Muhammad Tariq Vs The State

Judgment Sheet

PESHAWAR HIGH COURT, PESHAWAR

(Judicial Department)

Criminal Appeal No. 932-P/2025 Muhammad Tariq VS The State

JUDGMENT

Date of hearing: 02.04.2026.

Appellant by: Malik Nasruminallah, Advocate.

The State by: Mr. Abdul Rauf Afridi, Additional Advocate General.

SAHIBZADA ASADULLAH, J.- Through this single judgment, we intend to decide the instant as well as the connected Cr.A No. 937-P/2025 titled “Jamal Vs The State” as both these appeals are arising out of one and same judgment dated 24.09.2025, rendered by the learned Judge Anti-Terrorism Court-I, Peshawar, delivered in case FIR No. 168 dated 11.02.2022 under sections 9-D/17 KP CNSA, 2019 of Police Station University Town, Peshawar, whereby the appellants were convicted and sentenced as follows: -

“U/s 9(d) of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa CNSA to imprisonment for life with fine of Rs. 500,000/- (rupees five lac) each or in default whereof to further suffer simple imprisonment for one years each. Benefit of section 382-B Cr.P.C has been extended in favour of the appellants.”

2.Brief facts of the case are that the complainant, Muhammad Ibrahim, SHO, along with other police officials, was on routine patrolling when he received information that opium would be smuggled to Punjab through Canal Road, Peshawar, in a Honda Civic bearing registration No.

LEE-8508; that upon such information, he rushed to the spot, laid a barricade, and on appearance of the said vehicle, signaled it to stop, but the driver, instead of complying, accelerated the vehicle in an attempt to flee; that the vehicle was chased and, after pursuit, was intercepted; that the driver

disclosed his name as Jamal, while the front-seat passenger disclosed his name as Muhammad Tariq; that search of the vehicle resulted in recovery of six plastic bags containing 110 packets of opium, and upon further search, 20 additional packets were recovered from secret cavities of all four doors of the vehicle; that each packet contained 1200 grams of opium, making the total recovered contraband 156 kilograms;

that test samples were drawn and the remaining narcotics were sealed into separate parcels. Hence, the instant case.

3.After completion of

investigation, complete challan was put in court. Provisions of section 265-C Cr.P.C.

were complied with and the appellants were charge sheeted, to which they pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. In order to prove its claim, the prosecution produced and examined as many as 08 witnesses. After closure of prosecution evidence, statements of the appellants were recorded under

section 342 Cr.P.C., wherein they posed innocence, however, neither they wished to be examined on Oath as required under section 340 (2) Cr.P.C. nor wanted to produce evidence in defence. The learned trial Court, after full-fledged trial, convicted and sentenced the appellants vide the impugned judgment, hence, these appeals.

4.Arguments of the learned

counsel for appellants as well as the worthy Additional Advocate General were heard at length and with their valuable assistance the record was scanned through.

5.After receiving spy information, the complainant, along with other police officials, laid a barricade. Upon the arrival of the vehicle, it was signaled to stop, however, the driver accelerated its speed instead. The vehicle was chased and was tactfully intercepted. Two persons were found aboard the car, who disclosed their names as Jamal, the driver, and Muhammad Tariq, the front-seat passenger.

The recovered contraband was weighed at the spot. Test samples were separated and sealed into 130 parcels, while the remaining case property was sealed separately into different parcels. The recovery memo was prepared on the spot. Thereafter, the accused were formally arrested. The test samples were transmitted to the office of the Chemical Examiner, from where a report was received confirming that the recovered substance was opium. The vehicle, along with the case property and the accused, was thereafter brought to the police station, where the relevant entries were made in Register No. 19. During the course of investigation, both appellants opted to confess their guilt and were accordingly produced before the Court of competent jurisdiction, where their confessional statements were recorded.

Upon completion of the investigation, the accused were sent up to face trial and, after

conclusion thereof, were convicted and sentenced through the impugned judgment.

