Peshawar High Court

Ghulam Rasool Vs Secty. Mines & Minerals etc

Outcome The constitutional petition was allowed; the impugned order dated 23.01.2026 was set aside and the MTC’s order dated 16.10.2025 was restored.

Case
WP No. 1233-P of 2026
Type
Constitutional
Length
19 pages

Summary

AI-generated · quotes checked against the text

The case concerned competing mineral claims over land in Kohat and whether the Appellate Tribunal could direct implementation of its earlier order without compliance with Clause 8 of Schedule VIII of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Mines and Minerals Act, 2017. The High Court held that reference to a duly constituted Dispute Resolution Committee was mandatory, set aside the Tribunal’s order, and restored the Mineral Title Committee’s decision remitting the matter for proper DRC proceedings.

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Written by AI from the judgment's text and may miss nuance. Rely on the full judgment below and the court's official copy. Court's own note: Statutory Scheme of the Act, Scope of the Dispute Resolution Committee (DRC), Powers of the Mineral Title Committee (MTC), and Effect of Non-Compliance: o Where disputes arise amongst stakeholders of a mineral-bearing area after the grant of a mineral title, the legislature has consciously carved out a separate and specialized mechanism through Clause 8 of Schedule VIII by constituting the Dispute Resolution Committee. Clause 8 of Schedule VIII provides that whenever a dispute arises amongst the stakeholders of a mineral-bearing area after the grant of a mineral title, the matter shall be referred to the Dispute Resolution Committee for submission of its recommendations to the Mineral Title Committee. The Legislature has deliberately employed the expression “shall”, leaving little room for doubt that reference to the DRC is mandatory whenever disputes of the nature contemplated by the provision arise. The use of mandatory language is neither accidental nor superfluous. It reflects the legislative intent that disputes involving mineral-bearing areas should first undergo an institutional process of local inquiry, technical verification and stakeholder consultation before any final administrative determination is made. o The statutory composition of the DRC further reinforces this legislative intent. The Committee comprises the concerned Deputy Commissioner as Chairman, a representative of the local mining association nominated by the Licensing Authority, a prominent elder of the locality nominated by the Licensing Authority and the concerned Assistant Director Minerals as Member-cum-Secretary. Such composition is evidently designed to combine administrative authority, technical expertise, local representation and customary tribal knowledge. The Legislature has thus consciously recognized that dispute concerning mineral-bearing areas, particularly in the merged districts, frequently involve questions extending beyond technical mining issues to matters of tribal ownership, customary rights, demarcation, possession and historical usage. Such disputes cannot ordinarily be resolved merely by examining office files or survey sketches prepared in isolation. The jurisdiction conferred upon the DRC is correspondingly wide. Besides resolving disputes amongst stakeholders, the Committee is specifically empowered to recommend settlement of inter-tribal land disputes, facilitate demarcation of mineral-bearing areas, determine division of land amongst tribes, sub-tribes and clans in accordance with the prevailing Rewaj and settled customary principles, and obtain assistance from any Government department wherever necessary. The Legislature has therefore entrusted the DRC with fact-finding functions which are neither incidental nor ancillary but constitute the very foundation upon which the Mineral Title Committee is expected to exercise its statutory jurisdiction. o The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Saeed Ahmad vs. Nestle Pakistan has clarified that although the High Court does not ordinarily reappraise evidence, interference becomes justified where findings are founded upon non-reading or misreading of material evidence or where factual errors assume the character of jurisdictional or legal errors. Tested on the touchstone of the above principles, the impugned order cannot be sustained. The learned Tribunal proceeded on the erroneous premise that the Mineral Title Committee was legally bound to implement the earlier recommendations without insisting upon compliance with Clause 8 of Schedule VIII. In doing so, the Tribunal completely overlooked that the Legislature itself had made reference to a duly constituted Dispute Resolution Committee an indispensable component of the statutory process wherever disputes arise amongst stakeholders of a mineral-bearing area after grant of a mineral title. The Tribunal further failed to appreciate that the recommendations already submitted had not resolved the principal controversies relating to demarcation, overlapping claims and availability of free area. Instead of requiring completion of the statutory process, it directed implementation of its earlier order, thereby effectively bypassing the mandatory jurisdiction entrusted to the Dispute Resolution Committee and compelling the Mineral Title Committee to decide the controversy on an admittedly incomplete factual foundation. Such an approach is legally unsustainable. It amounts to misinterpretation of the statutory framework, failure to give effect to a mandatory provision of law and material jurisdictional irregularity in exercise of appellate powers. The Tribunal, in effect, exercised jurisdiction in a manner not sanctioned by the Act itself. Once such jurisdictional error becomes apparent on the face of the record, constitutional intervention by issuance of a writ of certiorari becomes not only permissible but imperative to preserve the rule of law and ensure faithful implementation of the legislative scheme. This Court is, therefore, satisfied that the challenge raised by the petitioner does not seek reappraisal of disputed facts nor invite this Court to sit as an appellate forum over the findings of the Tribunal. Rather, the challenge is directed against a manifest jurisdictional error arising from disregard of a mandatory statutory procedure, misinterpretation of the governing provisions of the Act of 2017 and consequent failure to exercise jurisdiction in the manner prescribed by law. The case, therefore, falls squarely within the well-recognized parameters governing issuance of a writ of certiorari under Article 199 of the Constitution.

