Abdul Wakeel Vs The State & another

Judgment Sheet

PESHAWAR HIGH COURT, PESHAWAR

(Judicial Department)

Criminal Appeal No. 1040-P/2025 Abdul Wakeel Vs The State & another Date of hearing: 29.04.2026

Appellant by: Malik Mushtaq Ahmad, Advocate.

The State by: Mr. Jawad Ali, AAG.

Respondent by: Mr. Ishfaq Ahmad Afridi, Advocate.

JUDGMENT

SAHIBZADA ASADULLAH, J.- Through this single order, we intend to decide the instant criminal appeal filed by the appellant Abdul Wakeel, as well as the connected criminal revision No. 280-P/2025, filed by the petitioner/complainant Sartaj Ahmad, for enhancement of the sentence, as both the matters are arising out of one and the same judgment dated 11.10.2025, passed by the learned AD & SJ/Child Protection Court/JJC, Peshawar, in case FIR No. 433 dated 07.04.2023 under sections 302/34 PPC, read

with section 53 CPA, registered at Police Station Faqirabad, Peshawar whereby, the learned trial Judge has convicted and sentenced the appellant as under:

i. U/s 302(b) PPC, to imprisonment for life as Tazir, with compensation of Rs. 500,000/- (Rupees five lac), to be paid to the legal heirs of the deceased Waqas Ahmad, within the meaning of section 544-A Cr.P.C. which shall be recoverable as arrears of land revenue, or in default, to further undergo simple imprisonment for six months.

Benefit of section 382-B Cr.P.C was extended in favor of the appellant.

2.Brief facts of the case are that on 07.04.2023, the complainant, Sartaj Ahmad, while present along with the dead body of his son Waqas Ahmad, in the casualty of LRH, Peshawar, reported the matter to the local police that while he was present at his house, his son had gone out to the mosque

for offering prayer; that subsequently, he was informed by his neighbors regarding the occurrence, whereupon he rushed to the spot and found his son in a severely injured condition; that he came to know that his son had been fired upon by two individuals riding a motorcycle; that the injured was immediately shifted to the hospital, however, he succumbed to his injuries and was declared dead. Hence, the instant case. It is pertinent to mention that later on, the complainant appeared before the Court of competent jurisdiction and got his statement recorded under section 164 Cr.P.C., wherein the present appellant was charged for commission of the offence.

3.After completion of investigation, complete challan was put in Court.

Provisions of section 265-C Cr.P.C. were complied with and, the appellant was charge sheeted, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. In order to prove its claim, the prosecution produced and examined as

many as 11 witnesses. After closure of prosecution evidence, statement of accused was recorded under section 342 Cr.P.C., wherein he posed innocence, however, neither he wished to be examined on oath as required under section 340 (2) Cr.P.C, nor wanted to produce evidence in defense. The learned trial Court, after full-fledged trial convicted and sentenced the appellant, fully detailed in the earlier part of this judgment, hence, this appeal.

4.Indeed, the occurrence was a most unfortunate one, culminating in the tragic loss of a precious human life. The deceased, though initially found alive and in an injured condition, was immediately removed from the place of occurrence for being shifted to the hospital for medical treatment, however, before any medical assistance could prove effective, he succumbed to the injuries sustained by him.

The matter was promptly reported by the complainant, the injury sheet was prepared.

After the death of the injured, his inquest report was also recorded, and the dead body was dispatched for postmortem examination to ascertain the cause of death and the nature of injuries. During the course of investigation, the investigating officer visited the place of occurrence and, on the pointation of the complainant as well as the eyewitness, prepared the site plan of the place of occurrence and conducted a detailed spot inspection. During such proceedings, blood-stained earth was taken into possession through cotton from the place where the deceased had fallen, and one empty cartridge of .30 bore was also secured from the scene. The investigating officer further collected the CCTV footage available near the place of occurrence, converted the same into a USB device, and made it part of the case property.

