Mumtaz Khan and another Vs Collector Land Acquisition Nowshera

JUDGME},IT SHEET

PESIIAWAR HIGH COURT, PESIIAWAR

(Iudicial Depatnen\ Renrlar First Aoneal No. 19&P of 20%

Mumtaz Khan and another vs. Collector land Nourshera with 3 others.

Present For Aouellents. I\dr. Rchan Saced, Advocate For Il&. Irshad Ahmad Khan, AAG for rcspondenb Respondents. No. 1 & 3 and Mr. Nasir Mehmood, Advocate for aoquiring depatuent

Date of hearins 07.05.2026

IUDGMENT

MUHAMMAD NAEEM ANWAR J: - TITTo ugh this single judgnrent, the above<aptioned Regular First Appeal and the connected appeals, the particulars of which are given below, instituted both by the la.ndowners and by the acquiring agency, i.e, the Khyber Pakhhrnkhwa licononric Zones Development and Management Company (KPEZDMC), are being decided together, iu they arise out of the conlmon iudgment and decree dated 25.02.2025 passed by the learned Ref'eree Court in ref'erences instituted under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinalter ref'erred to as "the Act of 1894). Since all the appeals arise out of the same land acquisition proceedings, involve conlnlon questions of law and f'act, pertain to Award No. 833/DCA-AIIA{SR dated 17.08.2017, and were heard together, they are being rlisposed of by this consolidated judgment in order to avoid repetition of facts, conllicting judgrnents, and inconsistent findings. The particulars of the connected appeals are as fbllows: l. RemlerFlrstAppcalNo. U&P/2025 titled Abiel AIi vs KPEZDMC, 2. Renrlar Fir* Appcd No. l79Pl2095. titled Fazal Akbar vs District Collector etc,

3.Renrlar First Appeal No. f94.P/20X5, titled Shah Nawaz vs District Collector etc,

4.Renrlar First Aoned No. 19.!P/2025 titled Nasir Ali vs. District Collector etc,

5.Regular FirstAppeal No. 96&P/2095. titled Shah Hussain etc vs District Collector ctc

6.Recular First ADDcal No. 287-Pl2095 titled Habib ul Akbar vs District Collector etc

7.Rerular Fint Appcal No. 81'GP/9025, titled Ghulam Rehman vs Gort etc

8.Renrlar Ftrst Appeal No. 37$Pn0r5, tided Sarnad Khan vs. District Collector ctc

9.Re*ular Fust Appcal No. 261-P/2025 , titled KPEZ,DMC vs Nasir Ali, 10. Renrlar Iirst ADDeal No. 969.P/2025. titled KPFZDMC vs. Ghulam Relman zurd others, ll.Regular First Apral No. 96&P19025, titled KPEZDMC vs. Samad Khan and others,

12.Renrlar first Apped No. 264P12025, titled KPEZ.,DMC vs. Mumtaz Khzur

13.Renrlar First Apped No. 96.!P12095, titled KPET-DMC vs Syed Mazhar Ali Shah Gillani,

14.Renrlar first ADDcal No. 96GP4095 , titled KPIZDMC vs. Fazal Akbar and others,

15.Renrlar First Appcal No. 267-Pl9095, titled KPEZDMC vs Sher Muhamrnad and others

16.Renrlar Eirst ADDGaI No. 26&P/2015. titled KPIiZDMC vs. Abid Ni and others

17.Remlar first ADD€d No. 96$P/9095 titled KPFZDMC vs. Shah Hussain and others,

18.Resdar Fint Appeal No. 97GP/20X5 , title<l KPIZDMC vs. Abdul Wahab zurd others,

19.Renrlar First Aoped No. 971-Pi20X5 titled I(PMDMC vs. Habib ul Akbar and others,

20.Rcsular first ADDeal No. 271Pl2025. titled KPFT,DMC vs. Shah Nazar arxl others, and

21.Renrlar First Appeal No. 27&P/2025 titled KPEZDMC vs Rahirn Dad and others

2.'I'he facts, shorn of unnecessary details, :re that the Khyber Paklrtunkhwa Iicononric Zones f)evelopment and Management Company (KPIZDMC), tlrrough its Industrial Estate Manager, Nowshera, requested the Provincial ()ovemment to initiate acquisition proceedings untler the Liurd Acquisition Act, 1894 fbr acquisition of lanrl, nreasuring 85il Kanals and l8 Marlas, situated in Mauza Mera K;urdar, 'l'ehsil and District Nowshera, fbr the stated purpose of F,:rpansion of Nowshera Industial Estafe. Acting upon the requisition so nlade, the competent Govemment authorities, initiated acquisition proceedings under the Act of lll94 by issuirg the requisite statutory notifications and, thereirlter,

completed all codal fbmralities, contemplated under Sections 4, 5-A, 6, 7, 9 and I I of the Act. Upon conrpletion of the statutory proceediryS;, the l,and Acquisition Collector announced Award No. 833/DC^,ABNSR dated 17.08.2017 whereby compensation was assesse(l according to the ckussification of land recorded in the revenue record. The Collector fixed conrpensation at difl'erent rates fbr difl'erent categories of land, namely Nal Chahi, Shahnelrri, Ghair Mumkin Abadi and Ghair Mumkin land. 'l'he landowners, f'eeling aggrieved of the quanhrnr of conrpensation determined in the Award, invoked their starutory right under Section l8 of the Act of 1894 and sought ref'erences tcr the competent Court, asserting that the conrpensation awarded neither represented the true market value of the acquired land nor reflected it.s enormous commercial potential, advantageous location and future utiliy. They further claimerl tlnt since the acquisition had been undertaken fbr the benefit of a corporate entity, namely I(PEZDMC, they were legally entitled to comllulsory acquisition cluuges at the rate of twenty-five I)ercent instearl o1' fifteen tr)ercent.

3.The ref'erences were transmitted to the learned Ref'eree Court, where all the parties were allbrded full opporhrniry to produce oral as well as documentary evidence. 'I'he learned Ref'eree Court, alter fianring the necessary issues, recording evidence and hearing the piuties, partly accepted the ref'erences and enhanced the compensafion to Rs. 125,000/- per marla. Besides the enhanced market value, the learned Referee Court awarded compulsory acquisition clnrges at the rate of filteen percent together with other statutory benelits. 'l'he afbresaid.judgment gave dse to two sets of appeals befbre this Court. The landowners seek J- f'urther enhancement of compensation and, ntore importantly, challenged the awartl of compuls<>ry acquisition charges at the rate of filteen l)ercent, contending tltat un<ler Section 23(21 of the Act they are entitlecl to twenty-five percent. Conversely, KPIZDMC challenges the enhancenrent itself, maintaining that the learned

Referee Court erred in relying upon the Local Commissioner's report and in ignoring the valuafion adopted by the Innd Acquisition Collector.

