Fateh Muhammad Khan etc Vs Ghulam Muhammad Khan etc

Judgment Sheet

IN THE PESHAWAR HIGH COURT, ABBOTTABAD

BENCH

JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

Civil Revision No. 360-A/2014

JUDGMENT

Date of hearing...................27.04.2026.................................

Petitioners (Fateh Muhammad Khan & others) By Haji Sabir Hussain Tanoli, Advocate.

Respondents (Ghulam Muhammad & others) By Mr. Amanullah Khan Salik, Advocate.

AURANGZEB, J.- This revision petition is directed against the consolidated judgment and decree dated 18.12.2014, passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Battagram, whereby the petitioners’ appeals filed against the judgment and decree dated 29.09.2012 of the learned Civil Judge, Allai, were dismissed.

2.The facts of the case, in brief, are that the respondents/plaintiffs filed the declaratory suit in respect of their title in the suit property, detailed in the head-note of the plaint, claiming it ownership as ancestral property and contended that the petitioners/defendants have got no interest therein. It was contended that the suit property was under supervision of the petitioner/defendant No.1 as trust (amanat), being the elder of the locality. They assailed the validity of alienation of the suit property on behalf of predecessor in

interest of respondents/plaintiffs in favour of the petitioner/defendant No.1 and also challenged the mutation No.701 entered by petitioner/defendant No.1 in favour of the petitioners/defendants No.2 to 4 as illegal, unlawful and ineffective upon rights of the respondents/plaintiffs. Perpetual mandatory injunction and possession was also prayed for as consequential relief. The petitioners/defendants appeared before the learned trial court and contested the suit by filing their written statement.

The learned trial court after framing issues, recording evidence and hearing arguments of learned counsel for parties, decreed the suit of the respondents/plaintiffs vide judgment and decree dated 29.09.2012. Not contented with the same, the petitioners/defendants filed appeals before the learned appellate court, which were dismissed vide consolidated judgment and decree dated 18.12.2024, hence, this revision petition.

3.I have heard arguments of the learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the record with their valuable assistance.

4.The history of litigation demonstrates that the matter had already been subjected to judicial scrutiny up to this Court, which had upheld the remand order. The learned trial Court, upon

remand, was required to decide the matter strictly in accordance with law by properly appreciating the evidence. However, a perusal of the impugned judgments reflects that the learned Courts below reiterated earlier conclusions without addressing the material deficiencies pointed out in the earlier round. The exercise undertaken post-remand, therefore, does not satisfy the requirement of a fresh and independent appraisal of evidence, thereby vitiating the findings.

5.The foundational aspect of the case is the nature of the transaction between the predecessor-in-interest of the respondents and petitioner/defendant No.1. In paragraph No.2 of the plaint, the respondents themselves admitted that the suit property was handed over to defendant No.1, albeit asserting that it was given as amanat. This admission unequivocally establishes transfer of possession.

6.Once transfer and possession are admitted, the burden shifts heavily upon the plaintiffs to prove that such transfer was not a sale but merely a fiduciary entrustment. The learned Courts below failed to appreciate that such a plea requires strict proof, particularly when it is set up to invalidate a duly attested mutation.

7.The respondents/plaintiffs utterly failed to substantiate the plea of amanat. No documentary evidence, such as any receipt or writing, was produced. PW-2 (plaintiff No.1), in unequivocal terms, admitted that no amandari receipt was ever executed. This admission is fatal to the case of the plaintiffs.

