Zafar Baig Bhittani Vs The State & others

Judgment Sheet

PESHAWAR HIGH COURT, PESHAWAR

(Judicial Department)

Ehtesab Criminal Appeal No. 09-P/2003 Zafar Baig Bhittani VS The State & others Date of hearing: 18.12.2025.

Date of announcement: 24.12.2025.

Appellant by: Mr. Abdul Samad Khan, Advocate.

The State (NAB) by: Mr. Hashmat Jehangir, Special Prosecutor.

JUDGMENT

SAHIBZADA ASADULLAH, J.- Through this order, this Court intends to decide the question of maintainability of the pending Ehtesab Criminal Appeals, against conviction and acquittal. Since the issue goes to the root of the matter and touches upon the jurisdiction of this Court, it is considered appropriate to determine the same at the threshold, before embarking upon the merits of the case.

2.When this matter first came before this Court, it was necessary to examine whether the pending appeals were affected by the statutory amendments, whether they were

liable to be remitted to the learned trial Court for onward transmission to the appropriate forums, and whether any pending decision could properly be treated as non est. In that context, this Court heard learned counsel in Eh.Cr.A No. 13-P/2012, and concluded that it retained jurisdiction over all pending appeals, whether arising from conviction or acquittal.

Subsequently, certain appellants and respondents contended that the matter had not been fully heard, and that the earlier judgment may have been rendered per incuriam, having been decided without full assistance on questions going to the root of jurisdiction, the effect of amendments, and the nature of substantive appellate rights. To ensure that this Court was fully apprised of the matter, notice was issued to the respondents as well as to the appellants in cases of a similar nature, who appeared before the Court along with their learned counsel. The learned counsel representing the parties reposed confidence in Mr. Abdul Samad Khan, ASC, learned counsel for the appellant in the instant

criminal appeal, who invited the attention of this Court to an order passed in Eh.Cr.A No.

13-P/2012, and sought to persuade the Court that the said order was rendered in the absence of the appellant and without proper assistance, and therefore, should be declared per incuriam. Before proceeding further, we deem it appropriate to reproduce the concluding paragraph of the order dated 20.02.2025, which reads as follows:

“When the relevant aspect of the case is taken into consideration, this Court comes to the conclusion that this criminal appeal is excluded from the same, and as such, it is a past and closed transaction. This Court intends to hear the appeal on merits, so the office is directed to fix the appeal at the earliest, along with the connected appeals.”

3.At this juncture, it becomes necessary to address the submission that the earlier order may fall within the well- recognized exception of per incuriam. A decision is regarded as per incuriam where it is rendered in ignorance of a binding statutory provision or a binding precedent, or where the Court was not apprised of a relevant legal

position having a direct and material bearing on the controversy. The doctrine rests on the premise that precedential value attaches not merely to the outcome, but to an outcome arrived at upon a full and correct exposition of the governing law. In the present case, the contention advanced is not that an alternative interpretation was merely possible, but that the jurisdictional issue, going to the root of the maintainability of the pending appeals, may have been determined without the benefit of comprehensive assistance from all concerned stakeholders, particularly counsel representing respondents in appeals against acquittal.

Jurisdiction, it bears reiteration, is neither conferred by consent nor concluded by concession, it is a pure question of law which this Court is obligated to examine suo motu.

Any determination thereof, if rendered without full consideration of the statutory framework or binding authority, cannot attain

conclusiveness merely on account of acquiescence by the parties then present.

Where a Court proceeds on an assumed

jurisdiction, without being invited to examine the legal consequences flowing from subsequent statutory amendments, or without assistance on the scope, object, and temporal operation of the amended law, such adjudication may be exposed to scrutiny on the touchstone of per incuriam. This concern assumes greater significance where the determination does not remain confined to the lis between the parties, but has a bearing on a category of cases and effectively determines the forum and fate of multiple pending appeals. It is equally well settled that the doctrine of per incuriam does not permit a rehearing on merits nor does it countenance a review under the guise of reconsideration.

However, where it is demonstrated that a binding provision of law or a decisive line of authority was neither brought to the notice of the Court nor examined, and that such omission bears a direct nexus to the conclusion reached, the Court is not precluded from correcting the course, lest an error of law be perpetuated in the name of finality. Viewed

in this context, if it appears that the earlier order may have been rendered without adequate assistance on the effect of the amendments upon pending appeals, the nature of appellate rights as substantive rights, and the principles governing prospective and retrospective operation of statutes, the doctrine of finality yields to the higher obligation of legality. The corrective jurisdiction of this Court is then attracted, not as an exercise in review, but as an incident of its duty to ensure that the law is correctly declared and applied. Accordingly, should it emerge upon reconsideration that the earlier determination was reached without due assistance on a jurisdictional question of fundamental importance, or in disregard of the settled legal position, this Court would be justified in treating the earlier order as per incuriam and in proceeding to decide the matter afresh in accordance with law.

