Syed Waqar Hussain Gilani Vs Federation of Pakistan etc

JUDGMENT SHEET

PESHAWAR HIGH COURT, PESHAWAR

JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

W.P No. 2725-P/2023 Syed Waqar Hussain Gilani vs. Federation of Pakistan and 4 others

PRESENT:

Dr. Shakil Azam Awan, Advocate for petitioner.

M/s. Atif Nazir Deputy Attorney General (DAG) & Rahat Ali Nahaqi AAG for Federation.

Mr. Sabah Uddin Khattak, Advocate for Respondent No. 3.

Date of hearing: 22.04.2026.

JUDGMENT

MUHAMMAD NAEEM ANWAR, J: - Through this common judgment, we propose to dispose of the instant writ petition as well as Civil Miscellaneous Applications Nos. 2272-P of 2024, 2416-P of 2024 and 2417-P of 2024, as all these matters arise out of the same factual background, involve common questions of law, and require interpretation of the provisions of the Works of Defence Act, 1903, particularly the legality and effect of restrictions imposed under Sections 3 and 7 thereof read with S.R.O. No. 076(I)/2003 dated 08.07.2003. Since the controversy in all the matters revolves around substantially identical facts and common legal issues concerning the rights of the petitioners/applicants vis-à-vis the statutory powers of the Federal Government and the Ministry of Defence, they are being decided together in order to avoid repetition of facts, multiplicity of reasoning, and the possibility of conflicting conclusions.

2.Facts of Writ Petition: The petitioner claims to be the lawful allottee of Residential Plot No. 318, Sector C-4, Phase-II, Kohat Development Authority (KDA), Kohat, allotted in his favour through allotment letter dated 10.04.2008. According to him, after fulfillment of all codal formalities, he submitted an application dated 21.02.2023 before respondent No.3 seeking demarcation of the plot, issuance of

a site plan and possession certificate so as to enable him to raise construction over the allotted property. Instead of processing his request, respondent No.3 informed the petitioner that it was unable to demarcate the plot or issue the requisite possession certificate in view of a communication issued by respondent No.5 under the caption "Publication of Advertisement Notice" dated 01.06.2016, whereby reference was made to S.R.O. No. 076(I)/2003 dated 08.07.2003 issued under the provisions of the Works of Defence Act, 1903. The petitioner was consequently restrained from undertaking any construction on his plot. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner has invoked the constitutional jurisdiction of this Court under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, challenging the legality of the aforesaid communication, the action of respondent No.3, and S.R.O. No. 076(I)/2003 dated 08.07.2003. The principal contention advanced by the petitioner is that before denying him possession or preventing construction over his plot, the respondents were legally obliged to first determine, through proper survey and demarcation, whether his plot actually falls within the prohibited distance of 1,143 meters from the crest of the outer parapet of the Ammunition Depot, Kohat. It is argued that neither any survey nor any authenticated plan identifying the restricted area has ever been supplied to him, nor has any lawful determination been made regarding the exact location of his property vis-à-vis the notified restricted zone. According to the petitioner, the impugned action is therefore arbitrary, unsupported by any lawful exercise undertaken under the Works of Defence Act, 1903, and violative of his constitutional right to own, possess and enjoy property. The petitioner has further challenged the constitutional validity of Sections 3 and 7 of the Works of Defence Act, 1903, on the ground that the said provisions confer excessive and unguided powers resulting in unreasonable restrictions upon proprietary rights. In the alternative, it has been prayed that if construction over the allotted plot is legally impermissible, respondent No.3 be directed to allot another residential plot of identical dimensions at a suitable location free from

such restrictions together with issuance of possession certificate and site plan. A further direction has also been sought requiring the respondents to relocate the Ammunition Depot away from the residential and commercial limits of Kohat Development Authority.

3.Facts of the Connected Civil Miscellaneous Applications:

The applicants in Civil Miscellaneous Applications Nos. 2272-P of 2024, 2416-P of 2024 and 2417-P of 2024 seek implementation of the judgment rendered by this Court in Writ Petition No. 4518-P of 2020 along with connected Writ Petition Nos. 3334-P of 2020 and 5414-P of 2020. Through the said common judgment, this Court directed the Ministry of Defence, Government of Pakistan, to undertake actual measurement of a distance of 1,143 meters from the crest of the outer parapet of the Ammunition Depot, Kohat, in the presence of officials of Kohat Development Authority and the petitioners therein. It was further directed that only if, after such exercise, the plots of the petitioners were found to fall within the notified restricted zone, should the respondents proceed strictly in accordance with the provisions of the Works of Defence Act, 1903, and Notification/S.R.O. dated 08.07.2003. The entire exercise was directed to be completed within three months. The applicants allege that although measurements have subsequently been conducted, the respondents have merely relied upon the alleged measurement reports to prohibit construction and utilization of their plots without initiating proceedings contemplated by the Works of Defence Act, 1903, particularly those relating to assessment and payment of compensation. It is, therefore, their contention that the respondents have implemented the restrictive portion of the earlier judgment while completely ignoring the mandatory statutory obligations imposed upon them under the Act.

