Ashfaq Ahmad Vs Mst Mehrun Nisa

IN THE PESHAWAR HIGH COURT, PESHAWAR

[JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT]

C.R No. 582-P/2018

Ashfaq Ahmad and Others ................. Petitioners Vs.

Mst. Mehrun Nisa and others .......... Respondents Present: M/S Inayat-ur-Rehman and Muhammad Abid Khattak, Advocates, for the petitioners.

M/S Abdul Samad Khan (Sr.) and Abdul Qayyum Khattak, Advocates, for the respondents.

Date of hearing: 17.02.2026

JUDGMENT

MUHAMMAD IJAZ KHAN, J.- Through this revision petition, petitioners have challenged the judgment and decree of the learned Additional District Judge-I, Peshawar dated 15.03.2018, whereby the appeal filed by the respondents / defendants was allowed and thereby set-aside the judgment and decree of the learned Senior Civil Judge, Peshawar dated 24.09.2003, who vide the same had decreed the suit of the petitioners / plaintiffs.

2.Precisely, the facts leading to the filing of this petition are that the petitioners / plaintiffs, being legal

heirs of Marghub Ahmad, brought a suit that their said predecessor and respondent / defendant No.1 namely, Mahboob Ahmad Khan (now represented by his legal heirs) were real brothers and they were running joint business in the name of Ahmad Brothers, Agents Standard Vacuum Oil Peshawar and that both of them were owner of suit khasra Nos.

394 and 395 on the basis of mutation No. 1928 attested on 04.06.1970 and their properties were joint as mentioned in the deed dated 26.08.1971 and subsequently some portion of the suit khasra Nos. 394 and 395 was acquired by the Provincial Urban Development Board vide award dated 11.10.1988 and the compensation amount for the acquired land was fixed as Rs. 250/- per square feet but in appeal filed by the respondent / defendant No.1 namely, Mahboob Ahmad Khan, it has been enhanced to Rs. 1000/- per square feet i.e. Rs. 55,35,000/- per kanal, however, since respondent / defendant No.1 has showed himself as exclusive owner of the entire suit khasra Nos. 394 and 395 and as such the entire amount of compensation was assessed in his name though he

was entitled to only half of it, whereas the petitioners / plaintiffs were entitled for the remaining half of the compensation amount with interest thereon which according to them came out to be Rs. 81,67,500/- and the interest assessed on the compensation amount is Rs. 1,69,237/- and as such by this way petitioners / plaintiffs are also entitled for half of the said interest amount i.e. Rs. 84,618/-. When the respondent / defendant No.1 namely, Mahboob Ahmad Khan was summoned he submitted his written statement, whereby he denied all assertions of the petitioners / plaintiffs but admitted only to the extent that the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners / plaintiffs namely, Marghub Ahmad is his real brother. In view of the divergent pleadings of the parties, the learned trial court framed as many as fourteen (14) issues and the parties were directed to produce their respective evidence, which they had accordingly led, and as such after a full-fledged trial, the suit of the petitioners / plaintiffs was decreed by the learned trial court vide judgment and decree dated 24.09.2003. Respondent / defendant No.1 through his LRs considering

themselves aggrieved, initially preferred an appeal to this Court, however, later on due to enhancement in the pecuniary jurisdiction of District Appeal Court, the same was transmitted and entrusted to the learned Additional District Judge-I, Peshawar, who after hearing both the parties allowed the same vide impugned judgment and decree dated 15.03.2018 and thereby dismissed the suit of petitioners / plaintiffs and also set aside the judgment and decree of the learned Trial Court dated 24.09.2003, who vide the same had decreed the suit of the petitioners / plaintiffs, hence the instant petition.

3.Detail arguments of the learned counsel for the parties were heard and they also submitted their written arguments. The same were perused and the appended record was also gone through.

4.The main objection of the learned counsel for the petitioners was that the learned trial court has decided and has recorded exhaustive issue-wise findings by analyzing and evaluating the evidence of both the parties, however, the learned Appeal Court through the impugned judgment and decree has not

carried out its statutory duty in line with Order XLI Rule 31 CPC rather the suit of the petitioners / plaintiffs has been dismissed on technicalities.

Learned counsel for the petitioners further submitted that the suit of the petitioners / plaintiffs was very much maintainable before the civil court as the civil court is the court of plenary and ultimate jurisdiction to decide the fate of civil rights of the parties and thus they have wrongly been non-suited on the touchstone of various provisions of The Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Urban Planning Ordinance, 1978 (hereinafter to be referred as “The Ordinance of 1978”).

