Mst. Fatima & others Vs Rahim Ullah & others

JUDGMENT SHEET

IN THE PESHAWAR HIGH COURT,

MINGORA BENCH (DAR-UL-QAZA), SWAT

(Judicial Department) W.P No. 342-M/2024

Mst. Fatima & another Vs. Rahim Ullah & others

For petitioner: Mr. Akhtar Munir, Advocate For respondent: Ex parte Research Mr. Qaiser Abbas, former Research Officer, Supreme Court of Pakistan.

Dr. Mazhar Ali Khan, Sr. Research & Reference Officer, Peshawar High Court.

Date of hearing: 09.02.2026

JUDGMENT

Dr. Khurshid Iqbal, J.-

1.Through the instant petition under Article 199 of the Constitution, the petitioners have assailed, to the extent indicated herein, the judgments and decrees, dated 15.05.2023 and 29.03.2024, passed by the learned Family Court, as well as the appellate Court, respectively.

2.The learned Family Court decreed: (i) dissolution of marriage between the parties on the basis of divorce already pronounced, (ii) maintenance of wife (petitioner No. 1) at the rate of Rs. 1,000 per month and minor daughter (petitioner No. 2) at the rate of Rs. 2,000 per month for the past seven months, and Rs. 5,000 for the future with annual increase, and (iii) dowry articles as per list annexed with the plaint. However, the claim for dower was dismissed on the premise that it stood paid through a Dispute Resolution Council (DRC), and the claim regarding parental gold ornaments was also declined. The learned appellate court enhanced maintenance allowance for petitioner No. 1 to Rs. 3,000 per month, while maintaining the remainder.

3.The brief background is that the parties entered into matrimonial bond with dower fixed at three tolas of gold ornaments. It is the case of petitioner No. 1 that at the time of her departure to the matrimonial home, three tolas of gold ornaments were with her as dower, and half tola of gold ornaments were given by her parents. It is alleged that her husband Page 1 of 13

(respondent) forcibly took possession of the said ornaments, later returned only one quarter tola, and unlawfully retained the remaining ornaments. A minor daughter, petitioner No. 2, was born out of the wedlock. The petitioner No. 1 further alleges that she was subjected to violence and ultimately turned out from the matrimonial home along with the minor child about seven months prior to institution of the suit, and that the respondent neither maintained them nor bore medical expenses nor inquired after their welfare despite interventions. On such premises, she instituted the suit seeking dissolution, recovery of dower and dowry articles, medical expenses, and past as well as future maintenance.

4.The respondent initially remained absent; ex parte proceedings followed. Upon his application, the ex parte decree was set aside and he filed written statement, denying second marriage, and asserting that the dower of three tolas of gold ornaments had already been paid through the DRC at Police Station Kokarai, vide compromise deed No. 134 dated 02.07.2020 along with an amount of Rs. 30,000. He admitted dowry articles but disputed their quantum. He also resisted past maintenance on the plea that the petitioner No. 1 had left the matrimonial home without his permission.

5.Pre-trial reconciliation was undertaken by the learned Family Court but failed. Issues were framed and evidence was directed. After partial evidence, the respondent absented himself, whereupon ex parte proceedings were again initiated. The suit was partially decreed vide ex parte judgment and decree dated 15.05.2023. The appeal met the fate with modification to the extent of already noted. Hence the present petition.

6.Learned counsel for the petitioners was heard and the record perused. This Court remains mindful of the fact that constitutional jurisdiction is not a substitute for a regular appeal on facts. However, where findings are founded upon misreading or non-reading of material evidence, where legally unproved material is treated as determinative, or where statutory and contractual entitlements are defeated by an approach inconsistent with settled jurisprudence, the supervisory jurisdiction is properly invoked to prevent a miscarriage of justice.

