Hajira Sarwar, Assistant Women Coach PCB, Vs Federation of Pakistan, through Secretary Sports, Islamabad & others

THE PESHAWAR HIGH COURT, PESHAWAR

(Constitutional Jurisdiction)

W.P No.3948-P/2024

Hajra Sarwar, Assistant Women Coach, Pakistan Cricket Board (PCB), Peshawar Region/Zone, R/O Phase-05, Hayatabad, House No.139, Sector 2-C, Peshawar.

Versus

Federation of Pakistan, through Secretary Sports, Islamabad & Others.

Date of hearing: 14.04.2026.

For petitioner(s): Mian Zakir Hussain, Advocate.

For respondent(s): Mr. Zaki-Ur-Rahman, Advocate for respondent-PCB.

Mr. Faseeh Ullah, DAG, for the Federation.

JUDGMENT

INAM ULLAH KHAN, J.-

1.In the backdrop of this constitutional petition filed under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 (“the Constitution”), the petitioner, Hajra Sarwar, calls into question the legality of the appointment of respondent No. 8, made during the tenure of the Interim Government. As a consequential relief, she seeks the regularization of her appointment as “Assistant Women Coach, PCB, Peshawar Region/Zone” along with all back benefits at par with similarly placed employees.

Additionally, she prays that respondent No. 8 be restrained Page 1 of 30

from simultaneously holding the office of Chairman, Pakistan Cricket Board, alongside his positions as Interior Minister and Senator. The petitioner, therefore, seeks the following relief(s):

It is, therefore, humbly requested that on the acceptance of this writ petition:

a. The appointment of respondent No. 8, made during the reign of Interim Government, may be declared as illegal, unlawful, void, ineffective and in consequence whereof, the petitioner's positions/post of "Assistant Women Coach, PCB, Peshawar Region/Zone" may kindly be ordered to be regularized by giving all the back benefit at par with the alike nature of employees, whose contracts have been regularized even after serving 03/04 years of their services with raise in salary. Besides, any order of the respondents which have violated the vested right of the petitioner may also be declared as illegal and against the domain law and Constitution.

b. The respondent No. 8 be precluded from holding the portfolio of Chairman Pakistan Cricket Board during his tenure as Interior Minister and Senator, with such other relief, as may deems fit in the circumstances of the case, may also be granted.

c. Any other remedy which this Court deems fit and proper may also be granted in favour of the petitioners.

2.The concise facts of the petition are that the petitioner, Ms. Hajra Sarwar, is a well-qualified individual holding a Master’s degree in Social Work and Sociology, with extensive experience in the field of cricket. She has served the Pakistan Cricket Board (“PCB”) at both national and international levels and has maintained an unblemished service record over a period of approximately 13 years. Since 2018, she has been serving as Assistant Page 2 of 30

Women Coach, PCB (Peshawar Region/Zone), under Employee No. 8891, on a contractual basis, and her contract has been extended from time to time in recognition of her performance and experience. The grievance of the petitioner is that despite being senior and more experienced, her services have not been regularized, whereas similarly placed employees have been regularized with enhanced salaries after completion of shorter contractual tenures, thereby subjecting her to discriminatory treatment. It is further contended that despite repeated representations, the respondents have failed to regularize her position and have even withheld her salary for July 2024 without lawful justification. The petitioner also challenges the appointment and continued holding of multiple public and political offices by respondent No. 8, including Chairman PCB, during the tenure of the Interim Government, alleging that such appointment and continuation are unconstitutional, without lawful authority, and in violation of statutory provisions as well as the rules of the International Cricket Council (“ICC”). It is asserted that the Interim Government lacked authority under Section 230 of the Elections Act, 2017 to make such appointments, and that the holding of political office alongside the position of Chairman PCB renders respondent No. 8 ineligible. The petitioner submits that the respondents’ actions, including the failure to regularize her services and withholding of salary for July 2024, are illegal, arbitrary, and violative of Articles 25 and 27 of the Constitution. Aggrieved by these acts and having no other efficacious remedy, the petitioner has approached this Court for redress of her grievances.

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3.In response to the legal notice, respondents No. 4 to 8 filed their respective comments, opposing the petition and contesting the grant of relief. It is contended that the service rules of respondent No. 4 (PCB) are non-statutory in nature;

therefore, the present petition is not maintainable under Article 199 of the Constitution. The respondents further submit that the petitioner has an adequate and efficacious alternate remedy available under Paragraph 37 of the Constitution of Pakistan Cricket Board, 2014 (“PCB Constitution 2014”), read with the procedure for proceedings before independent adjudicators, which she has failed to exhaust. It is also averred that the petitioner’s reliance on ICC rules is misconceived, as such rules arise out of a private contractual framework between the ICC and its member boards and do not fall within the ambit of constitutional jurisdiction. The respondents further assert that the petitioner lacks locus standi to challenge the appointment of respondent No. 8, as she continued to serve under him for a considerable period and has only belatedly raised objections, indicating mala fide intent. Emphasizing settled principles of law, the respondents submit that the writ jurisdiction cannot be invoked by individuals acting for personal gain or with ulterior motives, and the Court must guard against petitions filed by busybodies or meddlesome interlopers. It is asserted that the petitioner has failed to establish bona fide, public interest, or any violation of fundamental rights or statutory provisions warranting interference by this Court. Accordingly, the respondents pray that the petition be dismissed for lack of maintainability and locus standi.