6.The learned trial Court, while rendering the impugned judgment, meticulously examined the evidence brought on record and, after conscious application of judicial mind to the material collected during investigation, found the present appellants culpable for the commission of the offence charged, while extending the benefit of doubt to the co- accused, who were consequently acquitted of the allegations. The foremost question engaging the attention of this Court is whether the learned trial Court was justified in arriving at such conclusion and whether the prosecution had, in fact, succeeded in bringing on record legally admissible and confidence-inspiring evidence establishing a nexus between the appellants, the recovered contraband, and the vehicle in question. Equally significant is the determination of the issue whether the

prosecution was able to prove, beyond reasonable doubt, the conscious knowledge and deliberate awareness of the appellants regarding the presence of narcotic substance concealed in the motorcar. It is manifest from the very inception of the case that the appellants adopted a specific line of defense. Not only did they deny the allegations levelled against them, but they also opted to record their confessional statements before the Court of competent jurisdiction, wherein they sought to explain the attending circumstances surrounding the occurrence. Therefore, this Court cannot remain oblivious to such a material development and is constrained to examine the same in juxtaposition with the entire body of evidence available on record. True that the confessional statements carry inculpatory features to a certain extent;

nevertheless, the appellants did not expressly acknowledge their participation in the business of narcotics, nor did they admit

possessing conscious knowledge regarding the presence of the contraband in the vehicle. However, the crucial inquiry is not confined merely to the language employed in the confessions, but extends to the broader question whether such pleas, when tested against the surrounding

circumstances and the prosecution evidence, are capable of creating a dent in the prosecution case or probabilising the defense version advanced by the appellants. Since the offence alleged entails exceptionally severe penal consequences, the law casts a correspondingly heavier obligation upon both the prosecution and the learned trial Court to observe the highest standards of caution, fairness, and procedural fidelity. The more stringent the punishment, the stricter becomes the duty of the Court to ensure that conviction rests upon evidence of unimpeachable character and not upon conjectures, assumptions, or fragmented inferences. This Court is

conscious of the settled principle that the ultimate object of criminal administration of justice is not merely to secure convictions, but to prevent miscarriage of justice in all its manifestations. Therefore, it is imperative for this Court to undertake a fresh, independent, and penetrating appraisal of the evidence so as to ascertain whether the findings recorded by the learned trial Court are sustainable within the framework of law and evidence, so this Court considers it appropriate to re-examine the statements of the prosecution witnesses and to re- appreciate the entire evidentiary material collected during the course of investigation.

7.The points for determination before this Court are as to whether the occurrence took place in the manner alleged by the prosecution and at the stated time; whether the recoveries in question were in fact effected from the vehicle allegedly intercepted by the police party and whether such vehicle was connected with or

belonged to the appellants; whether the prosecution has been able to establish, through cogent and confidence-inspiring evidence, the conscious knowledge of the appellants regarding the presence and transportation of narcotic substance concealed in the motorcar; whether the defense plea advanced by the accused merits judicial consideration, particularly in the backdrop of the statements made by them before the Court of competent jurisdiction in the nature of confessional statements; whether the prosecution has satisfactorily proved the safe custody and unimpaired chain of possession of the recovered contraband from the place of recovery up to the police station, as well as the secure transmission of the representative samples to the office of the Chemical Examiner, and as to whether the prosecution has succeeded in establishing the guilt of the appellants beyond the

shadow of reasonable doubt so as to warrant the maintenance of their conviction.

8.This case possesses certain

peculiar and distinguishing features, for the liability of the appellants and their alleged complicity in the offence cannot be adjudged merely on the conventional considerations relating to the recovery of narcotics from the motorcar, the safe custody of the recovered contraband from the place of occurrence to the police station, or the safe transmission of the representative samples to the office of the Chemical Examiner. The real controversy pivots upon far more fundamental questions that whether the appellants possessed conscious knowledge regarding the presence of narcotics in the vehicle;

whether any legally sustainable nexus between the appellants and the vehicle in question has been established; and whether the prosecution has succeeded in proving their involvement in the illicit trade

of narcotic substances. It is significant to observe that, from the very inception of the prosecution case, the appellants consistently advanced a specific defense plea. Their stance throughout remained that they had no knowledge whatsoever regarding the presence of narcotics in the vehicle; that they were merely daily wage laborers engaged in routine subsistence activities and that the vehicle in question, according to them, belonged to the co- accused Shams-ur-Rehman, who ultimately came to be acquitted by the learned trial Court. Therefore, this Court is called upon to determine whether such defense plea is capable of sustaining judicial scrutiny despite the recovery of a substantial quantity of narcotics from the motorcar, and, if so, what the legal parameters governing such consideration would be, particularly in relation to the standard of proof required to establish conscious possession and knowledge. For proper