Subsequently, after a few days of the occurrence, the appellant/accused was arrested. During police custody, he led the

police party to the place of occurrence and thereafter to his house, where, on his pointation, a .30 bore pistol was recovered and taken into possession through recovery memo. The recovered firearm along with the crime empty secured from the place of occurrence was transmitted to the Forensic Science Laboratory for ballistic examination, and the report so received affirmatively established that the crime empty had been fired from the pistol recovered at the instance of the appellant, thereby furnishing corroborative forensic evidence connecting him with the commission of the offence. It is further borne out from the record that the appellant, during the course of investigation, volunteered to confess his guilt and was accordingly produced before the court of competent jurisdiction, where his confessional statement was recorded in accordance with law. It is pertinent to mention that the father of the deceased got his statement recorded under section 164

Cr.P.C., wherein he directly implicated the appellant in the commission of the offence.

Likewise, the brother of the deceased, namely Daniyal Ahmad, also got his statement recorded under the same provision, wherein he disclosed the motive which, according to the prosecution, furnished the immediate cause for the commission of the offence. The co-accused was likewise arrested and subjected to investigation. Upon completion of the investigation, the police submitted challan before the Court of competent jurisdiction.

The accused were thereafter committed to face trial. Upon conclusion of the trial, the learned trial Court, after appraisal of the evidence brought on record, was pleased to acquit the co-accused of the charge, however, the present appellant was found guilty, convicted, and sentenced for the commission of the offence. Hence, the instant criminal appeal.

5.The learned trial Court, after due application of judicial mind to the facts and circumstances of the case and upon proper appraisal of the evidence brought on the record, found the appellant guilty of the commission of the offence and recorded conviction and sentence against him. The foremost duty of this Court, while exercising appellate jurisdiction, is to examine whether the approach adopted by the learned trial Court is founded upon sound reasoning, proper appreciation of evidence, and correct application of law, and whether the conclusion so reached can safely be sustained. True that the prosecution has attributed a specific and direct role of firing to the appellant; however, it is equally true that no ocular witness came forward either to identify the appellant at the place of occurrence, to identify him during the test identification parade, or to directly nominate him as the perpetrator of the offence at the earliest available opportunity. In such

circumstances, this Court is required to determine whether the collected evidence, independently and collectively, is sufficient to connect the appellant with the commission of the offence beyond reasonable doubt. This Court is further required to examine whether the CCTV footage secured by the investigating agency from the place of occurrence, subsequently converted into a USB device and played before the learned trial Court, was capable in law and fact of establishing the identity of the assailant, particularly when the identity of the person seen therein remained the foundational issue in controversy. It is equally to be examined whether such electronic evidence was subjected to forensic scrutiny so as to establish its authenticity, integrity, and evidentiary worth, and whether any scientific process was undertaken to ascertain that the person appearing in the footage was in fact the appellant arraigned before the Court. It appears from the record that the learned trial

Court was persuaded, on the one hand, by the confessional statement made by the appellant and, on the other, by the CCTV footage produced by the prosecution.

Therefore, this Court is under obligation to examine whether the confessional statement satisfies the requirements of voluntariness, truthfulness, and legal admissibility, and whether it inspires confidence so as to be safely relied upon. Likewise, it is to be examined whether the CCTV footage, by itself or in conjunction with the other incriminating circumstances, is sufficient to establish the identity and role of the appellant in the occurrence. It is settled that where the case rests substantially on circumstantial evidence, every circumstance relied upon by the prosecution must be proved independently and must form an unbroken chain leading to no hypothesis except the guilt of the accused. A solitary circumstance, howsoever incriminating, unless duly corroborated by other reliable

pieces of evidence, would ordinarily be insufficient to sustain conviction for a capital offence. To avert any miscarriage of justice, this Court considers it imperative to reappraise the evidence available on the record and to examine the testimony of the prosecution witnesses afresh, so that the innocent may not suffer and the guilty may not escape the consequences of law.

