just presumed dead for all intent and purposes after a period of seven years has expired. Therefore, Article 124 by itself is of no help in visualizing the probable time of death of a missing person within those seven years. However, the Court which is seized of the matter for making a declaration in terms of Article 124 is not prevented from visualizing the probable time of death on the basis of the circumstances in which the person has disappeared. Thus inference as to the probable time of death of a person who has gone missing for more than seven years can be drawn by the Court only by considering the facts and circumstances in which the person has disappeared. So once a missing person is presumed dead after the full seven-year statutory period has expired, the circumstances surrounding the disappearance of a person would facilitate the court in determining his probable time of death within those seven years. This is also the ratio laid down by this Court in Muhammad Sarwar's case referred by the learned amicus curiae”.

7.So, question requiring determination was whether Imam Hussain Shah had, in fact, remained unheard of for a sufficiently long period so as to attract the legal presumption of death. The

respondent/plaintiff asserted that his whereabouts had been unknown for the last thirty years. Upon denial of this assertion by the petitioners/defendants, the burden shifted upon them to prove that Imam Hussain Shah was alive. Their case, in this regard, was that Imam Hussain Shah had migrated to India prior to partition and had been residing there since then. However, in support of this plea, the petitioners/defendants examined only one witness, i.e., DW-1. A close

scrutiny of his testimony reveals that it was wholly insufficient to establish the continued existence of Imam Hussain Shah. No documentary evidence whatsoever was produced to substantiate such a claim.

In these circumstances, the learned trial Court rightly concluded that the petitioners/defendants had failed to discharge the burden cast upon them, and consequently, the presumption of death, as pleaded by the respondent/plaintiff, remained unrebutted.

8.The petitioners/defendants also set up a specific plea that Imam Hussain Shah, prior to his alleged departure to India, had alienated the suit property in favour of their predecessor-in-interest. The burden to prove such alienation squarely lay upon the petitioners/defendants. The learned trial Court correctly placed the onus of proof in this regard upon them. However, the evidence adduced by the petitioners/defendants fell far short of the legal requirement. They examined only a special attorney, who admittedly was neither a witness to the alleged transaction nor was able to provide any concrete particulars regarding the date, place, or manner of such sale. No documentary evidence was produced to corroborate the alleged alienation. In the absence of any reliable and legally admissible evidence, the

learned trial Court rightly negatived this plea, and such finding does not suffer from any misreading or non- reading of evidence.

9.So far as the question of title is concerned, the same was directly and substantially in issue between the parties. The learned trial Court framed a specific issue (issue No.4) in this regard. Although it is a settled principle that separate issues are to be framed for each material proposition, yet in the facts of the present case, the controversy essentially revolved around the entitlement of the respondent/plaintiff as legal heir of Imam Hussain Shah on one hand, and the claim of the petitioners/defendants based on the alleged survival and prior alienation by Imam Hussain Shah on the other. The parties were fully aware of their respective stands and were afforded adequate opportunity to produce evidence in support thereof.

The findings recorded by the learned trial Court comprehensively address all material aspects of the controversy. While deciding the said issue, the learned trial Court properly appreciated the evidence and correctly determined the onus of proof. All relevant questions were duly considered and adjudicated, and the conclusion arrived at, in favour of the respondent/plaintiff, is well-founded.

10.During the course of arguments, learned counsel for the petitioners raised an objection that in the main suit, the “public at large” was a necessary party, and the suit suffered from mis-joinder and non- joinder of parties within the contemplation of Order I Rule 9 C.P.C. The contention, however, is misconceived and devoid of substance. A careful perusal of the record would show that the decree passed by the learned trial Court was confined strictly to the rights inter se between the parties to the lis, i.e., the respondent/plaintiff and the present petitioners/defendants, and no relief of a general or declaratory nature affecting the rights of the public at large was either claimed or granted. In such circumstances, the presence of any third party or the public at large was neither necessary nor indispensable for the effective adjudication of the controversy. It is settled law that a suit cannot be defeated on the ground of non-joinder of parties unless such party is shown to be a necessary party whose presence is essential for complete and effective determination of the dispute.