4.The National Accountability

Ordinance, though conceived as a statute of exceptional purpose, has not remained

immutable since its promulgation. Over the years, it has traversed a protracted and eventful legislative journey, witnessing successive amendments. The earlier modifications were largely episodic, addressing particular exigencies or procedural contingencies. By contrast, the amendments of 2022 and 2023 represent a decisive and deliberate evolution. They did not merely refine the Ordinance, they reconstituted its structure, recalibrated its jurisdictional ambit, and reshaped the very philosophy underlying the accountability framework. In this perspective, it serves little jurisprudential purpose to dwell upon amendments of a transient or episodic character. The focus of inquiry must be directed towards those legislative interventions which materially enhanced and precisely delineated the pecuniary jurisdiction of the National Accountability Bureau. Through these enactments, Parliament consciously contracted the previously expansive reach of the Ordinance, confining its operation to matters of corruption of an extraordinary

financial magnitude. The rationale underpinning this transformation is neither obscure nor accidental. The Ordinance, in its earlier iteration, cast an unusually wide net, unsettling legal certainty and occasioning the invocation of an extraordinary accountability mechanism in matters that could otherwise have been resolved within the ordinary criminal justice framework. Experience revealed that such unrestrained breadth was neither sustainable nor consistent with the principles of proportionality, fairness, and reasoned restraint. With the passage of time, the legislature recognized the pressing necessity to pause, recalibrate, and redefine the parameters of accountability. It was in response to this imperative that Parliament resolved to prescribe a definitive pecuniary threshold. By fixing the jurisdictional floor at Rs. 500 million, it signaled that only cases of exceptional financial gravity would attract the scrutiny of the accountability Courts, while matters below this threshold would be remitted to forums otherwise competent under the

general law. This legislative choice was deliberate and substantive, it was not cosmetic. It reflected a conscious effort to narrow ambit of NAB, ensuring that its extraordinary powers were reserved for truly extraordinary cases. In furtherance of this design, a structured mechanism was established. Cases falling short of the prescribed threshold are to be transmitted to the competent Courts or authorities, while only qualifying matters are to proceed before the Accountability Courts, constituted under the Ordinance. As the controversy revolves around the subsequently introduced amendments, whereby cases already decided were excluded from the ambit, this Court deems it essential to reproduce the relevant provision, which reads as follows:

“Section [4(4)(f)] all final order, decisions or judgments passed by the Court before the commencement of the National Accountability (Amendment) Act, 2022 (XI of 2022), the National Accountability (Second Amendment) Act, 2022 (XVI of 2022) and the National Accountability (Amendment) Act, 2023 (XXIV of 2023), shall remain in force and operative unless reversed, notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (2) of section 1 each of the

National Accountability (Amendment) Act, 2022 (XI of 2022), the National Accountability (Second Amendment) Act, 2022 (XVI of 2022) and the National Accountability (Amendment) Act, 2023 (XXIV of 2023).”

5.This legislative framework

manifests a deliberate endeavor to restore equilibrium, to focus accountability where it is most warranted, and to restrain the deployment of extraordinary jurisdiction to cases which merit such intervention.

Notwithstanding these legislative measures, a persistent cloud of uncertainty enveloped matters pending at various stages, whether inquiry, investigation, or trial. Similar questions arose regarding appeals already pending, whether before this Court or the appellate forum constituted under the accountability regime. Controversies surfaced on multiple fronts, the forum competent to exercise jurisdiction, the Courts already seized of matters and the authority empowered to proceed with cases that, under the revised statutory framework, no longer satisfied the pecuniary threshold. These uncertainties

extended equally to inquiries and investigations still underway, many of which did not meet the prescribed financial requirement. Faced with these practical and legal dilemmas, the legislature intervened once again, enacting amendments which prescribed, with clarity, the manner in which cases were to be transferred, the authorities responsible for further investigation, and the forums before which such matters were to be placed. The amendments also clarified the procedural stage at which matters were to be referred to competent Courts or investigative agencies, and delineated categories of cases to be treated as concluded or past transactions. These measures were neither redundant nor ornamental, they were intended to resolve the precise uncertainties now confronting this Court and to establish a coherent pathway for the orderly disposition of pending inquiries, trials, and appeals.