4.[,earned counsel appearing lbr tlte liurdowners contended that the learned Ref'eree Court correctly appreciated the documentary evidence, the sale mutations, the l,ocal Commissioner's repoft:rnd the immense commercial potential of the acquirerl property but nevertheless committed a legal error in awarding conrpulsory acquisition charges at the rate of lifteen percent only. It is argued that the acquisition was initiated at the request of KPEZDMC, a juristic entity falling within the definition of a "Company" under the Act of 1894, fbr expansion of its intlustrial estate, and not fbr acquisiti<ln by the Government fbr a public purpose. Consequently, the landowners are entitled to conrpulsory acquisition clmrges at the enhanced rate of tweny-five percent unrler Section 23(2) of the Act.

5.Per contra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the acquiring clepartnrent submitted that the learned Ref'eree Court has already awarded excessive compensation. According to tlte learned counsel, the l,ocal Commissioner's repoft suflers fiom serious legal infirmities and ouglrt not t() have been relied upon. It is lurther argued that the Collector riglrtly assessed conrpensation on the basis of the prevailing valuation schedule and the revenue record and, therefbre, the enharlcement granted by the Ref'eree Court deserves to be set aside. With regard to conrpulsory acquisition charges, learned counsel nraintaine<l that industrial development seles the larger public interest an<I, therelbre, even if the beneficiary is KPFZDMC, tlte acquisition must be treated a-s one fbr a public purpose attracting only filteen percent compulsory acquisition charges.

6.I hare heard the leitrned counsel fbr the respective parties at consirlerable length, exantined the entire record, and have also

gone through the statutory provisions as well as the authoritative pronouncenrents of the august Supreme Court cited at the Bar.

7.Upon thouglrtlul consideration of the rival submissions, it beconres evident that although nun)erous grounds have been urged in these apJreals, the entire controversy substantially revolves around two principal questions, the deternilnation whereof would efl'ectively resolve all the connecte<l ap1 rcals. The first ouestron concerns the orouer detemrinati<ln of th en rarket value of the acouiretl liurd within the contemolation of Sec on 23(l) of the I-and Aco uisition Acl 1894 This necessarily requires examination of the principles repeatedly laid down by the august Supreme Court regarding the manner in which cr>mpensation is to be assessed, tlte evidentiary value of sale transacti<>ns, mutations, revenue recorrl, local Conrnrissioner's report, oral evidence, potential value, location, future prospects and constihrtional guarantee of adequate compensati<>n emb<xlied in Article 24 of the Constitution of the Islanric Republic of Pakist;ur, 1973. 'l'he second and more sicnificart ouestion con(:er I1s dre interprctation ol'Section 23(2) ol the Act of 1894. The con trovemv is whether conroulsory acouisition charses are oavable at the rate of fif-teen Dercent or twenty-five r)ercent where land is acquired at the reouest iurd fbr the benefit of a corDorate entiry. Resolution of tlus question necessarily requires examination of the statutory scheme of the Act, particularly Sections 3(e), 3(f), 4, 5-A, 6,7,9, ll,23(21 nnd 50(2), together with the consistent line of authorities rendered by the aulJust Suprenre Court beginning fr<>n II4ii Muhammad Yaooob(1997 SCMR 1670) and culmirutins n B.P. hkisan F,xolontioa and hoduction Inc. v. Ashioue lfussain N I:Ialepa (2024 SC\[R 8381.

8.Since both issues involve interpretation of the statutory provisions of the Act of 1894 ar-ul their application to the evidence available on the record, they shall trc examined separately, though they remain closely interlinked. The question relating to

determination of market value under Section 23(l) shall first be considered because the contpulsory acquisition charges contenrJrlatetl by Section 23(2) are necessarily calculated upon the market value so determined. Befbre adverting to the evidence produced by the parties, it would be advantageous to exanrine the statutory scheme goveming compulsory acquisition of land and the seftled principles evolved by the august Suprenre Court regarding <leternrination of fair conrllensation unrler Section 23 of the l^and Acquisition Act, 1894, as these principles constitute the legal fbundation fbr resolving the controversy involved in the present appeals.

9.Having considered the fadual background and the rival submissions advanced by the learned counsel lbr the parties, the first and fbremost question requiring determination is whether the learned Referee Court rightly assessed the market value of the acquired land at the rate of Rs. 12.5,000/- per marla or whether the conrpensation determined either by the [;urd Acquisition Collector or by the Ref'eree Court calls fbr interf'erence by this Court in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. The determination of conrpensation in cases of compulsory acquisition is governed by Section 23 of the I;rnd Acquisition Act, 1894. The olrject of the provision is neither to enrich the kurdowner at the expense of the acquiring autlxrrity nor to permit the State or the acquiring agency to acquire private properry lbr less than its real wortlt. 'Ihe statutory nrandate is to ensure payment of fair, just iur<l equitable conrpensation, representing the ttue market value of the propery ( compulsorily acquired. Since conrpulsory acquisition deJrrives a citizen of his constitutionally protected proprietary riglrts, the law insists that compensation ntust be real iutd adequate, not illusory or arbitrary.

10.1'he riglrt to property enjoys constitutional protection under Article 24 of the Constitution of tlte Islanric Republic of Pakistan, 1973, which guarantees that no person shall be deprived of his

property save in accordance with law and except upon payment of compensation <letermined in the ntanner prescribed by law. The constitutional guarantee of compensation is not an empty lbrmality. It obligates the Collector as well as the Referee Court to detemdne compensation objectively, lairly and judicially, ensuring that the owner receives the hue equivalent of the property of which he has been conrpulsorily deprived. 'l'he .jurisprudence governing deternrination ol nrarket value has gradually evolved tlrough a consistent line of authoritative pronouncements rendered by tlte august Suprenre Court. The entire law on the subject now stands comprrehensively consolidated in Province of Puqjab tlrrough Land Acquisition Collectorv. Benrm AzrzaQ0l4 SCMR 75). In the said judgnrent, alter examining the earlier authorities including Abdur Rauf Khan v. Land Acquisition Collector(1991 SCMR 2164), Murad Khiut v. Liurl Acquisition Collector(l9gg SCMR 1647) an<l nunrerous other precerlents, the Suprenre Courl authoritatively summarized the principles governing assessnrent of compensation under Section 23 of the Act of 1894. The Court emphatically held that although the ntarket value has ordinarily tt> be deternrined with ref'erence to the date of publication of the rxrtification un<ler Section 4 of the Act, such determination cannot be nmrle mechanimlly by nrerely relbrring to the revenue entries, oflicial valuation schedules or average price lists prepared lbr adnrinistrative convenience.'l'he jutlicial exercise contenrplated under Section 2il is considerably wider. [t requires tlte Couft to ascertain the real nrarket value which the acquired property would f-etch in arl open nrarket if sold voluntarily by a willing seller to a willing purchaser <ln the relevant date, assunring that the acquisition proceedings <li<l not exist. 'l'he Suprenre Court {urther ollserved ,k that revenue classification of liurd, though relevant, is by no nleans decisive. Ag,icultural larxl recorded a^s Barani, Banjar, Main or ()lnir Muntkin may possess imnrense commercial worth owing to its a<lvzurtageous location, proxinrity to urba.n centres, higltways,

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industrial estates, educational institutions, residenti:rl colonies or other developmental activities. Conversely, land of a superior agricultural classification may command conrparatively lesser value because of its remoteness or lack of developntental potential. 'fherefbre, the Courl must ascertain the true market worth by consi<lering the entirety of' the surrounrling circumstances ratlter than confining itself to the nomenclature employed in the revenue record.