8.In ordinary human conduct, entrustment of valuable immovable property without any documentation is highly improbable. The oral assertions of the plaintiffs, unsupported by contemporaneous record, do not meet the evidentiary threshold required to rebut a registered revenue entry. The learned Courts below, by placing reliance on such uncorroborated assertions, fell into a manifest error. In this regard reliance is placed on the judgment of august court rendered in case titled Ashiq Muhammad and others versus Mst. Suhagan (2023 SCMR 1171), wherein it was held that:- “5. Additionally, the respondent has set up a case that she had leased out the subject property to the appellant through an oral lease (mustajri) agreement and the lease money was being paid to her regularly. However, she admitted in her cross-examination that she has no proof or receipt to show that any lease (mustajri) money was ever paid by the appellant. Beside, the evidence produced by the

respondent to prove that the subject land was given to appellant on lease (mustajri), does not inspire confidence as the respondent in her deposition very categorically asserted that she herself entered into a lease (mustajri) agreement with the respondent and that there were no witnesses of lease whereas PW-2 in his cross-examination stated that the terms of lease (mustajri) agreement were settled in his as well as his brother Ghulam Shah's presence. Consequently, the findings of the trial Court as well as the appellate Court were dell founded on facts and law and the setting aside of such concurrent findings by the High Court while exercising its revisional jurisdiction could not be sustained.”

9.The mutation in question was attested on 11.12.1991, whereas the suit was instituted on 23.08.2006 after an inordinate delay of approximately fifteen years. The respondents attempted to overcome this delay by alleging fraud and late knowledge.

10.It is a settled principle that fraud must be specifically pleaded and strictly proved. The record, however, is devoid of any cogent evidence to substantiate such plea. PW-2 stated that his father had died about eight years earlier and that he gained knowledge of the mutation only fifteen months prior to filing of the suit. This assertion is not only self-serving but also contrary to the surrounding circumstances, particularly when the

mutation remained intact in the revenue record for years.

11.In absence of proof of fraud, the case squarely falls within the ambit of Article 18 of the Limitation Act, and the suit was hopelessly time- barred. The learned Courts below misdirected themselves by overlooking this legal bar. In this regard reliance is placed on the judgment of apex court rendered in case titled Mst. Rabia Gula and others versus Muhammad Janan and others (2022 SCMR 1009), wherein it was held that:- “8.1 First and foremost, the bar of limitation applies to the challenge made by the respondent to the gift mutation of 1977 after a period of 32 years, as concurrently held by the trial and appellate courts. The said findings of the two courts have not been addressed by the Revisional Court in the impugned judgment. 8.2 The respondent was claiming his right over the Suit Property No.1 based on his inheritance from the estate of his father, and challenged the gift mutation, essentially on the ground that the same was the result of fraud, and asserted that he gained knowledge thereof some days before the institution of the suit. However, neither in the plaint nor in the evidence, did the respondent assert that his father, the purported donor, who remained alive for about 23 years after sanction of the gift mutation, was not aware of the gift mutation and thus could not challenge the same during his lifetime. This omission on the part of the respondent, to our mind, was crucial and in fact, defeats the very legal basis upon which he could

have saved his claim from the bar of limitation.

8.3 Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1908 ("Limitation Act") is the most pivotal provision providing relief in computing the limitation period, applicable to a person who claims to be deprived of the knowledge of his right to sue based on the fraud of the other party. That section is reproduced for ease of reference:

18.Effect of fraud. Where any person having a right to institute a suit or make an application has, by means of fraud, been kept from the knowledge of such right or of the title on which it is founded, or where any document necessary to establish such right has been fraudulently concealed from him, the time limited for instituting a suit or making an application---

(a)against the person guilty of the fraud or accessory thereto, or (b) against any person claiming through him otherwise than in good faith and for a valuable consideration, shall be computed from the time when the fraud first became known to the person injuriously affected thereby, or, in the case of the concealed document, when he first had the means of producing it or compelling its production. In essence, this provision postpones the commencement of the limitation period in cases where a person is by means of fraud kept from the knowledge of his right to institute a suit. In such circumstances, the period of limitation commences from the date when the fraud first became known to the "person injuriously affected". Such injuriously affected person can, therefore, institute a suit within the limitation period specified for such suit in the First Schedule ("Schedule") to the Limitation Act, but computing it from the date when he first had knowledge of the fraud, whereby he was kept from