7.The central reason for declining dower before the courts below is the purported DRC settlement. The manner in which this document has Page 2 of 13

been used to defeat dower reflects a fundamental inversion of burden and a dilution of proof standards. Dower is not a ceremonial formality. It is a binding legal obligation and an essential component of the marriage contract. The Hon‘ble Supreme Court has reaffirmed that the Nikah Nama is a civil contract and that its terms must be approached by ascertaining the parties‘ intention, not by mechanical assumptions.1 Where payment is pleaded, it is a plea of discharge. The party asserting discharge must prove actual payment and lawful satisfaction, especially where the beneficiary repudiates receipt. A court cannot allow a claimed discharge to rest on a paper whose making, voluntariness, and procedural regularity are themselves doubtful.

8.On the evidence, the petitioner No. 1categorically denied receipt of three tolas of gold ornaments and the amount of Rs. 30,000, while admitting receipt of parental half tola of gold ornament. A marginal witness of the purported settlement appeared as PW-2, and admitted witnessing payment of the remaining amount of Rs. 20,000 to petitioner No. 1 wife, but no question regarding payment of dower ornaments was put to him, despite the petitioner No. 1‘s specific stance that her dower had been forcibly taken by the husband. The courts below treated a portion of testimony of PW-2 as an admission of payment, yet failed to consider the subsequent and material part of his deposition that the dower was utilised for purchase of a vehicle by the husband, and that he had not read the DRC settlement, and that thereafter they approached the office of the DPO and were advised to seek remedy through court. This was not a peripheral detail. It directly undermined the inference of discharge.

9.Most significantly, the Chairman of the DRC, examined as DW-4, stated that he was not present during the settlement proceedings due to a road accident and that he later signed the document at his house. No other member of the council was produced. In such circumstances, and particularly where voluntariness, meaningful participation, and procedural regularity are in serious doubt, the so called settlement could not be accorded probative value to defeat a wife‘s dower claim. Thumb impressions on a document do not, by themselves, establish informed consent, do not prove the reality of payment of the disputed subject matter, Muhammad Yousaf v. Huma Saeed and others (2024 SCMR 1078).

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and do not cure foundational defects in the manner of the document‘s execution. A court must be especially cautious where an informal settlement paper is invoked to extinguish a woman‘s financial entitlement, for the law‘s insistence on proof is itself a safeguard against coerced or manufactured discharge.

10.The conclusion drawn by the courts below that thumb impressions on the DRC document ipso facto proved full payment of dower along with Rs. 30,000 is thus a misreading of evidence and an unwarranted leap from form to substance. On the record, it stands established that the wife voluntarily admitted receipt of parental half tola ornament, but did not admit receipt of dower of three tolas of gold ornaments. The finding that dower stood paid is, therefore, unsustainable. Petitioner No. 1 is held entitled to recovery of dower amounting to three tolas of gold ornaments. The parental gold ornament weighing half tola is held to have been received by petitioner No. 1 in view of her voluntary admission.

11.This conclusion is also consistent with the broader interpretive discipline articulated by superior courts on Nikah Nama obligations. The Hon‘ble Supreme Court has cautioned against a mechanical approach to marriage contract entries and has emphasised that dower obligations must be enforced with due regard to intention and social realities.2 Likewise, where ambiguity exists in contractual terms, particularly where the wife may not have exercised meaningful participation in drafting of settlement, ambiguity cannot be construed to her detriment and the benefit of doubt must go in favour of the wife, applying the rule of contra proferentem where appropriate.3 Although the present case concerns discharge rather than construction of the dower clause, the same rights-protective interpretive sensibility applies. A court should not allow a doubtful paper arrangement to dilute a clear dower entitlement.

12.The next limb of the case concerns maintenance. The learned Family Court declined adequate maintenance on the ground that Nikah Nama was not produced. This approach is misconceived. The husband admitted the marriage in written statement, and the minor child is not Haseen Ullah v. Mst. Naheed Begum and others (PLD 2022 Supreme Court 686).