6.The points for determination

before this Court are as to whether the occurrence took place in the manner and at the time alleged by the prosecution; whether the appellant was duly identified through the CCTV footage and whether such electronic evidence fulfills the legal and forensic requirements of admissibility and reliability;

whether any independent witness came forward to corroborate the prosecution case regarding the involvement of the appellant;

whether the confessional statement attributed to the appellant was voluntary, truthful, and legally admissible; whether the

recovery of the .30 bore pistol at the pointation of the appellant and the positive forensic report connecting the recovered weapon with the crime empty constitute sufficient incriminating evidence against him;

and whether, on the basis of the entire evidence brought on record, the prosecution has succeeded in proving its case against the appellant beyond the shadow of reasonable doubt.

7.In order to appreciate the

peculiar facts and surrounding

circumstances of the present case, this Court considers it necessary to take into account certain foundational aspects which have direct bearing upon the prosecution case and the evidentiary value of the circumstances relied upon. Foremost among them is the age of the deceased and that of the appellant. The record reflects that at the time of the occurrence, the deceased was a young boy of about 17 to 18 years of age, whereas the appellant was admittedly an

elderly person of about 70 years. Though in the card of arrest, his age has variably been mentioned between 68 to 70 years, the investigating officer, while appearing before the Court, unequivocally confirmed the appellant to be approximately 70 years of age. This substantial disparity in age naturally invites judicial inquiry into the nature and character of the relationship, if any, subsisting between the deceased and the appellant. Equally significant is the fact that the parties were residents of altogether different localities. The record reveals that the appellant was a resident of District Charsadda, Tehsil Shabqadar, whereas the deceased was a resident of Peshawar and was living near Dir Tower. This

geographical separation assumes

significance in determining the origin, continuity, and nature of the alleged association between the two, for the prosecution was under obligation to explain how and under what circumstances the

appellant and the deceased came into contact with each other and what, if any, relationship existed between them. A careful examination of the record shows that at the earliest available opportunity, neither the father of the deceased nor his brother could explain the inter se relationship between the deceased and the appellant, nor could they disclose the nature of interest which the appellant allegedly had in the deceased. It was only subsequently, when the brother of the deceased got his statement recorded under section 164 Cr.P.C. that the prosecution attempted to introduce a motive by alleging sexual harassment and projecting the same as the immediate cause of the occurrence. Such improvement, introduced at a subsequent stage, necessarily requires cautious judicial scrutiny. Since the prosecution case rests entirely upon circumstantial evidence, the evidentiary structure of the prosecution assumes greater importance. It is pertinent to note that one

witness, namely Maaz, shown by the prosecution as a witness associated with the spot proceedings, had initially assisted the investigating officer during the spot inspection, however, when produced before the trial Court, he did not support the prosecution version and was consequently declared hostile and thereafter abandoned.

Thus, what remains on the record against the appellant are the alleged confessional statement, the CCTV footage allegedly collected from the place of occurrence and subsequently converted into a USB device, and the recovery of the .30 bore pistol allegedly effected at the pointation of the appellant, coupled with the positive forensic report, therefore, the legal question which falls for determination is whether in the absence of direct ocular account, these isolated pieces of circumstantial evidence, either independently or collectively, are sufficient in law to establish the identity of the appellant, his presence at the place of

occurrence, and his culpability in the commission of the offence. This Court is conscious of the settled principle that a conviction can lawfully be based on circumstantial evidence alone, however, the equally settled principle is that every circumstance relied upon must be independently established, all such circumstances must form an uninterrupted chain, and that chain must be so complete as to exclude every hypothesis inconsistent with the guilt of the accused. In legal metaphor, one end of the chain must touch the deceased and the other must touch the accused, leaving no missing link in between.

This Court is equally mindful that mere relationship of the complainant with the deceased is not by itself a valid ground to discard his testimony. Relationship does not render a witness untruthful, rather, what is required is careful scrutiny of such testimony.