4.Stance of the Respondents: Separate para-wise comments have been submitted in the writ petition, while replies have also been filed in the connected civil miscellaneous applications. The consistent

stance of the respondents is that S.R.O. No. 076(I)/2003 dated 08.07.2003 was lawfully issued by the Federal Government in exercise of powers conferred by Sections 3 and 7 of the Works of Defence Act, 1903. The said notification, according to the respondents, imposed restrictions upon construction within a radius of 1,143 meters from the crest of the outer parapet of the Ammunition Depot, Kohat. It is asserted that the notification was duly published in the Official Gazette and was also publicized through newspapers, thereby providing sufficient notice to the general public. It is further contended that the petitioner's plot was allotted in the year 2008, nearly five years after issuance of the S.R.O.; therefore, neither the petitioner nor Kohat Development Authority can claim ignorance of the statutory restrictions. According to the respondents, respondent No.3, while developing the housing scheme, ought not to have allotted plots falling within the prohibited zone. Consequently, if any loss has been suffered by the petitioner, his remedy lies against the Kohat Development Authority and not against the answering respondents, who have merely enforced the statutory restrictions imposed in the interest of national security. The respondents further maintain that the impugned notification has been issued strictly in accordance with the Works of Defence Act, 1903, and constitutes a lawful restriction enacted in public interest to protect strategic defence installations. Such restrictions, according to them, neither violate Articles 4, 9, 23 or 24 of the Constitution nor infringe the petitioner's fundamental rights, as reasonable restrictions imposed by law in the interest of national security stand on an altogether different constitutional footing. In the connected applications, respondents Nos.1 to 3 have additionally pleaded that, pursuant to the earlier judgment of this Court, measurements have already been undertaken, whereupon it has been established that the plots of the applicants fall within the prohibited distance of 1,143 meters. It is, therefore, asserted that the applicants are legally bound to comply with the restrictions contemplated by the Works of Defence Act, 1903, and no further direction is warranted.

5.We have heard the learned counsel for the parties at considerable length, perused the record annexed with the petition and applications, and considered the relevant statutory provisions of law with the able assistance of learned counsel for the petitioner/applicants, learned DAG, AAG and learned counsel for

KDA.

6.Before adverting to the rival submissions, it would be advantageous to notice certain facts which are either admitted by the parties or stand established from the record, as these constitute the foundation for determination of the controversy involved in the present proceedings. It is not disputed that the petitioner in the writ petition and all the applicants in the connected civil miscellaneous applications are the owners and/or lawful allottees of their respective plots situated within the housing scheme developed by the Kohat Development Authority. Equally undisputed is the fact that the land comprising the Kohat Development Authority Scheme was acquired through Award dated 10.03.1986, followed by a supplementary award, whereas land for establishment and expansion of the Ammunition Depot was acquired separately under independent acquisition proceedings culminating in Award No. 4385/A/DC- KT/Ammo Depot dated 10.11.2021. It is also an admitted position that the Kohat Development Authority Scheme and the Ammunition Depot are adjacent to each other. The record further reveals that after issuance of S.R.O. No. 076(I)/2003 dated 08.07.2003, respondent No.5 addressed communications to the Kohat Development Authority informing it that approximately 220 residential plots situated in Phase-II, Sector C-4, fall within the restricted distance of 1,143 meters from the crest of the outer parapet of the Ammunition Depot and, therefore, construction over such plots was not permissible except in accordance with the Works of Defence Act, 1903. These facts are not seriously disputed. The real controversy, therefore, is not whether restrictions can lawfully be imposed under the Works of Defence Act, 1903, but whether such restrictions can

be enforced against the petitioners without strict compliance with the mandatory statutory procedure relating to survey, demarcation, notice, determination and payment of compensation prescribed by the Act, and whether denial of the beneficial use of privately owned property without following that procedure is constitutionally sustainable.