Muhammad Yousaf v. Huma Saeed and others (2024 SCMR 1078). Contra proferentem— (Latin: ̳against the party making or alleging. Against the guarantor‘. In a contract, an ambiguous term shall be interpreted against the one who offers it. See, Prem & Shahray‘s Judicial Dictionary of Words ad Phrases, Thomson Reuters, 2016, p1136.

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disputed. Once the marital bond and the parent-child relationship stand admitted, the obligation to maintain follows as a legal duty. Under the Muslim personal law, maintenance of the wife is a binding obligation upon the husband during the subsistence of a valid marriage, and it does not depend on any express stipulation at the time of Nikah.4 The decisive inquiry is whether the wife is willing to discharge marital obligations and whether separate residence is attributable to the husband‘s own act, omission, cruelty, neglect, or other constraining circumstances.5

13.Here, the wife‘s consistent stance is that she was subjected to violence and ousted along with the minor. The husband‘s plea is that she left without permission. In such controversy, courts must decide on the civil standard, viz., balance of probabilities. The Hon‘ble Supreme Court has cautioned that family courts must evaluate the wife‘s testimony in her own words along with surrounding circumstances, and must not insist on stereotyped corroboration as a condition for belief.6 It has further emphasised that maintenance is a statutory obligation during the subsistence of marriage and not a reward, and that conclusions must be rooted in evidence and probabilities, not in presumptions that nullify the obligation.7 Equally, it is settled that where the wife is ousted and her assertion remains unrebutted, maintenance becomes payable from the date of ouster for so long as the marital bond subsists8, and constrained separate residence does not, by itself, disentitle a wife from sustenance.9

14.Conversely, the law also recognises that where a wife deliberately withdraws from cohabitation without just cause, refuses to return despite bona fide reconciliation efforts, and fails to prove allegations of ouster or cruelty, she may be disentitled to past maintenance.10 However, such disentitlement must rest on a reasoned factual finding on balance of probabilities, and not on pejorative stereotyping or a mechanical equation of separate residence with misconduct.11 The present record, as summarised, does not support a reasoned finding of unjustified withdrawal. Rather, the wife‘s assertion of ouster and neglect was not Haseen Ullah supra note 2.

Ibid.

Dr. Seema Hanif Khan v. Waqas Khan and others (2025 SCP 392).

Ibid.

Usman Khan v. Mst. Shehla Gul (2020 CLC 910).

Pervez Laghari v. Mst. Naseema (2021 YLR 2057).

Mst. Safina Noor v. Muhammad Ayub (2023 CLC 244); Sobia Hina v. Additional District Judge, Rajanpur (2017 YLRN 316); Muhammad Saeed v. Additional District Judge (2019 CLC 1008).

Dr. Seema Hanif Khan, supra note. 6 Page 5 of 13

effectively rebutted, and the husband repeatedly absented himself at the trial stage, thereby leaving the material stance unrebutted on the civil standard.

15.Maintenance, however, must be realistic. The amounts fixed by the learned Family Court, and even as enhanced by the learned appellate court, are plainly inadequate in the prevailing economic context. Maintenance is meant to secure subsistence and dignified living, especially for a minor child whose welfare is a present and continuing right. Courts are entitled to take judicial notice of inflationary trends and erosion of purchasing power. A maintenance figure that is illusory in effect undermines the right in substance.

16.Accordingly, maintenance is enhanced and fixed at Rs. 5,000 per month for petitioner No. 1, and Rs. 7,000 per month for petitioner No. 2, both for past as well as future periods, with an annual increase of 10 percent to reasonably offset inflation. The amount already paid, if any, shall be adjusted.

17.While examining the record, it has also emerged that certain questions were put to the wife and her brother touching alleged conduct of a non-party relative and other insinuations having no nexus with any fact in issue. Such questioning was irrelevant and scandalous. The duty of the court to control cross-examination is a duty anchored in law and fortified by constitutional command. The court must forbid indecent, scandalous, insulting, or needlessly harassing questions which are not shown to be necessary for determining facts in issue, or which are designed to humiliate. This is integral to fair trial and to Article 14 of the Constitution which guarantees the dignity of man.