knowledge of his right to institute the suit. Thus, section 18 of Limitation Act is an umbrella provision that makes the limitation period mentioned in the Articles of the Schedule, begin to run from the time different from that specified therein.1 8.4 It is but fundamental to appreciate that the "fraud" stated in section 18 of the Limitation Act must not be confused with the fraud that constitutes cause of action, and creates a right to institute the suit for the relief prayed therein. The "fraud" envisaged in section 18 only relates to concealing, not creating, the right to sue, and thus affects only the limitation period, and has nothing to do with the cause of action and the relief prayed.2 8.5 It would, thus, be safe to hold that, when despite obtaining knowledge of such fraud and his right to sue, as mentioned in section 18, the injuriously affected person does not institute the suit within the prescribed limitation period, no fresh period of limitation can be available to his legal heir(s) or any other person who derives his right to sue from or through him (the injuriously affected person);3 for once the limitation period begins to run, it does not stop as per section 9 of the Limitation Act.

8.6 Further, the definition of the term "plaintiff", as given in section 2(8) of the Limitation Act also has the effect of barring the fresh start of the limitation period for the legal heir(s) or any other person, who derives his right to sue from or through such injuriously affected person, as it provides that "plaintiff" includes any person from or through whom a plaintiff derives his right to sue. 8.7 Therefore, it is the date of knowledge of the "person injuriously affected" of the fraud mentioned in section 18, and of his right to sue that is relevant for computing the limitation period, not of his legal

heir(s), unless he asserts and prove that his predecessor (the person injuriously affected) never came to know of the fraud, whereby his right to institute the suit was concealed, in his lifetime; in the latter eventuality, it is, of course, the knowledge of the present plaintiff (his successor) that would be the starting point for the limitation to run.

8.8 Needless to mention that, a plaintiff who wants to avail the benefit of section 18 of the Limitation Act must assert the commission of such fraud by the defendant, in the plaint, and should also give the particulars thereof, and the date of knowledge, as required under Rule 4 of Order VI of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, and then prove the same through positive evidence.4 8.9 In the present case, the "person injuriously affected" by the alleged fraud (if it were committed) in getting the gift mutation sanctioned was the respondent's father, Mawaz Khan (the purported donor). The respondent derived his right to institute the suit to challenge the gift mutation from his father, being his legal heir. It is, therefore, the date of the knowledge of his father, not of the respondent that is the starting point for computing the limitation period of six years provided in Article 120 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act - the residuary Article applicable to suits instituted, under section 42 of the Specific Relief Act 1877 ("Specific Relief Act"), for declaration of any right as to any property. 8.10 In this regard, we note that the respondent (plaintiff) did not assert in the plaint that the appellants (defendants), by means of fraud, kept Mawaz Khan, his father (the person injuriously affected) from the knowledge of his right to institute the suit to challenge the gift mutation, during his life, nor did he give the particulars thereof; what to say of proving the same. Furthermore, we

note that the respondent (plaintiff) did not assert any such fraud of the appellants even against himself, and give any date of his attaining knowledge of such fraud and his right to institute the suit. Therefore, the benefit of section 18 of the Limitation Act for computing the limitation period for instituting the suit to challenge the gift mutation cannot be extended to the respondent (plaintiff).

8.11 Thus, the limitation period of six years provided in Article 120 of the Limitation Act is to be computed from the time mentioned in the said Article, that is, when the right to sue accrued. It reads:

Description of suit.

Period of limitation.

Time from which period begins to run.

120.Suit for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in this schedule.

Six years.