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4.This Court heard arguments advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner, learned AAG, and learned counsel for PCB and carefully & minutely gone through the record.

5.Upon careful perusal of the record, the comments submitted by the respondents and the material annexed thereto, it is established that the controversy between the parties pertains to the eligibility of appointment of respondent No. 08. According to the petitioner, respondent No. 08 has simultaneously held multiple high-level positions, including Chairman of the PCB, Member of the Senate, Interior Minister, and Acting Chief Minister, all during an interim governmental setup. In this context, the petitioner seeks the regularization of her position as “Assistant Women Coach, PCB, Peshawar Region/Zone,” along with all consequential back benefits, at par with similarly situated employees whose services were regularized after completing three to four years of service, including salary increments. The petitioner has placed particular emphasis on the position of Chairman PCB, asserting that such an office demands a high degree of attention, competence, and relevant experience in the field of cricket. She contends that respondent No. 08 lacks such experience and has instead demonstrated a propensity toward favoritism and nepotism, allegedly resulting in adverse consequences for various PCB employees. Specifically, the petitioner alleges that, at the direction of respondent No. 08, her right to regularization has been adversely affected and her salary for July 2024 was withheld.

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6.From the petitioner’s contentions, it is evident that she seeks the issuance of writs of mandamus and quo warranto under Article 199 of the Constitution, therefore, before examining the merits of the case, the Court considers it appropriate to outline the applicable constitutional and jurisprudential framework governing the issuance of these writs, in order to address the petitioner’s grievances in light of settled legal principles.

7.A writ of mandamus, as provided under Article 199(1)(a)(ii) of the Constitution of Pakistan, is a high prerogative writ or judicial remedy, which empowers this Court to issue directions to the authorities i.e., a lower court, tribunal, public official, or statutory body, working within its territorial jurisdiction, who failed to perform his duties as required by the law. It commands the performance of a mandatory public or statutory duty that has been unlawfully refused or neglected. The writ of Mandamus directs the authority to act, though not to act in any particular manner, and is generally available only where no other adequate legal remedy exists. Historically, the writ of mandamus originates from English common law, where it developed as a mechanism to compel public authorities to perform duties imposed upon them by law. Its purpose was to ensure that public officials acted within the scope of their lawful authority. Over time, the writ has evolved within modern statutory frameworks governing its application across various jurisdictions. In Pakistan, the Hon’ able Supreme Court, in Meraj-ud-Din1 case, traced the historical evolution 1 The State of Pakistan v. Mehraj-Ud-Din (PLD 1959 SC 147).

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of mandamus and emphasized that the writ serves to enforce a clear legal duty imposed upon public officials, particularly where no adequate alternative remedy is available. The Court clarified that mandamus is not a source of law but a means to enforce existing legal rights and obligations.

Similarly, the Supreme Court in Secretary Finance2 case held that a writ of “Mandamus” commands the person to whom it is addressed to perform some public or quasi-public legal duty, which he has refused to perform, and the performance of which cannot be enforced by any other adequate legal remedy. Legal scholars further elaborated upon this principle. Ferris, in his treatise Extraordinary Legal Remedies, defines mandamus as an instrument to compel the reasonable exercise of official discretion where there is a failure to perform a duty arising from an office, trust, or station. He underscores that even where discretion exists, a public official cannot refuse to act altogether.

8.Similarly, Halsbury’s Laws of England states that mandamus may be issued to compel public authorities to discharge their duties, thereby ensuring fairness and adherence to the rule of law. It further requires that the applicant demonstrate a legal right to the performance of a corresponding duty by the respondent. The issuance of a writ of mandamus is subject to well-established legal preconditions: (i) the petitioner must demonstrate a clear legal right to the performance of the duty sought to be enforced, and such right must arise from law rather than a private contractual arrangement; (ii) the duty must be 2 Secretary Finance and others v. Ghulam Safdar (2005 SCMR 534.)

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specific, positive, and ministerial in nature, imposed by law upon the respondent; (iii) there must be no other adequate or efficacious remedy available, such as a civil suit or other statutory recourse; (iv) there must be a clear failure or refusal on the part of the public authority to perform the duty in question; and (v) the issuance of mandamus must serve the broader interest of justice by ensuring that public officials fulfill their lawful obligations. In summary, a writ of mandamus is a judicial command directing a public authority to perform a legally mandated duty. It cannot be invoked to enforce private rights or contractual obligations, which are ordinarily adjudicated through civil proceedings.

The jurisdiction of the Court in issuing mandamus is thus confined to ensuring that public authorities act within the limits of their lawful authority and discharge their public duties in accordance with law and there must be no other adequate or alternate remedy available.