18.This constitutional understanding is further reinforced by Islamic ethical and legal norms that inform the social order and the administration of justice. The Quran describes spouses as garments for one another12, a relationship signifying protection, privacy, and mutual covering, not exposure and public shaming. In the same moral register, Islamic teachings command husn al-muasharah, and discourage suspicion, backbiting, and the spreading of allegations that corrode honour and family bonds. These principles do not displace legal tests. They illuminate the purposes of legal Al-Baqarah, 2:187.

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safeguards that protect privacy and restrain humiliation in judicial proceedings. Consistently with this, the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 recognises privileged communications between spouses during marriage, reflecting a deliberate policy choice that certain communications within marriage are protected from compulsory disclosure. The same jurisprudential sensibility applies, with equal force, to scandalous cross- examination that attempts to pierce privacy and dignity without lawful relevance or necessity. The Hon‘ble Supreme Court‘s insistence that family adjudication be free from stigma and degrading assumptions further anchors this duty of process-control.13

19.The impact of scandalous questioning is not confined to the immediate lis. Such questioning tends to sow seeds of hatred, social degradation, and lasting resentment within families and communities. It normalises public shaming as a forensic tactic. It also risks long term harm to minors, who are often the silent stakeholders in family litigation. The well being of a child is not merely about financial provision. It is also about emotional security, stability, and freedom from stigma. When the judicial forum is allowed to become a theatre of humiliation, the harm radiates beyond the parties, affecting inter-generational relationships, the child‘s sense of identity, and the possibility of future reconciliation.

20.This highlights an essential feature of the Family Courts Act, 1964 regime. Family Courts are not ordinary civil courts in manner and purpose. Their primary statutory orientation is to promote reconciliation and settlement of family disputes through pre-trial efforts and a less formal procedure, so that family conflicts are resolved with speed, fairness, and minimum bitterness. Adjudication remains available and necessary when settlement fails, but the process must still reflect the distinctive family court ethos. The objective is to resolve, not to rupture; to restore rights and stability, not to deepen hostility; and to secure lawful entitlements without degrading those who seek relief.

21.The facts of the present case also warrant placing legal restraint upon DRC proceedings in family disputes by construing Section 73 of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Police Act, 2017, in a constitutionally harmonious manner. Section 73 is textually framed as an enabling provision Dr. Seema Hanif Khan, supra note 6.

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authorising the Provincial Police Officer, ―for out of Court amicable settlement of petty nature cases‖, to constitute Dispute Resolution Councils at District, Sub-Division or Police Station level, with composition and procedure ―as may be prescribed‖. Read with the preambular orientation of the Act towards service-oriented policing, community participation, and maintenance of public order, the provision is purposive in design and facilitative in character. It creates a civic de- escalation space within the police framework for voluntary compromise of minor disputes that affect social amity or may otherwise provoke petty criminality. It does not, on its language, employ the vocabulary of adjudication, jurisdiction, determination of rights, enforceable decrees, or binding orders in the judicial sense.

22.The provision needs to be understood from the perspective of its purpose in the context of the 2017 Police Act. In purposive interpretation, the judicial task is not to treat legal language as an end in itself, but to construe the text as an instrument through which law pursues its ends within a constitutional democracy.14 Purposive interpretation is a comprehensive approach in which the interpreter selects, from among the legally available meanings of a text, the meaning that best realises the purpose the text is designed to serve, while maintaining fidelity to the institutional limits of adjudication.15 In this view, ―purpose‖ is not reduced to a psychological inquiry into a drafter‘s mind. It is a legal construction that integrates subjective elements, meaning the author‘s intent, and objective elements, meaning the values and functions the legal system expects the text to advance.16 The subjective purpose reflects, at different levels of abstraction, the intention of the text‘s creator and is to be gathered from material legitimately bearing upon what the author sought to achieve. The objective purpose, by contrast, comprises the values, goals, interests, policies, aims, and functions that the text should actualise in a democracy, also operating at different levels of generality, from concrete regulatory aims to foundational constitutional values.17 Meera Shafi v. Ali Zarar, (PLD 2023 SC 211). Citing Ahron Barak‘s The Judge in a Democracy, the august Court explains that in a constitutional democracy, ―[t]he role of a judge is to understand the purpose of law in the society and help the law achieve it purpose‖ (para. 7).