appreciation of these pivotal aspects, this Court considers it necessary to advert, in the first instance, to the version set forth by the complainant himself in the foundational report. It was therein alleged that secret information had been received regarding the trafficking of narcotics, pursuant whereto a barricade was laid by the police party. According to the complainant, upon arrival of the motorcar, the same was signalled to stop, however, instead of complying with the signal, the driver accelerated the vehicle, compelling the police officials to chase it, whereafter, following a hot pursuit, the vehicle was eventually intercepted. It was thereafter that the appellants were apprehended, their identities ascertained, and upon search of the vehicle, a considerable quantity of opium was allegedly recovered from the secret cavities of the motorcar. If the contents of the report are accepted at their face value, the conduct attributed to the

appellants would undoubtedly assume considerable evidentiary significance, for an attempt to evade interception by accelerating the vehicle and fleeing from the police party may legitimately furnish a circumstance suggestive of conscious awareness regarding the incriminating substance concealed therein. In such eventuality, the subsequent inquiry relating to conscious knowledge may not present substantial difficulty, because the alleged conduct of the occupants itself would constitute a relevant incriminating circumstance connecting them with the recovered narcotics, however, the matter does not rest there. The prosecution was under a legal obligation to substantiate this crucial component of its narrative through unimpeachable and coherent evidence. The entire complexion of the case materially changes if the prosecution fails to establish the alleged chase and hot pursuit in the manner narrated by the complainant. In that

eventuality, this Court would necessarily be required to examine, with greater circumspection, the confessional statements of the appellants and the explanations furnished therein regarding their occupations, their relationship with the acquitted co-accused, the purpose for which they had allegedly travelled in the vehicle, and their asserted lack of knowledge concerning the concealed narcotics. In this regard, the testimony of the Investigating Officer assumes decisive importance. It has surfaced from the record that when the Investigating Officer was confronted with the site plan during the course of cross-examination, specific questions were put to him concerning the alleged acceleration of the vehicle, the hot pursuit undertaken by the police party, and the place where the vehicle was ultimately intercepted. The Investigating officer admitted that the site plan reflected only one place pointed out by the complainant

and that no separate location depicting the initial point where the vehicle was signalled to stop, nor the route of chase allegedly undertaken thereafter, had been indicated therein. Had the occurrence transpired in the manner asserted by the complainant, it was incumbent upon him to disclose to the Investigating officer the exact point where the barricade had been laid, the place where the signal to stop was given, the approximate distance for which the vehicle was chased, and the precise location where it was ultimately intercepted after the alleged pursuit. These were not insignificant omissions capable of being brushed aside as mere investigative irregularities, rather, they strike at the very root of the prosecution narrative, particularly because the alleged conduct of fleeing from the police party constitutes the principal circumstance relied upon to infer conscious knowledge on the part of the appellants.

What renders this aspect even more

consequential is the fact that the appellants had opted to record confessional statements seeking to explain the surrounding circumstances and to probabilise their plea regarding lack of knowledge of the narcotics allegedly concealed in the vehicle. Once the prosecution sought to rely upon the alleged chase and evasive conduct of the appellants as indicative of guilty consciousness, the burden squarely rested upon it to prove that circumstance with precision, consistency, and certainty.

Therefore, when neither the complainant furnished the requisite details to the Investigating Officer, nor were such particulars incorporated in the site plan, and when the Investigating officer himself conceded that the initial place where the vehicle had allegedly been signalled to stop and the location of the barricade were not shown, then, in the considered opinion of this Court, a material inconsistency

emerges between the version contained in the foundational report and the subsequent account rendered by the complainant while appearing before the learned trial Court as PW-05. Such inconsistency cannot be treated lightly, for it directly impacts the credibility of the prosecution story regarding the conduct attributed to the appellants and, by necessary implication, the question of their conscious knowledge concerning the narcotics allegedly recovered from the vehicle.

9.Another material witness

associated with the alleged recovery proceedings and the interception of the vehicle was PW-07, namely Basit. A careful examination of his testimony reveals that, during cross-examination, he unequivocally stated that the vehicle was signalled to stop and that it stopped accordingly. Had the occurrence transpired in the manner asserted by the complainant, the witness would naturally have disclosed that the

occupants had refused to comply with the signal, that the vehicle had accelerated its speed, and that it was ultimately intercepted only after a hot pursuit undertaken by the police party. Significantly, no such account was furnished by him. This omission is not of a trivial or inconsequential nature. On the contrary, when the witness, who admittedly claimed to be present at the spot and to have witnessed the entire occurrence, failed to corroborate the complainant on this most crucial aspect of the prosecution narrative, it materially undermines the authenticity of the allegation relating to acceleration of the vehicle and the alleged chase.