6.The promulgation of the

amendments naturally evoked widespread interest. Individuals against whom proceedings

were pending sought, in particular, to invoke the revised jurisdictional scheme to halt proceedings in accountability Courts and transmit their cases to appropriate forums, however, the controversy extended beyond ongoing trials and inquiries to pending appeals, whether arising from convictions or acquittals under the Ordinance. A clear divergence of interest emerged, appellants urged non-maintainability of appeals, whereas the prosecution contended that jurisdiction remained intact and appeals competent for adjudication. It was against this backdrop that this Court undertook a meticulous examination of the scope, intent, and application of the amendments. This Court considered whether pending appeals were to be continued, remitted, or returned to appropriate forums, and if so, in what manner such dispositions were to occur. At various stages, counsel for multiple matters appeared before the Court yet, several questions remained unresolved.

Learned counsel proposed that the determination of these questions in a

representative case would furnish guiding principles for all similar matters, enabling this Court to adjudicate pending cases consistently and coherently. This Court, finding this approach both practical and judicious, retained a limited number of cases for hearing, as they collectively raised the core questions essential for determination. To ensure clarity and coherence, this Court formulated precise questions, the answers to which are indispensable to the future course of proceedings. In this manner, the principles are properly articulated, the intention of the Court transparently conveyed, and a reasoned framework established for the orderly adjudication of all analogous matters.

7.Learned counsel invited the

attention of this Court to the judgment reported as PLD 2012 Balochistan 104 to substantiate the well-settled principle that an appeal is a continuation of the original proceedings, a proposition with which we find no reservation and with which we fully concur. There can be no cavil with the settled proposition that an

appeal is but a continuation of the original proceedings. This principle is too well entrenched in our jurisprudence to admit of any serious contest, nor can this Court be persuaded to depart from it. Yet, the controversy before us does not concern the existence of this doctrine, but rather the limits of its legitimate application. The real question that thus arises is whether, without affording a hearing and without subjecting each case to judicial scrutiny on its own merits, this Court may extend, in a sweeping and indiscriminate manner, the benefit so earnestly sought by the appellants. Equally significant is the issue whether the Court may arrest the proceedings at their very threshold, solely for the purpose of mechanically applying subsequent amendments and thereby conferring a benefit tailored to the desire of the appellants. To adopt such a course would be to subordinate the discipline of adjudication to expediency, and to eclipse the cardinal principle that justice must not only be done, but must be seen to be done after due process. The doctrine that an

appeal is a continuation of proceedings cannot be stretched to a point where it eclipses the equally fundamental requirement of hearing, examination, and reasoned determination. The law does not countenance the conferment of statutory advantages in vacuo, it insists that such benefits, if at all available, must emerge from a judicious appraisal of the facts, the law, and the stage at which the proceedings stand.

Accordingly, while the continuity of proceedings in appeal remains beyond dispute, it cannot be invoked as a talisman to short-circuit the judicial process, nor can it serve as a license to dispense benefits in advance of, and in derogation from, a proper hearing.

8.We are of the considered view that this issue has been examined across eras, across jurisdictions, and by Courts of every standing. Whenever the doctrine was reaffirmed and given enduring force, the underlying object was singular and clear, that where a new question arises, it may be examined and resolved within the pending

cause, not that cases be disposed of wholesale, without hearing, each time such a question is presented before the Courts. At all times, this principle has been understood to mean that an appellate Court approaches the matter as though it were seized of it for the first time, unfettered by the mere fact that a prior decision exists, and uninfluenced by any constraint that might otherwise foreclose a full and open adjudication. It was never intended to erect an artificial barrier upon the duty of Court to hear, to inquire and to decide, nor to place a judicial embargo upon the free and independent exercise of its jurisdiction. In the present case, to invoke this doctrine solely for the purpose of harvesting a benefit flowing from a subsequent amendment, in matters where no final order has yet been passed, would be to distort both law and principle.

Such an approach would run counter to the settled canons of adjudication, for it would convert a doctrine meant to facilitate justice into an instrument for its circumvention. The law does not sanction the pursuit of legislative

advantage divorced from judicial

determination, nor does principle permit that pending causes be reshaped by retrospective aspiration rather than resolved by reasoned adjudication. To do so would be to offend both the discipline of law and the integrity of judicial process.