Aharon Barak, Purposive Interpretation in Law, trans. Sari Bashi (Princeton University Press, 2005) pp. 88–90.

Ibid. p 88.

17 Ibid.

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23.Barak explains that purposive interpretation proceeds through interlocking components: language, purpose, and judicial discretion. Language sets the range of semantic possibilities, purpose supplies the normative direction, and discretion operates within the semantic range to select the meaning that best realizes the purpose. This structure makes plain that purposive interpretation is not a licence to disregard text. It begins with the semantic boundaries of the enacted words, and only then asks which of the available meanings best fulfils the law‘s purpose. The outer boundary is the language itself. Barak expresses this limit in the formulation that ―interpretation ends at the point at which language ends‖.18 The same discipline is reinforced by his account of institutional legitimacy: the principle of separation of powers legitimates the judicial role in interpretation. While ―judges may not create a new legal text‖19, they shall ―fill in the gaps‖, as Denning ruled in Seaford Court Estate (1949), to fathom the purpose of a statute in the given social conditions.20 Within the semantic range, discretion is not an embarrassment to be concealed, but a feature to be regulated. The interpreter may need to exercise discretion in determining the limits of language, in evaluating the competing indications of subjective and objective purpose, and in selecting the meaning that best realises the overall purpose.21 Purposive interpretation is holistic rather than sequential: interpretive presumptions, subjective and objective, apply from the outset and accompany the analysis to its conclusion.22 Context is disciplined by purpose, in the sense that the goal of interpretation determines which context is relevant, so that the interpreter focuses on the context that assists in realising the legitimate purpose of the text.23 This framework offers a disciplined pathway between rigid literalism and free ranging creativity, insisting on fidelity to semantic limits while selecting, within those limits, the meaning that best realises the law‘s purpose.24

24.Where a statutory provision is amenable to more than one construction, the court must, as a first principle, prefer the construction that preserves constitutionality, coherence with the legal system, and the Ibid. p 18.

Ibid. p 16.

Seaford Estate Ltd., v. Asher [1949] 2 KB 481.

Barak. p 92.

Ibid. p 93.

Ibid. p 102.

Ibid. p 16, 18, 88-93, 102.

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functional integrity of the statute, rather than an expansive interpretation that pushes the provision into conflict with the constitutional structure. This is the settled discipline of purposive interpretation and narrow construction in our jurisdiction.25 Comparative authority similarly cautions that a focused interpretation is legitimate to make a provision workable and constitutional, but it cannot be used as a cloak for judicial legislation by adding words not found in the text.26 It is also a requirement of purposive construction that when the court is confronted with two seemingly conflicting provisions, whether within the same statute or across different enactments, it must interpret one without sacrificing the other. Unless a special provision expressly prevails over a general one under the rule of generalia specialibus non derogant, the court is under a duty to construe such provisions harmoniously. Given that a presumption of constitutionality is attached to the acts of the legislature, this court must strive to infer the true meaning and purpose of the provision by aligning it with the broader legal framework. The objective is to save the overall intent of the legislature through an interpretation that maintains statutory equilibrium and avoids an unnecessary collision with constitutional mandates.

25.The interpretative technique must, however, remain within constitutional restraint. A focused, purposive interpretation does not license the court to confer upon statutory words a meaning beyond what their language can bear. These limits, articulated in the interpretive theory noted above, align with our constitutional arrangement under Article 175, which separates functions and requires each organ to remain within its assigned sphere, and which not permit the creation of parallel adjudicatory authority through the undue enlargement of executive-led forums.

