Janis alias Jan Muhammad VS The State

Judgment Sheet

IN THE PESHAWAR HIGH COURT, PESHAWAR

JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

Cr.A No. 116-A/2024

JUDGMENT

Date of hearing...................29.04.2026.................................

Appellant (Janis alias Jan Muhammad) Sardar Muhammad Asif, Advocate.

Respondents (The State & another) The State By Mr. Shoaib Ali, Assistant Advocate General and Respondent No.2/complainant By Mr. Amir Zada Khan, Advocate.

AURANGZEB, J.- Through this common judgment, this Court intends to dispose of the instant criminal appeal preferred by the appellant, namely Janis alias Jan Muhammad son of Sabit Gul, assailing his conviction, along with Criminal Appeal No. 122-A of 2024, as well as Criminal Revision No.25-A/2024 instituted by Shaif-ur-Rehman seeking conviction of respondents No.1 & 2/accused, namely Fahad & Mst. Zuhra Bibi, and enhancement of the sentence awarded to the appellant, Janis alias Jan Muhammad. All these matters arise out of and call in question the judgment dated 23.07.2024 rendered by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-I, Battagram.

2.Vide the impugned judgment, appellant namely Janis alias Jan Muhammad was convicted under Section 302 (b) P.P.C, as Tazir, for the murder of Mst.Riffat Bibi and was sentenced to imprisonment for life. He was further directed to

pay compensation to the tune of Rs.5,00,000/- (Rupees five lac) to the legal heirs of the deceased under Section 544-A Cr.P.C, and in default thereof to undergo simple imprisonment for a further period of six month. He was also convicted under Section 201 PPC and sentenced to two years simple imprisonment with a fine of Rs.50,000/- (fifty thousand) and in default of fine to undergo six months simple imprisonment. The benefit of Section 382-B, Cr.P.C was also extended to him while respondents/accused namely Fahad and Mst. Zuhra Bibi were acquitted.

3.Brief facts of the case as per the FIR Ex.PA are that the complainant namely Shafi ur Rehman (PW-8) reported the matter to the local police at police station, Battagram to the effect that the sister of complainant namely Mst. Riffat Bibi (deceased) had solemnized marriage with one Muhammad Rafique alias Malang in the year 2011 and out of the wedlock, three children were born who are alive whereas, brother-in-law of complainant namely Muhammad Rafique is in Saudi Arabia for earning his livelihood. That in the absence of husband of the deceased Mst Riffat Bibi, her brother-in- law namely Jan Muhammad and his son Fahad Muhammad accused often used to quarrel with her as well as blamed her.

Consequently, the deceased Mst.Riffat Bibi became annoyed and had come to the house of her parents at Tehsil Oghi. That the deceased was persuaded by the complainant repeatedly

and they used to send back to the house of her husband.

However, the deceased Mst. Riffat Bibi had told them that her brother-in-law would kill her by leveling the accusation of bad character. That on 07.01.2023, the complainant tried to contact with his deceased sister Mst. Riffat Bibi but her cell was responding as switched off. Later on, the complainant after his satisfaction reached to the conclusion that the accused with their mutual consultation killed sister of the complainant on the pretext of honor and hidden the dead body in some unknown place. On the report of complainant, the case FIR No.11 dated 20.01.20223 was registered under sections 302/311/201/202/34 PPC at police station Battagram.

4.After the completion of investigation, challan was submitted against the appellant namely Janis alias Jan Muhammad and respondents namely Fahad and Mst. Zuhra Bibi (accused) for trial to the court of learned Additional Sessions Judge-I, Battagram, who were formally charged to which they pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. In order to prove its case, the prosecution has produced nine (09) witnesses and thereafter the appellant and respondents (accused) recorded their statements under Section 342 Cr.P.C denying their involvement in the commission of the offence for which they were charged. However, they wish not to be examined as their own witnesses on Oath in rebuttal of charge against them within the contemplation of section 340 (2)

Cr.P.C or to produce any evidence in their defence. The learned trial Court on conclusion of the trial convicted and sentenced the appellant namely Janis alias Jan Muhammad while acquitted the respondents namely Fahad and Mst. Zuhra Bibi mentioned in Para No.2 of the instant judgment.