However, in the present case, the significance lies in the fact that the

complainant is admittedly not an eyewitness to the occurrence, and the only person who was projected as having knowledge of the relevant circumstances, namely Daniyal Ahmad, brother of the deceased, was not ultimately produced before the Court after having been abandoned, therefore, while there appears no apparent motive for the complainant to falsely implicate the appellant, the burden nevertheless remained upon him and the prosecution to establish by legally admissible and confidence-inspiring evidence that it was indeed the appellant who committed the offence and that the information received by him regarding the involvement of the appellant originated from a credible and trustworthy source. It is also significant that though the confessional statement of the appellant was recorded several days after his arrest, the complainant nominated the appellant only after a delay of about 21 days. Such delayed nomination, in the peculiar facts of the case, requires

satisfactory explanation, particularly when the complainant himself was not an eyewitness. If the delayed implication is to be accepted as bona fide, the prosecution was further required to establish what independent material, apart from the alleged confession, was available with the complainant to satisfy him regarding the involvement of the appellant. These are not isolated questions but interconnected circumstances, each bearing upon the reliability and truthfulness of the prosecution story. Their cumulative effect must be examined with utmost care. Accordingly, this Court deems it essential to reappraise the evidence on the record, reconsider the statements of the witnesses, and evaluate each circumstance first in isolation and then in conjunction with the others, so as to assess both its individual evidentiary worth and its cumulative probative force, and thereby determine whether the learned trial

Court was justified in recording conviction against the appellant.

8.It is evident from the record that the unfortunate occurrence took place at an hour when darkness still prevailed and visibility was naturally impaired. In such circumstances, where the occurrence is alleged to have been committed through firing by an unidentified assailant, the question of identity assumes central importance, and it was for the prosecution to establish, through reliable and legally admissible evidence, as to who the assailant was and by what means his identity was ascertained. It is pertinent to observe that while lodging the report, the complainant merely stated that he had received information regarding the tragic incident.

However, neither in the First Information Report nor in his deposition before the trial Court did he disclose the source of such information, nor did he claim his own presence at the place of occurrence at the

relevant time. Had any witness present at the spot informed him regarding the involvement of the appellant, the natural course would have been to disclose the identity of such source at the earliest opportunity. The absence of such disclosure creates a material vacuum in the prosecution story. It is equally significant that the appellant was not nominated at the initial stage. His implication surfaced only subsequently, after the investigating officer had collected the CCTV footage and examined the same. This circumstance, by itself, necessitates careful scrutiny of the basis upon which suspicion was converted into formal accusation. The prosecution case reveals that the assailants appearing in the CCTV footage had their faces muffled. In such a situation, where facial identity could not be discerned, this Court finds itself confronted with a serious question as to how the investigating officer came to suspect the appellant, particularly when the appellant was neither a resident of

the locality where the occurrence took place nor shown to have any known criminal antecedents or immediate connection with the place of occurrence. The investigating officer, who appeared before the trial Court as PW-10, was under obligation to explain the source and basis of such suspicion.

However, a careful reading of his testimony reveals that he failed to disclose any independent material which could rationally connect the appellant with the occurrence.

More importantly, in his cross-examination, he candidly admitted that the identity of the person shown in the CCTV footage could not be ascertained from the recording itself.

What is even more startling is the explanation later advanced that the appellant was suspected on the basis of his gait and body movement, allegedly because he had previously served in the police department and was known to the investigating officer.

This explanation, in the considered view of this Court, is wholly unsafe to form the basis

of criminal liability. The law requires proof, not conjecture. Recognition based merely on gait, particularly where the face is concealed, the body posture is general in nature, and no scientific comparison has been undertaken, remains inherently speculative. Such an exercise may at best create suspicion, but suspicion, however grave, can never substitute proof. This Court is further mindful of the fact that the appellant is an elderly person of about 70 years of age, whereas the deceased was a young person aged around 17/18 years. The record does not reveal that the appellant had any prior criminal history, nor was he a resident of the place where the occurrence took place. In these peculiar circumstances, for the investigating officer to conclude, merely on the basis of gait and general appearance, that the person shown in the footage was the appellant, appears to be an inferential leap unsupported by objective evidence. This Court is conscious that if such a mode of