Arshad Mehmood v. Commissioner/Delimitation Authority, Gujranwala and others (PLD 2014 Lahore 221); Province of Sindh through Chief Secretary and others v. M.Q.M. through Deputy Convener and others (PLD 2014 Supreme Court 531); Messrs Chenone Stores Ltd. through Executive Director (Finance Accounts) v. Federal Board of Revenue through Chairman and 2 others (2012 PTD 1815); Al-Karam CNG and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others (2011 PTD 1); Messrs Elahi Cotton Mills Ltd. and others v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary M/o Finance, Islamabad and 6 others (PLD 1997 Supreme Court 582).

Calcutta Gujarati Education Society and another v. Calcutta Municipal Corporation and others (AIR 2003 SC 4278); Suresh Kumar Koushal and another v. NAZ Foundation and others (2014) 1

SCC 1).

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26.This constitutional restraint is not abstract in our jurisprudence.27 The Hon‘ble Supreme Court has repeatedly treated separation of powers and institutional role fidelity as foundational, warning that encroachment on another organ‘s domain imperils constitutional democracy. 28 The same constitutional logic has been applied, with particular force, to parallel justice structures: bodies such as jirgas or panchayats cannot adjudicate civil rights or criminal guilt; at most they may act as mediation or reconciliation fora where parties willingly consent, because adjudication is a legally chained process of fact finding and application of law which the Constitution and statutes reserve to courts and authorised forums.29

27.In the present context, and for the purpose of clarifying the operational limits of the DRC, section 73 is to be understood in a manner consistent with the principle of separation of powers and the constitutional framework. Properly construed, section 73 authorises the Provincial Police Officer to constitute DRCs only as facilitative, non-coercive, out of court fora for reconciliation in matters of a petty nature, namely, minor disputes of little or inconsiderable importance which affect social amity or are likely to cause provocation leading towards a petty criminal offence. It does not confer adjudicatory competence. A DRC is not a court; it cannot determine civil status or legal liabilities, extinguish statutory obligations, or create binding outcomes that displace the jurisdiction of competent courts or special statutory fora. To construe this provision otherwise would be to transform, albeit inadvertently, an executive-anchored forum into a parallel adjudicatory track, which would be irreconcilable with Article 175 and the constitutional requirement that the adjudication of rights and liabilities be conducted by fora expressly vested with jurisdiction by law. This interpretative clarity is further supported by the internal language and structure of section 73 itself. The statute speaks only of amicable Meera Shafi, supra note 14; JS Bank v. Province of Punjab (2021 SCMR 1617); Tariq Iqbal v. Government of KPK (2019 SCMR 859); Saif-Ur-Rehman v. ADJ (2018 SCMR 1885); Nawaz Chandio v. Ismail Rahu (2016 SCMR 875); Aamer Raza v. Minhaj Ahmad (2012 SCMR 6); Khalid Masood v. Khurshid Begum (2001 SCMR 550); Federation of Pakistan v. Noori Trading Corporation (1992 SCMR 710).

District Bar Association, Rawalpindi and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others (PLD 2015 Supreme Court 401); Messrs Mustafa Impex, Karachi and others v. The Government of Pakistan through Secretary Finance, Islamabad and others (2016 PTD 2269); Jurists Foundation through Chairman v. Federal Government through Secretary, Ministry of Defence and others (PLD 2020 Supreme Court 1); Chief Executive Officer, Multan Electric Power Company Ltd., Khanewal Road, Multan v. Muhammad Ilyas and others (2021 SCMR 775).