9.Is it to be characterized as

consistency, or does it amount to self- contradiction, and would it not border upon an irony of the gravest kind that, on one hand, the jurisdiction of this Court is being vigorously questioned, while on the other, this Court is being called upon to declare the impugned judgment as non est and to recommence the proceedings as though the cases were still languishing at the stage of inquiry or investigation before the Accountability Court or National Accountability Bureau (NAB). Such an expectation is not merely alien to the law, it strikes at the very architecture of adjudication.

To accede to it would be to affirm a principle that finds no home in statute, nor any sanctuary in established jurisprudence. It

would require this Court to exercise a jurisdiction while simultaneously negating the very foundation of that jurisdiction, an exercise that is conceptually incoherent and legally impermissible. The law does not contemplate that a judgment, once rendered by a Court of competent jurisdiction, may be wished away for convenience, nor that proceedings which have traversed the full course of trial and appeal may be retrograded to a pre-trial stage by judicial fiat. To do so would be to substitute doctrine with expediency, and reason with indulgence. Having surveyed the matter in its entirety, we find no escape from the conclusion that amendments, if relied upon, must be examined in light of their object, purpose, and underlying legislative intent, and not as instruments for undoing concluded or substantially advanced judicial processes.

Only by such a calibrated approach can this Court meaningfully respond to the contention raised, without unsettling the settled or inventing a principle unknown to law and unheard of in jurisprudence.

10.Learned counsel for the parties placed reliance upon certain judgments from the Superior Courts, therefore, we deem it appropriate to undertake a comparative appraisal of the cited precedents, so as to ascertain whether they are determinative of the controversy in hand or whether they operate in a field distinguishable on facts and law. Such an exercise is indispensable, for precedents are not to be applied mechanically, their binding force is confined to the ratio decidendi emerging from the factual matrix in which they were rendered. Reliance was placed upon the judgment reported as PLD 1974 SC 180 titled “Commissioner of Sales Tax (West), Karachi v. Messrs Kruddsons Ltd.”, whereupon we carefully examined the same. Upon such examination, we found the factual and legal matrix to be distinguishable, as the said judgment was rendered to reinforce the proposition that a curative statute, enacted during the pendency of proceedings, is capable of being applied even at the appellate stage. Conscious, however,

that precedents derive their normative force not from their conclusions but from the principles which animate them, we considered it necessary to subject the said judgment to close and reflective scrutiny, so as to ascertain the true contours of its ratio. That scrutiny yields a clear and unambiguous result. The amendment which fell for consideration in “Commissioner of Sales Tax (West), Karachi v.

Messrs Kruddsons Ltd.” was one to which the legislature had expressly imparted retrospective operation, and it was only by virtue of that decisive legislative command that the Apex Court accorded it effect notwithstanding the pendency of the appeal.

The judgment, in turn, drew authoritative sustenance from the earlier decision in “Saeedur Rehman v. Chief Election Commissioner” (PLD 1965 SC 157), where relief was granted because, during the subsistence of the appeal, the very disqualification impugned therein had been legislatively effaced. In “Saeedur Rehman v.

Chief Election Commissioner”, section 116 of

the Representation of the People Act, 1957, stood repealed during the pendency of the proceedings by section 2 of the

Representation of the People (Repeal) Act, 1963. That enactment was not confined to a repeal simpliciter. By the deliberate employment of a deeming clause, the legislature ordained that the repeal shall be taken to have occurred on the twenty-third day of March, 1962, thereby clothing it with unmistakable retrospective force. More significantly still, subsection (2) thereof declared, in terms both plain and peremptory, that no person shall be deemed to be, or to have ever been, disqualified from election to, or membership of, the National Assembly or a Provincial Assembly under the repealed law, and that no election shall be called in question before any Court, tribunal, or authority on that account. By this legislative command, the foundation of disqualification and all its juridical consequences were comprehensively obliterated, leaving the Courts with no option but to proceed on the footing that the repealed

statute had never operated to create a subsisting disability. Read in this light, the jurisprudence of this Court discloses a consistent and principled thread. Relief was granted in both “Saeedur Rehman v. Chief Election Commissioner” and “Commissioner of Sales Tax (West), Karachi v. Messrs Kruddsons Ltd.” not merely because the proceedings were pending, but because two conditions coexisted and were indispensable, first, that the statute in question was curative and expressly retrospective, and second, that the lis had not yet attained finality. Equally instructive is what these judgments do not say.