5.Arguments of learned counsel for the parties as well as Assistant Advocate General heard and record of the case perused.

6.The available record shows that Mst. Riffat Bibi was murdered in a brutal manner and her dead body was amputated into pieces. The occurrence, as reflected from the prosecution evidence, had taken place inside the house of the appellant. Subsequently, on the pointation and disclosure of the appellant, the dead body of the deceased, packed in bags, was recovered from the place where it had been concealed.

During investigation, the weapon of offence i.e. axe, along with other incriminating articles, was also recovered on his pointation. The appellant also made a judicial confessional statement before the learned Magistrate, wherein he confessed his guilt and narrated the manner in which the occurrence had taken place.

7.From the available record and the evidence produced by the prosecution, the following questions arise for determination:-

(1)Whether the occurrence took place inside the house of the appellant namely Janis alias Jan Muhammad, and, if so, whether the burden of proof shifts upon him?.

(2)Whether on the pointation of appellant namely Janis alias Jan Muhammad, the dead body of the deceased was recovered and whether such recovery has been proved in accordance with law?

(3)Whether the confession of the appellant namely Janis alias Jan Muhammad was recorded before the Magistrate in accordance with law?

(4)Whether the recovery of weapon of offence and other incriminating articles, allegedly secured at the instance of the appellant, has been proved by the prosecution in a reliable and legally acceptable manner?

(5)Whether the medical evidence, in the shape of postmortem report, supports the prosecution case?

(6)Whether the motive alleged by the prosecution has been proved in accordance with law?.

8.The first and most decisive circumstance, forming the substratum of the prosecution case, is that the occurrence admittedly took place within the house of the appellant, where the deceased, Mst. Riffat Bibi, was residing. The record leaves no manner of doubt that the deceased was last seen alive in the company of the appellant inside his residential premises. This fact assumes great legal

significance, particularly in cases involving custodial or domestic occurrences, where the deceased is found dead in circumstances suggesting violence within the exclusive domain of the accused.

9.Admittedly, the deceased was residing in the house of the appellant prior to the occurrence. The record reflects that the initial site plan (Ex: PW9/5) was prepared on 21.01.2023 at the pointation of the complainant, who is the brother of the deceased, identifying the house of the appellant as the place of occurrence. The appellant was arrested on the same date i.e, 21.01.2023, and during the course of investigation he further identified and explained the place of occurrence, whereupon a supplementary site plan (Ex: PW9/8) was prepared, again depicting the house of the appellant. It is further borne out from the record that prior to the occurrence, the deceased had moved an application before the local police on 04.01.2023, wherein she categorically alleged that the appellant intended to kill her. On receipt of the said application, the local police summoned the appellant, who made a statement and entered into a compromise, assuring that he would take due care of the deceased, whereafter the deceased was taken back to the appellant’s house on the same day i.e, 04.01.2023. The said application has been marked as “A”. Significantly, despite the fact that the deceased was residing with the appellant, no report with regard to her

disappearance was ever lodged by the appellant. Thus, it clearly transpires from the record that the deceased was admittedly residing with the appellant at the relevant time.

10.It is a settled principle of criminal jurisprudence, recognized through consistent judicial pronouncements, that where a person dies an unnatural death within the precincts of a house occupied by the accused, the latter is expected to offer a plausible explanation as to how such death occurred.

While the primary burden of proof always remains upon the prosecution to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt, yet where certain facts are especially within the knowledge of the accused, as contemplated under Article 122 of the Qanun-e- Shahadat Order, 1984, the accused cannot simply remain silent and expect to escape the legal consequences of such incriminating circumstances.