5.As against this, the learned counsel representing the respondents / defendants defended the impugned judgment and decree of the learned Appeal Court by submitting that subject property was acquired by the Provincial Urban Development Board (PUDB) under the provisions of The Ordinance of 1978 which is a complete code in itself and provide the mode of acquisition of the land by the board (PUDB) and also provides appropriate forum for the redressal of grievance of person(s) having interest in

the acquired land and as the petitioners / plaintiffs had not resorted for the same rather they have approached to the civil court and that too at a very belated stage, therefore, their suit has rightly been held as not maintainable.

6.In order to comprehensively address the aforesaid controversy(ies), it would be relevant to mention here that the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners/plaintiffs namely, Marghub Ahmad and respondent / defendant No.1 namely, Mahboob Ahmad khan are real brothers and are recorded co- sharer in the joint / suit property which is measuring 7 kanals 02 marlas and out of it 3267 square feet (approximately 12 marls) has been acquired by the respondents-board for the purpose of widening and extension of Eid Gah Road Peshawar vide award dated 11.10.1988, and in the said award the respondent / defendant No.1 namely, Mahboob Ahmad Khan has only been shown as the owner and thus it was he alone who had contested the said award before the various fora available under the provisions of The Ordinance of 1978 and as against this, neither

the predecessor-in-interest of the present petitioners / plaintiffs, namely Marghub Ahmad nor the petitioners / plaintiffs themselves had contested the said award rather, instead of challenging the said award before the forum provided under the provisions of The Ordinance of 1978, the petitioners/plaintiffs have filed the instant suit seeking a declaration to the effect that since they are the owners of the suit property to the extent of half of the acquired land, therefore, they are entitled for the half of the compensation amount of the acquired land, and thus in the given facts circumstances, now this Court would proceed to decide the fate of the judgment and decree of the learned trial court as well as that of the learned Appeal Court and to determine that as to whether the Appeal Court has rightly or wrongly dismissed the suit of the present petitioners / plaintiffs, being not maintainable?

7.The heading as well as the contents of the plaint as filed by the present petitioners / plaintiff would clearly and manifestly show that in Para-A of their plaint, the petitioners / plaintiffs have sought a

declaration to the effect that since they are owner of half of the property, therefore, they are entitled for half of amount of the compensation alongwith the interest of the land which has been acquired vide award dated 11.10.1988. In para-B of their plaint, the petitioners / plaintiffs have sought issuance of perpetual injunction restraining the respondent / defendant No. 1 namely, Mahboob Ahmad Khan from receiving the entire compensation amount with respect to the acquired land from defendant No.2 to 4 (PUDB) and for issuance of restraining direction to defendant No.2 to 4 not to pay it to defendant No. 1 namely, Mahboob Ahmad Khan. In para-C of their plaint, the petitioners / plaintiffs have sought a decree for the recovery of Rs. 81,67,500/- which is half of the amount of compensation of the acquired land. In para-D of their plaint, the petitioners / plaintiffs have sought for the recovery of Rs. 84,618/- as half of the interest and lastly in the alternative a suit for possession of the acquired land. In the given facts and circumstances and keeping in view, the piths and substance of the suit of the petitioners / plaintiffs, the

same has been filed entirely and exclusively for claiming their half share in the compensation amount of the land which was acquired by the respondent- board through an award dated 11.10.1988, therefore, with these nature of claims whether the instant suit could be maintainable by keeping the same in juxtaposition with various provisions of The Ordinance of 1978 which provides a mechanism for the redressal of such like grievances of the interested person in the acquired land as well as special forum for the same which is to be highlighted as under:-

8.Like, The Land Acquisition Act, 1894, The Ordinance of 1978 too provides a complete and comprehensive mechanism that as to how the land is to be acquired by the board and in this regard Section 50 of The Ordinance of 1978 being relevant is reproduced below:-

50.Publication of preliminary notification and power of officers thereupon.-Whenever it appears to the Board that land in any locality is needed or is likely to be needed for the purposes of this Ordinance a justification to that effect shall be published in the official Gazette, and the Collector shall cause

public notice of the substance of such notification to be given at convenient places in the said locality.