Even otherwise, no such objection appears to have been raised before the learned trial Court at the appropriate stage; therefore, the petitioners are precluded from agitating the same for the first time in

revisional jurisdiction. The said contention, thus, carries no legal weight and is accordingly repelled. In the case of “Muhammad Ashfaq and another vs.

Sardar Allah Yar and others” reported as 1997 MLD 1453 it has been held that;

“As for the plea that the Government is a necessary party and that the same ought to have been arrayed as suffice it to say that no suit can be dismissed because of non joinder of parties, even otherwise, this issue was decided against the petitioners at the trial stage but they did not care to file any cross appeal or cross-objection nor did they raise any argument during the course of hearing of the first appeal, therefore, the petitioners are estopped to raise the same objection in this respect. Reliance can safely be placed on Kanwal Nain and 3 others v. Fateh Khan and another PLD 1983 SC 53”.

Similarly, in the case of “Abdul Hamid Khan vs. Muhammad Zameer Khan and 2 others” reported as 1990 MLD 1617 it has been held that;

“After going through the judgments cited at the Bar it is clear that there are two categories, broadly speaking, of situations in which the question can arise whether the Government or one of its functionaries is a necessary party in a suit or not. In one category fall the cases in which the Government and its functionaries are vested with the power of deciding certain rights of the citizens but so far as the subject-matter of the dispute is concerned the Government itself has no interest in it. In the other category would be cases where a Government functionary not only takes an action or passes an order but also the Government has an interest in the subject-matter. The first category can comprise instances where a revenue official incorporates an entry in a revenue record of lands belonging to private citizens, a Government functionary registers a document evidencing transaction of sale between two persons etc. These are the cases in which though the authority to decide or act

has been exercised by the Government or the Government functionary no interest of the Government itself is involved. In the second category fall cases in which the interests of the Government are involved for instance a Government functionary forfeits land in favour of the Government, a public officer passes an order for the confinement of a person in civil prison for non-payment of land revenue or any other revenue claimable by the Government, the Government or a person acting on its behalf passes an order in the interests of law and order that a person shall be detained in preventive detention etc.

We are of the view that in the first category of cases the Government is not a necessary party while in the second category the Government is a necessary party in whose absence a suit cannot proceed. We may point out that the principles on this subject are different in writ jurisdiction where by its concept a writ only lies against a person performing functions in connection with the affairs p of the State and not otherwise. It is, therefore, that in writ jurisdiction whether the Government or the Government functionary has any interest in the subject matter or not, a writ cannot be said to be properly constituted unless there is a public functionary or the Government as a party.

In the case before us the President passed an order cancelling the allotment of the present appellant and the Government itself has no interest in the property itself. The evacuee property is not vested in ownership or control in the Government. The administration of evacuee property is vested in the Custodian while the power of cancellation in case of abandonment or relinquishment has been given .by a special provision to the Government. The provision only authorises the Government to take a decision in respect of the property and in making that decision the Government neither acquires any interest in the property nor suffers any loss. It, therefore, cannot be said that without the Government being before the Court the suit could not proceed or in other words it was a misjoinder”.

11.Even otherwise, parties could not be denied relief on the ground of mis-joinder or non- joinder under Order I Rule 9 CPC. In the case of

“Nasrullah Khan and another vs. Mst. Khairunnisa and others” reported as 2020 SCMR 2101 the Hon’ble Apex Court has held that that;