11.Another inrportart principle reaflirmed in Begunt Adza (supr) is that the best evidence of nrarket value ordinarily consists of bona ficle sale transactions relating to sinril:u land situated in the immediate vicinity and executed witliln a reasonable period preceding the notification under Section 4, pref'erably within the previous twelve nrontlm. Conrpiuable sale transactions lumislr the saf'est iurd nrost ob.jective guide because they retlect the prevailing market conditions unall'ected by speculative considerations. However, the Supreme Court simultaneously cautioned that sale deeds cannot invariably be treated as conclusive evidence of'market value..Judicial notice was taken of tlte prevalent llractice whereby consirleration nrentionerl in registere<l documents is frequently understated to reduce stanrp duty, registration charges and fiscal liabilities. Consequently, where documentary evidence rloes not truly reflect the prevailing nrarket price, the Couft is not powerless. It may legitinrately rely uynn otlter hustworthy rnaterial including oral testinrony of respectable local property <lealers, persons conversant with prevailing market prices, oflici:rl witnesses, expert opinion and any other reliable evirlence capable of assisting tlre Court in aniving at the hue nrarket value. 'l'he ratio of Begunt Azizais, therefi>re, tltat tleterntination of compensation un<ler .\_ Section 23 is essentially a judicial exercise requiring evaluation of all releviurt ob.jective l'actors, including the location of tlte land, surrounding develollnrent, accessibility, existing infiastructure, conrnrercial imlnrtance, luture prosllects and every circunrstance

which would legitinntely influence the price payable by a prudent purchaser in a.n open nrarket. The albresaid principles were originally elaborated in Murad Khanv.I-and Acouisition 1 SCMR 164 wherein the Supreme Court held that the expression "market value' occuring in Section 23 has not been statutorily defined because no rigid fornrula czur aclequately deterntine the value of every parcel of land. The Court observed that nrarket value is essentially a question of lact to be determined upon appreciation of all relevant evidence available in a particular case. 'l'he judgnrent further held that valuation schedules prepared by the Revenue Depattment or average price lists may constitute one relevant circumstiurce, but they cannot override reliable evidence demonstrating the actual market value of sinrilarly situated property.

12.-l'he sanre principle was reiterated by the august Suprente Court in Government of Pakistan v. Ghularn Murtaza and others P016 SCMR 1l4l). wherein it was authoritatively held that average price schedules prepared by the Revenue Deparhnent cannot be treated as the sole fbundation fbr deternrining compensation. Suclr schedules are nrerely administrative guidelines and cannot substitute judicial determination contemplated under Section 23. The Collector as well as the Refbrence Court are under a legal obligation to c<>nsider all relevant evidence including sale trzursacti<>ns, nrutations, location of the lancl, f'uture potential ancl surrounding circumstances befbre arriving at a fair deternrination of nrarket value. The jurisprurlence has lleen lurther developed in the recent judgrnent of the Supreme Court rendered in Govemment of Pakistan throudr Secretarv v. MsL Ayesha Bibi and others (2024 SCMR 1323).'l'he Courl reaflirrned that there exists no universal or inflexible lbrmula fbr detemrination of compensation under the l,and Acquisition Act. Every acquisition lns to be examined in the ligllt of its own peculiar lacts and circunrstances. The Courl enrplnsizerl that thejudicinl deternrination of compensation must

necessarily consider not only contenrporimeous sale transactions but also the rlevelopmental prospects, existing inlrastructure, future utility, location, accessitlility, comnrercial inrportance and every fhctor having a rati<lnal bearing uyron tlte nrarket value of the acquired land. 'l'he Court lurther reiterated that the concept ol' "nrarket value" cannot be divorced liom the funrre utiliq, and econonric potential of the land because a prudent purchaser inviuiably takes such consirlerations into account while negotiating the purchase price. 1'hus, the cunrulative ell-ect of the alnve authorities unmistakably establishes the fbllowing legal propositions:

(l)For determination of market ralue, the date of issuance of notification under 4 is notthe sole criterion; (O Comparable sale transactions relating to similar land executed within a reasonable pedod constiurte the best evidence of prerailing market ralue;

(lO Reircuue entries, mluation tables and a\rcrage price schedules are relevant but never conclusive;

(rv)The C,ourt must eraluate the location, surroundings, accessibility, existirg infizstructur€, derrclopmental prospecB and fuUue pot€ntial of the acquired property;

(v)The object of the inquiry is to ascertain the price n&ich a willhg purchaserwould reasonably pay to a wiling seller in an open and unrestricted markeq

(vr)Where doormentary evidence does not tuly reflect market conditions, credible oral evidence and other tmstworthy marerial may legitimately be considered; and

(vii)The ultimate object of section 23 is to auad fair, reasonable and equitable compensation correspoudiqg to the true market ralue of the acquired property.

Keeping the afbresairr settred principles in view, trre evidence produced befbre the leanrerl Ref'eree Court now deseryes examination. In the present case, the acquiring departrnent prurcip;rlly relied upon trre testimony of RW_I, who candidly adr,itted t,at the valuati.n inc.4xrratea in trre Aw:ud had been rleternrinecl prinx*,y on trre basis of the ,ne-year average price sc.e.ule rrnintainea lly t,e Re'enue Delxutnrent. sigrifica,try, ,<r independent eviclence wa_s prorlucecl by the acquiring agency to

establish that the rates mentioned in the Awird represented the actual prevailing market value of comparable land situated in the vicinity. l,ikewise, no loca.l property dealer, purchaser, venrlor or inrlependent witness acquainte<l with the prevailing market conditions was pro<luced to subsEurtiate the valuation arbpted by the Collector.