When the right to sue accrues. The provision clearly declares that for computing the limitation, the period of six years would commence from the date of accrual of right to sue, but it does not state when such right accrues. To ascertain, when does the right to sue accrue to a donor, to seek a declaration of his ownership right over the property shown to have been gifted and of his such right not to be affected by the gift mutation, we have to consider another provision of law, that is, section 42 of the Specific Relief Act. 8.12 A suit for declaration of any right, as to any property is filed under section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, which reads:

42.Discretion of Court as to declaration of status or right--- Any person entitled to any legal character, or to any right as to any property, may institute a suit against any person denying, or interested to deny, his title to such character or

right, and the Court may in its discretion make therein a declaration that he is so entitled, and the plaintiff need not in such suit ask for any further relief:

Provided that no Court shall make any such declaration where the plaintiff, being able to seek further relief than a mere declaration of title, omits to do so.

(Emphasis added) It becomes evident by reading the above provisions that the right to sue accrues to a person against the other for declaration of his right, as to any property, when the latter denies or is interested to deny his such right. It thus postulates two actions that cause the accrual of right to sue, to an aggrieved person:

(i)actual denial of his right or (ii) apprehended or threatened denial of his right.

8.13 Now, what "actions" can be termed as an "actual denial of right", and what a mere "apprehended or threatened denial of right", in the context of adverse entries recorded in the revenue record. It is important to note that a person may ignore an "apprehended or threatened denial" of his right taking it not too serious to dispel that by seeking a declaration of his right through instituting a suit, and may exercise his option to institute the suit, when he feels it necessary to do so, to protect his right. For this reason, every "apprehended or threatened denial" of right gives a fresh cause of action and right to sue to the person aggrieved of such apprehension or threat. However, this option to delay the filing of the suit is not available to him in case of "actual denial" of his right; where if he does not challenge the action of actual denial of his right, despite having knowledge thereof, by seeking declaration of his right within the limitation period provided in the Limitation Act, then

his right to do so becomes barred by law of limitation.

8.14 Admittedly, entries in the revenue record do not create or extinguish proprietary rights. Such an entry may at most be termed as a mere "apprehended or threatened denial" of right, and not an "actual denial" of right. Accordingly, every new adverse entry in the revenue record relating to proprietary rights of a person in possession (actual or constructive) of the land regarding which the wrong entry is made, gives to such person, a fresh cause of action to institute the suit for declaration.

8.15 The situation is, however, different in a case where the beneficiary of an entry in the revenue record also takes over the possession of the land on the basis of sale or gift transaction, as the case may be, recorded in that entry. His action of taking over possession of the land in pursuance of the purported sale or gift is certainly an "actual denial" of the proprietary rights of the purported seller or donor. Therefore, in such a case, if the purported seller or donor does not challenge that action of "actual denial" of his right, within the prescribed limitation period, despite having knowledge thereof, then his right to do so becomes barred by law of limitation.

8.16 In the present case, as per the revenue record and other evidence, the appellants, the purported donees, took over possession of the Suit Property No. 1 on the basis of gift transaction recorded in the gift mutation since the date of sanction of the gift mutation, that is, 29.04.1977. Their act of taking over possession was an "actual denial" of the proprietary rights of the purported donor, therefore, it was necessary for the purported donor to challenge the gift mutation (if it had been got sanctioned fraudulently)

within the limitation period of six years provided in Article 120 or to seek recovery of the possession of the Suit Property No.1 within the limitation period of twelve years as provided in Article 142 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, from that date. Mawaz Khan, the donor, did not opt for any of the two, and allowed both possibly applicable periods of limitation to lapse during his lifetime, since he died in the year 2000 after about 23 years of the said act of taking over possession of the Property No.1 by the appellants. Therefore, no fresh limitation period could be made available to his legal heir, the respondent. Thus, the challenge made by the respondent in 2009 to the gift mutation of 1977, based on his inheritance rights from Mawaz Khan, was clearly barred by time, as concurrently held by the trial and appellate courts, especially when the respondent is not found entitled to the benefit of section 18 of the Limitation Act. This crucial issue was not addressed by the Revisional Court in the impugned judgment, hence, it warrants interference by this Court in its appellate jurisdiction, in the interest of justice. A reasonable and natural gift 8.17 Although we need not look into the merits of the gift transaction and gift mutation that followed, as the very suit to their extent has been held to be barred by law of limitation, yet we, in the peculiar circumstances of the case, are constrained to note that the gift transaction recorded in the impugned gift mutation, as appropriately held by the appellate court, appears to be reasonable and natural in the facts and circumstances of the case; where a father, whose son had contracted a second marriage, transferred some of his property to his first daughter- in-law, who also happened to be his niece, and to his granddaughters to