(2)Thereupon it shall be lawful for any officer either generally or specially authorised by the Board in this behalf and for his servants and workmen i. to enter upon and survey and take levels of any land in such locality;

ii. to dig or bore into the sub-soil; iii. to do all other acts necessary to ascertain whether the land is adapted for such purpose;

iv. to set out the boundaries of the land proposed to be taken and the intended line of the work (if any) proposed to be made thereon;

v. to mark such levels, boundaries and line by placing marks and cutting trenches; and vi. to cut down and clear away any part of any standing crop, fence or jungle where otherwise the survey cannot be completed or the levels or the boundaries and line cannot be taken or marked, as the case may be:

Provided that no person shall enter into any building or upon any enclosed court-yard or garden attached to the dwelling house (unless with the consent of the occupier thereof) without previously giving such occupier at least 7 days' notice in writing of his intention to do so, (3) Where any damage is caused to any land in consequence of anything done, in pursuance of the provisions of this section, shall there be paid compensation, the amount of which shall be determined in the manner and in accordance with the provisions hereinafter set out, that is to say,—

(a)Where the amount of compensation can be fixed by agreement, it shall be fixed in accordance with the agreement; and (b) where no agreement can be reached, it shall be fixed by the Collector. The aggrieved party may file an appeal within ten days against the award of the Collector in the Court of the

Commissioner with a view to get an increase or decrease in the compensation fixed in the said award.

The aforesaid section of law requires a board that whenever it appears to it that land in any locality is needed then to this effect a notification shall be published in the official gazette and the Collector shall cause public notice of the substance of such notification to be given at convenient places in the said locality. Sub-clause (b) of Subsection (3) of Section 50 of The Ordinance of 1978 further provides that any person who is aggrieved of the said notification may file an appeal within ten days against the award of the Collector to the Commissioner with a view to get an increase or decrease in the compensation fixed in the said award. The Ordinance of 1978 further provides that after issuance of the said notification under Section 50, notice(s) is/are to be issued to the interested person(s) and in this regard Section 52 of The Ordinance of 1978 being relevant is reproduced below:-

52.Notice to persons interested.-(1) The Collector shall then cause public notice to be given at convenient places on or near the land to

be acquired, stating that the Board intends to take possession of the land, and that claim to compensation for all Interests in such land may be made to him. He shall also inform all owners and claimants of interests in such land by giving them a special notice of 10 days in accordance with rules.

(2)Such notice, shall state the particulars of the land so needed and shall require all persons interested in the land to appear personally or by agent before the Collector at a date, time and place therein mentioned (such period not being earlier than 10 days after date of publication of the notice), and to state the nature of their respective interest in the land and the amount and particulars of their claims to compensation for such interests, and their objections, if any, to the measurements made under section 51. The Collector may require any such statement to be made in writing and signed by the party or his agent.

(3)The Collector shall also serve notice to the same effect on the occupier, if any, of such land and on all such persons known or believed to be interested there in or to be entitled to act for persons so interested.

The aforesaid section of law further requires from the Collector that he shall cause a public notice to the effect that the board intends to take possession of the land and that claim to compensation for all interests in such like land may be made to him and he shall inform all the owners and claimants of interests in such land by giving them a special notice of ten days in accordance with the law and after the aforesaid exercise, the Collector shall issue the award under

Section 53 of The Ordinance of 1978. Section 53 of The Ordinance of 1978 being relevant is also reproduced below:-

53.Inquiry and award by Collector.-On the day so fixed, or on any other day to which the enquiry has been adjourned, the Collector shall proceed to enquire into the objections. if any, which the person interested has made pursuant to the notice under section 52 or into the value of the land, or to the measurements made under sections 51, or into the respective interest of the persons claiming the compensation and shall make an award of the— i. true area of the land:

ii. compensation which in his opinion having regard to the provisions of section 55 and 56 should be allowed for the land; and

iii. apportionment of such compensation among all the person known or believed to be Interested in the land, of whom or whose claims lie has information, whether or not they have appeared before him.

The plain reading of the aforesaid provision would show that after issuance of notices under Section 52 of The Ordinance of 1978 and after enquiring of any objection filed by any interested person with respect to the value of the land or with respect to the measurement of the land or into the respective interest of the person(s) claiming the compensation and shall thereafter make an award.