Full judgment

Official copy

JUDGMENT SHEET

PESHAWAR HIGH COURT, PESHAWAR

JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

W.P. No. 1233-P/2026

GHULAM RASOOL VS. SECRETARY MINES & MINERALS & OTHERS

Date of hearing 02.07.2026

Present:

For petitioner. Mian Asif Aman, Advocate For Mr. Ali Azeem Afridi, Advocate (For Respondent respondents. No.6) Mr. Umair Jamal, Advocate (For respondents 1 to 3) Mr. Saif-ur-Rehman, Advocate (For Respondent No.7) Mr. Taskeen-ud-Din Khattak (AAG on behalf of KP)

JUDGMENT

MUHAMMAD NAEEM ANWAR, J: - Through the instant constitutional petition filed under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, the petitioner, Ghulam Rasool, has invoked the constitutional jurisdiction of this Court to assail the legality, validity and propriety of the order dated 23.01.2026 passed by respondent No.1 (Appellate Tribunal), whereby Appeal No. 1991-FRK/2025 preferred by respondent No.6 was allowed, the decision of the Mineral Title Committee (MTC) dated 16.10.2025 was set aside, and the licensing authority was directed to implement the Tribunal's earlier order. The petitioner seeks issuance of a writ of certiorari declaring the impugned order to be illegal, without lawful authority and jurisdiction, coram non judice and of no legal effect. He further seeks restoration of the decision of the Mineral Title Committee dated 16.10.2025 and a declaration that the proceedings and recommendations of the Dispute Resolution Committee (DRC) are void ab initio, having been undertaken by a committee allegedly not constituted in accordance with Clause 8 of Schedule VIII to the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Mines and Minerals Act, 2017.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND.

2.The controversy relates to competing claims over a mineral- bearing area situated at Sunni Khel, Zor Kallay, Dara Adam Khel, formerly Frontier Region (FR) Kohat and presently District Kohat. The record reveals that the petitioner was granted a Prospecting Licence for coal over an area measuring 496 acres vide allotment letter dated 13.05.2008 after fulfilling all legal formalities then applicable in the erstwhile Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), including execution of a Qoumi Agreement with the local landowners, approval through Ijlas-e-Aam and issuance of a No Objection Certificate by the competent authority. The licence remained operative for the prescribed period. Before expiry of the licence, the petitioner applied for its renewal before the competent authority and repeatedly pursued the matter. No decision, however, was taken upon his application and ultimately the request for renewal was rejected on 24.05.2019. In the meantime, respondent No.6 had, during the year 2016, submitted an application seeking grant of a Prospecting Licence over 11 acres of land, whereas respondent No.5 had also earlier applied for grant of a Prospecting Licence over 134 acres, both areas allegedly overlapping with the petitioner's existing mineral title. Feeling aggrieved by the rejection of renewal, the petitioner preferred an appeal before the competent appellate authority which was accepted on 11.08.2020. Consequently, the petitioner's Prospecting Licence was restored and a fresh licence was issued in his favour on 08.09.2021. Following the merger of the tribal areas into the Province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the petitioner sought rectification of the sketch and geographical coordinates of his Prospecting Licence. The matter was examined by the Technical Committee, followed by inspection through a Technical Assessment Committee. After completion of the technical survey envisaged under Section 56-F of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Mines and Minerals (Amendment) Act, 2019, the working paper was placed before the Mineral Title Committee, which approved