9.So far as the writ of quo warranto is concerned, the same is envisaged under Article 199(1)(b)(ii) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. This constitutional remedy equips the superior judiciary with a vital mechanism to restrain the Executive from making appointments to public office in contravention of law, while simultaneously safeguarding the rights of citizens against unlawful deprivation of offices to which they may be entitled. It also serves a broader public purpose by preventing the unlawful occupation of public offices by usurpers who might otherwise continue in such positions, either through executive connivance or administrative Page 8 of 30

apathy. The writ of quo warranto is among the most ancient prerogative remedies recognized in common law, with its roots traceable to medieval England. The Halsbury’s Laws3 of England, dealt with writ of quo warranto in the following terms:

An information in the nature of a quo warranto took the place of the obsolete writ of quo warranto which lay against a person who claimed or usurped an office, franchise, or liberty, to enquire by what authority he supported his claim, in order that the right to the office or franchise might be determined.” Broadly stated, the quo warranto proceeding affords a judicial enquiry in which any person holding an independent substantive public office, or franchise, or liberty, is called upon to show by what right he holds the said office, franchise or liberty, if the inquiry leads to the finding that the holder of the office has no valid title to it, the issue of the writ of quo warranto ousts him from that office. In other words, the procedure of quo warranto confers jurisdiction and authority on the judiciary to control executive action in the matter of making appointments to public offices against the relevant statutory provisions; it also protects a citizen from being deprived of public office to which he may have a right. It would thus be seen that if these proceedings are adopted subject to the conditions recognized in that behalf, they tend to protect the public from usurpers of public office in some cases, persons not entitled to public office may be allowed to occupy them and to continue to hold them as a result of the connivance of the executive or with its active help, and in such cases, if the jurisdiction of the courts to issue writ of quo warranto is properly invoked, the usurper can be ousted and the person entitled to the post allowed to occupy it. It is thus clear that before a citizen can claim a writ of quo warranto, he must satisfy the court, inter alia, that the office in question is a public office and is held by usurper without legal authority, and that necessarily leads to the enquiry as to whether the appointment of the said alleged usurper has been made in accordance with law or not.

As defined in Halsbury’s Laws of England, the expression literally means “by what authority”, and it is designed to inquire into the legal basis upon which a person 3 Halsbury’s Laws of England, 3rd Edition Vol. II. (Also See AIR 1965 S.C. 491).

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claims to hold a public office. The fundamental object of this writ is to determine whether the holder of a statutory or constitutional office is lawfully entitled to occupy that position, or whether such occupancy amounts to usurpation without lawful authority. Consequently, a person invoking this jurisdiction must satisfy the Court that the office in question is a public office and that the incumbent is holding it without lawful sanction, thereby necessitating an inquiry into the legality of the appointment itself.

10.Likewise, the Halsbury’s Laws4 of India delineates that the writ of Quo warranto is a discretionary remedy which the Court may grant or refuse according to the facts and circumstances of each case. The writ lies only in respect of a public office of a substantive character. The writ calls upon the holder of a public office to show to the Court under what authority he is holding that office. The Court may oust a person from an office to which he is not entitled. It is issued against the usurper of an office and the appointment authority is not a party. The quo warranto proceeding affords a judicial remedy by which any person, who holds an independent substantive public office or franchise or liberty, is called upon to show by what right he holds the said office, franchise or liberty so that his title to it may be duly determined, and in case the finding is that the holder of the office has no title, he would be ousted from that office by judicial order. In other words, the procedure of quo warranto gives the judiciary a weapon to control the executive from making appointments to public office against law and to 4 Halsbury’s Laws of India, Volume 35. Page 145.

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protect a citizen from being deprived of public office to which he has a right. These proceedings also tend to protect the public from usurpers of public office, who might be allowed to continue either with the connivance of the executive or by reason of its apathy. It will, thus, be seen that before a person may effectively claim a writ of quo warranto, he has to satisfy the court that the office in question is a public office and is held by a usurper without legal authority, and that inevitably would lead to the enquiry as to whether the appointment of the alleged usurper has been made in accordance with law or not. While defining the writ of quo warranto in Dr. Farzana Bari5 case, the Islamabad High Court has held that:

35.Quo warranto literally means "by what warrant". It is issued to determine the right of a person holding an office and directing him to disclose under what authority he is holding that office. The purpose of the writ of quo warranto is to ensure that a public office is occupied by an authorized person only. The two conditions which are essential for the issuance of a writ of quo warranto are that (i) the appointment under challenge must be to a public office; and that (ii) the said appointment should have been made without the authority of law or in other words contrary to the relevant statutory provisions. [...].

11.It is, however, also a settled principle of law that proceedings in quo warranto are not intended to adjudicate private disputes or advance personal grievances. Rather, their nature is essentially inquisitorial, as consistently recognized by the superior courts, focusing on the legality of the authority under which the office is held. The scope of inquiry is thus confined to examining the validity of the title 5 Dr. Farzana Bari v. Ministry of Law, Justice and Human Rights through Secretary and 3 others (PLD 2018 Isl. 127).

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of the office-holder, and not the enforcement of individual rights. In this regard, the Honorable Sindh High Court, in Mukhtiar Ahmad Abro6 case, has held that a petition for quo warranto filed by a person having a vested or personal interest may not be maintainable, as such proceedings are meant to vindicate public rights, not private claims.

Furthermore, the grant of a writ of quo warranto lies within the sound judicial discretion of the Court, to be exercised in light of the facts and circumstances of each case. One of the foremost considerations for the Court is to scrutinize the conduct, bona fides, and motive of the relator. Where it appears that the petition is vexatious, mala fide, or motivated by personal animosity, the Court may justifiably decline to exercise its jurisdiction. The Court must remain vigilant to ensure that the extraordinary jurisdiction is not invoked as a tool for pursuing private vendettas under the guise of public interest. Thus, where the petition is tainted by malice or ulterior motives, the writ ought to be refused.