They offer no warrant for the proposition that an amendment lacking retrospective reach, or one enacted after rights have crystallized, may be pressed into service to reopen concluded matters. That silence is neither accidental nor insignificant, it reflects a settled judicial reluctance to disturb vested rights in the absence of a clear legislative mandate. When these principles are brought to bear upon the present case, the inapplicability of the

precedents relied upon becomes self-evident.

The amendment now invoked neither evinces a curative character nor carries retrospective operation, whether expressly or by necessary implication. In such circumstances, this Court cannot, under the guise of interpretative generosity, attribute to the legislature an intention which it has consciously refrained from expressing. To do so would be to transgress the settled boundary between interpretation and legislation, therefore, the contention advanced lacks juridical substance and cannot be sustained.

11.In resolving the controversy relating to retrospective or prospective application of a statute, this Court finds authoritative guidance in Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, a treatise consistently relied upon by Superior Courts while construing legislative intent. The principles enunciated therein furnish a settled and coherent framework for determining when a statute may legitimately be given retrospective operation and when it must, by

necessary implication, remain prospective.

Maxwell states the rule in clear and unambiguous terms that:

“It is a fundamental rule of English law that no statute shall be construed to have a retrospective operation unless such a construction appears very clearly in the terms of the Act, or arises by necessary and distinct implication.”

This presumption against

retrospectivity is not a mere technical canon, but a rule rooted in justice, equity, and good conscience. The underlying rationale, as explained by Maxwell, is that the legislature is presumed not to intend to interfere with vested rights, impose new burdens, or attach fresh legal consequences to transactions already completed, unless it has spoken in unmistakable language. Maxwell further elucidates that the presumption against retrospective operation applies with particular force where a statute affects substantive rights. In this regard, the learned author observes that:

“A statute is not to be construed so as to take away or impair vested

rights acquired under existing laws, unless the intention to do so is expressed in clear and unambiguous language.”

12.We cannot rest our conclusion at this stage and are constrained to carry the analysis a step further. It is an admitted position on the record that the amendment, at the time of its promulgation, expressly excluded matters already decided from the ambit of its operation. The legislative intent in this behalf is neither obscure nor capable of competing interpretation. Once such exclusion is provided in clear terms, the interpretative exercise stands significantly narrowed. In this backdrop, those cases which had been finally adjudicated upon by the learned Accountability Court prior to the coming into force of the amendment, even though presently pending in appeal before this Court, partake the character of past and closed transactions insofar as the applicability of the amendment is concerned.

The pendency of an appeal, though a continuation of proceedings for certain limited procedural purposes, does not efface the fact

that the original adjudication stands concluded under the law as it existed at the relevant time.

The appellate forum examines the legality and correctness of a completed act of adjudication, it does not render the concluded trial an open or undecided transaction for the purposes of subsequent legislative intervention, unless the statute so mandates. The principles governing statutory interpretation, as consistently expounded, leave little room for doubt. The Court is duty-bound to give effect to the statute as enacted, not as it might have been framed.

It may read into a statute only that which is expressly stated or necessarily implied, and must refrain from importing words, intentions, or consequences which the legislature has consciously omitted. Where the legislature has, in explicit terms, excluded retrospective operation, the Court cannot, under the guise of interpretation, supply retrospectivity by implication or judicial creativity. This position finds authoritative support in the golden rules of interpretation as articulated by Maxwell.

Maxwell states, with marked clarity, that the

general rule is that every statute is prima facie prospective, and it is not to be construed so as to have retrospective operation unless such an intention is clearly expressed or arises by necessary implication. He further cautions that statutes should not be interpreted so as to disturb vested rights, invalidate past transactions, or reopen matters which have been finally concluded, except upon the clearest legislative command. Maxwell further distinguishes between procedural statutes and those affecting substantive rights. While changes in procedure may, in certain circumstances, apply to pending proceedings, a statute which affects substantive rights, liabilities, or jurisdiction cannot be applied retrospectively, particularly where it seeks to undo or alter the legal consequences of acts done or adjudications completed under the previous law. The right of appeal, though procedural in form, has consistently been recognized as a substantive and vested right, accruing at the time of institution of proceedings, and cannot be taken away or

impaired except by express enactment or necessary intendment. Applying these principles to the case in hand, the legislative exclusion of already decided matters operates as a decisive indicator of intent. It manifests a conscious choice by the legislature to preserve the sanctity of concluded adjudications, notwithstanding their pendency in appeal. To construe the amendment otherwise would not only run afoul of settled principles of Maxwell, but would also amount to attributing to the legislature an intention which it has explicitly disclaimed. Consequently, we hold that the amendment in question does not apply to cases finally decided by the learned Accountability Court prior to its enforcement, and such matters shall continue to be governed by the unamended law before this Court and, if occasion so arises, before the Apex Court. Any contrary interpretation would result in unsettling concluded transactions, impairing vested rights, and transgressing the well-established limits of judicial interpretation.

