Mushtaq Ahmad & others vs. Federation of Pakistan & others

IN THE PESHAWAR HIGH COURT, PESHAWAR

(JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT)

Writ Petition No. 1518-P/2026 with I.R

Mushtaq Ahmad & others vs.

Federation of Pakistan & others

Date of hearing: 27.02.2026

For Petitioners: M/s Amir Javed Advocate and Muhammad Sangeen Khan Advocates.

For Federation: Mr. Bilal Ahmad Durrani, AAG.

JUDGMENT

FARAH JAMSHED, J.- Through the instant constitutional petition filed under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, the petitioners, serving as officials in various capacities in the office of the Accountant General, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, have called in question letter No.10-49/CGA/DISCIPLINE-II/2023/402 dated 01.09.2025, issued by the office of the Controller General of Accounts (CGA), Government of Pakistan (respondent No.04), whereby information was sought regarding the employees who had allegedly allowed payments from security deposits to different contractors in light of certain annexures of a fact-finding inquiry report.

2.Briefly stated, the case of the petitioners is that an undated and allegedly anonymous complaint was received by respondent No.04, alleging fraudulent payments under different heads including Security, Pension, G.P. Fund, and Pay & Allowances. On the basis thereof and pursuant to letter dated 07.11.2024, and 22.05.2025, three Fact-Finding Inquiries (FFI) were conducted by officers of the CGA. The petitioners contend that the FFIs were fundamentally flawed, as they relied solely upon Systems, Applications and Products (SAP) generated data without reconciling physical records and without considering systemic and historical limitations of the SAP-based financial management system introduced under Project to Improve Financial Reporting and Auditing

(PIFRA).

3.It is further submitted that subsequent special audit conducted through the office of the Auditor General of Pakistan substantially diluted the alleged financial irregularities and attributed discrepancies to systemic and technical issues rather than individual misconduct.

Notwithstanding this, the office of the CGA, vide impugned letter dated 01.09.2025 sought information for initiation of disciplinary proceedings and is allegedly in the process of issuing charge sheets under the relevant Efficiency and Discipline (E&D) Rules. Petitioners alleged that such action is mala fide, violative of Articles 4, 10-A, 18 and 25 of the

Constitution, and based on inconclusive findings. They have prayed for declaration that the impugned letter and contemplated proceedings are illegal and requested for direction to conduct a comprehensive de novo reconciliation- based inquiry before initiating any disciplinary action.

4.We have heard learned counsel for the petitioners and learned AAG at considerable length and have perused the record made available.

5.Before touching the merits of the case, it is considered appropriate to first examine the nature and legal effect of the impugned communication. The impugned letter dated 01.09.2025, issued by the office of the Controller General of Accounts, reads as under: -

SUBJECT: INITIATION OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

AGAINST THE EMPLOYEES OF FINANCE DEPARTMENT,

GOVT. OF KP.

The undersigned is directed to refer this office letter No. 10- 49/CGA/Discipline/2023/276 dated 14-05-2025 and your reply there of vide letter No. Discipline/Security-Vol-11/2024-25/782 dated 20-08- 2025 on the above subject.

CGA Office vide letter dated 14-05-2025 requested to provide information of employees who allowed payments from security deposit to different contractors in the light of "Annexure J & Annexure M" of fact-finding inquiry report (copy was enclosed with the said CGA. Office letter) However, the provided information has not cleared that whether the provided information pertains with the Annex-J or Annex-M. It is, therefore, once again requested to provide clear information according to the "Annexure J & Annexure M" of the fact finding inquiry report on the following format:

Sr. SAP Name of Designation Name No. Amounts of No. User Officers/Officials of of bills ID Office bills

6.A plain reading of the impugned letter reveals that the Accountant General, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, has been asked to provide information regarding the employees, as mentioned therein. The contents of the letter do not reveal that any charge- sheet has been issued, nor initiation of formal proceedings under the applicable E&D Rules against the petitioners is evident from said letter, rather it is a reiteration of an earlier request for clarification and particulars.

7.The Controller General of Accounts Pakistan, is the premier accounting office responsible for maintaining federal and provincial government accounts, authorizing payments and providing financial reporting. It operates within the statutory framework of the Controller-General of Accounts (Appointment, Functions and Powers) Ordinance, 2001(Ordinance No. XXIII of 2001) and within the constitutional scheme envisaged under Articles 168 to 170 of the Constitution. Seeking information from a subordinate office for the purpose of examining administrative or financial matters falls squarely within the domain of supervisory and administrative oversight legitimately exercisable by the CGA.

The impugned letter, issued by the Assistant Director

(Discipline-II) of the CGA’s office, must therefore be viewed in that context.

8.Likewise, it is by now well settled that constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 is primarily supervisory in nature and is not to be invoked against show cause notices, preliminary inquiries, fact-finding exercises, or requests for information, unless such actions are patently illegal, void, without jurisdiction, mala fide on the record, or cause immediate civil consequences. The Supreme Court in Fayyaz Dawar1 case while referring to its earlier judgment reported as 2005 SCMR 445, held that:

The object of proceedings under Article 199 of the Constitution is the enforcement of a right and not the establishment of a legal right and, therefore, the right of the incumbent concerned which he seeks to enforce must not only be clear and complete but simpliciter and there must be an actual infringement of the right.