rectification of the petitioner's sketch over the available free area on 01.10.2021, pursuant where to a rectified Prospecting Licence was issued on 04.11.2021. The said rectification became the subject matter of challenge by the private respondents before the Appellate Tribunal. During pendency of those proceedings, the Tribunal directed that the dispute be referred to the Dispute Resolution Committee for submission of recommendations. The petitioner alleges that although proceedings were initiated before the DRC, he was not afforded an effective opportunity of hearing, the Committee neither undertook proper demarcation of the disputed area nor determined the question of overlapping claims, and eventually submitted recommendations dated 20.12.2023 merely suggesting that respondent No.6 had fulfilled codal formalities while recommending constitution of a Grand Jirga for resolving disputes relating to ownership and demarcation. On the strength of those recommendations, respondent No.6 pursued his claim before the Tribunal. The petitioner further states that despite pendency of these proceedings, the Mineral Title Committee, after considering the petitioner's subsisting rights, converted his Prospecting Licence into a Mining Lease over an area measuring 395.78 acres for a period commencing from 08.09.2024 and ending on 07.09.2054. The petitioner also asserts that respondent No.6 had initially failed to obtain a valid No Objection Certificate over the applied area and his application had remained defective. Subsequently, however, an NOC dated 11.02.2022 was issued in his favour although, according to the petitioner, the applied area substantially overlapped with his restored Prospecting Licence.

3.Earlier, respondent No.6 had also instituted Writ Petition No. 625-P/2019, which was disposed of with directions to the Mineral Title Committee to decide the matter after hearing all concerned. Similarly, the petitioner's challenge to the Tribunal's earlier order through Writ Petition No. 6508-P/2024 was

dismissed primarily on the ground that the recommendations of the DRC were merely recommendatory and that no final decision had yet been rendered by the Mineral Title Committee. This Court, however, expressly observed that any aggrieved party would be at liberty to challenge the final decision of the MTC before the appropriate forum. Thereafter, while considering the matter afresh, the Mineral Title Committee, in its meeting held on 16.10.2025, observed that the report of the nominated team disclosed unresolved disputes regarding demarcation, overlapping claims and constitution of the DRC. Accordingly, the Committee deferred the matter and remitted it to the Deputy Commissioner, District Kohat, with directions to convene a properly constituted Dispute Resolution Committee in accordance with Clause 8 of Schedule VIII to the Act of 2017 for submission of fresh recommendations. Respondent No.6 challenged the aforesaid decision before the Appellate Tribunal through Appeal No. 1991- FRK/2025. The Tribunal, vide order dated 23.01.2026, accepted the appeal, set aside the decision of the Mineral Title Committee dated 16.10.2025 and directed implementation of its earlier order, giving rise to the present constitutional petition.

SUBMISSIONS OF LEARNED COUNSEL FOR PARTIES.

4.Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the impugned order suffers from patent jurisdictional and legal infirmities. It was argued that Clause 8 of Schedule VIII creates a mandatory statutory mechanism for resolution of disputes arising after grant of a mineral title and that the Mineral Title Committee rightly remitted the matter to a duly constituted DRC before taking any final decision. According to learned counsel, the Tribunal completely misconstrued the statutory framework by rendering the DRC mechanism redundant and directing implementation of an earlier order despite unresolved disputes regarding demarcation, availability of free area and overlapping claims. It was further contended that the DRC which submitted recommendations dated

20.12.2023 was itself not constituted strictly in accordance with Clause 8 of Schedule VIII; that the petitioner was denied an effective opportunity of hearing; and that the recommendations did not determine any of the issues which the statute specifically entrusts to the DRC.

5.Conversely, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.6 supported the impugned order and maintained that the Mineral Title Committee had failed to comply with the Tribunal's earlier directions and unnecessarily prolonged the matter by remanding it to the Deputy Commissioner. According to him, the earlier recommendations of the DRC sufficiently addressed the controversy and no further proceedings were required. The learned Additional Advocate General and learned counsel representing the official respondents largely supported the statutory framework under the Act and left the matter to the discretion of the Court.

QUESTIONS FOR DETERMINATION.

6.The controversy gives rise to the following questions for determination:

 Whether Clause 8 of Schedule VIII to the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Mines and Minerals Act, 2017 prescribes a mandatory statutory mechanism for resolution of disputes arising after grant of a mineral title?

 Whether the Dispute Resolution Committee which submitted recommendations dated 20.12.2023 fulfilled the statutory requirements contemplated by the Act?