Consequently, this Court finds itself persuaded to hold that the prosecution has failed to establish that the vehicle was either accelerated in an attempt to flee or intercepted after any hot pursuit whatsoever. In the considered view of this Court, the introduction of the theory of acceleration and pursuit appears to have

been a deliberate prosecutorial attempt to attribute conscious knowledge to the appellants by portraying their conduct as indicative of guilt. Indeed, the very emphasis placed upon the alleged evasive conduct shows that the prosecution itself realized the centrality of the element of conscious possession and awareness in the peculiar circumstances of the case.

However, such an incriminating circumstance cannot be accepted merely because it has been asserted, rather it was incumbent upon the prosecution to establish the same through evidence of sterling and unimpeachable character. This Court would not have hesitated to place reliance upon such circumstance had it been duly substantiated by the Investigating officer through the site plan indicating the various relevant locations, including the point where the vehicle was first signalled to stop, the route allegedly taken during the chase, and the exact place where the

vehicle was ultimately intercepted.

Likewise, corroboration by the marginal witness, namely Basit Pervaiz, would have considerably strengthened the prosecution case, yet, once the Investigating Officer failed to furnish these material particulars and the witness associated with the recovery proceedings himself did not support the complainant on this decisive aspect, the prosecution version becomes internally inconsistent and bereft of the degree of certainty required in criminal jurisprudence. It is a settled principle of criminal law that where a circumstance is introduced as the foundational basis for inferring guilty knowledge, such circumstance must be proved with precision and consistency. Any material contradiction touching the very genesis of such inference necessarily weakens the evidentiary value of the prosecution case. In the present matter, the contradiction is neither peripheral nor collateral, rather, it strikes

directly at the prosecution’s attempt to establish conscious knowledge on the part of the appellants. Furthermore, the significance of these inconsistencies becomes even more pronounced when viewed in conjunction with the defense plea adopted by the appellants from the very inception of the case. The appellants consistently maintained that they had no knowledge regarding the presence of narcotics in the vehicle and sought to explain their presence therein through circumstances unconnected with the illicit trade of narcotics. In such circumstances, this Court is inclined to hold that the plea so advanced cannot be discarded summarily or treated as an afterthought, particularly when the prosecution evidence itself suffers from material infirmities on the issue most crucial to the determination of conscious possession. Therefore, the inquiry necessarily extends beyond the mere factum of recovery and requires deeper

scrutiny into whether the appellants had any legally established connection with the motorcar in question; whether the Investigating Officer succeeded in collecting reliable evidence showing a joint venture between the appellants and the acquitted co-accused; whether any material was brought on record indicating prior involvement of the appellants in narcotics- related activities and whether any evidence existed to show that the appellants were beneficiaries, directly or indirectly, of the alleged narcotics enterprise. Only after examining these interconnected

circumstances in their cumulative effect can this Court safely evaluate the evidentiary worth of the prosecution case, the conduct of the witnesses, the explanations furnished by the appellants, their inter se relationship with the acquitted co-accused, and the alleged benefit purportedly derived from the illicit business of narcotics.

10.This Court is constrained to observe, with considerable concern, that the prosecution appears to have abandoned meaningful investigation in relation to the acquitted co-accused, namely Shams-ur-rehman, despite the fact that the entire prosecution case itself suggested that the vehicle from which the narcotics were allegedly recovered belonged to him. The record further reflects that he was stated to be an Afghan national who, owing to legal impediments, could not have the vehicle formally registered in his own name, yet, notwithstanding the obvious significance of such circumstance, no serious effort was undertaken by the investigating agency to probe into his background, his source of livelihood, the nature of his business activities, his place of residence, or his possible involvement in narcotics trafficking or any allied criminal enterprise. The Investigating Officer displayed a surprising degree of

indifference towards these crucial facets of the matter. No meaningful inquiry was conducted to ascertain whether the acquitted co-accused had previously been associated with narcotics-related activities, whether he maintained any nexus with persons engaged in such trade, or whether the vehicle allegedly used for transportation of contraband had earlier been involved in similar activities. Instead, the investigation appears to have proceeded upon the simplistic assumption that since the appellants were allegedly found travelling in the vehicle, their mere presence therein was sufficient to sustain the prosecution case, thereby rendering any further inquiry unnecessary. This Court is of the view that such investigative laxity has caused serious and irreparable dents to the prosecution case. Under the scheme of the relevant narcotics law, it is not the mere physical proximity to the recovered substance which constitutes the gravamen of the offence,

