Khan Malook Vs Khan Bahadur and others

f)

JUDGMENT SHEET

IN THE PESHAWAR HIGH COURT,

BANNUBENCH

(Judicial Department)

W.P No.177-812026

Khan Malook Vs.

Khan Bahadur and others

Present: Mr. Inam llllah Khan Marv,it fot Delilioner (Through video-ltnk)

(Mollon Casel

D@g:- 30.04.2026

JUDGMENT

SABIT ULLAH J:- By means of the instant

Constitutional Petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, the petitioner has assailed the legality, propriety and correctness of order dated 03.12.2025 passed by the leamed Judicial Magistrate- VII, Lakki Marwat, whereby the complaint instituted under Section 182 P.P.C. was dismissed, as well as judgment dated 02.02.2026 rendered by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-III, Lakki Marwat, whereby the criminal revision preferred there against was concurrently dismissed.

2.The factual backdrop giving rise to the present proceedings is that respondent No.l had moved an application under Section 22-A(6), Cr.P.C. before the leamed Justice of Peace seeking registration of a criminal Shet Qodultdh/steno' (S.B) HoN'Bl F ME IIISTTCE SAEIT lll I-AH XIIAN

case against the present petitioner and another accused namely Javed Ahmad. The said application was accepted vide order dated 13.08.2024 with a direction to the Station House Officer concemed to record the F.I.R., accompanied by an observation that in case the allegations were found false during the course of investigation, recourse under Section 182 P.P.C. might be undertaken against the complainant. Consequently, F.I.R. No.276 of 2024 was registered at Police Station Ghazri Khel, District Lakki Marwat under Sections 506, 387, 447, 427, 379 and 34 P.P.C. against the petitioner and his co-accused. The matter thereafter underwent regular police investigation. Upon culmination thereof, the Investigating Officer neither formed an opinion that the allegations were false nor recommended initiation of proceedings under Section 182 P.P.C. Conversely, sufficient incriminating material was ( found available by the investigating agency, resultantly whereof a complete challan under Section 173 Cr'P'C' was submitted before the competent Court. The case proceeded to trial before the leamed Additional Sessions Judge-III, Lakki Marwat and, subsequently, the petitioner along with his co-accused was acquitted under Section 265'K, Cr'P'C' on the premise that the prosecution evidence was insufhcient to sustain conviction and that no probability of sher Qadu oh/steno+ IS.SI HON'BLE MR.IUSTICE SABIT IIT I AH RHAN

conviction existed. Subsequent to his acquittal, the petitioner instituted a complaint under Section 182 P.P.C.

before the leamed Judicial Magistrate alleging that respondent No. t had set the criminal law into motion on the basis of false and fabricated allegations. The leamed Magistrate, however, vide order dated 03.12.2025 declined to proceed with the complaint on the ground that the statutory preconditions necessary for invocation of Section 182 P.P.C. were altogether absent. The criminal revision preferred there against was likewise dismissed by the leamed Additional Sessions Judge-III, Lakki Marwat vide judgment dated 02.02.2026. These concurrent hndings are the subject matter of challenge before this Court.

3.Leamed counsel for the petitioner contended that acquittal of the petitioner in the substantive criminal case itself constituted sufficient proof that the allegations levelled in the F.I.R. were false and malicious. It was argued that once the criminal proceedings culminated in acquittal, the complainant became liable to prosecution under Section 182 P.P'C. Leamed counsel further submitted that the leamed Justice of Peace, while directing registration of the F.LR., had already observed that proceedings under Section 182 P.P.C. could be initiated if the allegations were sherQoduttoh/stano' (s,B) HON'BLF MR.IUSTICE SABIT III I AIT KHAN

found false, therefore the Courts below misdirected themselves in law while declining the petitioner's complaint.

4.I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and have examined the available record with anxious consideration.

5.The controversy involved in the instant petition essentially revolves around the scope, application and legal prerequisites of Section 182 P.P.C. and, more particularly, whether acquittal of an accused person under Section 265- K, Cr.P.C. by itself fumishes a valid foundation for prosecution of the complainant under the aforesaid penal provision. Section 182 P.P.C. contemplates punishment of a person who fumishes false information to a public servant intending thereby to cause such public servant to exercise lawful powers to the detriment, annoyance or injury of another person. The provision is intended to safeguard the sanctity of public administration from deliberate misuse through furnishing of false information. The legislative scheme unmistakably demonstrates that the jurisdiction to set the law in motion under Section 182 P'P'C' is intrinsically linked with the satisfaction of the public servant to whom such information is fumished' The settled she.Qadu oh/steno' (S.B) HON'BLE MR IUSTICF SABIT tlLI,AH K}IAN

principle of criminal jurisprudence is that acquittal of an accused person does not, by itself, establish falsity of the allegations levelled against him. Acquittal may stem from a variety of factors including insufficiency of evidence, defective investigation, contradictions in prosecution evidence, procedural infirmities or failure ofthe prosecution to discharge its burden beyond reasonable doubt. An order of acquittal under Section 265-K, Cr.P.C. merely signifies that, on the basis of evidence available on record, there exists no likelihood of conviction. Such acquittal cannot be construed as a positive declaration that the criminal accusation itself was false, fabricated or maliciously instituted. In the present case, the Investigating Officer, after conducting a full-fledged investigation, did not conclude that the allegations were false or vexatious. On the contrary, the investigating agency found sufficient material to justify submission of challan before the competent Court.

This circumstance alone is sufficient to negate the foundational requirement contemplated under Section 182

P.P.C.