ensure their financial security, out of his love and affection for them.”

Further reliance is placed on the judgment of Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan rendered in case titled Haji Muhammad Younas deceased through Legal Heirs versus Mst.

Farukh Sultan and others (2022 SCMR 1282).

12.Another significant aspect is that the predecessor-in-interest of the respondents, who allegedly executed the transaction, never challenged the mutation during his lifetime. This omission is of considerable legal consequence.

13.The successors cannot be permitted to agitate a claim which their predecessor, being fully competent, chose not to assert. The belated challenge, without any plausible explanation, undermines the credibility of the plaintiffs’ case and affects their locus standi. The learned Courts below failed to assign due weight to this crucial circumstance. In this regard reliance is placed on the judgment of apex court rendered in case titled Ghulam Mustafa versus Mst. Mah Begum and others (2024 SCMR 795), wherein it was held that:-

“4. The perusal of the records reveals that the appellant, while testifying as a witness, explicitly admitted the following: the

sanctioning of Mutation No. 653 in Khasra 314 in the year 1984; that in Khasra No. 316, vide mutation No. 591 dated 07.07.1982, the predecessor in interest of respondents No. 1 to 7 mutated land in favour of Respondents Nos. 12 to 15 and Respondents Nos. 16 and 17, and the Respondents Nos. 8 and 26, respectively, and that too, when his father was still alive; further during the course of his cross- examination, the appellant acknowledged the sale of half share in Khasra 316 by both him and the predecessors-in-interest of respondents Nos. 32 to 37; he also admitted that a specific portion of the property underwent partition between his father and the predecessors-in-interest of respondents. In addition to the above admissions, what is also pertinent to note that the appellant in 1994 had initiated a civil suit, seeking a decree for declaration, partition, and possession concerning Khasras 274 and 275. However, concerning the partition, the appellant did not pursue a claim for the remaining property. In the same year 1994, the appellant and the predecessors in interest of respondents Nos. 32 to 37 lodged an application against mutation 653, which was subsequently dismissed.”

In the same judgment the apex court further held that:-

“7. Regarding the accrual of cause of action and the application of the law of limitation in suits for declaration, the Supreme Court, in the case of Salamat Ali v. Muhammad Din (PLD 2022 SC 353), elucidated the distinction between cases where the cause of action stems from an "apprehended/threatened denial"

and those rooted in an "actual denial". The Court affirmed that: - "26. What "actions" can be termed as an "actual denial of right", and what a mere "apprehended or threatened denial of right", in the context of adverse entries recorded in the revenue record, is a question that requires consideration. Admittedly, entries in the revenue record do not create or extinguish proprietary rights. Such an entry may at most be termed as a mere "apprehended or threatened denial" of right, and not an "actual denial" of right. Accordingly, every new adverse entry in the revenue record relating to proprietary rights of a person in possession (actual or constructive) of the land regarding which the wrong entry is made, gives to such person, a fresh cause of action to institute the suit for declaration. The situation is, however, different in a case where the person in possession (actual or constructive) of the land regarding which the wrong entry is made, is ousted from such possession, besides a wrong entry in the revenue record. In such a case, the act of ousting him from the actual or constructive possession of the land, constitutes an "actual denial" of his rights, and does not remain a mere "apprehended or threatened denial"." (Emphasis added) 8. A co-owner of the joint property who, despite possessing knowledge of an "actual denial of his right", refrains from challenging the said invasion of his right within the stipulated period of limitation, is denuded of the right to challenge the same. Similarly, in cases of joint property, where the third party interest is created and reflected in subsequent revenue records (Jamabandi), the same would not give rise to a renewed cause of action since it amounts to the actual denial of his right, as established in

the precedent of Haji Muhammad Yunis v. Mst. Farukh Sultan (2022

SCMR 1282).