rather, the decisive factors are conscious possession and conscious knowledge. The concept of conscious possession has repeatedly engaged the attention of the Supreme Court of India. In “Dharampal Singh v. State of Punjab (2010) 9 SCC 608”, it was authoritatively held that possession under narcotics law is not a mere physical or casual custody, but possession coupled with conscious awareness regarding the existence and nature of the contraband. The Court further observed that though statutory presumptions may arise once foundational facts are established; the initial burden nevertheless lies upon the prosecution to prove circumstances connecting the accused with the recovered substance in a legally sustainable manner. These indispensable ingredients assume even greater significance in a case where, from the very inception, the accused consistently disassociated themselves from the

recovered narcotics and specifically pleaded absence of knowledge regarding its presence in the vehicle. More importantly, the ownership and control of the vehicle itself was attributed to the acquitted co-accused. In such

circumstances, it became incumbent upon the prosecution to thoroughly investigate and conclusively establish the true relationship of the appellants with the vehicle and with the recovered contraband.

Regrettably, the prosecution maintained silence on these essential aspects, thereby leaving a conspicuous vacuum in its case which it ultimately failed to bridge through reliable evidence. It is noteworthy that when the Investigating Officer was specifically questioned regarding the connection of the appellants with the motorcar, he admitted that no ownership or proprietary link between the appellants and the vehicle had surfaced during investigation. He further acknowledged that the vehicle, in fact,

belonged to Shams-ur-rehman, but since he could not legally have it registered in his own name, the registration did not stand in his favour in the official record maintained by the Excise and Taxation authorities. This admission carries substantial evidentiary value. If, on one hand, the Investigating Officer himself accepted that the vehicle belonged to the acquitted co-accused, and if, on the other hand, the narcotics were recovered from concealed portions of that very vehicle, then such circumstance naturally furnishes a stronger nexus between the acquitted co-accused and the contraband allegedly recovered therein. In that eventuality, he became the most material person requiring thorough investigation, for he was potentially the individual most capable either of owning the narcotics or of deriving benefit from their transportation and trafficking, yet, inexplicably, the prosecution exhibited no meaningful interest in investigating the

matter from that perspective. The absence of evidence regarding his past history, business activities, criminal background, or possible participation in narcotics trafficking unmistakably reflects the superficial manner in which the investigation was conducted, rather than undertaking a comprehensive and impartial inquiry into all possible dimensions of the occurrence, the prosecution appears to have remained content merely because the appellants had allegedly been apprehended from the vehicle. Such an approach falls considerably short of the standard expected in cases involving grave penal

consequences. When these vital

circumstances are examined collectively, little ambiguity remains that the defense plea advanced by the appellants from the very inception carries substantial force and plausibility. This conclusion becomes even more compelling when the defense version is juxtaposed with the inconsistent

prosecution evidence relating to the alleged hot pursuit. The complainant attempted to introduce the theory that the vehicle had accelerated and was intercepted only after a chase, evidently to establish conscious knowledge on the part of the appellants, however, the Investigating officer failed to corroborate the same through the site plan or through specification of the relevant places connected with the alleged pursuit, while PW-07, who claimed to be an eyewitness to the occurrence, also failed to support that assertion. These

circumstances assume decisive

significance because the alleged conduct of fleeing from the police party constituted the principal incriminating circumstance relied upon by the prosecution to infer guilty consciousness. Once that circumstance itself becomes doubtful and uncorroborated, the entire edifice sought to be constructed upon it correspondingly loses strength. The confessional statements of the appellants,

when read in conjunction with the aforesaid circumstances, also do not advance the prosecution case to the extent suggested.