identification is accepted as sufficient proof, it would open dangerous avenues in criminal administration of justice, where presumptions and subjective impressions may take the place of legal proof. Criminal jurisprudence, however, does not permit conviction on assumptions. Before proceeding further, this Court has also examined the proceedings conducted by the learned trial Court on 24.07.20254, whereby the USB containing the CCTV footage was brought before the Court, connected to the computer system, and viewed during trial proceedings. The order sheet reflects that the learned trial Court itself undertook the exercise of viewing the footage in an attempt to ascertain the identity of the assailant. However, this Court is constrained to observe that where the face of the assailant remained muffled and the identity was not visible from facial features, any visual comparison made by the Court without scientific assistance could only remain an exercise in assumption. More

importantly, the trial Court did not adopt any procedural safeguard, such as directing the appellant to replicate the manner of walking or movement for comparative purposes, nor was any expert opinion sought to scientifically compare gait, posture, or bodily movements. The conviction recorded by the learned trial Court appears to have been substantially influenced by two factors i.e., the alleged confessional statement and the purported recognition of the appellant from the CCTV footage. So far as the CCTV footage is concerned, this Court is of the considered view that the same was not capable of independently establishing identity. It is also an admitted position that the USB containing the CCTV footage was never sent to the forensic laboratory for authentication, verification of integrity, or enhancement for identity analysis. The investigating officer himself admitted in his deposition that no forensic examination of the electronic record was ever conducted.

This omission strikes at the root of the evidentiary value of the CCTV footage. In modern criminal trials, electronic evidence, before being relied upon for fixing criminal liability, must pass through the necessary forensic and legal safeguards so as to ensure authenticity, originality, and reliability.

In the considered view of this Court, once the most vital piece of evidence relied upon by the prosecution was neither scientifically examined nor capable of establishing identity on its face, the trial Court’s personal visual assessment could not lawfully substitute expert verification or legal proof. Accordingly, this Court finds no ambiguity in holding that the CCTV footage has been wrongly relied upon by the learned trial Court. Being deficient in evidentiary worth and resting substantially upon presumption, it cannot safely be treated as an incriminating circumstance capable of fastening criminal liability upon the appellant, either

independently or even as a strong corroborative piece of evidence.

9.Turning now to another important piece of evidence, which in fact constituted one of the principal foundations for the conviction recorded by the learned trial Court i.e., the judicial confessional statement of the appellant, this Court considers it necessary to examine its legal worth, evidentiary value, and intrinsic reliability. The record reflects that after the arrest of the appellant, the investigating agency sought his physical remand, which was duly granted by the competent Court. Upon expiry of such custody, the appellant expressed his desire to confess his guilt and was accordingly produced before the learned Judicial Magistrate, where his confessional statement was recorded in accordance with law. A careful reading of the confessional statement reveals that it is fairly comprehensive in nature. It narrates the alleged relationship between the appellant and the deceased, the

source of annoyance, the motive behind the occurrence, and the manner and timing of the killing. However, the mere

comprehensiveness of a confession is not by itself sufficient to render it reliable. The law requires the Court to satisfy itself, first, that the confession was recorded in accordance with the mandatory legal requirements and, secondly, that it was voluntary, truthful, and confidence-inspiring. The first aspect relates to legality of recording. Upon examination of the record, this Court finds that the learned Judicial Magistrate appears to have observed the formal legal requirements before recording the confession. The relevant caution was administered, rational and material questions were put to the appellant, and the answers thereto were duly recorded. Therefore, the procedural safeguards appear to have been observed, however, compliance with procedural formalities does not automatically establish voluntariness or truthfulness. The next and

more important question is whether the confession was in fact voluntary and whether it bears the imprint of truth. It is significant to note that while answering one of the questions put by the learned Judicial Magistrate, the appellant disclosed the period for which he had remained in police custody before making the confession. This circumstance requires careful judicial scrutiny, for where an accused remains in police custody for a considerable period before confessing, the Court must be doubly cautious in examining whether the confession was the result of free will or the product of coercion, inducement, or pressure. Since there is admittedly no direct ocular account and the prosecution case substantially rests upon circumstantial evidence, the confessional statement must necessarily be tested against the surrounding circumstances and the evidence independently collected by the investigating agency. A confession, to inspire confidence,

must be in harmony with the proved facts and attendant circumstances of the case. It is a settled proposition of criminal law that a confessional statement is either to be accepted as a whole or rejected as a whole.