Furthermore, after issuance of the award as per the aforesaid Section 53 of The Ordinance of 1978, if either the board or any person aggrieved by the said award then it or he may file an appeal under Section 60 of The Ordinance of 1978. Section 60 of The Ordinance of 1978 being relevant is reproduced below:-

60.Appeal against award.- (1) The Board or any person aggrieved by an award of the Collector made under section 53, may, within one month of such award, appear the Commissioner. Where the affected party had no intimation of the award the appeal may be filed within six weeks of the award.

(2)The Commissioner may, after giving the Board and the person affected by the award an opportunity of submitting any objection 1 to the appeal and after hearing them, make such order as he may deem fit.

The aforesaid section of law mandates that the Board or any person aggrieved by the Collector’s award may file an appeal before the Commissioner within one month from the date of the award, however, if the affected party was not informed about the award, the appeal may be filed within six weeks from the date of the award. The said section of law further provides that the Commissioner is required to

give both the Board and the affected person an opportunity to raise objections and be heard. After considering their submissions, the Commissioner may pass any order as deemed appropriate by him and any person or board who is aggrieved of the aforesaid decision of the Commissioner may also avail the remedy of review which has provided by Section 61 of The Ordinance of 1978 which is also reproduced as below:-

61.Review:- The Collector or the Commissioner, either of his own motion or on an application made in this behalf by the Board or any affected person, may at any time, review an order made by him or his predecessor, in so far as it corrects an arithmetical, clerical or patent error or mistake only.

9.The aforesaid reproduced provisions of law would show that The Ordinance of 1978 has provided a complete mechanism of acquiring the land and to address the grievances of any interested person(s) or claimant(s) in the said land with respect to the value and measurement of land, as well as with respect to the respective interest of the person(s) claiming the compensation, however, in the present case at no

point of time the petitioners / plaintiffs have shown themselves as aggrieved or interested persons and they have neither raised any objection over the process of acquisition nor they have made any claim in the compensation amount. As against this, the respondent/defendant No.1 had vigorously pursued the said process before the Collector, before the appellate forum and then before this Court as it is an admitted fact and as transpire from the contents of award dated 11.10.1988 (Ex.PW 6/1) itself that the respondent / defendant No.1 namely, Mahboob Ahmad Khan appeared before the Collector and claimed to be the exclusive owner of the acquired property. He also laid his claim qua the compensation of the acquired land @ Rs. 1000/- per square feet and then when the award was issued under Section 53 of The Ordinance of 1978, then thereafter too the petitioners / plaintiffs did not demonstrate themselves as aggrieved or interested person in the acquired property, whereas the respondent / defendant No.1 namely, Mahboob Ahmad Khan immediately challenged this award in appeal before the Commissioner, Peshawar Division,

Peshawar under the provisions of Section 60 of The Ordinance of 1978 which appeal was entrusted to the learned Additional Commissioner, Peshawar Division, Peshawar and who was pleased to accept the same and enhanced the compensation amount from Rs. 250/- per square feet to Rs. 1000/- per square feet vide order dated 09.09.1989 (Ex.PW 6/2), whereas his claim of interest was declined. The aforesaid order of the learned Additional Commissioner, Peshawar Division, Peshawar was then challenged by the PUDB and Collector before the Additional Commissioner in its review jurisdiction but the same was also dismissed by it vide order and judgment dated 23.12.1989. Thereafter, the said orders were challenged before this Court through a Constitutional petition by filing W.P.No. 106/1990, in which respondent / defendant No.1 was only impleaded as respondent No.3 and ultimately the said writ petition was also dismissed by this Court vide order and judgment dated 18.12.1990 by upholding and maintaining the order of Additional

Commissioner, Peshawar Division, Peshawar, who had enhanced the compensation amount.

10.Keeping in view the aforesaid provisions of The Ordinance of 1978 and the conduct of both the parties, it is clear than crystal that The Ordinance of 1978 is a special law which provides a complete, comprehensive and exhaustive mechanism for the acquisition of the land by the board as well as to address the grievances of the interested person(s) by providing various remedies before various fora, however, the said remedies have not been exhausted by the petitioners / plaintiffs and as against this, the respondent / defendant No. 1 has exhausted the same well within time. It may be reiterated that once a special law has been enacted to regulate and govern a particular eventuality and when such special law also provides remedies in the form of appeal / revision / review before various fora then the same could not be bypassed and thus if the petitioners / plaintiffs were considering themselves to be entitled for half of the compensation amount of the acquired land and if they were aggrieved of the payment of whole

compensation amount to the respondent / defendant No.1 then they should have been surrendered and resorted to the remedies available under The Ordinance of 1978 as was done by the respondent / defendant No.1 and as such when they have not resorted for those remedies available under the special law then they could not resort to the remedies available under the general law as was done by the petitioners / plaintiffs in the present case by filing the instant suit and as such the learned Appeal Court has rightly dismissed the suit of the petitioners / plaintiffs.