Like circumstances were dealt with by the

Apex Court in the case reported as PLD 2004 SC 1168, titled “The Commissioner Inland Revenue and others v. Mekotex (Pvt.)

Limited and others”, wherein it was held that:

“10. Therefore, in our jurisdiction, the established principles for interpreting laws that have or appear to have retrospective effect are as follows. Every statute that relates to substantive rights and obligations should be deemed prospective unless, by express provision or necessary implication, it has been given retrospective effect. Courts must lean against giving a statute retrospective effect that affects vested rights and/or past and closed transactions by adhering to two rules: first, if two interpretations are reasonably possible, the one that saves vested rights and/or past and closed transactions should be adopted; and second, no statute should be construed to have retrospective effect to a greater extent than its language necessarily requires. Although vested rights may be affected and taken away by express provision or necessary implication, past and closed transactions can be disturbed and reopened only by express provision." This is because, as noted above, the greater the unfairness, the more explicit the legislature's intent must be.”

13.After careful consideration of the submissions advanced by the learned counsel and a meticulous examination of the

precedents placed before this Court, we are called upon to determine the proper scope of the amendments now under scrutiny and their applicability to appeals presently pending before this Court. Central to this determination is the well-established principle that “an appeal is a continuation of proceedings.” By this doctrine, the appellate Court assumes the role of the trial forum, empowered to consider all matters that may not have been placed before the lower Court, in order to ensure the complete and proper administration of justice.

Yet, this authority is not unfettered. It cannot be exercised mechanically, nor without affording the parties a hearing. The precedents cited by the learned counsel, while establishing the general scope of appellate review, do not, in any comprehensive sense, justify bypassing the requirement of merit- based consideration or applying the amendments retroactively in the instant case.

To do so would be inconsistent with both law and principle. The amendments in question expressly apply only to cases which have not

been finally adjudicated by the Accountability Court. The present case, having been conclusively decided, constitutes a past and closed transaction. Its finality cannot be disturbed for the purpose of invoking amendments retrospectively. This principle of finality safeguards legal certainty, judicial stability, and the rule of law, cornerstones of any functioning judicial system. However, it is essential to clarify that the phrase “passed and closed transaction” is employed solely in the context of these amendments. It does not preclude further proceedings before this Court, nor before the Apex Court, where warranted.

The statutory language is neither ambiguous nor susceptible to any interpretation other than that these cases cannot be remitted for onward transmission to other forums, whether by the Accountability Court or the Director General, National Accountability Bureau. For this specific purpose, therefore, the matter is rightly treated as passed and closed.

Furthermore, the jurisdiction of this Court extends equally to appeals against conviction

and appeals against acquittal. Both categories of appeals fall within the purview of this Court and are to be adjudicated on their merits. In exercising this jurisdiction, this Court ensures that principles of natural justice, procedural fairness, and merit-based adjudication are scrupulously upheld. No party may be deprived of the right to have their case thoroughly examined at the appellate stage. In consequence, this Court is fully empowered to adjudicate the present case, as well as other similar cases, in accordance with the principles articulated herein. In sequel to the foregoing discussion, this Court is persuaded to conclude that the order dated 20.02.2025, passed by this Court in Ehtesab Criminal Appeal No. 13-P/2012, is well-reasoned and founded upon a correct appreciation of the law. This Court was not only properly assisted by learned counsel, but the relevant statutory provisions and the settled principles governing the subject were examined in their true perspective and applied with due care, therefore, we are not inclined to declare the

said order per incuriam. We further hold that the law so amended is not applicable to the cases pending before this Court. This Court remains fully competent to adjudicate the matter, and the proceedings shall continue in accordance with law, unaffected by the statutory amendment. The Additional Registrar (Judicial) is accordingly directed to list all such cases, including pending appeals against acquittal, before the respective Benches of this Court for final adjudication, so that they may be expeditiously and conclusively disposed of.

Announced

Naqqash Haider

JUDGE

JUDGE

Division Bench.

Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sahibzada Asadullah, J. Hon’ble Mr. Justice Dr. Khurshid Iqbal, J.