7.Statutory Scheme of the Works of Defence Act, 1903: Before examining the rival submissions, it is imperative to appreciate the object, scope and legislative scheme of the Works of Defence Act, 1903, for the controversy involved in the present proceedings substantially turns upon the true construction of its provisions. The Works of Defence Act, 1903 is a special enactment intended to strike a delicate balance between two competing public interests of equal constitutional significance, namely, the imperatives of national security and the protection of private proprietary rights. The Act authorizes the Federal Government to impose restrictions upon the use and enjoyment of privately owned land situated in the vicinity of defence installations so that such land may remain free from buildings and other obstructions capable of compromising the safety, security and operational efficacy of defence works. Simultaneously, however, the Legislature, being fully conscious that such restrictions inevitably diminish or impair valuable proprietary rights, has enacted a complete statutory mechanism for assessment and payment of compensation to every person whose rights are adversely affected by the operation of the Act. The preamble itself leaves no room for ambiguity. It declares that the legislation has been enacted not merely to impose restrictions, but also to determine and pay compensation on account of the imposition of those restrictions. The right to impose restrictions and the obligation to compensate, therefore, constitute complementary parts of one integrated statutory scheme and must be read harmoniously. Neither can be enforced in isolation from the other. The legislative intent is thus abundantly clear that while public safety and national defence may justify reasonable

restrictions upon proprietary rights, Parliament never intended that such restrictions should operate without affording the affected landowners the compensation expressly guaranteed by the statute.

8.The statutory mechanism envisaged under the Act proceeds in a sequential and mandatory manner. Under Section 3, whenever the Federal Government considers it necessary to impose restrictions upon land situated in the vicinity of any work of defence, it is required to issue a declaration under the signature of the competent authority. Such declaration must be published in the Official Gazette, while the Collector is further obliged to cause public notice of its substance to be given at convenient places within the locality. The declaration must identify the territorial limits of the affected area and specify the place where the sketch plan delineating the restricted boundaries may be inspected. Upon such publication, the declaration becomes conclusive evidence of the necessity for imposing restrictions. Following publication of the declaration, Sections 4 and 5 authorize duly empowered officers to enter upon the affected land for purposes of survey, measurement, demarcation, preparation of plans, taking levels and carrying out all preliminary acts necessary for determining the extent of restrictions proposed to be imposed. Any damage occasioned during the exercise of these powers must immediately be compensated, and disputes relating thereto are required to be determined by the Collector. Thereafter, Section 6 authorizes the competent authority, subject to the safeguards and limitations prescribed therein, to remove buildings, trees, excavations and other obstructions where such action becomes necessary for defence purposes. Even these powers are circumscribed by statutory limitations regarding the period of their exercise and are subject to the procedural safeguards provided by the Act. Section 7 constitutes the substantive provision authorizing imposition of restrictions. Depending upon the distance of the land from the defence installation, the Federal Government may prohibit or regulate construction of buildings, alteration of ground levels, plantation of

trees, storage of construction material, survey operations and other activities likely to interfere with the security requirements of the defence establishment. The restrictions are, therefore, not arbitrary executive directions but statutory limitations authorized by Parliament itself. However, significantly, the Act does not terminate at the stage of imposing restrictions.

9.Statutory Right to Compensation: Parliament, while authorizing curtailment of proprietary rights, simultaneously recognized that restrictions imposed under the Act substantially impair the beneficial use and enjoyment of privately owned property. Consequently, the Act creates an enforceable statutory right in favour of every affected person to receive compensation.

Section 9 obligates the Collector, within the period prescribed by law after publication of the declaration under Section 3, to issue notices to all persons interested, inviting their claims regarding compensation. The expression "person interested" has deliberately been assigned an expansive meaning. It is not confined merely to the owner of the land. It includes every person claiming any legal, equitable or beneficial interest in the compensation payable by reason of the restrictions imposed under the Act, including persons possessing easementary rights over the property. The legislative object is to ensure that every person whose proprietary or ancillary rights are adversely affected receives an opportunity to establish his claim before the Collector. Upon issuance of notice, the Collector proceeds to conduct an inquiry under Section 12 regarding the extent of the restrictions, the damage occasioned thereby, the persons entitled to compensation and the quantum payable to each of them. The Collector thereafter renders an award under Section 13, which becomes final unless challenged in accordance with the provisions of the Act. Where the award is disputed, the matter is referred to the Court under the subsequent provisions of the Act, where compensation is determined in accordance with the principles embodied in Sections 18, 19, 23 and 24. Thus, unlike a mere

executive instruction, the Works of Defence Act establishes a complete statutory code extending from publication of the declaration to final judicial determination and payment of compensation.

10.Constitutional Perspective: The statutory scheme is also consistent with the constitutional guarantees embodied in Articles 4, 9, 23 and 24 of the Constitution. Articles 23 and 24 recognize every citizen's right to acquire, hold and enjoy property and prohibit deprivation thereof except in accordance with law. These provisions do not place proprietary rights beyond legislative regulation; nevertheless, they require that any restriction imposed by the State must have lawful authority and must conform to the procedure prescribed by law. Likewise, Article 4 guarantees that every citizen shall be dealt with strictly in accordance with law, while Article 9, which protects the right to life and liberty, has consistently been interpreted by the superior courts to encompass the right to livelihood and the beneficial enjoyment of lawfully acquired property. Consequently, where Parliament itself has prescribed a complete statutory procedure regulating the manner in which restrictions may be imposed and compensation determined, neither the executive authorities nor the beneficiaries of such statutory powers can disregard any component of that procedure. The statute must be implemented in its entirety.