11.In the present case, the appellant neither offered any explanation in his statement under Section 342 Cr.P.C nor produced any defence evidence to rebut the prosecution case.

His silence, in the face of such a grave and incriminating circumstance, provides an additional link in the chain of evidence. The prosecution has established that the deceased was present in the house of the appellant and that her death was not natural but homicidal and brutal in nature. The absence of any explanation from the appellant, who was in the best position to clarify the circumstances leading to the

death, strengthens the prosecution case and excludes any hypothesis consistent with innocence.

12.The learned trial Court has, therefore, rightly treated this circumstance as a foundational fact which shifts the evidentiary burden upon the appellant to explain the occurrence, which burden he failed to discharge. This failure cannot be brushed aside as inconsequential; rather, it reinforces the inference that the appellant was directly connected with the commission of the offence. Reliance is placed on the judgment of apex court rendered in Jail Petition No. 787/2018 titled Waris Masih Versus The State decided on 21.01.2026, wherein it was held that:- “8. In light of the aforementioned principles, the record would indicate that the petitioner denied the circumstances that were presented to him during his examination under section 342 Cr.P.C, as indicated by the evidence presented by the prosecution. He declined to present any evidence or provide a statement under oath. The instant case abundantly establishes the fact that the death was caused by an act of causing injuries to the deceased’s cranium. The petitioner maintained his silence throughout the entire trial. The record shows that the petitioner and the deceased, as well as their children, were living in the same residence. The wife of the petitioner passed away in an unnatural manner; however, he did not provide any information regarding the circumstances that led to her death. He must have provided an explanation of the events that transpired at that time. In this regard, reference can be made to a decision of the Indian Supreme Court in the case of State of Andhra Pradesh v Gangula Satya

Murthy (AIR 1997 SC 1588) wherein it deemed a failure to offer an explanation as adverse to the accused by observing as under: “The fact that body of (Satya Vani) was found on the cot inside the house of the respondent is a very telling circumstance against him. Respondent owed a duty to explain as to how a dead body which was resultant of a homicide happened to be in his house. In the absence of any such explanation from him the implication of the said circumstance is definitely adverse to the respondent.”

9.In cases of homicidal death of a wife within the dwelling house, the accused is required to provide a plausible explanation for the circumstances, particularly his own conduct, as per Article 122 of the Order, as the facts are “especially within the knowledge” of the accused. The absence of any substantiation in his mere denial under section 342 Cr.P.C. is entirely insufficient. A strong adverse inference can be drawn against him under Article 129(g) of the Order due to his failure to provide any explanation. We are aware that the prosecution is not relieved of the primary burden by Article 122 of the Order, and that the absence of explanation or falsity of explanation in the statement under section 342 Cr.P.C. can only be used as an additional circumstance when the prosecution has established the other circumstances, which led to the sole conclusion of guilt of the accused. In the event that the prosecution successfully leads evidence to demonstrate that the accused and deceased were living together and were seen together shortly before the commission of the crime, or the offense occurs in the residence, and the husband fails to provide an explanation for how the deceased sustained injuries or provides an explanation that is later discovered to be false, it serves as an additional link in the chain of circumstances against him. In this regard we are fortified by a judgment of this Court in the case of Saeed Ahmed v State (2015 SCMR 710) wherein it was

held as under: “14. That with regard to vulnerable members of society, such as children, women and the infirm, who were living with the accused or were last in his company the accused ought to offer some explanation of what happened to them. If instead he remains silent or offers a false explanation he casts a shadow upon himself. This does not mean that the burden of proof has shifted onto the accused as it is for the prosecution to prove its case, however, in respect of the helpless or the weak that require protection or care it would not be sufficient for the accused to stay silent in circumstances which tend to incriminate him, and if he elects to do so he lightens the burden of the prosecution. Article 122 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order too stipulates that if a particular fact is especially within the knowledge of any person the burden of proving that fact is upon him. In the present case the prosecution had established its case against the appellant; two eye-witnesses had deposed against him and the medical evidence confirmed strangulation of the deceased. The appellant did not attend to the last rites of his wife who had died whilst residing with him, he also did not inform the police nor took his wife to a hospital and disappeared for two months, such circumstances corroborate the prosecution case in the absence of the appellant offering a reasonable explanation for his unnatural conduct.”