13.On the contrary, the olrjectors produced a substantial body <>l' documentary evidence consisting of registered sale dee<ls, attesterl nrutations, revenue recorrl and oral testimony clemonstrating the steadily increasing nnrhet trend prevailing in the locality. The mutations placed on record reveal t]nt sale transactions executed during the years inrntediately preceding the auyuisition reflected values sullstanti:rlly higher than those adopted by the Collector. The documentarJ evidence further indicates that tlte locality had already witnessed significiurt industrial and conrnrercial development even bef<rre issuance of the notification under Section 4. More importantly, the learned Ref'eree L^ourt, with a view to arriving at the true malket value and to avoid speculative assessnrent, appointed a Local Commissioner under Order XX\rI Rule 9, C.P.C. 'I'he [ocal Commissioner conducted a detailerl inspection of the acquired property in the presence of both parties and the concerned revenue oflicials. During the inspection, he ex:unined the physical fbatures of the locality, recorded statenrents of local properry dealers, obtained photographs and video recordings of the site, collected comparable sa.le trzursactions and submitted a conrprehensive reJrort supported by docunrentary nraterial. 'fhe l,ocal Commissioner ultinrately assesserl the prevailing market value bebveen Rs. 125,000/- and Rs.

140,000/- per marla afier considering the location, contmercial surrounding;, future utility and rlevekrpment:rl potential of the "k arquired lanrl. It is significant tltat the [,ocal Conrnrissioner sullsequently appeared befbre the lear-ne<l Ref'eree Couft, wltere lte wius sulrjected to Iengthy cross€xanrination. Despite exhaustive

questioning, nothing substiurtial could be elicited to discredit his inrpartiality, nrethorlology or conclusions. 'I'lte report thus renrained rnaterially unshaken iurrl continued to enjoy firll evirlentiary value.

L4. Equally important is the undislluted locatjon of the acquired property. 'l'he record unnristakably <lenronstrates that the land is situated a<ljacent to the existing industrial estate, enjoys direct accessibility, possesses commercial utility and has inrmense future development potential. These fhctors substantially enhance its market value and cannot be ignored merely because the revenue rccorcl classifies portions of the land difl'erently. Viewed curnulatively, the tlocunrentary evidence, oral testirnony, comparable sa.le [ansactions, Local Comnrissioner's report and surrounding circunrstances overwhelmingly establish that the valuation adopted by the Collect<lr was wholly unrealistic and failed to represent the actual market value contemplated by Section 23 of the Act. Conversely, the compensati<ln deternrined by the learrred Ref'eree Court at tlte rate of Rs. 125,000[ per marla is lullv supported by reliable evirlence and is entirely consistent with the principles autlroritatively laid rloun in Beqrm Azin(2014 SCMR 7l\,Ghulan Mwaza(2016 SCMR 1141) atd.Mst Ay,esln BibiQ024 SCMR 1323). Accordi ngly, I finrl no legal infimrity, .lurisdictional def'ect or nrisreading of evidence warriurting interf'erence with the cletemrination <>f nrarket value recorrled tly the learned Refbree Court. The lindings returned on this aspect are based ulnn proper appreciation of'evidence, conlbrrn to the settled principles goveming conrpulsory acquisition and laitlfully reflect the constitutional requiren)ent of payment of fair and adequate conrpensation under Article 24 of the Constitution.

t\ 15. Having upheld the nrarket value rleternrined by the leiunerl Ref'eree C<lurt, the next and nrore substantial confoversy requiritrg detemrination is wltetlter the litndowners are entitled to conrpulsory acquisition clnrges at tlte rate <>l LItV" or 25'y'" under

Section 2il(2) of the l,and Acquisition Act, 1894. Resolution of this issue necessarily requires examination of the statutoly schenre of tlte Act, particulady Sections 3(e), 3(f), 4, 5-A, 6, 7, 9, I l, 23(2) and 50(2), together with the entire evolution of judicial precedent beginning fiom Haii Muhammad Yao oob (1997 SCMR 1670) and culminatine inB .P. Pakistan Exoloration and Production Inc. v. Ashioue Hussain ta (2024 SCMR 833). to which I shall now advefi. The controversy is not merely arithmetical; rather, it concerns the proper interpretation of the statutory distinction maintained throughout the Act between acquisition'for a public pu4rose" and acquisition'for a company.'Since the answer to this question depends primarily upon the leg'islative fiamework itself, it woukl be advantageous to lirst exanrine the relevant provisions of the Act befbre adverting to the judicial precedents governing the fiekl.

16.'I'he Land Acquisition Act, 1894 is a complete code regulating compulsory acquisition of private propefiy. While empowering the State to acquire land without the consent of the owner, the l,egislature simultaneously incorporated sal'eguards intended to protect proprie[uy riglrts by ensuring pa].,rnent of fair conrpensation and by prescribing a transparent procedure belbre private propefty may be compulsorily acquired. The statutory scheme leaves no marrner of doubt that the L,egislature consciously recognized two distinct caiegories of acquisition, namely: (il acquisition for a public purpose; and (ii) acquisition for a company. 'Iliis distinction is neither accidental nor merely descriptive; rather, it permeates the entire scheme of the Act and assumes decisive impoftance while determining compulsory acquisition charges under Section 23(2). A carelul exiulination of the acquisition

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proceerlings contemplated by the Act reveals that the character of acquisition is deternined at its very inception. Tlte proceedings cornmence with issuance of a preliminary notification under Section 4, whereby the appropriate Government declares

that particular liurrl is likely to be needed either for a public purpose or for a comparry. 'I.he l,egislature ]ras deliberately employecl the disjunctive expression "or", thereby unmistakably recognizing two separate legal fbundations upon which compulsory acquisition may rest. Thus, the prelinrinary notilication itself constitutes the first statutory declaration regarding the true object of acquisition.

L7. Afier publication of the notification under Section 4, persons interested in the acquired property are allorded an opportunity to file objections unrler Section 5-A The right of objection conf'ened by Section 5-A is a valuable statutory saf'eguiud intended to ensure fairness befbre private property is compulsorily taken away. During these proceedings, the Collector is required to consider the objections and suburit his recommendations to the Govemmenl Consequently, the proceedings under Section 5-A also retain the character of the acquisition already disclosed in the prelimin:ry notification. llpon considerarion of the Collector's report, the appropriate Govemment issues a declaration under Section 6. This declaration is not a nrere procedural lbmrality. It represents the ()overnnrentls linal satisfhction that the land is required for a public eorfora as the case n)ay be. Therelbre, the declaration under Section 6 assumes considerable legal significance because it conclusively identifies the object fbr which the acquisition is sanctioned by the Government. Therealier, the Collectclr proceeds under Section 7 to take order lbr acquisition of the land, fbllowed by issuance of notices under Section 9, inviting claims fiom persons interestecl in the property. Ultimately, after considering the material produced befbre him, the Collector announces his Award underSection 11, determining the iuea of acquisition, the persons entitled to con)pensation and the amount payable. Thus, fionr comnlencement of acquisition under Section 4 until culnrination of proceedings in the Aw:rd under Section 11, the statutory record consistently reflects the very purpose lor which

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the acquisition has been underErken. Consequently, wlille deternrininl; entitlenrent unrler Section 2ll(2), the Courl is not requirerl to embark upon conjechlre or speculation; rather, it nrust ascertain the nature of acquisition fionr the statutory docunrents themselves.