Undoubtedly, the statements contain certain inculpatory elements, however, the appellants nowhere confessed themselves to be the owners of the narcotics, nor did they admit conscious knowledge regarding the same, rather they disclosed the circumstances in which, according to them, the vehicle had been taken from the parking area of Hayatabad Medical Complex. Once such a specific explanation had surfaced on record, elementary standards of fair investigation required the Investigating Officer to verify the same through objective means, including inspection of the relevant place and collection of CCTV footage, if available. Astonishingly, no such effort was undertaken. The omission to investigate this aspect further weakens the prosecution case, for a defense plea cannot be discarded mechanically where the

prosecution itself has failed to undertake investigation into matters capable of either confirming or disproving it. Criminal jurisprudence demands fairness not only in adjudication but equally in investigation, and where the investigative process itself remains selective or incomplete, the resulting benefit must necessarily accrue to the accused. Taking all these

circumstances together, this Court entertains no hesitation in concluding that the prosecution has failed to establish, beyond reasonable doubt, the conscious knowledge and conscious possession of the appellants regarding the narcotics allegedly recovered from the motorcar. At best, the material available on record, including the confessional statements and the admissions of the Investigating Officer, suggests that the vehicle belonged to the acquitted co-accused Shams-ur-rehman.

The said circumstance materially reinforces the defense plea advanced by the

appellants and substantially weakens the prosecution allegation regarding their conscious involvement in the transportation of narcotics. Accordingly, this Court is persuaded to hold that the appellants neither owned the vehicle nor possessed the requisite conscious knowledge regarding the contents concealed therein.

Since conscious possession and conscious knowledge constitute the foundational and indispensable ingredients of the offence under the relevant statute, absence of either is fatal to the prosecution case. In the present matter, both these elements have remained unproved. Consequently, the conviction recorded against the appellants cannot be allowed to sustain itself within the settled parameters of criminal justice administration. The Supreme Court of India in case of “Sorabkhan Gandhkhan Pathan v. State of Gujarat” (2004)13 SCC 608, has, in similarly circumstances, held that where the prosecution fails to establish

conscious awareness of the accused regarding the concealed contraband, mere occupancy of the vehicle cannot be elevated to proof of conscious possession.

11.The cumulative effect of the discussion undertaken hereinabove irresistibly leads this Court to the conclusion that the prosecution has miserably failed to establish, through evidence of

unimpeachable and confidence-inspiring character, the requisite nexus of the appellants with the vehicle in question, their conscious possession of the narcotic substance allegedly recovered therefrom, or their conscious knowledge regarding its presence in the motorcar. The prosecution evidence, when examined in its totality, falls short of satisfying the stringent standard of proof required in criminal jurisprudence, particularly in prosecutions arising under special penal statutes carrying exceptionally severe consequences. It appears that the learned trial Court, though assigning factual

reasons while recording conviction, failed to appreciate the matter within its correct legal perspective. The impugned judgment lacks the essential legal certainty required for sustaining a conviction in offences of the present nature, where conscious possession and conscious knowledge constitute the very foundation, indeed the sine qua non, of criminal liability. Mere presence of the appellants in the vehicle, absent proof of deliberate awareness and dominion over the contraband, could not legally justify the inference of guilt. In “Avtar Singh v. State of Punjab (2002) 7 SCC 419”, the Supreme Court of India cautioned that mere presence of an accused in a vehicle from which contraband is recovered does not ipso facto establish conscious possession unless the prosecution proves a clear and conscious nexus between the accused and the recovered substance. In the case in hand, the prosecution was under a bounden obligation to establish

these essential ingredients beyond the shadow of reasonable doubt, however, the material contradictions in the prosecution evidence, the incomplete and selective investigation, the failure to establish any proprietary or possessory link between the appellants and the vehicle, the omission to investigate the role of the acquitted co- accused who was admittedly connected with the vehicle, and the inability of the prosecution to substantiate the theory of evasive conduct and hot pursuit, collectively create serious doubts striking at the root of the prosecution case. Such doubts are neither artificial nor speculative, rather, they arise directly from the prosecution’s own evidence and investigative shortcomings. It is a cardinal principle of criminal administration of justice that where a single reasonable doubt emerges from the record, the accused becomes entitled to its benefit as a matter of right and not of grace. In the present case, the doubts arising on record

are not isolated or insignificant, they are deep-seated, structural, and fatal to the prosecution story. The impugned judgment warrants interference by this Court.

Resultantly, the instant criminal appeal, as well as the connected Criminal Appeal No.

937-P/2025 titled “Jamal VS The State” are allowed, the impugned judgment is hereby set aside, and the appellants are acquitted of the charge by extending to them the benefit of doubt. They shall be released forthwith, if not required to be detained in connection with any other criminal case.

Announced

Naqqash Haider

JUDGE

JUDGE

Division Bench Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sahibzada Asadullah, J. Hon’ble Mr. Justice Inam Ullah Khan, J.