"Considering this legal and factual context, it is imperative to underscore that the legal heirs of a joint property inherently possess the right to assert their claims without constraint by limitation. However, exceptions arise when third-party interests are introduced, and the actual possession of the joint property is transferred to a third party through a transaction with one of the legal heirs/cosharers. In the present case, as asserted by the appellant, the heirs purportedly illicitly transferred their share to a third party through the impugned mutation. Consequently, the period of limitation is triggered in such circumstances, requiring the aggrieved parties to seek remedy within the prescribed twelve-year limitation for the cancellation and possession of the disputed property."

Further reliance is placed on the judgment of this court rendered in case titled Haji Akbar and others versus Jehangir and others (2024 CLC 890 Peshawar), wherein it was held that:- “6. Be that as it may, the learned counsel for petitioners vigorously argued that impugned mutation No.105, dated 07.01.1929 (Ex.PW- 1/20) is illegal being attested at the time when Mir Akbar, predecessor in interest of the petitioners, was minor and; therefore, the same is ineffective upon their rights. It is settled principle of law that a person who is aggrieved from any transaction, which was made during his minority can challenge it under the law within three years, after getting the age of majority. 2022

SCMR 877 Intelligence Bureau Employees Cooperative Housing Society through Secretary v. Shabbir Hussain and others. In the instant case, Mir Akbar, predecessor in interest of the petitioners, died way back in the year 1988, but he did not challenge the impugned sale mutation in his lifetime before any competent court of law, despite having full knowledge of the same, therefore, his legal heirs are precluded to challenge its validity after his death as it is settled that the legal heirs cannot challenge the validity of a mutation, which was not questioned by their predecessor in interest in his / her lifetime. PLD 2023 SC 362 Saadat Khan and others v. Shahid-ur-Rehman and others.

7.Moreso, the inheritance mutation of Mir Akbar was attested in favour of his legal heirs (petitioners) way back in the year 1991, but even after the said date, the petitioners remained silent for long 18 years and filed the instant suit on 19.07.2010, challenging therein, the sale mutation No.105 of the year 1929, which is also hopelessly time barred on this count.

8.So far as the veracity, authenticity and legal value of impugned sale mutation No.105, dated 07.01.1929 is concerned, undoubtedly, an attested mutation cannot be considered as a document of title but simultaneously, when an attested mutation is properly incorporated in the revenue record in subsequent jamabandies for a long period of time, then the presumption of truth is attached thereto unless and until rebutted through cogent, reliable and; confidence inspiring evidence. Record also shows that the impugned mutation was attested by the vendors in favour of sons of Lashkar Khan way back in the year 1929, which is still intact and reflecting in the revenue record,

therefore, presumption of truth is attached thereto in terms of section 52 of the West Pakistan Land Revenue Act, 1969. 2010 SCMR 18 Muhammad Shamim v. Mst. Nisar Fatima.”

Reliance is also placed on the judgment of Lahore High Court rendered in case titled Umar Farooq versus Province of Punjab (2026 CLC 188 Lahore).

14.The learned appellate Court primarily based its findings on the ground that the defendants failed to prove the sale transaction by not producing the Patwari Halqa, Tehsildar, or second marginal witness. While such omissions may affect the defence, they cannot absolve the plaintiffs from discharging their initial burden.

15.It is a cardinal principle of civil jurisprudence that the plaintiff must stand on the strength of his own case and cannot derive benefit from the weakness of the defence. In the present case, the plaintiffs failed to prove the essential ingredient of amanat, hence the burden never shifted in a manner as presumed by the Courts below.