10.In the event of a homicidal death of a wife within the residence, and the victim was the accused’s wife who resided with him, the accused was obligated to provide an explanation for the injuries that the deceased sustained while residing in the same domicile house with him, as the deceased was discovered with multiple injuries and the cause of death was physical assault. The legal repercussions of this omission served as an additional link in the chain of circumstances in the absence of such an explanation.

11.The rationale for treating the husband as a primary suspect in cases where a wife suffers a homicidal death within the matrimonial home is not only rooted in presumption of guilt, but also in the social, legal and moral position traditionally ascribed to the cement within the family unit. The family has long been recognized across civilization and legal systems as the basic unit of society, and within this unit, the husband has historically been regarded as the head, manager and protector of the household. Classical legal and moral traditions, both religious and secular, have consistently placed upon the male head of the family a heightened duty of care, supervision, and protection towards his spouse and dependents. The Islamic jurisprudence articulates this responsibility with particular clarity. Verse 34 of Surah An-Nisa of the Holy Qur’an states that, “Men are caretakers of women.” The term qawwam in Arabic denotes one who bears responsibility, manages affairs and ensures protection and maintenance. In this sense, the husband is not merely a spouse, but a guardian of the family structure, entrusted with safeguarding its member.

12.The cases of Nasrullah v State (2017 SCMR 724) and Nazir Ahmed v State (2018 SCMR 787) are frequently cited as a point of deviation for the proposition that a husband cannot be convicted merely because the wife is found dead inside the matrimonial home. The rationale of the said judgements is firmly rooted in the settled principle that the burden of proof in criminal cases rests upon the prosecution and does not shift to the accused merely by reason of material proximity. However, a careful reading of the judgements reveal that the acquittals therein were not founded upon an absolute rejection of circumstantial reasoning in such cases, but rather upon the peculiar and fragile evidentiary matrix presented before the court. Even otherwise, the ratio of the aforesaid cases cannot be mechanically extended to all cases involving the

homicidal death of a wife within the matrimonial home. In cases where there is no ocular account, no credible evidence of third-party intervention, and where the death occurs within the exclusive domain of the matrimonial household, the evidentiary landscape materially differs. In such situations, the prosecution case rests upon strong and consistent circumstantial evidence, including the place of occurrence, last seen circumstances, conduct of the accused and failure to offer a plausible explanation for facts within his special knowledge. Where these circumstances collectively form a complete and unbroken chain, pointing irresistibly towards the guilt of the accused and excluding every reasonable hypothesis of innocence, reliance upon circumstantial evidence cannot be said to be unsafe.

13.It would also not be out of place to mention that the father of classical criminology generally considered to be the Italian nobleman and professor of law, Cesare Bonesana, Marchese di Beccaria who in 1764 published Dei Delitti e della pene (On Crimes and Punishment) states that: “There are some crimes which are, at the same time, of frequent occurrence in society, and yet are of difficult proof, [...] The legislator, instead of increasing the punishment, which would only serve to multiply the number of criminals, should endeavor to facilitate the proof of the crime.” Beccaria warns that if society relies only on torture or extreme presumptions to “solve” crimes taken place in secrecy, it breeds nothing of use to serve justice. But if the law intelligently shifts the evidentiary playing field (e.g., requiring the person with special access to explain), Justice can become deterrent. Hence this principle can be applied on such cases as the crime took place in secrecy of home which is in custody of husband as this is a classic “crime of difficult proof and hence he cannot be given a clean chit to go free without offering at least some

plausible explanation for the unfortunate event that occurred.