“6. Mir Habibullah Khan son of Mir Imam Bakhsh Khan who acted as attorney and sold the disputed property to the respondents was not arrayed as defendant in the suit. He was a necessary party as it was he who on the strength of the disputed power of attorney sold the suit property to the respondents. He also appears to be real uncle of the appellant No. 1 and brother of the donor as his father's name is the same as of the donor and their residential addresses, as reflected from the gift deed and power of attorney, are also the same. In Mian Zafar Ali v. Mian Khursheed Ali (2020 SCMR 291), this Court while dealing with an issue pertaining to non-joinder of a party held that non-joinder no doubt does not amount to dismissal of the suit in terms of Order I, Rule 9, C.P.C., however, where the Court considers it necessary that a person ought to have been made a party in the suit and has not been made, this would certainly lead to failure to prove one's case. The case of the appellants ought to be cancellation of disputed power of attorney and the resultant sale deeds executed by Mir Habibullah Khan on the basis of such power of attorney by playing fraud and forgery. Therefore, Mir Habibullah Khan, brother of the donor and the real uncle of the appellant No. 1, ought to have been made party in the suit as forgery, if any, can only be pointed towards him. Unless it is established that forgery has been committed by Mir Habibullah Khan the suit of the appellants could not be decreed. The fact that the appellants have not made him a party shows that such an omission is fatal to the suit even if it had been filed within the period of limitation. The omission looks deliberate as the person who could only commit fraud has not been sued and thus the appellants appear to have not come to the court with clean hands”. Similarly, in the case of “Mst. Jannat Bibi vs.

Saras Khan” reported as 2011 SCMR 1460 it has been held that;

“We have heard the appellant and perused the

record. It appears that only on the ground that the appellant has not impleaded the LDA as one of the defendants in a suit for declaration in respect of his title, the appellant has been non suited. It is by now settled principle of law that a plaintiff cannot be denied relief on the ground of mis-joinder or non-joinder of a party. Even otherwise, it is the duty of the Court to do justice and not to knock out the parties on technical grounds. We have also taken note of the fact that the dispute between the parties is in respect of a private dispute between the two private persons and at best LDA can be proper party and not necessary party, on which ground too relief cannot be denied to the appellant”.

12.The learned trial Court also examined the question of limitation and returned a finding in accordance with law. No material has been pointed out before this Court to demonstrate that such finding is erroneous or suffers from any legal infirmity. The learned appellate Court, upon reappraisal of the entire evidence, concurred with the findings of the learned trial Court and maintained the judgment and decree. It is well settled that concurrent findings of fact recorded by the Courts below are not to be lightly interfered with in revisional jurisdiction unless it is shown that the same are the result of misreading, non-reading, or arbitrary exercise of jurisdiction. In the present case, learned counsel for the petitioners has not been able to point out any material illegality, irregularity, or jurisdictional defect in the judgments passed by the Courts below.

13.It is well settled that the High Court's jurisdiction under Section 115 of the C.P.C. is limited in cases of concurrent findings by competent Courts. It can only intervene if there are serious legal flaws, such as insufficient evidence, misreading or ignoring material evidence, reliance on inadmissible evidence, abuse of jurisdiction, or perverse conclusions. Mere disagreement with factual findings or reappraisal of evidence does not justify interference unless there is gross misreading or overlooking of crucial evidence. In the case of “Aamir Afzal and another vs. S. Akmal (deceased) through L.Rs and 2 others” reported as 2024 SCMR 1649 the Hon’ble Apex Court has held that;

“While exercising jurisdiction under Article 115 of the C.P.C. the High Court has to first satisfy itself: (i) that the order of the subordinate court is within its jurisdiction, (ii) that the case is one in which the court ought to exercise jurisdiction; and that in exercising jurisdiction that court has not acted illegally, that is, in breach of some provisions of law, or with material irregularity by committing some error of procedure in the course of the trial which is material in that it may have affected the ultimate decision. Section 115 applies only to cases in which no appeal lies, and where the legislature has provided no right of appeal. The manifest intention of the legislature is that the order of the trial court, right or wrong, shall be final, except in specific circumstances. It is, therefore, obvious that unless the case is not covered under Section 115 of the C.P.C. and the High Court was satisfied in this regard, then in such a case no power could be exercised to interfere simply because it differs, however profoundly, with the conclusions of the subordinate court regarding questions of law and facts.