While defining the writ of quo warranto in Muhammad Hanif Abbasi 7 case, the Honorable Supreme Court ruled that the writ of quo warranto is discretionary, and the High Court is competent to inquire into the motives and conduct of the person challenging public office appointments. The relevant excerpt is reproduced below:

There can be no cavil with the principle that to grant the relief in the nature of quo warranto is within the discretionary power of the superior Courts, it should not be allowed as a matter of course, rather the conduct and 6 Mukhtiar Ahmed Abro v. P.O Sindh C. P. No. D–1058 of 2020 decided on 17.05.2022 (2022 SHC 939 [Sindh High Court]). 7 Muhammad Hanif Abbasi v. Jahangir Khan Tareen and others (PLD 2018 SC Page 12 of 30

the bona fides of the relator, the cause and the object of filing such petition is of considerable importance and should be examined; it should be ascertained if the petition has been filed with some mala fide intent or ulterior motive and to serve the purpose of someone else. We are of the considered view that quo warranto remedy should not be allowed to be a tool in the hands of the relators, who approach the court with mala fide intentions and either have their own personal grudges and scores to settle with the holder of the public office or are a proxy for someone else who has a similar object or motive.

12.In this backdrop, it becomes imperative, at the very threshold, for the Court to determine whether the conduct of the petitioner is such as to merit the exercise of this extraordinary jurisdiction, and whether the petitioner can be regarded as a bona fide relator deserving of relief in the nature of quo warranto. Only upon satisfaction of these foundational considerations should the Court proceed to examine the substantive legality of the impugned appointment. Before adverting to a detailed examination of the further definitional contours, applicability, and the circumstances warranting issuance or refusal of the writ of quo warranto, this Court considers it appropriate to refer to the dictum of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Pakistan rendered in Jawad Ahmad Mir 8 case, wherein the principles regulating the issuance of a writ of quo warranto were comprehensively articulated. The cumulative effect of the said judgment is that such a writ lies where the holder of a public office lacks the prescribed qualifications, the appointment has been made by an authority not competent in law, or the mandatory procedure has not been followed.

It was further observed that no special or personal interest 8 Jawad Ahmad Mir v. Prof. Dr. Imtiaz Ali Khan (2023 SCMR 162).

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of the relator is required, nor is it necessary to demonstrate infringement of a specific legal right; rather, it suffices that the relator, being a member of the public, approaches the Court bona fide. Similarly, this Court, in its recent judgment rendered in Ali Azim Afridi9 case, while placing reliance on Jawad Ahmad Mir (supra), has also elaborately discussed the prerequisites and circumstances for issuance of a writ of quo warranto. In the said judgment, this Court has also exhaustively examined the concept, scope, and procedural framework governing such writ in the light of juristic opinion and authoritative pronouncements of the august superior courts. From the said exposition, this Court identified the following essential preconditions for issuance of a writ of quo warranto:

(i)The office must be a public, substantive office created by or under law;

(ii)The respondent must be in actual occupation of, and functioning in, such office;

(iii)There must be a clear, demonstrable violation of a mandatory statutory provision governing the appointment, or the respondent must lack an essential qualification prescribed for that office;

(iv)The petition must be bona fide and not filed for collateral or personal purposes, since the jurisdiction is equitable and discretionary.

13.A careful consideration of the pleadings, the contentions advanced by both sides, and the documentary material on record reveals that the controversy in the instant petition revolves around two distinct yet interlinked 9 Ali Azim Afridi v. Syed Waqar Shah & Others, decided on 22.01.2026 (Writ Petition No. 5588-P of 2025).

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dimensions: firstly, the grievance of the petitioner relating to the alleged non-regularization of her contractual service and withholding of salary; and secondly, the challenge to the legality of the appointment and continuation of respondent No. 8 as Chairman PCB, through the invocation of constitutional remedies in the nature of writs of Mandamus and Quo Warranto under Article 199 of the Constitution.

14.At the very outset, it is imperative to delineate the nature of relief sought. The petitioner primarily seeks enforcement of her alleged right of regularization, coupled with ancillary relief of back benefits, while simultaneously invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court to question the authority of respondent No. 8 to hold a public office. Though presented together, these two claims are governed by distinct legal principles and must be assessed within their respective constitutional and statutory frameworks. Thus, the questions that fall for determination before this Court are:

(i)Whether a contractual employee of the Pakistan Cricket Board may seek regularization of service through a writ of Mandamus; and

(ii)Whether respondent No. 8 lawfully holds the office of Chairman, Pakistan Cricket Board; &

(iii)Whether the petitioner, being aggrieved in her personal capacity, has locus standi to seek a writ of Quo Warranto against a holder of public office.

15.As regards the first issue, i.e., the petitioner’s claim for regularization of her contractual service, it is now a well- settled proposition of law that a writ of mandamus lies only to enforce a legal right arising from a statutory provision or Page 15 of 30

a duty imposed by law. The foundational requirement is the existence of a corresponding legal obligation on the part of the respondent, which must be public in nature and not merely contractual. In the present case, the petitioner’s engagement with the Pakistan Cricket Board (respondent No. 04) is admittedly contractual in nature and governed by non-statutory service rules. Consequently, no vested legal right to regularization is made out within the constitutional jurisdiction. This determination has far-reaching implications, as it removes such service matters from the ambit of constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199. Where the governing rules lack statutory character, any right claimed thereunder cannot be elevated to the status of a legally enforceable right through a constitutional petition.