 Whether the Mineral Title Committee acted within its lawful jurisdiction in remitting the matter to the Deputy Commissioner for constitution of a duly constituted DRC?

 Whether the Appellate Tribunal committed a jurisdictional error by setting aside the decision of the Mineral Title Committee and directing implementation of its earlier order without ensuring compliance with the statutory mechanism?  Whether the impugned order dated 23.01.2026 is amenable to judicial review under Article 199 of the Constitution by issuance of a writ of certiorari?

Statutory Scheme of the Act, Scope of the Dispute Resolution Committee (DRC), Powers of the Mineral Title Committee (MTC), and Effect of Non-Compliance

7.Having heard the learned counsel for the parties at considerable length and examined the record, the principal controversy requiring determination is not merely whether respondent No.6 is entitled to a Prospecting Licence over the disputed area, but whether the statutory procedure prescribed under the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Mines and Minerals Act, 2017 for adjudication of disputes amongst stakeholders of a mineral-bearing area was lawfully followed before the impugned order came to be passed.

8.Before examining the rival claims on merits, it is imperative to appreciate the statutory framework governing the dispute. The Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Mines and Minerals Act, 2017 is a complete code regulating the grant, renewal, transfer, conversion and administration of mineral titles within the province. The Act establishes a structured institutional framework comprising the Licensing Authority, the Mineral Title Committee (MTC), the Appellate Tribunal and the Dispute Resolution Committee (DRC), each entrusted with distinct statutory functions. The legislative scheme demonstrates that these authorities do not operate in isolation; rather, they perform complementary functions intended to ensure that mineral titles are granted and regulated in a transparent, technically sound and legally sustainable manner. The Licensing Authority is entrusted with processing applications for mineral titles and ensuring compliance with the statutory requirements prescribed under the Act and the Rules framed thereunder. The Mineral Title Committee functions as the principal statutory authority empowered to examine proposals relating to grant, renewal, conversion and cancellation of mineral titles and to take final administrative decisions in accordance with law. The Appellate Tribunal exercises appellate jurisdiction over

decisions rendered under the Act. However, where disputes arise amongst stakeholders of a mineral-bearing area after the grant of a mineral title, the legislature has consciously carved out a separate and specialized mechanism through Clause 8 of Schedule VIII by constituting the Dispute Resolution Committee. Clause 8 of Schedule VIII provides that whenever a dispute arises amongst the stakeholders of a mineral-bearing area after the grant of a mineral title, the matter shall be referred to the Dispute Resolution Committee for submission of its recommendations to the Mineral Title Committee. The Legislature has deliberately employed the expression “shall”, leaving little room for doubt that reference to the DRC is mandatory whenever disputes of the nature contemplated by the provision arise. The use of mandatory language is neither accidental nor superfluous. It reflects the legislative intent that disputes involving mineral-bearing areas should first undergo an institutional process of local inquiry, technical verification and stakeholder consultation before any final administrative determination is made.

9.The statutory composition of the DRC further reinforces this legislative intent. The Committee comprises the concerned Deputy Commissioner as Chairman, a representative of the local mining association nominated by the Licensing Authority, a prominent elder of the locality nominated by the Licensing Authority and the concerned Assistant Director Minerals as Member-cum-Secretary. Such composition is evidently designed to combine administrative authority, technical expertise, local representation and customary tribal knowledge. The Legislature has thus consciously recognized that dispute concerning mineral- bearing areas, particularly in the merged districts, frequently involve questions extending beyond technical mining issues to matters of tribal ownership, customary rights, demarcation, possession and historical usage. Such disputes cannot ordinarily be resolved merely by examining office files or survey sketches

prepared in isolation. The jurisdiction conferred upon the DRC is correspondingly wide. Besides resolving disputes amongst stakeholders, the Committee is specifically empowered to recommend settlement of inter-tribal land disputes, facilitate demarcation of mineral-bearing areas, determine division of land amongst tribes, sub-tribes and clans in accordance with the prevailing Rewaj and settled customary principles, and obtain assistance from any Government department wherever necessary. The Legislature has therefore entrusted the DRC with fact-finding functions which are neither incidental nor ancillary but constitute the very foundation upon which the Mineral Title Committee is expected to exercise its statutory jurisdiction.