Kanwal Nain and others v. Fateh Khan

and others PLD 1983 SC 53 and Umar Dad Khan and another v. Tila Muhammad Khan and others PLD 1970 SC 288 ref.

The scope of jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 115 of the C.P.C. is limited in relation to concurrent findings of the competent courts. The exceptions to this rule are when the findings are based on insufficient evidence, misreading of evidence, non- consideration of material evidence, patent errors of law, consideration of inadmissible evidence, abuse of jurisdiction, and when the conclusions drawn are perverse and based on conjectural presumptions. The erroneous decisions of fact are ordinarily not revisable and the mere fact that the High Court may differ on a question of fact or mixed question of law and fact is not a valid ground for interfering with concurrent findings. Moreover, the concurrent findings recorded on the basis of evidence are not susceptible to further review to justify interference by the High Court in revisional jurisdiction. The interference by a High Court in such jurisdiction would not be justified on the ground that reappraisal of evidence might suggest another view of the matter unless there has been a gross misreading of evidence and material evidence was ignored”.

14.In this case, the two Courts below have concurrently recorded their findings of facts and law, which this Court found them as perfectly in accordance with the available evidence of the parties and thus the same neither suffer from any misreading or non- reading of evidence nor the same suffer from any illegalities or material irregularities, so as to warrant the interference of this Court in a revisional jurisdiction under section 115 CPC. The scope, extent and domain of revisional jurisdiction of this Court has elaborately been dilated upon by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of “Nasir Ali vs. Muhammad Asghar” reported as 2022 SCMR 1054 that section

115, C.P.C empowers and mete out the High Court to satisfy and reassure itself that the order of the subordinate Court is within its jurisdiction; the case is one in which the Court ought to exercise jurisdiction and in exercising jurisdiction, the Court has not acted illegally or in breach of some provision of law or with material irregularity or by committing some error of procedure in the course of the trial which affected the ultimate decision. If the High Court is satisfied that aforesaid principles have not been unheeded or disregarded by the Courts below, it has no power to interfere in the conclusion of the subordinate Court upon questions of fact or law. The scope of revisional jurisdiction is limited to the extent of misreading or non-reading of evidence, jurisdictional error or an illegality of the nature in the judgment which may have material effect on the result of the case or if the conclusion drawn therein is perverse or conflicting to the law. Furthermore, the High Court has very limited jurisdiction to interfere in the concurrent conclusions arrived at by the courts below while exercising power under section 115, C.P.C. Similarly, in the case of “Salamat Ali and others vs. Muhammad Din and others” reported as PLD 2022 Supreme Court 353, it was also held that a revisional Court cannot upset a

finding of fact of the Court(s) below unless that finding is the result of misreading, non-reading, or perverse or absurd appraisal of some material evidence. The revisional Court cannot substitute the finding of the Court(s) below with its own merely for the reason that it finds its own finding more plausible than that of the Court(s) below. Similar view also reiterated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of “Muhammad Sarwar and others vs. Hashmal Khan and others” PLD 2022 Supreme Court 13, where in para-6 it was held that it is well settled exposition of law, deducible from plethora of dictums laid down by superior Courts that section 115, C.P.C. empowers and meted out the High Court to satisfy and reassure itself that the order of the subordinate court is within its jurisdiction; the case is one in which the Court ought to exercise jurisdiction and in exercising jurisdiction, the Court has not acted illegally or in breach of some provision of law or with material irregularity or by committing some error of procedure in the course of the trial which affected the ultimate decision. If the High Court is satisfied that aforesaid principles have not been unheeded or disregarded by the Courts below, it has no power to interfere in the conclusion of the subordinate Court upon questions of fact or law.

15.In view of the above discussion, the impugned judgments and decree of the two Courts below are neither the result of misreading and non- reading of evidence, therefore, the same are upheld and maintained and consequently the instant revision petition is dismissed.

Announced

Tahir Saleem

JUDGE