The Court cannot dissect it and accept one part while rejecting another, unless the law specifically permits severability in exceptional circumstances. Therefore, if material parts of the confession are found to be false, doubtful, or inconsistent with the established facts, the evidentiary worth of the entire confession becomes seriously impaired. The confessional statement in the present case, when subjected to judicial scrutiny, raises serious doubts. Firstly, the statement speaks of a close relationship between the appellant, an elderly man of about seventy years, and the deceased, a boy aged about seventeen to eighteen years, yet, no independent evidence has been brought on record by the prosecution to establish the nature, extent, or continuity of

such relationship. Secondly, and more importantly, the confession narrates that an amount of rupees 18 lac had allegedly been advanced or transferred by the appellant to the deceased, and that dispute over such amount became the cause of annoyance and ultimately the motive for the occurrence. This assertion, if true, constituted a highly material circumstance and required independent verification. It was incumbent upon the prosecution to collect documentary evidence, bank records, financial transactions, or any other material capable of substantiating such a significant monetary dealing. Surprisingly, it has emerged from the record, and was fairly conceded during arguments, that no such transaction was ever traced, no bank record was produced, and no evidence was brought on record to show that either the appellant possessed such an amount or that the deceased had any account or business through which such a transaction could have been made. This

omission is not insignificant. This Court finds it difficult to comprehend how such a substantial amount could allegedly have been entrusted to a young boy of seventeen or eighteen years without leaving behind any trace of financial record, documentary evidence, or even knowledge of his family members. These circumstances directly strike at the truthfulness of the confession. If the foundational factual assertions contained in the confession stand disproved or remain wholly unsubstantiated, the confession itself loses its reliability. This Court is of the considered view that once the prosecution failed to establish the alleged financial transaction, the business dealings, and the underlying motive narrated in the confession, the authenticity of the confession suffered a serious dent. Even otherwise, if the confessional statement is juxtaposed with the other evidence on the record, particularly the CCTV footage, material inconsistencies emerge. The mode and manner of

occurrence narrated in the confession do not reconcile with the circumstances reflected in the video recording. The prosecution itself relied upon the CCTV footage as an important circumstance, however, the same failed to establish the identity of the assailant and, to some extent, created inconsistency regarding the actual manner of occurrence.

Thus, the confession does not find corroboration from the surrounding circumstances, rather, in certain respects, it stands in conflict with them. Another significant circumstance is the timing of the confession. The appellant did not opt to confess when first produced before the Court for obtaining physical remand. He chose to confess only after the expiry of police custody. This delayed emergence of confession, after prolonged police contact, is again a circumstance requiring caution.

When the confessional statement is examined as a whole, this Court finds that on one hand it contradicts the prosecution’s own

surrounding circumstances, and on the other hand its material assertions remain unproved. In such circumstances, this Court is unable to hold that the confession is wholly truthful, voluntary, and confidence-inspiring.

Accordingly, this Court is of the considered view that the confessional statement lacked the degree of reliability necessary to form the sole or decisive basis of conviction, and the learned trial Court fell into serious error in placing substantial reliance upon it for recording conviction against the appellant. It is by now a settled canon of criminal jurisprudence that a confessional statement is to be accepted as a whole or rejected as a whole, the Court is not permitted to dissect it in fragments so as to retain the inculpatory part and discard the rest. Once the surrounding circumstances negate the very manner of occurrence narrated in the confession, and once the material assertions contained therein stand unsupported or contradicted by independent evidence, the

confession loses its intrinsic worth and ceases to inspire judicial confidence. A conviction cannot be sustained merely because the maker of the statement is the accused and therefore presumed to explain away its falsity. Such an approach would impermissibly shift the burden of proof from the prosecution to the defence, which is wholly alien to the settled principles of criminal law. The prosecution must stand on its own legs and prove its case by cogent, confidence-inspiring and legally admissible evidence. Where the confession itself is found inconsistent with the proved circumstances, prudence and law both demand its exclusion from consideration, for suspicion, assumption, or moral conviction can never substitute proof beyond reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court of India in case of “Hanumant Govind Nargundkar v. State of Madhya Pradesh” (AIR 1952 SC 343), has held that:

“It is settled law that an admission made by a person whether amounting to a confession or not cannot be split up and part of it used against him. An admission must be used either as a whole or not at all.”