11.Questions for Determination: In light of the admitted facts, the pleadings of the parties and the statutory framework noticed above, the controversy essentially gives rise to the following questions for determination:

(i)Whether the respondents can lawfully enforce the restrictions contained in S.R.O. No. 076(I)/2003 dated 08.07.2003 merely upon determining that the petitioners' properties fall within the restricted distance of 1,143 meters, without simultaneously initiating the statutory proceedings contemplated by the Works of Defence Act, 1903, for determination and payment of compensation?

(ii)Whether the statutory restrictions imposed under Sections 3 and 7 of the Act are self-executory, or whether their enforcement is conditioned upon compliance with the remaining mandatory provisions of the Act relating to survey, demarcation, notice, inquiry and compensation?

(iii)Whether deprivation of the beneficial use and enjoyment of privately owned property, without recourse to the compensation mechanism prescribed by the Act, is consistent with Articles 4, 9, 23 and 24 of the Constitution?

(iv)Whether the respondents have faithfully complied with the earlier judgment rendered by this Court in Writ Petition No. 4518-P of 2020 and connected petitions, or whether they have implemented only that part of the judgment relating to measurement while disregarding the statutory obligations that arise after such measurement?

12.Principles Governing Interpretation: Before proceeding further, one principle deserves particular emphasis. It is a settled canon of statutory interpretation that where a statute prescribes that a thing shall be done in a particular manner, it must be done in that manner alone or not at all. Every other mode of performance is necessarily excluded. This principle has repeatedly been affirmed by the august Supreme Court and the superior courts, including in the cases of “Qamar Javed vs. Gul Jahan” (2005 MLD 1329), “Syed Bashir Hussain vs. Abdul Waheed” (2013 MLD 1675), “SNGPL VS. OGRA” (PLD 2013 Lahore 289), “Cantonment Board Clifton vs. Sultan Ahmad Siddique” (2016 CLC 919), “Muhammad Akram Javid vs. Bashir Ahmad Soak” (2016 CLC 1751), “Hassan Bakhsh vs. Sultan” (2016 MLD 1157). “Ajmir Shah, Ex-Sepoy vs. the Inspector General, Frontier Corps Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and another” (2020 SCMR 2129). “Muhammad Hanif Abbasi v. Imran Khan Niazi” (PLD 2018 SC 189), “Shahida Bibi v. Habib Bank Limited” (PLD 2016 SC 995) and “Human Rights Cases Nos.4668 of 2006 and others” (PLD 2010 SC 759). This doctrine assumes greater significance where the statute authorizes interference with proprietary rights. Since the power exercised by the respondents is entirely statutory, its exercise must strictly conform to every mandatory requirement prescribed by the Legislature. Selective compliance with

the Act by enforcing the restrictive provisions while disregarding the compensatory provisions would amount to rewriting the statute, an exercise impermissible in law. The controversy shall, therefore, be examined keeping in view the above statutory scheme and settled principles of law.

13.Having examined the statutory framework and the rival submissions, we now proceed to determine whether the respondents have acted in accordance with the mandate of the Works of Defence Act, 1903, while enforcing the restrictions contained in S.R.O. No. 076(I)/2003 dated 08.07.2003. There is no cavil with the proposition that protection of defence installations and preservation of national security constitute matters of paramount public importance. Courts have consistently recognized that the State possesses ample legislative competence to impose reasonable restrictions upon the use of private property where such restrictions are demonstrably necessary for safeguarding strategic defence establishments. The validity of the legislative object underlying the Works of Defence Act, 1903 is, therefore, beyond dispute. The controversy before us, however, does not concern the competence of the Federal Government to impose restrictions under the Act. Rather, the real question is whether the respondents can enforce those restrictions while simultaneously disregarding the statutory obligations imposed upon them by the very enactment from which they derive their authority. The answer, in our considered opinion, must be returned in the negative.

14.The Act creates reciprocal rights and obligations: A careful reading of the Works of Defence Act reveals that Parliament has enacted a complete code regulating every stage of the process beginning from publication of the declaration and culminating in payment of compensation. The legislative scheme is neither fragmentary nor optional. Every stage prescribed by the Act forms part of one integrated statutory mechanism. The Act first authorizes the Federal Government to declare that restrictions are necessary. It thereafter empowers the authorities to survey and demarcate the

affected land. It specifies the nature of restrictions that may be imposed. Simultaneously, however, it obligates the Collector to initiate proceedings for determination of compensation, conduct an inquiry, assess the diminution in proprietary rights, apportion compensation amongst all persons interested and thereafter make an award subject to judicial scrutiny. The Legislature has thus consciously balanced two competing public interests—the collective interest of national security and the individual right to property. The State has been granted authority to impose restrictions. The citizen has correspondingly been granted a statutory right to compensation. These two rights are inseparable. One cannot survive independently of the other. To permit enforcement of restrictions while ignoring the statutory obligation to compensate would amount to enforcing only one-half of the legislative scheme and rendering the remaining provisions wholly redundant. Such an interpretation would violate the settled principle that every provision of a statute must be given its due meaning and effect, and that no provision enacted by Parliament should be treated as superfluous or otiose.