14.Considering the circumstantial evidence produced by the prosecution in the light of above-mentioned principles of criminal jurisprudence, the sequence of circumstances is entirely consistent with the hypothesis that the petitioner committed the murder of the deceased.

These circumstances are wholly inconsistent with the theory of an unknown intruder or the petitioner’s innocence. The cascade of guilt that results from the non- participation of the petitioner in the burial rites, failure to report the crime, abscondence immediately after the occurrence until his arrest, the unnatural death of the deceased inside the matrimonial home, and the petitioner and deceased being the only adults in the house at the time of the occurrence leaves no room for any inference other than the petitioner’s involvement in the murder.”

13.The second highly incriminating circumstance is the recovery of the dead body of the deceased on the pointation of the appellant. The evidence on record establishes that the deceased had gone missing and her whereabouts were unknown to the complainant party as well as to the local police. It was only after the arrest of the appellant that he disclosed the place where the dead body had been concealed.

Acting upon such disclosure, the Investigating Officer, in the presence of witnesses, recovered the mutilated body of the deceased, which had been cut into pieces and packed in bags, from a ravine. The sketch and recovery memo of the dead body was prepared by the investigation officer as Ex:PW9/2

and memo Ex:PW8/1 and witnesses of the recovery memo of dead body of deceased were produced by the prosecution.

14.This circumstance falls squarely within the purview of “discovery of fact” as envisaged under Article 40 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984. The jurisprudential rationale behind admissibility of such evidence is that when an accused person furnishes information leading to the discovery of a fact which was previously unknown, such information, to the extent that it relates distinctly to the fact discovered, becomes admissible in evidence. In the present case, the fact discovered is not merely the location of the dead body, but also the manner in which it had been concealed, which unmistakably points towards the involvement of the appellant.

15.The recovery of the dead body in such a gruesome and concealed condition, on the exclusive pointation of the appellant, constitutes a powerful piece of circumstantial evidence. It establishes not only the knowledge of the appellant regarding the place of concealment but also his active role in disposing of the body in order to screen the offence. The presence of independent witnesses to the recovery and the preparation of recovery memo further lends credibility to this piece of evidence.

16.It is also significant to note that prior to this disclosure, the investigating agency had no clue about the location of the

deceased. Thus, the discovery is not a planted or fabricated circumstance but a genuine and natural consequence of the information supplied by the appellant. The learned trial Court has rightly placed reliance on this circumstance, treating it as a crucial link in the chain of evidence, which directly connects the appellant with the commission of the crime. In this respect reliance is placed on the judgment of apex court rendered in case titled Khan Muhammad versus The State (2011 SCMR 705), wherein it was held that:- “2. Mr. Muhammad Zaman Bhatti, the learned counsel for the appellant has endeavored to point out the lapses and flaws on the part of the Police in the matter and conduct of investigation, which according to him was not consistent with the law; and that the whole case was built upon circumstantial evidence which required substantial corroboration but was lacking in the instant case. It is also contended that Khan Muhammad appellant was minor at the time of commission of offence, who could not be awarded death penalty. The learned Additional Prosecutor-General Sindh, has vehemently argued the matter, supporting the conviction recorded by the Trial Court and the High Court of Sindh. He contends that conviction is supported by the evidence on the record and is consistent with law on the subject. According to him, assuming there was any irregularity the same does not result in reversing the sentence in view of section 537, Cr.P.C. It is contended that recovery of dead body at the pointation of the appellant corroborates his confessional statement.