10.It is true that the alleged weapon of offence was recovered on the pointation of the appellant during the course of investigation, however, it is equally true that no independent and disinterested witness was associated with the process of such recovery. The record reveals that the investigating officer did not furnish any plausible explanation as to why no effort was made to secure the presence of independent witnesses, particularly when the recovery was allegedly effected from a residential place where such association could conveniently have been arranged. This omission assumes significance, for recoveries effected in police presence alone, though not per se inadmissible, require

cautious judicial scrutiny. This Court is further required to examine whether the prosecution succeeded in establishing the safe custody of the recovered weapon and its secure transmission to the forensic laboratory, so as to exclude the possibility of tampering, substitution, or fabrication.

However, the prosecution has failed to produce the most material witnesses connected with the chain of custody, thereby leaving a serious gap in the evidentiary chain. Thus, on one hand, the very mode of recovery remains shrouded in doubt for want of independent corroboration, and on the other hand, the safe custody and safe transmission of the recovered pistol to the forensic laboratory have not been affirmatively established through confidence- inspiring evidence. Even if the recovery and the positive forensic report are taken at their face value, the same still remain a piece of circumstantial evidence. It is settled beyond cavil that a single circumstance, however

incriminating, cannot by itself become the sole determining factor for conviction unless it forms part of a complete and unbroken chain of circumstances connecting the accused with the commission of the offence and excluding every hypothesis consistent with innocence. In the present case, the prosecution has failed to construct such an unbroken chain. The CCTV footage failed to establish identity; the confessional statement was found deficient in truthfulness and voluntariness; the motive remained unproved, and the ocular account was altogether absent. In such circumstances, the recovery of the weapon, standing in isolation and unsupported by a complete chain of corroborative evidence, loses much of its probative force and cannot safely be made the foundation for sustaining conviction. The cumulative effect of the circumstances brought on record does not lead this Court to an irresistible conclusion of guilt, rather, the missing links, material

contradictions, and evidentiary deficiencies create reasonable doubt regarding the prosecution story. It is a cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence that where a reasonable doubt arises, its benefit must necessarily accrue to the accused. Reliance is placed on case titled “Kamal Din alias Kamala vs the State” reported as 2018 SCMR 577, the relevant is reproduced below: -

“4. As regards the alleged recovery of a Kalashnikov from the appellant's custody during the investigation and its subsequent matching with some crime-empties secured from the place of occurrence suffice it to observe that Muhammad Athar Farooq DSP/SDPO (PW18), the Investigating Officer, had divulged before the trial court that the recoveries relied upon in this case had been affected by Ayub, Inspector in an earlier case and, thus, the said recoveries had no relevance to the criminal case in hand. Apart from that safe custody of the

recovered weapon and its safe transmission to the Forensic Science Laboratory had never been proved by the prosecution before the trial court through production of any witness concerned with such custody and transmission.”

11.For what has been discussed

above, this Court is left with no option but to hold that the prosecution failed to prove its case against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt, and the learned trial Court fell into serious error while recording conviction by overlooking the material infirmities and essential defects in the prosecution case. Consequently, the impugned judgment is found unsustainable in law, suffering from inherent legal and factual defects, warranting interference by this Court in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction. Resultantly, this appeal is allowed, the impugned judgment is set aside, and the appellant is acquitted of the charge.

He shall be released forthwith, if not required

to be detained in connection with any other case.

12.Now, adverting to the connected Criminal Revision No. 280-P/2025, filed by the complainant for enhancement of the awarded sentence, since the appellant has succeeded in securing acquittal and the impugned judgment has been set aside, so the instant criminal revision has lost its utility, the same is dismissed as such.

Announced

Naqqash Haider

JUDGE

JUDGE

Division Bench.

Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sahibzada Asadullah, J. Hon’ble Mr. Justice Inam Ullah Khan, J.