15.Restriction is not acquisition, but it is a compensable deprivation: Learned Deputy Attorney General argued that since neither possession nor ownership of the petitioners' properties has been acquired by the respondents, no liability to compensate has arisen. The submission, though attractive at first glance, cannot withstand judicial scrutiny. The Works of Defence Act itself draws a clear distinction between acquisition of land and imposition of restrictions upon its use. Ownership may continue to vest in the citizen. Possession may likewise remain with him. Nevertheless, once statutory restrictions prohibit him from constructing, developing or otherwise beneficially utilizing his property, his proprietary rights stand substantially curtailed. Property is not merely the physical corpus of land. It equally includes every lawful incident attached to ownership, including possession, enjoyment, development, user and the economic potential of the property. Where these incidents are

substantially impaired by operation of law, the owner undoubtedly suffers legal injury notwithstanding that formal title continues to remain vested in him. It is precisely for this reason that Parliament incorporated elaborate provisions regarding compensation under the Act. Had compensation become payable only upon acquisition of ownership or physical possession, there would have been no necessity to enact Sections 9, 12, 13, 18, 23 and the allied provisions relating to compensation for restrictions. The existence of these provisions itself demonstrates that Parliament recognized restriction of user as an independent compensable injury.

16.The controversy is no longer res integra. In Land Acquisition Collector and others v. Abdul Qayyum Malik and others (1980 SCMR 63), the august Supreme Court examined the effect of restrictions imposed under the Works of Defence Act. The Court held that where reliance is placed upon restrictions created by a notification issued under the Act, the burden lies upon the authorities to establish that the land in question actually falls within the notified area. More importantly, the Supreme Court observed that where restrictions imposed under the Works of Defence Act deprive landowners of the beneficial use and development potential of their property, the statute itself provides an effective mechanism for determination and payment of compensation. In that case, since neither assessment nor payment of compensation had been established, the plea founded upon the notification failed both on facts and in law. The Supreme Court further held that mere existence of restrictions upon construction does not completely destroy the potential value of land. Restrictions capable of relaxation or removal cannot automatically reduce valuable urban land to ordinary agricultural land. The possibility of removal of restrictions remains a relevant factor while evaluating proprietary rights and compensation. The ratio decidendi flowing from the above judgment is that statutory restrictions cannot be viewed in isolation from the compensatory scheme enacted by Parliament.

17.The same principle was reiterated by the Lahore High Court in Mian Irfan Akram vs. Government of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Defence and others (2012 YLR 139). The learned Deputy Attorney General had argued therein that since possession of the land had never been taken by the respondents, compensation was not payable. The contention was unequivocally rejected. It was held that liability to compensate under the Works of Defence Act does not depend upon acquisition or physical possession of land. The moment restrictions imposed under the Act substantially deprive the owner of the beneficial use and enjoyment of his property and compel him to keep the land free from construction for defence purposes, a compensable injury comes into existence. The obligation to compensate continues so long as the restrictions remain operative. We are in respectful agreement with the above exposition of law.

18.Similar principles were reaffirmed in Wing Commander, PAF Base, Samungli, Quetta vs. Naseeb Ullah Khan and others (2021 CLC 1738) wherein it was observed that although restrictions imposed for defence purposes undoubtedly serve a legitimate public object, they cannot be enforced in disregard of the statutory safeguards and compensatory rights created by the Act itself. The judgment reiterates that public interest and private rights are not mutually destructive concepts. The statute itself harmonizes both by authorizing restrictions while simultaneously guaranteeing compensation.

18-A. The controversy involved in the instant petitions cannot be examined solely through the prism of the Works of Defence Act, 1903. It also calls for an examination of the constitutional guarantees protecting proprietary rights and the extent to which the State may legitimately regulate those rights in furtherance of public interest. The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 neither accords an absolute immunity to private property nor permits arbitrary interference therewith. Rather, it seeks to maintain a

constitutional equilibrium between the sovereign powers of the State and the proprietary rights of citizens.

18-B. Article 23 of the Constitution guarantees to every citizen the right to acquire, hold and dispose of property in any part of Pakistan, subject to the Constitution and any reasonable restrictions imposed by law in the public interest. Complementing this guarantee, Article 24 expressly prohibits deprivation of property save in accordance with law and further mandates that compulsory acquisition or taking possession of property can only be undertaken for a public purpose and upon payment of compensation in the manner prescribed by law. These provisions unmistakably recognize that while the State may regulate or even acquire private property for legitimate public purposes, such power cannot be exercised arbitrarily or dehors the procedure established by law.