The superior courts have repeatedly held that the service rules of the PCB are non-statutory in nature. The Honorable Supreme Court in M/O IPC through Secretary10 also held that service in the PCB is not covered by statutory rules. The relevant part of this dictum reads as follows:

13.As regards the other respondents are concerned, without going into the question whether a collateral attack could be made by them qua the supersession of the Board, when primarily they were aggrieved of their termination orders. Suffice it to say that these petitions were liable to be dismissed for two simple reasons firstly that their services were not governed by any statutory rules and thus their writ petitions were not competent in terms of the law laid down in the judgment reported Abdul Wahab and others v. HBL and others (2013 SCMR 1383), secondly, the employment(s) of the said respondents admittedly was contractual in nature and their services were terminated after due notice as per their contractual terms and conditions of service. And even on this account the writ petitions were incompetent 10 M/O IPC through Secretary and others vs. Arbab Altaf Hussain and others

(2014 SCMR 1573).

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and had to fail. It may be added here, that their termination(s) was made by the competent authority in the Board; for example, in the case of Arbab Altaf Hussain, as stated earlier, notice was served upon him and ultimately his service was terminated by Director HR & A, who as per the Board's non-statutory rules, was the competent (authority) to do so. Besides to their extent the rule of exercise of de facto jurisdiction was attracted even if the supersession of the Board was assumed to be bad in law. So the writ petitions filed by all other respondents, as mentioned earlier, were liable to be dismissed on these scores.

Reliance is also placed on Vice Chancellor Agricultural University Peshawar11, wherein, the Supreme Court held as under:

6.It is well settled that there is no vested right to seek regularization for employees hired on contractual basis unless there is any legal or statutory basis for the same. The process of regularization requires backing of any law, rules or policy. It should adhere to the relevant statutory provisions and government policies. In the absence of any of the same, a contractual employee cannot claim regularization.

The above principle is recently reaffirmed by the Honorable High Court of Sindh, at Karachi in Toufique Ahmad 12 case. In this case, the petitioner was a Chief Executive Officer (CEO) for the Sindh Cricket Association on contractual basis, who was later on terminated from PCB on 01.09.2022. He impugned his termination order before the Honorable High Court of Sindh, whose petition was dismissed for the reason that petitioner’s service being contractual in nature and lawfully terminated by the PCB.

Consequently, the petitioner’s grievance pertaining to her regularization, being rooted in a non-statutory framework, 11 Vice Chancellor Agricultural University Peshawar and others Vs. Muhammed Shafiq and others (2024 SCMR 527) 12 Toufeeque Ahmed v. Federation of Pakistan and others decided on 27.08.2025 in CP No.D-5236 of 2022.

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does not satisfy the essential precondition for issuance of a writ of mandamus.

16.Furthermore, it is a cardinal principle governing constitutional jurisdiction that such extraordinary relief is not to be invoked where an adequate and efficacious alternate remedy is available. This doctrine, often described as the rule of exhaustion of remedies, has been consistently affirmed by the superior courts. In the instant matter, Clause-37 embedded in PART-VI (Dispute Resolutions or Appeals) of the PCB Constitution 2014, expressly provides a mechanism for resolution of disputes through independent adjudicators, thereby offering a complete and specialized forum for redressal of grievances such as those raised by the petitioner. Paragraph-37(1)(2) of such Constitution is reproduced below for ease reference:

37.Panel of Adjudicators. -

(1)The Board shall maintain a Panel of Adjudicators for resolution of disputes, hearing of appeals against orders of the Board or officials or committees appointed by or under the Board. The Panel of Adjudicators shall consist of former Judges of the Supreme Court of Pakistan and the High Courts or persons of good repute qualified to be a Judge of the Supreme Court or a High Court of Pakistan.

(2)Any association or active club or member or department or any other person, aggrieved by a decision or order of a scrutiny committee of the Board or of the Election Commissioner or a Deputy Election Commissioner or by any other decision or order of the Board may prefer an appeal against such decision with the Board of Governors within fourteen days of the decision or order, which shall be referred to an

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adjudicator selected from amongst the panel maintained by the Board:

The bare reading of above paragraphs construed that the Board shall maintain a Panel of Adjudicators comprising former Supreme Court/High Court Judges or persons qualified as such, to hear appeals and resolve disputes. Any aggrieved person may appeal against decision of the Board or its committees to the Board of Governors within fourteen days, whereupon the matter shall be referred to an adjudicator selected from the Panel. The Honorable Supreme Court in Sana Jamali 13 case also affirmed that a litigant must exhaust remedies available under the relevant legal framework before invoking constitutional jurisdiction.

This principle has been consistently applied in matters concerning PCB, including the case of Pakistan Cricket Board14, while disposing the same, the august Apex Court held that the matter be presented before a learned former Judge in terms of Para-37 of the PCB Constitution, which matter also relates to the determination of active clubs by the PCB scrutiny committee. Identically, in Rizwan-Ul-Haq15 case, the Honorable Lahore High Court also held that:

“4. The titled writ petition is misconceived on account of alternate remedy available to the petitioner under Paragraph No.37(2) of the Constitution of the PCB for redressal of his grievance inasmuch as issuance of the election schedule and exclusion of name of the petitioner constitute a decision assailable before the Adjudicators.