National Commission on Status of Women through Chairperson and others v. Government of Pakistan through Secretary Law and Justice and others (PLD 2019 Supreme Court 218); The Province of East Pakistan and others v. Md. Mehdi Ali Khan and others (PLD 1959 Supreme Court 387); S.M. Waseem Ashraf v. Federation of Pakistan (2013 SCMR 338). Page 11 of 13

settlement, confines the field to petty nature cases, and provides an explanation defining petty as small, minor, or of less importance. The semantic content of this definition does not extend to complex, rights- laden disputes involving personal status, dissolution of marriage, dower, maintenance, custody, or guardianship claims, which the legal system treats as serious and subject to specialised judicial safeguards. Thus, maintaining this focused, facilitative interpretation is not an exercise in challenging the statute, but rather an effort to ensure that its application remains within the bounds of its intended legislative purpose and the constitutional scheme of the provision within constitutional bounds.30

28.The deeming proviso to Section 73, which validates previously constituted DRCs and deems their ―actions taken, decisions made or order passed‖ to be valid, must accordingly be understood through the same lens of narrow construction. A deeming clause cannot validate what the Constitution forbids, nor can it be construed as a silent grant of adjudicatory jurisdiction that the primary provision itself does not contain. It is, therefore, to be understood as a saving provision against technical challenges to constitution of these councils, and as validating only bona fide facilitative steps taken within the lawful remit of Section 73. It does not function as an enlargement clause that immunizes conduct exceeding statutory limits or converts mediated outcomes into binding adjudications on substantive rights and liabilities.31 The operational consequence of this focused construction is that a DRC document styled as a settlement cannot, by its mere existence or the presence of thumb impressions, be treated as conclusively extinguishing statutory or legal entitlements, nor can it be permitted to displace the jurisdiction of a competent court to determine rights based on evidence. At most, such material may evidence that reconciliation was attempted and may be considered, if at all, as a piece of material subject to strict proof of authenticity, voluntariness, and lawful scope, while the court retains its exclusive duty to adjudicate rights and liabilities under the governing law. Where parties reach a voluntary understanding, the lawful course is to place it before the competent court Arshad Mehmood v. Commissioner/Delimitation Authority, Gujranwala and others (PLD 2014 Lahore 221); Province of Sindh through Chief Secretary and others v. M.Q.M. through Deputy Convener and others (PLD 2014 Supreme Court 531).

Province of Sindh through Chief Secretary and others v. M.Q.M. through Deputy Convener and others (PLD 2014 Supreme Court 531).

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or forum for appropriate action in accordance with law; Section 73 does not authorise the police framework to substitute that adjudicatory process.

29.In view of the foregoing, Additional Registrar (Judicial) of this Court shall transmit a copy of this judgment to the Inspector General of Police, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Peshawar, for information of all concerned and for necessary compliance, so that appropriate training and guidance is imparted to Chairmen and members of the DRCs to confine their functioning to the statutory remit, and to ensure that proceedings, where held, remain fair, voluntary, and properly documented.

30.Additional Registrar (Judicial) shall also circulate a copy of this judgment to all learned Judges of the Family Courts within the Province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through the Registrar, Peshawar High Court, with the direction that presiding officers shall remain vigilant in enforcing evidentiary discipline, shall actively control cross examination, and shall not permit scandalous, irrelevant, or humiliating questions that undermine dignity, fair trial, and the statutory purpose of family adjudication.

31.For the reasons recorded above, the petition is allowed in part. The finding of the courts below that dower stood paid through the DRC is set aside. Petitioner No. 1 is held entitled to recovery of dower amounting to three tolas of gold ornaments. The parental gold ornament weighing half tola is held to have been received by petitioner No. 1 in view of her voluntary admission. Maintenance is enhanced and fixed at Rs. 5,000 per month for petitioner No. 1 and Rs. 7,000 per month for petitioner No. 2, for past as well as future periods, with annual increase of 10 percent, subject to adjustment of any amount already paid. The remaining aspects of the impugned judgments and decrees are maintained.

32.This petition is disposed of in the above terms.

Announced

(Sikandar Hayat) -Sd-

JUDGE

SB: Justice Dr. Khurshid Iqbal

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