18-C. Equally significant is Article 4 of the Constitution, which embodies one of the fundamental postulates of the rule of law by guaranteeing that every citizen shall be dealt with strictly in accordance with law. The expression "in accordance with law" does not merely signify the existence of statutory authority; it equally requires faithful adherence to every substantive and procedural safeguard prescribed by the statute conferring such authority. The executive cannot selectively invoke those provisions which confer power while disregarding those which impose corresponding obligations. To hold otherwise would render the constitutional guarantee illusory.

18-D. Likewise, Article 9 guarantees that no person shall be deprived of life or liberty except in accordance with law. Judicial pronouncements of the august Supreme Court have consistently assigned an expansive meaning to the expression "life", holding that it embraces not merely physical existence but every facet of human dignity necessary for meaningful enjoyment of life, including the right to livelihood, shelter, lawful occupation and beneficial enjoyment of property. Although Article 9 does not create an independent right to

property, deprivation of the beneficial use and enjoyment of lawfully owned property inevitably impacts the right to livelihood and, therefore, attracts constitutional scrutiny.

18-E. In constitutional jurisprudence, a distinction has consistently been maintained between the State's power of eminent domain and its police power. Under the doctrine of eminent domain, the State may compulsorily acquire private property for a public purpose, but only upon payment of just compensation. Police power, on the other hand, enables the State to regulate the use of private property in the larger public interest without necessarily acquiring ownership thereof. Such regulation may legitimately extend to matters concerning public health, public safety, environmental protection, town planning and national defence. Nevertheless, where regulatory restrictions become so onerous that they substantially deprive the owner of the ordinary and beneficial use of his property, the distinction between regulation and acquisition becomes considerably attenuated. In such circumstances, constitutional and statutory safeguards assume greater significance to prevent disproportionate interference with proprietary rights.

18-F. The Works of Defence Act, 1903 exemplifies this constitutional balance. Parliament has not chosen to acquire every parcel of land adjoining defence installations. Instead, it has adopted the lesser measure of imposing restrictions upon the use and enjoyment of such land. However, recognizing that these restrictions substantially impair proprietary rights, the Legislature has simultaneously incorporated an elaborate machinery for determination and payment of compensation. The compensatory provisions are, therefore, neither incidental nor ancillary; they constitute an indispensable component of the legislative scheme itself.

18-G. It is, therefore, erroneous to contend that because ownership remains vested in the landowner, no compensable injury arises. Property, in constitutional contemplation, comprises not merely title

but also the aggregate of rights flowing from ownership, including possession, enjoyment, development, alienation and economic exploitation. Where statutory restrictions substantially diminish or sterilize these incidents of ownership, the owner suffers a legal injury notwithstanding retention of formal title. It is precisely this diminution in proprietary rights which the Works of Defence Act recognizes and compensates.

18-H. The constitutional validity of the Works of Defence Act, 1903 thus rests upon the harmonious operation of its restrictive and compensatory provisions. The Act survives constitutional scrutiny because it does not merely authorize imposition of restrictions; it simultaneously secures compensation to every "person interested" whose proprietary rights are prejudicially affected. If the compensatory mechanism is ignored while the restrictive provisions alone are enforced, the legislative balance consciously struck by Parliament stands disturbed. Such selective implementation would not only frustrate the object of the Act but would also expose executive action to challenge under Articles 4, 9, 23 and 24 of the Constitution.

18-I. It is, therefore, the considered opinion of this Court that the power to impose restrictions under Sections 3 and 7 of the Works of Defence Act cannot be divorced from the statutory obligation to determine and pay compensation under the subsequent provisions of the Act. These obligations are reciprocal and inseparable. The authority to restrict the beneficial use of property derives its legal legitimacy from faithful compliance with the entire statutory framework enacted by Parliament. Any attempt to enforce one part of the statute while disregarding the other would amount to exercising statutory power in a manner not sanctioned by law and would offend the constitutional guarantees embodied in Articles 4, 23 and 24 of the Constitution.

19.The above statutory scheme also accords with the constitutional mandate embodied in Articles 4, 9, 23 and 24 of the Constitution. Article 23 guarantees every citizen the right to acquire, hold and dispose of property. Article 24 prohibits deprivation of property except in accordance with law. Article 4 assures every citizen that he shall be dealt with strictly in accordance with law. Article 9, as consistently interpreted by the superior courts, extends beyond mere animal existence and embraces those facets of life which make human existence meaningful, including lawful enjoyment of property and the right to pursue livelihood therefrom. No doubt, these constitutional rights are not absolute. Reasonable restrictions imposed by competent legislation in public interest are constitutionally permissible. However, equally settled is the principle that once Parliament itself prescribes the procedure by which those restrictions are to be imposed and compensation determined, the executive possesses no authority to bypass that procedure. The State cannot invoke one part of the statute while ignoring another. The respondents derive their authority entirely from the Works of Defence Act. Consequently, every action taken thereunder must conform to the complete statutory framework enacted by Parliament.