18.The significance of tltese statutory instruments becomes even ntore al)parent when Section 23(2) is read hamroniously with the rentaining provisions of the Act. Section 23(2) creates trvo distinct rates of compulsory acquisition clnrges. The lrgislarure, therefore, intended that befbre detemtining the applicable rate, the Court must first ascertain wltether the acquisition belongs to the category of acquisition for a public purpose or acquisition for a comlxuy. 'l'he distinction created by the kgislature c:tmot be ignored or obliterated by treating every acquisition tbr a company as autonratically serving a public purpose, nor can every acquisition involving s<>nre element of public benelit necessarily be regarrled as acquisitiou fbr a public purtr)ose within the contenrplation of Section 23(2). This interpretation finds further support from Section 50(2) of the Act, which provides:

In anv oroceedins held before a or Court in such cases the local arrthoritv or Comoanv rruw aDDear and adduce evidence for the Durrx)se of determininc the amount of comD€nsation. " I'he legislative object underlying Section 50(2) is equally instructive. 'I-he provision nrerely confbrs upon the beneficiary conrpany or local autlxrrity a linrited riglrt of participation in proceetlings befbre the Collector or the Refbrence Court lbr tlte purpose of assisting in determination of compensation. The right conf'erred is procedural rather than substantive. It neither enlarges the riglrts of the acquiring conrpany nor curtails tlte statutory entitlentent of the landowners unrler Section 23(2). More iutlxrrfimtly, the provision itself recognizes the existence of acquisition for a company, thereby reinfbrcing the legislative distinction maintained drougltout the Act. F4ually significant is the lact that Section 50(2) does not create

any legal presumption that every acquisition undeftaken fbr a company nrust necessarily be treated as acquisition fbr a public purpose. Had such been the legislative intention, there woukl have been no necessity to separately ref-er to a "Conrpany" throughout the Act. The Legislature, being presumed t<l lmve enrployecl every expression deliberately, clearly intended that acquisition for a company and acquisition for a public purpose shoukl retain their distinct legal iclentities, leaving it to the Collector and, where necessary, the Refbrence Court to rletermine the lesal consequences llowing thereliom.

19.Viewed in its proper perspective, the statutory scheme unmistakably demonsfates that the decisive inquiry under Section 23(2) is not directed towards the legal status or corporate character of the beneficiary alone, rather, the Court must asceftain the real object of acquisition as reflected in the statutory notifications, the declaration under Section 6, the proceedings under Section 5-A, the notices under Section 9:urd the Award under Section 11. 'Ihese statutory instruments collectively constitute the primary evidence of the purpose fbr which the kurcl has been compulsorily acquired. It fbllows, therefbre, that whenever a dispute arises regarding entitlement to compulsory acquisition charges at the rate of l5/o or 257o, the Court must first undertake a careful exiunination of t]re statutory recorcl to determine whether the acquisition was decliued to be for a public purpose or for a company. Only alter such determination can the Court proceed to apply the principles embodied in Secrion 23(2). Having examinerl the legislative fiamework goveming the conffoversy, it now becomes necessary to consider how these provisions lmve been T interpreted by the august Supreme Court tluough a consistent line of authoritative pronouncements. The evolution of judicial prececlent rlenronstrates a gradual but definite crystallization of the governing principles, beginning witlr Haji Muharnmad Yaooob v. Collector Land Acquisition (1997 SCMR 1670) an<l culnilna trng m

the recent.iudgm ent rendered in B.P. Pakistan E:roloration and Production Inc. v. Ashioue Hussain flaleooto (2024 SCMR 833) lt is to these authorities that I shall now advert" 20. In view of the statutory fizunework goveming compulsory acquisition, it would now lrc appropriate to examine the judicial interpretation placed uJron Section 23(2) of the l,and Acquisition Act, 1894. Although, the statutory language remained uncluurged, the scope itnd application of Section 2ll(2) underwent gradu;rl judicial refinement tlrrough a series of authoritative pronouncements of the august Supreme Court. The earlier perception that every acquisition fbr a company necessarily entitled the landowners to compulsory acquisition charges at the rate of twenty-five percent has now been authoritatively explainerl, lurmonized anrl subs&urti:rlly qu:tlified by the later judgments of the Supreme Courl. Ttre controversy, therefore, can only be resolved by tracing the evolution of the law in its proper chronological sequence. The first significant pronouncement on the subject is Haii Muhamnad Yaooob and another v. Collector [and Acouisition/Additional Deou tv Cornmissioner. Peshawar w SCMR 1670 . TIte controversy befbre the Supreme Court was whether the landowners were entitled to conrpulsory acquisition clnrges at the enlnnced rate of twenq,-live (25 %) percent nrerely because the lrcneficiary of the acquisition happened to be a conrpany. 'fhe Suprenre Couft declined to accept such a broacl proposition. It was held that the burden rested upon the landowners to establish that the acquisition had been undertaken fbr the private benelit of the conrpany and not lbr a public tr)urpose. Since mr such evirlence was available, the clainr fbr twenty-five percent compulsory acquisition cluuges wa^s ref'used. Thus, the earliest authoritative pronouncement of the Supreme Court clearly recognized that the corporate stalus of the beneficiary was not, by itself, decisive of the conftoversy. 'fhe principle receive<l f'urther elucidation in Muharrmud Ishao and others v.