13 Sana Jamali v. Mujeeb Qamar (2023 SCMR 316). 14 Pakistan Cricket Board and Others v. Dera Lines Cricket Club Choti, Lahore and another, decided on 13.12.2019 (Civil Petition No.2229 of 2019 and CMA No.5153 of 2019).

15 Rizwan-Ul-Haq v. Pakistan Cricket Borad and others, decided on 05.05.2023 (W.P No.29413/2023).

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5.In view of the foregoing, the titled writ petition is dismissed for being not maintainable”.

Similarly, the Lahore High Court, in a series of judgments including Muhammad Irfan 16 and Zafar Iqbal 17 cases, has declined to entertain petitions involving PCB disputes on the ground of availability of alternate remedies under its Constitution. In light of this consistent judicial pronouncement, the petitioner’s failure to avail the remedy provided under Paragraph-37 is fatal to the maintainability of the present petition. The constitutional jurisdiction of this Court cannot be invoked as a substitute for the forum specifically created for adjudication of such disputes.

17.Another significant aspect pertains to the petitioner’s reliance on the rules and regulations of the ICC. This reliance is legally misconceived. The ICC operates as an international regulatory body, and its rules are contractual in nature, governing the relationship between it and its member boards, including the PCB. Such rules do not possess statutory force within the domestic legal framework of Pakistan. Article 199 jurisdiction is confined to enforcement of fundamental rights and statutory obligations. It does not extend to disputes arising out of private or international contractual arrangements. Therefore, any alleged violation of ICC regulations cannot form the basis for issuance of a constitutional writ.

16 Muhammad Irfan v. Pakistan Cricket Board, Lahore and others, decided on 02.05.2023 (W.P No.28153/2023).

17 Zafar Iqbal v. Pakistan Cricket Board, Lahore and others, decided on 02.05.2023 (W.P No. 28158/2023).

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18.Turning to the relief sought in the nature of quo warranto, it is necessary at the outset to reiterate the settled contours of this constitutional remedy. The jurisdiction of this Court in proceedings for quo warranto is limited and specific in nature. The writ is directed not toward examining the wisdom, desirability, or prudence of an appointment, but solely toward determining whether a public office is being held lawfully or without lawful authority. The inquiry, therefore, is confined to examining whether the appointment in question is contrary to any constitutional or statutory provision, or whether the incumbent lacks the qualifications expressly prescribed by the governing law. Unless a clear legal infirmity is demonstrated, the Court, in exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution, cannot substitute its own perception for that of the competent authority or enter into matters falling within the domain of policy and institutional governance. In the present case, the office of Chairman, PCB, undoubtedly possesses sufficient public character to attract constitutional scrutiny. The PCB is not merely a private sporting body;

rather, it performs functions of considerable national importance, represents Pakistan in international cricketing affairs, regulates a sport of immense public interest, and operates within a framework carrying substantial public and institutional significance. By reason of these attributes, the office of Chairman, PCB carries a distinct public element and is, therefore, amenable to judicial review in appropriate circumstances, including proceedings in the nature of quo warranto.

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19.The principal objection raised by the petitioner is that respondent No. 8, while simultaneously holding political executive office, has also assumed the office of Chairman, PCB, which allegedly gives rise to concerns regarding institutional integrity, independence, and conflict of interest.

The contention advanced is that the simultaneous exercise of political and administrative influence is fundamentally incompatible with the spirit of autonomous sports governance. Although such concerns may carry weight in matters of public discourse, institutional policy, or governance standards, the scope of inquiry in a quo warranto petition remains strictly confined to the existence or absence of lawful authority. Mere perceptions of impropriety, apprehensions of influence, or arguments founded upon institutional desirability cannot by themselves furnish a valid ground for judicial interference unless supported by an identifiable legal prohibition.

20.In order to determine the legality of respondent No.

8’s appointment, the Court has examined the relevant provisions of the PCB Constitution, 2014, which governs the structure, composition, election, qualifications, tenure, and removal of the Chairman. The constitutional framework introduced under the 2014 Constitution reflects a structured, rule-based, and internally regulated mechanism replacing the earlier regime of direct executive appointments.

Paragraph 6 of the PCB Constitution provides that the Chairman shall be elected by the Board of Governors (“BoG”) for a term of three years and shall be eligible for one further term only, thereby ensuring that no individual Page 22 of 30

remains in office for more than six years in aggregate. This provision itself demonstrates that the office is not filled through unilateral executive discretion but through a prescribed electoral process embedded within the institutional structure of the PCB.

21.Paragraph 7 further elaborates the mechanism of election by providing that the Chairman shall be elected in a special meeting of the BoG from amongst its members through a majority vote of the total voting membership. The Board comprises representatives from regional cricket associations and service organizations, together with two nominees of the Patron-in-Chief—the Prime Minister of Pakistan. The framework also clarifies that the representative of the Ministry of Inter-Provincial Coordination (“IPC”) serves merely as an ex-officio member without any right to vote. Although the Patron-in-Chief retains authority to issue general policy directions and his nominees may hold considerable influence within the ten- member Board, the election itself remains an internal institutional exercise regulated by the constitutional framework of the PCB.