20.The respondents' approach: Examined in the above legal backdrop, the approach adopted by the respondents cannot be sustained. The respondents have relied upon S.R.O. No. 076(I)/2003 and the subsequent measurement reports for the purpose of prohibiting construction over the petitioners' properties. However, the record placed before us does not disclose commencement of proceedings under the provisions governing determination of compensation. No material has been produced to demonstrate issuance of statutory notices contemplated by Section 9. No proceedings before the Collector have been shown. No inquiry appears to have been conducted under Section 12. No award has been made. Nor has any compensation been assessed, apportioned or paid to the persons whose proprietary rights stand curtailed. Thus,

while the restrictive provisions of the Act have been enforced with full vigour, the compensatory provisions have remained entirely unimplemented. Such selective implementation cannot receive judicial approval. The authority conferred by Parliament cannot be exercised piecemeal. The Act must be implemented as a whole. Where Parliament has chosen to balance national security with statutory compensation, the executive cannot disturb that balance by enforcing one obligation while ignoring the corresponding statutory right.

21.Application of Law to the Facts and Findings: Applying the above principles to the facts of the present case, it is evident that the controversy does not relate to the competence of the Federal Government to issue S.R.O. No. 076(I)/2003 or to impose restrictions under the Works of Defence Act, 1903. The statutory competence of the Federal Government to notify restricted zones around defence installations is traceable to Sections 3 and 7 of the Act and is not in serious dispute before us. Equally, the necessity of maintaining adequate safety and security around an ammunition depot is a matter falling within the exclusive domain of the State, and this Court is neither expected nor competent to substitute its opinion for that of the executive in matters concerning national defence. The dispute, however, concerns the manner in which those statutory powers have been exercised. The rule of law demands that every statutory power be exercised strictly within the limits prescribed by the statute itself. The greater the power conferred by law, the greater is the obligation to exercise it in conformity with the procedural safeguards enacted by the Legislature. Where a statute authorizes interference with proprietary rights, strict adherence to the prescribed procedure is not a mere formality but a mandatory condition for the lawful exercise of such power.

22.The admitted facts reveal that the respondents have acted upon S.R.O. No. 076(I)/2003 and the subsequent demarcation exercise by prohibiting the petitioners and applicants from

constructing upon or otherwise beneficially utilizing their respective properties on the premise that they fall within the restricted distance of 1,143 meters from the crest of the outer parapet of the Ammunition Depot, Kohat. However, beyond placing reliance upon the notification and the measurement reports, no material has been produced to demonstrate compliance with the remaining mandatory provisions of the Act relating to initiation of compensation proceedings. The record is conspicuously silent regarding issuance of notices to the persons interested under Section 9, commencement of inquiry by the Collector under Section 12, assessment of diminution in proprietary rights, determination of compensation in accordance with Section 23, or passing of an award under Section 13. Learned counsel for the respondents was likewise unable to point out any proceedings undertaken in accordance with the compensatory mechanism provided by the Act. The inevitable conclusion, therefore, is that while the respondents have enforced the restrictive provisions of the statute, they have failed to discharge the corresponding statutory obligation to initiate proceedings for determination and payment of compensation. Such an approach cannot be sustained in law. The Works of Defence Act, 1903 does not contemplate indefinite deprivation of the beneficial use and enjoyment of privately owned property without recourse to the statutory machinery for compensation. The Act itself recognizes that restrictions imposed in the interest of national security diminish valuable proprietary rights and, therefore, creates an enforceable right in favour of every "person interested" to receive compensation. Any interpretation permitting the State to prohibit construction and freeze the utility of private property without simultaneously implementing the compensatory provisions would defeat the very object of the Act and render substantial portions of the legislation redundant. Such a construction is impermissible.

23.We are equally unable to accept the contention that compensation becomes payable only where the Government acquires

ownership or physical possession of the land. This argument stands repelled by the statutory scheme itself and by the judicial pronouncements discussed above. The injury contemplated by the Act is not confined to dispossession. It extends to every substantial restriction imposed upon the lawful use and enjoyment of property. A landowner who is prohibited from constructing, developing, alienating for intended purposes, or otherwise beneficially utilizing his property suffers a real and measurable diminution of proprietary rights notwithstanding that formal title continues to vest in him. Such deprivation is precisely what the Act seeks to compensate.