3.There is no cavil that the prosecution has relied mainly on the circumstantial evidence but fully corroborated. Khair Muhammad (P.W.1), and Haji Dost

Muhammad (P.W.2), are natural an reliable witnesses of recovery of dead body of Sultan Ahmad (deceased). The prosecution also produced Dr. Ijaz Ali (P.W.3), who conducted the post-mortem examination of the dead body, Lal Muhammad (P.W.4), Tapedar, who prepared the sketch of place of recovery of dead body, Mohabat Ali Channa (P.W.5), In whose presence the dead body was recovered, Muhammad Yousaf (P.W:6), Judicial Magistrate, who recorded the judicial confession of the appellant. Zakir Hussain (P.W.7), H.C., Mashir of recovery of unlicensed pistol from the appellant, Mushtaq Ahmad (P.W.8), Mashir of recovery of dead body on the pointation of Khan Muhammad appellant and the recovery of revolver, Hassan Ali (P.W.9), Mashir of arrest of accused Anwar and recovery of unlicensed pistol and Ali Gohar Lalai SIP (P.W.10), the Investigating Officer. A part from the ocular account and evidence in the case the undeniable facts on the record are the disclosures and the confessional statements. The disclosures made by Khan Muhammad, who led the Police party to the place/room of the house of Nawab Chandio (on rent), where the dead body of Sultan Ahmad (deceased) had been buried, the medical evidence and recovery of crime weapon on the pointation of appellant are of unimpeachable nature. Such discovery and recovery of dead body of the deceased on the pointation of the appellant finds full support and corroboration from the statements of Khair Muhammad, Haji Dost Muhammad, Mohabat Ali Channa, Mushtaq Ahmad and SI Ali Gohar Lolai. The crime weapon used was produced by Khan Muhammad himself from the place near Stadium, where it had been concealed after digging the earth along with five live bullets and one fired bullet. The report of the Chemical Analyzer was another corroborative piece of evidence that the bullet had been tired from the said revolver. Their testimony, the recoveries made, the confessional

statements and, the medical evidence corroborate each other leading to the conclusion that Sultan Ahmad (deceased) was abducted for ransom and thereafter killed. The evidentiary value of the recovery of dead body at the pointation of the appellant can not be undermined on any valid ground. In Hakim Ali v. The State (1971 SCMR 412) a statement of the accused leading to recovery of incriminating articles was found to he a good piece of evidence of corroboration. In that case the petitioner/accused had taken the Investigating Officer to a field and "brought out the decapitated head of the deceased, wrapped up in the loi." In Sh. Muhammad Amjad v. The State (PLD 2003 SC 704), it was observed that "the Banglow in question was in possession of the appellant from where the dead body was recovered. It was also established by an unimpeachable evidence that recoveries of dead body, car or other articles were made on the lead, provided by the appellant. All above pieces of evidence under Article 40 ibid are admissible and were proved by conclusive evidence. It was accordingly held that all such pieces of circumstantial evidence when combined together provided strong chain of circumstances leading to the irresistible conclusion that it was the appellant who had killed the deceased."

17.The third and perhaps the most crucial circumstance is the judicial confessional statement of the appellant, recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C before a competent Magistrate. The evidentiary value of a judicial confession, when recorded in accordance with law, is of a very high order, as it constitutes a direct admission of guilt by the accused.

18.In the present case, the learned Judicial Magistrate, who recorded the confession, appeared as PW-7 and

categorically deposed that all legal and procedural requirements were strictly adhered to. The appellant was produced before the Magistrate after completion of police custody; he was duly warned that he was not bound to make a confession and that any statement made by him could be used against him. He was provided sufficient time for reflection and was kept away from police influence. Only after the Magistrate was satisfied that the appellant was making the statement voluntarily and without any coercion, was the confession recorded.

19.Although the appellant retracted from his confession during the course of trial, the law is well-settled that a retracted confession does not lose its evidentiary value merely on account of such retraction. The test to be applied is whether the confession was voluntary, true, and corroborated by independent evidence. In the instant case, the confession passes all these tests.