11.As far as the plea of the learned counsel for the petitioners / plaintiffs that the instant suit was validly and competently filed before the Civil Court as under Section 9 of The Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (hereinafter to be referred as “The Code of 1908”) the Civil Court has got the plenary and ultimate jurisdiction to entertain and try all suits of civil nature and thus the said Section being relevant is also reproduced below:-

9.Court to try all civil suits unless barred. The Courts shall (subject to the provisions herein contained) have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature

excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred.

The plain reading of Section 9 of The Code of 1908 would obviously and surely shows that the Civil Courts shall have jurisdiction to try all suits of civil nature except those suits which are either expressly or impliedly barred. The phrase “expressly” and “impliedly” as occurring in the aforesaid Section are of much significance as the Civil Courts shall have no jurisdiction to entertain a suit where a special law has expressly barred the jurisdiction of the Civil Court, whereas such bar could be inferred from the language of the special law, if a special statute governing and dealing a particular dispute and thus such inferred bar would be an implied bar. As highlighted hereinabove, a complete and comprehensive procedure has been provided under The Ordinance of 1978 for the redressal of the grievances pertaining to various kinds of disputes and as the dispute as agitated in the instant suit do fall within the powers and functions of the fora/ authorities provided under the provisions of The Ordinance of 1978, therefore, it is a case where the concept of implied bar is duly attracted. It would also

not be out of place to mention here that filing of suits before the Civil Court and their cognizance thereof without adverting to the mechanism provided under the special law i.e. as provided in the instant case by The Ordinance of 1978 would on one hand amount to render the provisions of Sections 50, 52, 53, 60 & 61 of The Ordinance of 1978 as redundant and on the other it will also go a long way to defeat the clear intention of the legislature, therefore, on this touchstone too, the instant suit before the Civil Court is/was not competent. In a case1 the Lahore High Court in para-6 has held that now dilating upon the central question involved in the matter about the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts, suffice it to say that according to section 9 of C.P.C., the Civil Courts are the courts of ultimate jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature, excepting the suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. In my considered view, the ouster of jurisdiction of the Civil Courts, which under the law are the courts of plenary and ultimate jurisdiction in the dispute Hakam and others .vs. Tassadaq Hussain Shah (PLD 2007 Lahore 261)

between the parties pertaining to civil nature, should not be lightly inferred or the lack of jurisdiction be assumed as a matter of course. But there should either be express provision in any law/statute, which debars and takes away the jurisdiction of such court, and the provision must be strictly construed and applied leaving no room for doubt that the jurisdiction of the civil Courts has been ousted, or if the ouster is claimed on the basis of implication, the implication must be founded and adjudged on the touchstone that the forum or the tribunal created by the special law have been conferred with the exclusive jurisdiction to try the matter of a specific civil nature. It has further been held that for applying the rule of implied bar, it has to be seen that where a special tribunal or a public body is created by or under the authority of an Act of the Legislature for the purpose of determining rights which are the creation of the Act, then the jurisdiction of that tribunal or of that body is exclusive and the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is barred.

12.The question where a special law has provided a remedy then without resorting to the said remedy, a

Civil Court could assume jurisdiction or not has

remained a favorite subject of the Indo-Pak Superior Judiciary as in a case2 the Apex Court in para-6 has observed that it is settled principle of law where a special remedy is provided for under the law, it may not be bypassed. The same view had earlier been held by the Lahore High Court in the cases3. Similarly, a controversy came before the Sindh High Court in a case4 where the Employees Old Age Benefit

Institution (EOBI) requires certain information from the employer establishment and their petition was dismissed solely on this ground that since a complete mechanism for the redressal of the grievances has been provided under Section 33 of The Act of 1976,

therefore, the proper course for the aggrieved person was to have approached to the said authority.