9.From the jurisprudential standpoint, the petitioners claim at this stage is also contradictory to the doctrine of ripeness. The Blacks’ Law Dictionary in 11th Edition as defined the term “ripeness” as below:

The state of a dispute that has reached, but has not passed, the point when the facts have developed sufficiently to permit an intelligent and useful decision to be made. The requirement that this state must exist before a court will decide a controversy’.

Special Secretary-II (Law & Order), Home & Tribal Affairs Department, Govt. of KPK, Peshawar and others vs. Fayyaz Dawar

(2023 SCMR 1442)

10.In this context, the Lahore High Court in Mughal-E- Azam Banquet Complex through Managing Partner2 discussed the doctrine of “ripeness” at length and emphasized that the doctrine of “ripeness” ensures that Courts must avoid premature adjudication until the disputes become concrete and focused, thereby preventing abstract disagreements over policy matters. The relevant extract read as under: - Just as a case can be brought too late, ... it can be brought too early, and not yet be ripe for adjudication ... until the controversy has become concrete and focused, it is difficult for the court to evaluate the practical merits of the position of each party.’ The basic rational behind the ‘Ripeness’ doctrine is ‘to prevent the courts through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves, in abstract disagreements over administrative policies, and also to protect the agencies from judicial interference until an administrative decision has been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties.’ ‘Ripeness’ requires that an issue be sufficiently found and felt to be a justifiable controversy ... As courts insist on a concrete context, that context enables them to better see the problems that they are supposed to redress. As courts insist on completed agency action, that insistence may (1) eliminate the waste of courts deciding disputes that might be mooted as an agency runs its course, (2) assure the courts of the knowledge gained from applied agency expertise, and (3) provide them with a record already developed by the agency. (Emphasis provided)

11.Similarly, in Sabira Khatoon3 case the Lahore High Court held that: Ripeness is a doctrine which courts use to enforce prudential limitations upon their jurisdiction. While Mughal-E-Azam Banquet Complex Through Managing Partner vs. Federation of Pakistan Through Secretary & 4 others (2011 PTD 2260)

Sabira Khatoon vs. Government of The Punjab & others (2021 PLC (C.S.) 1600)

dealing with service appeal against judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal, the Supreme Court in Faisal Ali4 case, further clarified distinction between fact-finding or discrete inquiries and regular inquiries. It was held that:

a fact-finding enquiry is more or less the same. The purpose of it is also to investigate, establish facts, and compile a report for the management so that disciplinary proceedings may be initiated if the competent authority chooses to do so in accordance with law. The purpose of the fact-finding inquiry is not to declare the delinquent innocent or guilty, which is the function of the inquiry officer/inquiry committee, as the case may be. Whereas, a regular inquiry is triggered after issuing a show cause notice with a statement of allegations, and if the reply is not found suitable, then the inquiry officer is appointed and a regular inquiry is commenced (unless dispensed with for some reasons, in writing) in which it is obligatory for the inquiry officer to allow an evenhanded and fair opportunity to the accused to place his defense, and if any witness is examined against him then a fair opportunity should also be given to him to cross-examine the witnesses.

12.In the present case, the impugned letter has neither determined rights nor imposed any penalty. It has neither suspended the petitioners, nor recorded any findings of misconduct against them. It merely sought further clarification and information to ascertain facts. Even the apprehension of initiation of proceedings, howsoever strongly pleaded, cannot substitute for an actual adverse action or order capable of giving rise to an enforceable grievance.

13.The learned counsel for the petitioners has also laid much emphasis on alleged defects in the initial FFIs, the Faisal Ali vs. District Police officer, Gujrat & another (2025 SCMR 92)

findings of subsequent audits, and the technical limitations of the SAP system. However, the Court at this stage is not called upon to examine the merits of those inquiries or the validity of their conclusions. Such questions would become justiciable only upon the issuance of a charge sheet, the commencement of departmental proceedings, or an adverse order affecting the civil rights of the petitioners.

14.The constitutional jurisdiction is discretionary and equitable. It is not meant to pre-empt administrative fact- finding or to interject at internal correspondence between superior and subordinate offices. Entertaining the petition at this stage would amount to stifling the administrative process even before it has matured into a justiciable cause of action.

15.The plea that alternative remedy is not efficacious is also premature, as no departmental proceedings have yet been initiated. Should any charge sheet or any adverse order is issued, the petitioners would have adequate remedies under the relevant service rules, including representation, inquiry proceedings, appeal, and if necessary, constitutional recourse thereafter. To intervene now would pre-empt those statutory processes, which the superior courts have consistently declined to do.

16.It is, therefore, evident from the record that the impugned letter dated 01.09.2025 is merely a request for information and does not constitute initiation or culmination of

disciplinary action against the petitioners. No formal departmental proceedings have commenced, no charge sheet has been issued, and no adverse order affecting the civil rights, service structure, or status of the petitioners has been passed.

In such circumstances, the petitioners’ apprehension of possible future action, howsoever earnestly expressed, remains speculative and premature and does not constitute present, enforceable cause of action within the contemplation of Article 199 of the Constitution.

17.In view of the above, this Court is of the considered opinion that the instant writ petition is premature and does not disclose the present cause of action warranting interference under Article 199 of the Constitution.

18.For the reasons discussed above, we are of the considered opinion that the instant petition is premature and discloses no existing cause warranting constitutional interference, hence dismissed.

Announced

(Jebran, C.O)

JUDGE

JUDGE

(DB)Hon’ble Mr. Justice Syed Arshad Ali & Hon’ble Ms. Justice Farah Jamshed