20.Firstly, the voluntariness of the confession is established through the testimony of the Magistrate and the compliance of codal formalities. The allegation of torture raised by the appellant is not supported by any medical evidence. On the contrary, the medical examination of the appellant shows that he was physically and mentally fit. The mere assertion of torture, without substantiation, cannot render the confession involuntary.

21.Secondly, the truthfulness of the confession is borne out from its internal consistency and the detailed narration of events, which could only be within the knowledge of the perpetrator. The appellant has described the manner in which the offence was committed and the subsequent disposal of the body.

22.Thirdly, and most importantly, the confession stands fully corroborated by independent circumstances, including the recovery of the dead body, the recovery of weapon of offence, and the medical evidence. Such corroboration lends assurance to the Court regarding the reliability of the confession. In this regard reliance is placed on judgment of august court delivered in case titled Majeed versus the State (2010 SCMR 55), wherein it was held that:- “10. No doubt there was delay of 12 days in recording the confession but this by itself its not sufficient to discard the same. This Court in the case of Nabi Bakhsh v.

State 1999 SCMR 1972 held that delay in recording the confessional statement by itself is not sufficient to affect its validity. However, no hard and fast rule can certainly be laid down about the period within which the confessional statement of the accused ought to be recorded during investigation. Reference is also invited to Muhammad Yaqoob v. State 1992 SCMR

11.We have examined the confessional statement and found that the Magistrate after performing requirements of law and giving a time of half an hour recorded the same and he was of the opinion that the confession was voluntary and true. In the case of Gul Jamal v. State 1980 SCMR

654, it was held that no hard and fast rule as to how much time is to be allowed to the accused for reflection before confession is recorded. However, period of time depends on each case. In the present circumstances of the case, we find that the period given by the Magistrate for reflection purposes to the appellant was sufficient and it has not cawed any prejudice to the appellant. Even otherwise, any lapse by Magistrate in recording the confession cannot always be treated as fatal to the evidentiary value of confession when the Court is satisfied that lapse on the part of the Magistrate is not in any way adversely affected the voluntariness or truthfulness of the confession. Reference is invited to Naseem Akhtar v: State 1999 SCMR 1744 and Muhammad Yaqoob v. State 1992 SCMR 1983. We do not find any infirmity in the confessional statement which is corroborated by the dying declaration. Even otherwise, the recorded confession is sufficient for conviction if it is voluntary and true and requires no corroboration but as a rule of procedure the Court is required to seek corroboration of the same on material particulars. Reference is invited to Gul Muhammad v. The State 1991 SCMR 942. In this case confession has been fully corroborated by dying declaration.”

23.The learned trial Court has, therefore, rightly treated the confessional statement as a reliable and substantive piece of evidence, forming a central link in the chain of circumstances.

24.The fourth circumstance completing the chain of evidence is the recovery of the weapon of offence i.e. axe, along with other incriminating articles, on the pointation of the appellant. The prosecution witnesses have consistently

deposed that the appellant led the police to the place where the weapon was concealed. The recovery memo was duly prepared and the articles were taken into possession in accordance with law. In regard reliance is placed on the judgment of apex court rendered in case titled Sardar Muhammad & another versus Athar Zahoor and others (2017 SCMR 1668), wherein it was held that:- “The recovery of crime weapon on the pointation of appellant and matching of the empty recovered on the day of occurrence is yet another circumstance establishing the involvement of the appellant in the commission of offence. The Courts below, after analyzing the evidence in detail have concurred in their opinion regarding guilt of the appellant and we too have the same opinion regarding guilt of the appellant.”

25.The medical evidence provided by PW-6, the lady doctor, confirms that the injuries inflicted upon the deceased were consistent with the use of a sharp-edged weapon such as an axe. The post-mortem report reveals that the body of the deceased had been subjected to multiple injuries and was dismembered, which aligns with the account provided by the appellant in his confessional statement.