22.The eligibility criteria for the office of Chairman is also expressly codified under the PCB Constitution, 2014. A candidate must be a citizen of Pakistan, possess at least a bachelor’s degree, must not have been convicted of an offence involving moral turpitude, must not be an undischarged insolvent, and must be physically and mentally fit to discharge official responsibilities.

Furthermore, the constitutional scheme incorporates Page 23 of 30

internal accountability mechanisms by empowering the BoG to remove the Chairman through a vote of no confidence.

Collectively, these provisions reveal that the 2014 framework seeks to ensure transparency, continuity, accountability, and institutional regulation through clearly defined legal standards.

23.Most significantly, however, neither the petitioner nor learned counsel appearing on her behalf has been able to point out any provision within the PCB Constitution, 2014, or any other statutory or constitutional instrument, which expressly disqualifies a sitting Minister, Senator, political office holder, or public functionary from contesting for or holding the office of Chairman, PCB. The Court has carefully examined the governing framework and finds that while specific qualifications and disqualifications have indeed been prescribed, holding political or public office has deliberately not been included amongst the grounds of ineligibility. In the absence of such express prohibition, this Court cannot read into the statute a disqualification which the framers of the governing PCB Constitution themselves deliberately chose not to incorporate.

24.Likewise, the allegations relating to lack of experience, unsuitability, or alleged incompatibility have remained generalized assertions unsupported by reference to any mandatory legal requirement. No material has been placed before the Court demonstrating that respondent No.

8 lacked any of the qualifications prescribed under the PCB Constitution, 2014, or that the process through which he was elected suffered from any procedural illegality or Page 24 of 30

constitutional defect. Questions concerning whether a political office holder ought, as a matter of good governance or institutional propriety, to simultaneously head a sporting body are essentially matters of legislative policy and administrative preference, not enforceable legal disqualifications in the absence of express statutory command.

25.It is by now a settled principle of constitutional law that a writ of quo warranto cannot be issued on the basis of conjectures, perceptions, political disagreement, or subjective notions of institutional appropriateness. The foundation of such writ must rest upon demonstrable illegality. Where the governing legal framework neither prohibits the appointment nor prescribes the alleged disqualification, judicial interference would amount to substituting legislative intent with judicial preference, which is impermissible in constitutional jurisdiction.

Consequently, this Court finds that the petitioner has failed to establish any violation of the PCB Constitution, 2014, or any other binding legal provision governing the appointment and continuance of respondent No. 8 as Chairman, PCB. The challenge raised is therefore devoid of the legal foundation necessary for issuance of a writ in the nature of quo warranto. In the absence of any explicit statutory or constitutional bar, the objections raised by the petitioner remain within the sphere of policy, governance, and institutional debate, and do not warrant interference by this Court in exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution.

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26.It is also a well-settled principle of constitutional law that, although quo warranto proceedings are public in nature, the conduct and bona fides of the petitioner remain relevant in determining whether such jurisdiction should be exercised. A person with a personal interest or a conflict of interest is not ordinarily entitled to seek the issuance of a writ of quo warranto. In the present case, the petitioner asserts that her services were not regularized due to respondent No.

8, whom she alleges is unlawfully holding office. It is, however, an admitted position that the petitioner continued to serve under respondent No. 8 for approximately four months without raising any objection to his appointment.

The challenge has been brought belatedly and is coupled with personal service-related grievances, indicating that the relief is being sought for personal gain. This sequence of events casts serious doubt on the petitioner’s bona fides and suggests that the invocation of quo warranto jurisdiction is motivated by collateral considerations. In such circumstances, the writ sought cannot be issued. The Lahore High Court in Muhammad Yasin Saqib18 case has categorically held that a writ of quo warranto is not maintainable when filed by a person who is himself an interested party or is directly affected by the impugned action. The relevant paragraph is reproduced below for ready reference:

The writ of quo warranto cannot be issued as the petitioner himself is the party and writ petition of quo warranto is not maintainable if is filed by an interested person or who is affected himself by the order so impugned.

18 Muhammad Yasin Saqib v. Chairman, Pakistan Telecommunication Corporation; Islamabad and 7 others (2003 PLC (C.S.) 1105).

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27.This principle is rooted in the equitable nature of the jurisdiction, which requires that the petitioner approach the Court with clean hands and without ulterior motives. Where personal interest is intertwined with the relief sought, the Court must exercise caution and may decline interference.

The Honorable High Court in another judgment rendered in Dr. Khalil-Ul-Rehman19 case also observed that the petitioner is an interested person and cannot rely on issuance of writ of quo warranto to dislodge or remove respondent No.6 from the post to which she has been appointed after going through the due process. The relevant paragraph of the judgment is quoted below:

15.The petitioner seeks issuance of a writ of quo warranto against respondent No.6. Admittedly, the petitioner is an interested party and has not approached this Court pro-bono publico. He had competed with respondent No.6 and others for the post of Professor of Pathology but had not succeeded on account of having been awarded lesser marks by the Special Selection Board. In these circumstances, a writ of quo warranto cannot ordinarily be issued. Reliance in this regard is placed on Muhammad Yasin Saqib v. Chairman, Pakistan Telecommunication Corporation, Islamabad and 7 others (2003 PLC (C.S.) 1105) where it has been held that a writ of quo warranto is not maintainable if it has been filed by an interested party who was directly affected by the appointment that he challenges. In Muhammad Liaquat Munir Rao v. Shams-ud-Din and others (2004 PLC (C.S.) 1328), the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan deprecated the trend amongst civil servants to institute proceeding by way of seeking writ of quo warranto. It was held that such writs cannot be issued as a matter of course. The High Court would be entitled to look into the conduct, motive and lack of bona fides of the petitioner for the purpose of grant or refusal of relief in exercise of discretionary jurisdiction.