16.The impugned judgments reflect clear misreading and non-reading of material evidence.

The admissions of the plaintiffs regarding transfer

and possession, the absence of documentary proof of entrustment, the unexplained delay, and the conduct of the predecessor were either ignored or improperly appreciated. In this regard reliance is placed on the judgment of apex court rendered in case titled Mst. Faheeman Begum (deceased) through L.Rs and others versus Islam-ud-Din (deceased) through L.Rs and others (2023 SCMR 1402) wherein it was held that:-

“5. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellants and carefully examined the available record, along with the concurrent findings of the lower fora. The impugned judgment clearly reflects that the High Court has properly scrutinized the evidence adduced by the parties and the Judgments and Decrees of the lower Courts and, after proper application of mind, has reached a just and equitable conclusion. For ease of reference the operative paragraphs of the impugned judgment are reproduced hereunder:

"5. It was claim of the respondent- plaintiff Faheeman Begum that in fact no Tamleek was made in favour of the petitioners and the mutation No.260 dated 29.12.1981 was based on fraud, misrepresentation and collusion. After such allegation, the petitioners were under burden to prove valid Execution of said mutation, for which they produced Allah Bukhsh (D.W.1) Lumberdar, Jumma Shah (D.W.2) Tehsildar, Mumtaz Hussain Patwari (D.W.4), Sardar Yar Muhammad Buzdar Assistant Commissioner (D.W.5), Muhammad Shafi retired Patwari

(D.W.6) and one of the petitioners- defendants Islam-Ud-Din as D.W.3; they all have supported the stance take up by the petitioners and have deposed that the mutation on Tamleek was executed in accordance with law and Mst. Ghausan while appearing before the revenue officer got the same executed. All the witnesses remained affirm on material points. It has come on record that Mst. Ghausan remained alive for a considerable time but in her life time she did not ever challenge the veracity and legality of mutation in dispute; thus, as per ratio of judgment reported as Abdul Haq and another v. Mst. Surrya Begum and others (2002 SCMR 1330) the respondent-plaintiff Mst. Faheeman Begum had no locus standi to call into question the same while filing suit as admittedly the said mutation has been given effect in the revenue record. Same is the position in esteemed judgment reported as Muhammad Rustam and another v. Mst. Makhan Jan and others (2013

SCMR 299)= (PLJ 2013 SC 96).

Apart from this, the respondent- plaintiff Mst. Faheeman Begum has neither described the ingredients of fraud in plaint as required by Order VI, Rule 4 of the C.P.C. nor proved the same as to how the petitioners committed fraud; as against this, as stated above, the petitioners produced all the relevant witnesses in the witness box to prove the valid execution of mutation in their favour. They are in possession of the disputed property and nothing is on record to suggest that they ever paid share of produce to the respondent(s) plaintiff(s), rather it has been proved on record that donor and donees appeared before the concerned authorities and mutation of Tamleek was entered and attested in accordance with law. Reliance is placed on Taj

Muhammad Khan through and another v. Mst. Munawar Jan and 2 others (2009 SCMR 598).

Moreover, the mutation in dispute was executed on 29.12.1981, whereas the suit was instituted on 03.05.1997, which was badly barred by limitation." (emphasis supplied by us).”

17.Such misappreciation of evidence has resulted in grave miscarriage of justice, warranting interference by this Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction.

18.In the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, this Court is satisfied that the respondents/plaintiffs failed to prove their claim, while the learned Courts below erred in law and on facts in decreeing the suit.

19.Consequently, the instant civil revision petition is allowed. The impugned judgments and decrees passed by the learned trial Court as well as the learned appellate Court are hereby set aside, and the suit filed by the

respondents/plaintiffs stands dismissed.

0.Announced:

Aftab PS*/ JUDGE