26.Furthermore, the recovery of blood-stained clothes and other articles, which were sent to the forensic laboratory and found to contain human blood, provides additional corroboration to the prosecution case. The forensic evidence,

though corroborative in nature, assumes importance when read in conjunction with the other circumstances.

27.The recovery of the weapon and other articles is not an isolated circumstance; rather, it forms an integral part of the chain of evidence. It demonstrates that the appellant had not only committed the offence but had also retained control over the weapon and the incriminating material, which he subsequently attempted to conceal.

28.The learned trial Court has rightly appreciated this aspect of the case and has treated the recovery as a corroborative piece of evidence, reinforcing the prosecution version.

29.When the aforesaid circumstances are examined collectively, it becomes evident that the prosecution has succeeded in establishing a complete and unbroken chain of evidence. Each circumstance is firmly proved and is consistent only with the hypothesis of guilt of the appellant.

There is no missing link in the chain, nor is there any plausible explanation offered by the appellant to create doubt in the prosecution case.

30.The occurrence inside the house of the appellant, the recovery of the dead body on his pointation, the voluntary and corroborated judicial confession, and the recovery of weapon of offence together form a cohesive and compelling body of evidence, leaving no room for doubt regarding the

involvement of the appellant in the commission of the offence.

31.The learned trial Court has appreciated the evidence in a correct and judicious manner. The minor discrepancies and lapses pointed out in the prosecution case are not of such magnitude as to shake the confidence of the Court in the overall prosecution story. It is well-settled that such discrepancies are natural and do not necessarily discredit the entire case.

32.Consequently, this Court finds no infirmity, illegality, or perversity in the impugned judgment warranting interference. The appeal filed by the appellant namely Janis alias Jan Muhammad, being devoid of merit, is hereby dismissed. The conviction and sentence awarded to him under Sections 302(b) and 201 PPC are maintained.

33.So far as the criminal revision petition bearing No.25- A/2024 filed by the complainant for enhancement of sentence is concerned, the same does not merit acceptance. The learned trial Court, while awarding sentence to the appellant under Section 302(b) PPC, has consciously exercised its discretion in awarding imprisonment for life instead of capital punishment, keeping in view the overall facts and circumstances of the case. It has come on record that the motive alleged by the prosecution was not proved with certainty, which the learned trial Court has rightly treated as a

mitigating circumstance. It is by now a settled principle that where mitigating circumstances are available on record, the lesser penalty provided by law can safely be awarded. The learned trial Court has recorded sound and legally sustainable reasons for awarding life imprisonment, and no exceptional circumstance has been pointed out which may justify interference for enhancement of sentence. Thus, the quantum of sentence awarded neither suffers from any illegality nor calls for enhancement. Consequently, the instant criminal revision petition is dismissed.

34.Likewise, the criminal appeal bearing No.122-A/2024 filed by the complainant against the acquittal of co-accused namely Fahad and Mst. Zuhra Bibi is also devoid of merit.

The learned trial Court has extended benefit of doubt to the said accused after a careful appraisal of the evidence, noting that no specific role was attributed to them either in the ocular account or in the confessional statement of the appellant. It is well settled that acquittal carries a double presumption of innocence, and unless the findings recorded by the trial Court are perverse, arbitrary or based on misreading or non-reading of evidence, the appellate Court would be slow in interfering with such acquittal. In the present case, the prosecution has failed to bring on record any independent, cogent and reliable evidence connecting the said co-accused with the commission of the offence. The learned trial Court’s view is a plausible

and reasonable one, based on proper appreciation of evidence, and does not suffer from any infirmity. Therefore, the acquittal of Fahad and Mst. Zuhra Bibi is maintained, and the instant criminal appeal filed by the complainant is accordingly dismissed.

Announced:

JUDGE

JUDGE

Hon’ble Mr. Justice Syed Mudasser Ameer Hon’ble Mr. Justice Aurangzeb Aftab PS/*