16.In the above context reference may also be made to Dr. Azim-ur-Rehman Khan Meo v. Government of 19 Dr. Khalil-Ur-Rehman v. Government of Punjab through Chief Secretary, Punjab and 05 others (2015 P L C (C.S.) 793 [Lahore High Court]).

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Sindh and another (2004 SCMR 1299), wherein before issuance of a writ, the bona fides of the petitioner and whether or not he had come with clean hands was held to be a material factor in granting or refusal of relief by this Court. Likewise, in 2003 PLC (C.S.) 1105 as well as in 2004 PLC (C.S.) 1328 (Supra), it was held that before issuing a writ of quo warranto, this Court would look into the conduct and bona fides of the petitioner.

17.The conduct and bona fide of the petitioner has already been discussed in the earlier part of this judgment which has been found to be reckless and motivated by a blind desire to dislodge respondent No.6 from her post.

Similarly, the Apex Court in Ghulam Shabbir 20 case also held as under:-

Insofar as maintainability of the Petition is concerned it would be seen that per settled law a writ of quo warranto is not issued as a matter of course. The Court can and will enquire into the conduct and motive of the petitioner. However, no precise rules can be laid down for the exercise of discretion by the Court in granting or refusing the same and each aspect of the case is to be considered. There is also no cavil with the argument that in such cases it is not necessary that the petitioner be an aggrieved person and further that if it is established that the petitioner has approached the Court with ulterior motive, mala fide intention etc. relief can be declined.

The High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir at Muzaffar Abad in Muhammad Tahir21 case also held that:

As adumbrated the instant petition seems to be outcome of personal grudges. In case of Quo Warranto the question of laches is relevant to check the bona fide of the relator/petitioner and his prayed relief is liable to be filtered through the lens of bona-fide. Writ in the form of Quo Warranto cannot be issued in routine. Litmus test for issuance of writ is bona fide conduct of the person who comes forward and challenges the occupation of some office. Thus the instant writ petition entails dismissal on the sole ground of mala-fide coupled with laches.

20 Ghulam Shabir v. Muhammad Munir Abbasi and others (PLD 2011 SC 516). 21 Muhammad Tahir v. Chairman Board of Governor P.M. Azad Jammu & Kashmir and others, decided on 07.03.2022 in (Writ petition No.2874/2021).

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Consequently, the writ petition in hand stands dismissed having devoid of merits.

28.It is reiterated to observe that the petitioner seeks to intertwine her personal service claim with a broader challenge to the administrative structure of the PCB. Such an approach is legally untenable, as quo warranto proceedings are not designed to secure indirect personal benefits.

Additionally, the discretionary nature of both writs— mandamus and quo warranto—requires the Court to assess whether the exercise of jurisdiction would advance the cause of justice. In the present case, the petitioner’s conduct, coupled with the fact that her service is contractual in nature and governed by non-statutory service rules, the availability of alternate remedies, and the absence of any statutory violation, militates against such exercise. The Court must also remain mindful of the constitutional boundaries that separate judicial intervention from the executive domain.

Matters relating to administrative restructuring and appointments within specialized bodies like the PCB require judicial restraint unless a clear case of illegality is made out.

The power of this Court to issue various types of writs has been discussed in a judgment rendered by the Honorable High Court of Sindh in Sharaf-Ud-Din22 case, wherein it was held that courts do not interfere in policy matters of the executive, as such interference is contrary to the principle of trichotomy of powers. The relevant portion is reproduced below:

22 Sharaf-Ud-Din v. The Executive Engineer and 06 Others (2017 CLC Note 227 [Sindh]).

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9.It may be relevant to mention here that the jurisdiction of High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution is of extraordinary nature. Constitution had conferred power on High Courts for enforcement of fundamental rights. Such power of High Courts includes issuance of orders, directions or writ of five kinds, namely, habeas corpus, mandamus, certiorari, prohibition and quo warranto, however, despite expensive nature, various limitations are required to be satisfied before jurisdiction is to be assumed by High Court. Jurisdiction cannot be exercised to interfere in the policy matters of the Executive as it is against the principle of trichotomy of powers.

29.In sum, the petitioner has failed to establish: (i) a statutory right enforceable through mandamus; (ii) absence of an alternate remedy already available; (iii) violation of any statutory provision; or (iv) bona fide grounds warranting issuance of quo warranto. The cumulative effect of these deficiencies renders the present petition not maintainable, both on account of lack of jurisdiction and on equitable considerations. Question No. (i) and (iii) are, therefore, decided in the negative, while Question No. (ii) is decided in affirmative. Accordingly, this petition is dismissed. These findings, however, shall not preclude the petitioner from availing any remedy that may be available to her under the PCB Constitution or before any other appropriate legal forum.

Announced.

(Shahid Ali *JSS*) Sd. x x x x

SENIOR PUISNE

JUDGE

Sd. x x x x

JUDGE

(D.B)

Justice Ijaz Anwar & Justice Inam Ullah Khan

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