Likewise, in a case5 the Lahore High Court in para-5 of the judgment has observed that the legislature has provided a detailed machinery for the decision of any Muhammad Siddique (deceased) through LRs and others .vs. Mst. Noor Bibi (deceased) through LRs and others (2020 SCMR 483) Hakam and others .vs. Tassadaq Hussain Shah (PLD 2007 Lahore 261), Zahid Hussain and 10 others .vs. Shamasuddin and 9 others (2014 CLC 1334) and Muhammad Jalat Khan .vs. Faisal Hayat Khan and 4 others (2003 CLC 837) All Pakistan Security Agencies Association (APSAA) through Secretary and 5 others .vs. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Human Resources Development and 6 others (2012 P L C 258)

Ujala Cotton Mills .vs. E.O.A.B Institution and others (1994 PLC 560)

complaint, or any question or any dispute with respect to the matter the detail of which is mentioned in section 33 of The Act of 1976 and when the grievance of the petitioner is fully covered by Section 33 of The Act of 1976 then the proper course for an aggrieved person is to avail the remedy provided thereunder.

13.During the course of arguments, learned counsel for the petitioners also made much emphasis that the learned Appeal Court should have also been touched the merits of the case as was done by the learned trial court, however, such submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners is not legally correct as when the very suit of the petitioners / plaintiffs was found as not maintainable before the civil court on the touchstone of the various provisions of The Ordinance of 1978 which required from an aggrieved person of an award issued for the purpose of acquisition of land to file an appeal before the special fora and when that has not been availed and instead a suit has been filed and when such suit has been held as not maintainable, then the appeal court

was not required to touch or to dilate upon the merits of the case.

14.It is also relevant to mention here that in this case the learned trial court has granted a decree in favour of the petitioners / plaintiffs, whereas the learned appeal court has reversed the same, therefore, in cases where the judgement and decree of the two courts below are at variance, then this court in its revisional jurisdiction, shall determine and analyze that which judgment of the two is legally sustainable.

It is also settled law that in case of inconsistency of the judgment and decree between the appellate Court and the trial Court, the High Court shall see that as findings of which of the Court are based on proper appraisal of evidence as well as proper appreciation of the relevant law and as such in this case after analyzing and evaluating the same, the findings recorded by the appeal court are correct and are the result of proper appreciation of law. In a case6, it was held by the Apex Court that in a case of inconsistency of judgment between the two Courts below the High “Mst. Azra Gulzar v/s Muhammad Farooq & another” reported as 2022SCMR

Court was supposed to give its findings after reappraisal of the entire evidence. It was further held in the aforesaid judgment that the settled law in this regard is that revisional Court in such like situation has to re-appraise the entire evidence just to determine as to findings of which Court were based on proper appraisal of evidence and appreciation of law.

Similarly, in another case7, it was held by the Apex Court that if the finding of fact reached by the first appellate Court is at variance with that of the trial Court and as such the finding being at variance with that of the trial Judge, the two will naturally come in for comparison for their comparative merits in the light of the facts of the case and the reasons on which the two different findings have respectively proceeded.

This view is fortified by a long chain of judgments i.e.

Alloo v. Sher Khan and others (PLD 1985 SC 382), Abbas Ali Shah and 5 others v. Ghulam Ali and another (2004 SCMR 1342), Abdul Aziz v. Khuda Dad Khan (2004 SCMR 1046), Karim Bakhsh through L.Rs. and others v. Jindwadda Shah and Madan Gopal and 4 others v. Maran Bepari and 3 others” reported at PLD 1969 SC 617

others (2005 SCMR 1518), Muhammad Din and others v. Mst. Naimat Bibi and others (2006 SCMR 586), Muhammad Hassan v. Khawaja. Khalil ur Rehman (2007 SCMR 576) and Q.B.E. Insurance (International) Ltd. v. Jaffar Flour and Oil Mills Ltd.

(2008 SCMR 1037). It was further held in the aforesaid judgment that the settled law in this regard is that revisional Court in such like situation has to re- appraise the entire evidence just to determine as to findings of which Court were based on proper appraisal of evidence and appreciation of law.

15.In view of the above discussion and exposition of law on the subject, it is held that the impugned judgment and decree of the learned Appellate Court dated 15.03.2018 is not only in accordance with law but is also well-reasoned, therefore, the same is maintained and upheld, while the instant revision petition being devoid of any merits is hereby dismissed.

Announced 17.02.2026 Sd/-

JUDGE

(S.B) Hon’ble Mr. Justice Muhammad Ijaz Khan Noor Shah