Government of Puniab and others 2002 scMR 165 In that case, the acquisition had been undertaken fbr a Cooperative Housing Sociery. It was argued tlnt since the beneficiary was not the Govemment but a corporate body, the acquisition necessarily t'ell within the category of acquisition fbr a compa"ny. Repelling the contention, the Supreme Court drew an important distinction between the legal identity of the beneficiary and the purpose souglrt to be achieved. The Court observed that the housing scheme was open to every member of the public without discrimination; every purchaser of a plot automatically became a member of the Sociery, md no restricted class of persons exclusively benefited fiom the scheme. Consequently, notwitlntanding dre juristic personaliq, of the Socieqr, the acquisition substantially served a public purpose. The Court thus emplmsized that the nature and <lbject of acquisition, rather than the nomenclature or legal clmracter of tlte beneficiary, remained the decisive consideration. The appa-rent po sition of law underwent a noticeable shifi in MsL Sunaira Gul u Land Acquisition Collector. G.S .C. WAPDA. Peshawar and others 2011 SCMR 118 . 'l'he Supreme Court observed that WAPDA answered the definition of a "Cornpany" contained in Section 3(e) of the [,and Acquisition Act and consequently awarded compulsory acquisition charges at the rate of twenty-five percent. The judgment proceeded substantially on the fboting that once ac<luisition was shown to be fbr a conrpany, the enlumced statutory benefit automatically fbllowed. However, a c:ueful reading of the judgment reveals that the earlier larger Bench decision in Haii Muhammacl Yaqoob (1997 SCMR 1670)and the subsequent decision in Muhamnrad Ishaq (2002 SCMR 1652)were neither examined nor distinguished. Fqually signific;rnt is the fact that the Court was not called upon to undertake an elaborate examination of the distinction between acq uisition 'for a DU Dumosen and acquisition "for a company." Consequently, although Mst. Suntaira Gul recoglized WAPDA as a company within the meaning of

Section 3(e), it did not undertake the broader exercise of reconciling Section 2ll(2) with tlte statutory scheme of the Act or the earlier line of authorities. 1'he apparent divergence create<l by Mst. Suntaira Oulwas finally resolved by a 1'lrree-Member Bench of the august Supreme Court in Civil Aviation Authoritv throuch Proiect Director and others v. Rab Nawaz and others 2013 scMR 1124 This judgnrent nuuks the turning point in the jurisprudence relating to Section 23(2) and now constitutes the principal authority governing the subje ct. The Suprenre Court undertook an exhaustive survey of the previous case law. includins Haii Muhammad Yaooo b. Muhammad Ishao. aml Mst Sumaira Gul. and authoritatively reconciled the entire line of Irrecedents. 'fhe Court une<t uivocallv held that the entitlement of a landowner to conrnulsory acqur sition charses at the rate of twentv- five percent is not lbunded solelv uoon the lact that the beneficiaw is a comoanv. Tlte dec isive consideration is the oumose fbr which the land is acouired.

21.Accordingly, the Court authoritatively observed that even where the beneficiary is a statutory corporation or a body corporate established under a special statute and answering the definition of a conlpany, the landowners woukl nevertheless be entitled <lnly to fifteen percent compulsory acquisition clnrges if the acquisition is undertaken fbr a public purpose. Conversely, where land is acquired fbr the company's own holding, ownership, vesting or exclusive commercial use, divorced fiom any acquisition tbr public purpose, the liurdowners beconre entitled to twenty-live percent compulsory acquisition charges. The ratio decidendi of Rab Nawaz may thus be sumntarized in the fbllowing propositions:

0 the staurs of the beneficiary as a compatry is notby itself deterrninative;

(ii)the decisfue criterion is the purpose of acquisition;

(ur)where acquisition eerves a public pu4)ose, compulsory acquisition charges remain confined to fifteen percent notnithstanding that the beneficiary maybe acompany;

(iv)where acquisition is undertaken for the prirate oumership, holding, rrcsting or commercial benefit of a compann trenty-firrc percent compulsory acquisition chargss become parable; and

(v)the contrary impressiou sreated by Mst Sumain Grlcannot prevail because the earlier larger Bench authorities had not been considered therein.

The signific:rnce of Rab Nawaz lies not nrerely in the conclusion ultimately reached but also in the principle judicially evolved by harmonizing the entire stahrtory scheme of the Act with the previous precetlents. 'l'he ju<lgment shifted the fbcus of inquiry away fiom the identity of the beneficiary and redirected it towards the statutory purpose disclosed by the acquisition proceedings tlrenrselves. Consequently, after 2013 SCMR 1124, the contoversy cea"sed to revolve around the Iegal character of the beneficiary :urd became centered upon the true object of acquisition. The principle lbrmulated in Rab Nawaz has since attained the status of settled Iaw and has consistently been fbllowed and reaflirmed in the subsequent judgments of the august Supreme Court. The later authorities have n<>t departed lionr the ratio laid <lown therein; rather, they have further ckrifie<l and strengthened the principle by identilying the statutory notifications issued under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act as the prinrary source fionr which the true clnracter of acquisition is to be determined. It is, therefbre, evident tlnt Rab Nawaz's case (2013 SCMR 1124) constitutes the watersherl in the interpretation of Section 23(2). 1'he judgment authoritatively reconciles the earlier authorities and settles the principle that public purpose-not the corporate chiu'acter of the beneficiary-is the controlling test. Every sullsequent decision rendered by the Supreme Court has proceeded ulnn this very foundation.

22.As a result, the said principle was reallirnred with greater clarity in I.,and Acouisition Collector G.S.C. N.T.D.C. (WAPDA). Lahore and othen v. Mst Surriva Mehmood lan (2015 scMR 20 and was recently reiterated in B.P. Pakistan Exploration and

Inc. v. Ashio ue Hussain Haleooto and othen (2024 SCMR 833). 'I'hese authori ties finally removed every possible ambigui0, by hokling that the detemrination under Section 23(2) must prinnrily depend upon the purpose expressly disclosed in the acquisition notilications themselves. Since these nvo judgments furnish the final and prevailing exposition of law goveming the present controversy, they require separate and detailed exanunatlon.

23.The legal position, which attained finality in Civil Aviation Authoriw throush hoiect Director v. Rab Nawaz (2013 SCMR ll24l, was subsequently reallirmed and lurther explained by the august Sup reme Court in Land Acouisition Collector G.S.C. N.T.D.C. (WAPDA Lahore and others v. MsL Surrirna Mehmood &U €015 SCMR 28). The inrportance of this judgment lies in the lact that it considered both lines of authoriqr, namely the view expressed inMsL Sumaira Gul (2011 SCMR 118) and the earlier as well as later judgments of the Supreme Court, and authoritatively clarified the true scope of Section 23(2) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. 'l'he Supreme Court observed that although inMsl Sumaira Gul, WAPDA had been treated as a "Contpany" within the meaning of Section 3(e) of the Act and nuengr-five percent compulsory acquisition charges had consequently been awarded, yet there existed several earlier judgurents of the Supreme Court hokling to the contrary. The Court emphatically held that where Iand is acquired for a public puq)ose, even though the beneficiary may be a company within the meaning of Section 3(e), compulsory acquisition charges remain payable only at the rate offifteen percent However, where acquisition is undertaken simpliciter for a comDanv for is orivate ownershftr. holdins. vestinE or use , the landowners become entitled to compulsory acquisition charges at the rate oftwenty-five percent The Hon'ble Supreme Court further obseryed that a plain reading of Section 23(2) itself reveals that the deterrnining f'actor is the purpose of acquisition zurtl not

merely the legal character of the beneficiary. Consequently, the statutory distinction maintained by the kgislature between acquisition lbr a public purpose and acquisition fbr a conlpany must be given full efl'ect. Any interpretation obliteratjng that distinction would render the stahrtory language redundant, which is imperrnissible in law. The judgment in MsL Surriya Mehmood Jan thus re:rflirmed the ratio already laid down in Rab Nawaz and finally settled the controversy lly holding that the expression "fbr a company" occurring in Section 23(2) cannot be interpreted in isolation, rather, it must be harmoniously construed with the entire statutory scheme of tlte Act, including the notifications issued under Sections 4 and 6, the proceedings under Section 5-A and the Award announced under Section 11.