24.The earlier judgment of this Court rendered in Writ Petition No. 4518-P of 2020 and connected petitions also does not advance the respondents' case. Through the said judgment, this Court merely directed that the respondents should first undertake measurement in the presence of the parties and, if the plots were found to fall within the restricted distance, thereafter proceed strictly in accordance with the provisions of the Works of Defence Act, 1903. The expression "in accordance with the provisions of the Act" necessarily incorporates the entire statutory procedure and cannot be confined merely to enforcement of the restrictions contained in Section 7. Compliance with the earlier judgment, therefore, required the respondents not only to identify the affected properties but also to initiate the proceedings contemplated by the Act for assessment and payment of compensation. Implementation of one part of the statutory scheme while ignoring the other cannot be regarded as faithful compliance with the directions previously issued by this Court.

25.At this juncture, it is necessary to clarify that this judgment should not be construed as preventing the respondents from enforcing the Works of Defence Act, 1903 or the notification issued thereunder. National security remains a paramount constitutional obligation of the State, and the restrictions contemplated by the Act serve an important public purpose. What the law insists upon is that such restrictions must be enforced strictly in the manner prescribed

by Parliament. The respondents cannot be permitted to rely upon the restrictive provisions of the Act while disregarding the statutory rights simultaneously conferred upon the affected citizens. The rule is elementary yet fundamental: when the law requires a thing to be done in a particular manner, it must be done in that manner alone and in no other. This principle has repeatedly been affirmed by the superior Courts, and there is no justification for departing from it in the present case.

26.Conclusions: In view of the foregoing discussion, the questions framed for determination are answered as follows:

(i)The Federal Government is legally competent to impose restrictions upon the use and enjoyment of land situated within the notified area under Sections 3 and 7 of the Works of Defence Act, 1903. However, the enforcement of such restrictions is inseparably linked with the mandatory statutory procedure relating to survey, demarcation, notice, inquiry, assessment and payment of compensation.

(ii)The respondents cannot lawfully prohibit or indefinitely restrain the beneficial use and enjoyment of privately owned property merely on the basis of S.R.O. No. 076(I)/2003 without simultaneously initiating and pursuing the statutory proceedings for determination and payment of compensation in accordance with the provisions of the Works of Defence Act, 1903.

(iii)Deprivation of the beneficial use and enjoyment of property otherwise than in accordance with the complete statutory scheme of the Act is inconsistent with Articles 4, 9, 23 and 24 of the Constitution, which guarantee that no person shall be deprived of his proprietary rights except in accordance with law.

(iv)The earlier judgment of this Court in Writ Petition No. 4518- P of 2020 required the respondents to proceed strictly in accordance with the Works of Defence Act, 1903 after completion of the measurement exercise. Such compliance necessarily includes implementation of the provisions relating to compensation.

27.Consequently, this writ petition as well as Civil Miscellaneous Applications Nos. 2272-P of 2024, 2416-P of 2024 and 2417-P of 2024 are disposed of with the following directions:

(i)The respondents shall, within the framework of the Works of Defence Act, 1903, ensure that all properties falling within the restricted distance of 1,143 meters from the crest of the outer parapet of the Ammunition Depot are properly identified, surveyed, measured, demarcated and incorporated in the plans and registers contemplated by the Act.

(ii)Thereafter, the Collector shall, without unnecessary delay, initiate proceedings under the relevant provisions of the Act by issuing notices to all persons interested, conduct the inquiry prescribed by law, determine the extent of diminution in proprietary rights, assess the compensation payable in accordance with Sections 12, 13 and 23 of the Act, and pass an award in accordance with law.

(iii)Every person aggrieved by the assessment, apportionment or determination of compensation shall remain entitled to avail the statutory remedies provided under the Works of Defence Act, 1903.

(iv)Until the respondents undertake the statutory process in the manner contemplated by the Act, the restrictions imposed under S.R.O. No. 076(I)/2003 shall not be enforced in a manner that deprives the petitioners/applicants of their statutory right to compensation. However, this shall not preclude the respondents from taking such lawful measures

as may be immediately necessary in cases of genuine emergency or overriding public safety, strictly in accordance with the provisions of the Act.

(v)The respondents shall complete the exercise directed herein with all convenient dispatch and, in any event, within a period of four months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this judgment.

28.Before parting with the case, we reiterate that the present judgment does not dilute the authority of the State to safeguard defence installations nor does it question the validity of S.R.O. No. 076(I)/2003. It merely affirms the constitutional principle that the exercise of statutory power must remain coextensive with the statutory duties imposed by the same enactment. National security and private property rights are not mutually exclusive; the Legislature has consciously harmonized them through the Works of Defence Act, 1903 by authorizing restrictions while simultaneously guaranteeing compensation. The respondents are, therefore, bound to implement the statute in its entirety, giving equal effect to both its restrictive and compensatory provisions. There shall be no order as to costs. Announced on 22.04.2026.

Released on 18.07.2026.

JUDGE

JUDGE

Ashfaq Ahmad

(DB)Hon’ble Mr. Justice Muhammad Naeem Anwar and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Wiqar Ahmad.