6.The acquittal subsequently recorded by the trial Court did not obliterate the conclusions drawn during investigation nor did it amount to a judicial pronouncement shet Qadulloh/steno' (s B) IIoN'BLE Mn- ltlsrrcF saBlr lll I AH (HAN

declaring the F.I.R. false or concocted. Considerable emphasis was placed by the leamed counsel for the petitioner upon the observation made by the leamed Justice of Peace while directing registration of the F.I.R. The argument, however, is devoid of substance. The said observation was merely contingent in nature and confined to the stage of investigation. It neither constituted a binding direction for initiation of proceedings under Section 182 P.P.C. nor curtailed the statutory discretion vested in the investigating agency. The competent police authorities were required to independently assess whether the allegations were false so as to warrant recourse under Section 182 P.P.C., which admittedly was never done in the present matter.

7.The legal position on the subject is no longer open to controversy. ln Jhammad Aslam vetsus Inspector- General and others (PLD 2001 Lahore 84),itwas held that the prerogative to initiate proceedings under Section 182 P.P.C. lies exclusively with the public servant to whom false information is fumished and that no other authority can compel initiation of such proceedings against the first informant. The ratio laid down therein fully govems the controversy involved in the instant case. Similar view was sherQodultah/steno' ts.B) I{ON'BLE Mf,.IUSTICF SABIT ULLIIH XIIAN

reiterated ln Muhammad Ashraf versus Justice of Peace/Additional Dislrict Judge, Chakwal and 3 others (2014 P.Cn,L,J 343), wherein it was authoritatively held that proceedings under Section 182 P.P.C. become attracted only where allegations contained in the F.I.R. are investigated and ultimately found false or baseless. The leamed Court further clarified that the power to proceed under Section 182 P.P.C. rests solely with the concemed police ofhcer who had set the criminal law into motion. In Syed Iqbal Hussain versus District Police Offtcet' Hafizabad and 5 others (2004 P.Cr,L.J 256), it was held that for invocation of Section 182 P.P.C., it is imperative that the allegations involving cognizable offence should first be properly investigated and thereafter found false and baseless. The leamed Court unequivocally observed that unless the allegations are discarded as false during investigation, proceedings under Section 182 P.P.C. cannot validly be initiated. Likewise, in Muhammad lbrahim versus [Jmaid Ali and 4 others (2016 MLD 346)' it was held that any observation made by a Magistrate or Justice of Peace while directing registration of an F.I.R. cannot be treated as a mandatory direction requiring the police authorities to proceed against the complainant under Section 182 P.P.C. The competent authorities must independently Sher Qodullah/steno' (S.B) HoN'BLEMR IUSTICE saBlT I'LLAII KHAN

I

determine whether circumstances warrant such prosecution.

ln Khawaja Muhammad Waseem versus Syed Jalees Anjum and others (2018 P.Cr.L.J 1230), it was further held that the nominated accused of an F.I.R. possesses no locus standi to independently pursue proceedings under Section 182 P.P.C., as such proceedings are statutorily reserved for initiation by the concemed public servant. The learned Court further observed that although remedies relating to malicious prosecution may otherwise be available, the accused cannot appropriate unto himself the statutory authority vested in the public servant concemed. The precedents referred to hereinabove unequivocally establish the following legal propositions: firstly, proceedings under Section 182 P.P.C. become competent only where allegations contained in the F.I.R. are investigated and ultimately found false; secondly, acquittal of an accused person does not ipso facto establish falsity of allegations;

thirdly, the authority to initiate proceedings under Section 182 P.P.C. exclusively vests in the concemed public servant; and lastly, observations made by a Justice ofPeace while directing registration of an F.I.R. do not constitute binding directions for prosecution of the complainant' Examined in the light of the principles discussed above, the petitioner's claim is legally unsustainable.

shet Qodullah/steno' ts.B) HoN',Bl E MR.llISrrCEsaBlT ULLAH KIIAN

8.The acquittal recorded in his favour under Section 265-K, Cr.P.C. merely reflected insufficiency of evidence for conviction. Neither the investigating agency nor the trial Court recorded any categorical finding that the allegations levelled in the F.I.R. were false, fabricated or maliciously instituted. In absence of such determination, the very jurisdictional foundation necessary for invocation of Section 182 P.P.C. was conspicuously lacking. The leamed Courts below have correctly appreciated both the factual matrix and the legal position goveming the controversy and have concurrently concluded that no case for proceeding under Section 182 P.P.C. was made out against respondent No.l.

The impugned orders neither suffer from misreading or non- reading of evidence nor disclose any jurisdictional defect or patent illegality warranting interference by this Court in exercise of constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution. It is trite that constitutional jurisdiction is supervisory and discretionary in nature and is not intended to substitute concurrent findings recorded by competent Courts unless the same are shown to be arbitrary, capricious, coram non judice or patently illegal. No such infirmity has been demonstrated in the present matter' sher Qodu oh/steno' (S.B) EON'BLE MR.IIJSTICE SABIT ULL/\II (HAN

9 For the foregoing reasons, this Constitutional Petition being devoid of merit is hereby dismissed. The observations made hereinabove are confined to adjudication of the instant petition alone and shall not prejudice the rights of the parties in any independent proceedings available under the law.

Announced.

30.04.2026 -sd- Judge

JI]DGE

ll o )

sher Qodu oh/steno' (s.B) IfON'BLF MR.IIJS'TICE SABITIJI I AH KHAN