24.The law was again examined by the august Supreme Court in its recent judgment rendered in B.P. Pakistan Exploration and hoduction Inc. u Ashique Hussain Halepoto and others (2024 SCMR 833). The controversy betbre the Court was substantially identical. The acquiring conrpany contended that although the beneficiary was a company, the acquisition had been undertaken fbr a public purpose. The Supreme Court carefully examined the statutory notifications issued under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act and fbund that the Government itself had expressly declared therein that the acquisition was being undeftaken for a public purpose. On the strength of that statutory declaration, dre Court held tlnt compulsory acquisition charges payable under Section 23(2) stood reduced liom twenty-five percent to fifteen percent. The signilicance of B.P. Pakistan F.,:rplorationextends lhr beyond its ultimate conclusion. For the lirst time, the Supreme Couft expressly identified the notification issued under Section 4 as the principal statutory document lbr <letennining the true character of' acquisition. 'lhe Court held tlnt once the notification iself declares the acquisition to be fbr a public purpose, such declaration furnishes the primary fbundation lbr determining entitlement

under Section 23(2). Consequently, the stahrtory notifications issued during acquisition proceedings assunle decisive evidentiary value while deciding whether conrpulsory acquisition clnrges are payable at fifteen percent or twenty-live percent. \Mlten tlte above authorities are read conjointly, the legal position admits of no ambiguity. The lbllowing propositions now constitute the prevailing Iaw governing Section 23(2):

O The mere fact that the beneficiary an$wers the definition of a 'Company' under Section 3(e) does not automatically entitle the landowners to compulsory acquisition charges at the rate of trventy-firrc percenL (O Equally, the mene assertion by the acquiring agcncy that the acquisition ultimately serve$ some public interest is insufficient to reduce compulsory acquisition drarges to fifteen percenl (ur) The decisirrc inqutry is directed torrriards the real purpose of acquisition as disclosed by the stahrtory proceedings undertaken under the Acr

(rv)The C,ourt must primarily examine the notifications issued under Sections 4 and 6, the proceedings rurder Section 5-A the declaration made by the Gorrcrnment, the notices issued under Section 9 and the Awad announced under Section 11.

(v)If those stahrtory documenb demonsfate thatthe acquisition has been undertaken for apublic puq)ose, compulsory charges remain payable at the rate of fifteeu perceut errcn rvhere tre beneficiary is a company.

(vi)Conrrcrsely, where the stahrtory record demonstrates that acquisition has been undertaken for the onmership, rrcsting, expansion, derrclopment, commercial exploitation or exdusirc benefit of a company, without a declaration that the acquisition i*elf is for a public pu4)ose, the landornmen become entitled to compulsory acquisition charges at the rate of twenty-five percenl These principles, having repeatedly been aflimred by August Supreme Court :tnd now constitute the binding and prevailing law under Article 189 of the Constitution and leave litde room fbr further controversy.

25.Having examined the statutory provisions and the judiclrl precedents, the controversy involved in the present appeals now re<luires application of the afbresaid princ\rles to the f'acts appearing on the record. A careful examination of the acquisition proceedingi produced befbre the learned Ref'eree Court reveals

that the acquisition was initiated on the requisition made by tbe Khulrcr Pakhankhwa hnomic hnes De t and Manapement Comunv (KPEZDMC) fbr the F,:cpansion of Norrshera Industial Fstate. More importantly, every statutory step conrmencing fronr the prelinrinary notification issued under Secdon 4, the proceedings under Section 5-A, the declaration under Section 6, the order under Section 7, the notices issued under Section 9 and finally the Award announced under Section 1l consistently describe the acquisition as being undertaken for erpansion of Nowshera Industrial Estate at the request and fbr the benefit of KPFZDMC. Significantly, unlike the tacts involved in B.P. Pakistan Exploration (2024 SCMR 833), the statutory norifications produced before this Court do not declare that the acquisition is being underulken for a public purpose. 'fhe kgislature consciously employed the expressions "public purpose" and "company" separately tlrroughout the Act, and where the Government intends acquisition fbr a public purpose, such declaration ordinarily finds explicit reflection in the statutory notifications themselves. No such declaration exists in the present case. Equally, the respondents have failed to produce any independent evidence establishing that the land was acquired fbr public ownership or direct public use. Mere assertions that industrial development ultimately benefits the economy cannot substitute the statutory declaration contemplated by tlte Act nor discharge the evidentiary burden resting upon the acquiring agency.

The entire acquisition was initiated upon the request of KPFZDMC for expansion of its industrial estate. The land, upon acquisition, vested in the beneficiary company itself lbr development, management ancl utilization in accordance with its statutory functions. Such vesting is entirely distinguishable fiom acquisition undertaken by the Govemntent itself fbr roads, hostrlitals, schools, canals, airports or other public infrastructure directly owned and controlled by the State. The respondents have

repeatedly argued that industrial development ultimately promotes employrrrent, investnrent and economic growth and therefbre serves a public interest. 'fhere can hardly be any dispute with this broad proposition. Almost every industrial, commercial, housing, energy or infiastructural project eventually generates sonre benefit fbr society. However, the existence of an incidenAl public benefit is not the stahrtory test embodied in Section 23(2). [f every acquisition capable of conf'erring some indirect public advantage which were to be treated as acquisition lbr a public purpose, the distinction deliberately maintained by the kgislature between acquisition "for a public purpose" and acquisition "fbr a company" would become wholly redundant. Such an interpretation would def'eat the legislative intent and render the words "Iilr a company" occurring in Sections 3(1), 4, 6 and 23(2) entirely superlluous, 'l'he Court must therefore distinguish between public benefit and public pupose. \A4rile every public purpose undoubteclly conf-ers public benefit, every acquisition producing some incidental public benefit does not necessarily constitute acquisition fbr a public purpose within the contemplation of the l,and Acquisition Acl The statutory inquiry is not directed towards remote economic consequences but towards the purpose expressly declared by the Govemment in the acquisition proceedings themselves.

26.The statutory notifications fbrming part of the present record unmistakably establish that the acquisition was undertaken fbr the expansion of an industrial estate at dre instance of KPEZDMC. No notification under Section 4 or declaration under Section 6 has been brought on record declaring the acquisition itself to be fbr a public purpose. Nor lns any evidence been produced showing that the Covemment intended the l:urd to vest in itself fbr direct public owrrership or public use. In these circumstzurces, the statutory recorcl ovetwhelmingly supports the conclusion that the acquisition lalls witliln the category of acquisition for a company rather than acquisition for a public

purpose. Consequently, applyng the principles authoritatively laid down in tlaji Mulnmmad Yaqoob (1997 SCMR 1670), Muhammad Ishaq (2OOZ SCMR l652l,Rab Narmz (2013 SCMR ll24), Mst Sur.ila Mehmood Jan (2015 SCMR

28)and B.P. Pakistan Exploration (2024 SCMR 833), I have no hesitation in holding that the present acquisition satislies the statutory test envisaged under Section 23(2) lbr award of compulsory acquisition charges at the rate of twenty-five percent The leamed Ref'eree Court, with utmost respect, failed to undertake the above statutory inquiry. It appears to have proceeded merely on the assumption tlmt industrial development itself constituted a public puq)ose without examining whether the statutory notilications issued under Sections 4 and 6 disclosed suclr purpose. This ourission resulted in iur erroneous application of Section 23(2). 'fhe impugned judgment, therefbre, calls fbr interl'erence to the limited extent of substituting compulsory acquisition charges at the rate oftwenty-five percentin place of fifteen percent, while maintaining the determination of market value and the remaining statutory benefits awarded by the learned Ref'eree Court. 'fhe inevitable conclusion, therefbre, is that the Iandowners are legally entitled to compulsory acquisition charges at the rate of 25% of the market value, together with all other statutory benefits admissible under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.

27.As a consequence, of the statutory fiamework of the l;urd Acquisition Act, 1894 and the authoritative pronouncements of the august Supreme Court goveming determination of compensation under Section 23, the controversy involved in the present appeals now requires application of those seffled principles to the evidence available on tlte record. So fiu as the determination of market value { is concemed, the learned Ref'eree Couft has rightly appreciated tlte oral as well as documentary evidence. The acquired land is admittedly situated adjacent to the existing Nowshera Industrial Estate and enjoys considerable commercial importance,

accessibility and f uture developmental potential. Besides producing registered sale transactions and contemporaneous mutations relating to comparable properties, the landowners also relied upon the report of the Local Conrnrissioner, who inspected the locality in the presence of the parties, examined the prevailing market conditions and assessed the market value alter considering the Iocation, surrounding development iutd commercial utility of the acquired land. The report remained substantially unshaken during cross-ex:unination and finds due coroboration fiom the documentzuy evidence produced by the landowners. Conversely, the acquiring agency primarily relied upon the average valuation schedule prepared by the Revenue Department without producing any independent evidence to establish that the rates adopted by the Collector represented the actual market value prevailing on the date of the notification issued under Section 4. In view of the principles autlrcritatively laid down it Prouince of Pu4iab v. Begunt Aziza(2014 SCMR 75),(]oventntent oI' Pakisan v. Ghulant Murtaza (2016 SCMR 1141) and Governnrcnt ol'Pakisttut v. Mst. Ayesln Bibi (2024 SCMR 13211), I find no legal infirmity in the determination of market value recorded by the leamed Referee Court, which is based upon proper appreciation of the evidence and faithlully rellects the true market value contemplated by Section 23(1)of the Act.

28.'l'he discussion made hereinabove leads to the fbllowing inescapable conclusions:

(i)'l'he learned Ref'eree Court rightly deternined the market value of the acquired Iand after properly appreciating the oral and documentary evidence, including the contemporaneous sale transactions, revenue record, I-.,ocal Comnrissioner's repoft, the location of the acquired land and its intmense commercial as well as future developmental potential. -[he determination of market value at Rs. 1%,000/- per rnarla is fully supported by the evidence on

record and is in consonance with the principles authoritatively laid down by the august Supreme Court in Prouince of Punjab through Land Acquisition Collector v. Begum Aziza (2014 SCMR 7!t), Govemntent ol'Pakistan v. Ghuliun Murtaza(2016 SCMR ll4l) andGovemntent ol' Pakistan through Secreary v. Mst. Ayesha Bibi (2024 SCMR 1323). Consequently, the linclings of the learned Rel'eree Court on the question of market value warrant no interfbrence.

(ii)The learned Ref-eree Court, however, I-ell into legal error while restricting compulsory acquisition charges to 15% of tlte nrarket value. The determination under Section 23(21 ol the I.,ard Acquisition Act, 1894 does not depend merely upon the corporate stahrs of the beneficiary but upon the purpose for which the acquisition has been turdertaken, as consistently declared by the august Supreme Court in I*yi Muhammad Yaqoob(1997 SCMR 1670), Muhantntad Ishaq (2002 SCMR 1652), Civil Auiation Authoity v. Rab Nawaz(2013 SCMR LL24), Land Acquisition Collector G.S.C. N.T.D.C. v. Mst. ,9urriya Mehmoocl ln (2015 SCMR 28) and B.P. Pakistan Erploration and Production Inc. v. Aslique Hussain Halepoto (2024 SCMR 833).

(iii)In the present case, tlte acquisition proceedings were initiated at the requisition of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa F,cononric Zones Developmetrt and Management Company (KPIZDMC) lbr the expansion of the Nowshera Industrial Flstate. The notifications issued under Sections 4, 5'A, 6,7 and 9 of the Act, as well as the Aw:rd announced under Section 1 1, consistently disclose acquisition fbr the benefit of the beneliciary company. None of the statutory notilications declares the acquisition to be one fbr a public puqx)se, nor have the respondents produced any cogent evidence establishing that the acquisition was intended fbr public

ownership or direct public use. Mere proof that the project nlay incidenrally promote industrial development or economic growth is insuflicient to convefi an acquisition undertaken fbr a company int<l one fbr a public purpose within the contemplation of Section 23(2) of the Act.

(iv)Consequently, the appellantsJandowners are legally entitled to compulsory acquisition charges at the rate of 25% of the market value instead of L5% awarded by the learned Ref'eree Court.

It is held that the appeals filed by Khyber Paklrtunkhwa Economic Tnraes Deve and Manarement Comoanv (KPEZDMC) are dismissed. 'I'he <letermination of the market v:rlue by the learned Ref'eree Court is marntained in its entireq,. The appeals preferned by the landormen iue partly allowed to the extent that the impugrred judgment and decree are modified by substituting compulsory acquisition charges at the rate of 25% of the determined market ralue in place of 1596 awarded by the leamed Ref'eree Court. Except fbr the above modification, the impugned judgment and decree are maintained in all other respects.

Announced on 07.05.2026.

Released on24, 2026.

-M.

Zafi'al CS" '}lJ

JU E