10.It is equally significant that the DRC itself does not render a final adjudication. Its role remains recommendatory. Nevertheless, the recommendatory nature of its opinion does not diminish its statutory significance. On the contrary, the recommendations constitute the factual foundation enabling the Mineral Title Committee to reach a lawful and informed decision. There exists a marked distinction between a recommendation that is merely advisory in the ordinary administrative sense and a recommendation which forms an integral step in a mandatory statutory process. Clause 8 unmistakably falls within the latter category. Consequently, while the MTC is not bound to mechanically accept every recommendation of the DRC, it cannot lawfully dispense with the statutory process itself where the conditions attracting Clause 8 are present. The record before this Court unmistakably demonstrates that the dispute between the parties squarely falls within the scope of Clause 8. The controversy is not confined to competing applications for grant of mineral titles. Rather, it encompasses determination of overlapping claims, availability of free area, validity of the No Objection Certificate issued in favour of respondent No.6, demarcation of the disputed mineral-bearing area, reconciliation of rival tribal claims, and

determination of the legal effect of the petitioner’s subsisting Prospecting Licence. Each of these questions falls directly within the statutory functions assigned to the DRC. Admittedly, the petitioner was granted a Prospecting Licence as early as 13.05.2008. Equally undisputed is the fact that respondent No.6 applied for grant of a Prospecting Licence only in the year 2016. The petitioner's licence was subsequently restored by the competent appellate authority and thereafter rectified through a technical survey duly approved by the Mineral Title Committee. The record further reveals that the petitioner's Prospecting Licence was eventually converted into a Mining Lease in accordance with the amended sketch. Whether the area subsequently claimed by respondent No.6 remained available after restoration and rectification of the petitioner’s mineral title; whether any overlap exists between the rival claims; whether the NOC issued in favour of respondent No.6 was legally sustainable; and whether respondent No.6 could lawfully claim priority over land already covered by the petitioner’s mineral title, are all questions which necessarily require factual verification and technical determination before any lawful adjudication can be made. The recommendations dated 20.12.2023 submitted by the DRC do not appear to have undertaken that exercise. A careful examination thereof reveals that the Committee neither determined the exact extent of the disputed area nor resolved the question of overlapping claims. It did not identify the free area available, if any, for consideration of respondent No. 6’s application, nor did it reconcile the competing claims of the parties in accordance with the prevailing Rewaj. On the contrary, the Committee itself recommended constitution of a Grand Jirga for resolving issues relating to ownership and demarcation, thereby implicitly acknowledging that the principal disputes remained unresolved.

11.It was precisely for this reason that the Mineral Title Committee, while considering the report of the nominated team,

consciously refrained from taking a final decision and instead remitted the matter to the Deputy Commissioner for convening a duly constituted Dispute Resolution Committee in strict conformity with Clause 8 of Schedule VIII. Such a course cannot, by any stretch of legal reasoning, be regarded as abdication of jurisdiction. Rather, it represents a proper exercise of statutory jurisdiction by ensuring that the mandatory procedure prescribed by the Legislature is complied with before valuable mineral rights are finally determined. A statutory authority acts within jurisdiction when it insists upon compliance with the procedure prescribed by law. Conversely, it exceeds jurisdiction when it dispenses with mandatory statutory requirements in the perceived interest of administrative convenience. The Mineral Title Committee adopted the former course, whereas the learned Tribunal, by directing implementation of its earlier order without insisting upon compliance with Clause 8, effectively rendered the statutory mechanism established by the Legislature otiose. The Court is mindful that procedural provisions are not invariably mandatory. However, where the procedure constitutes the very safeguard intended to protect competing proprietary, tribal and statutory rights, compliance ceases to be a matter of form and assumes substantive significance. The statutory role assigned to the DRC is one such safeguard. Its purpose is to prevent arbitrary allocation of mineral-bearing areas by ensuring that competing claims are first subjected to transparent inquiry, proper demarcation, local participation and technical verification. Dispensing with that process would undermine both the legislative intent and the principles of fairness embodied in the Act.

12.The submission advanced on behalf of respondent No.6 that the earlier recommendations sufficiently concluded the controversy is equally devoid of substance. The recommendations themselves disclose that crucial issues concerning ownership, demarcation and settlement of competing claims remained

unresolved. An incomplete statutory exercise cannot constitute compliance with Clause 8, nor can an inadequate recommendation furnish a lawful basis for final adjudication by the MTC or the Appellate Tribunal. The conclusion is, therefore, inescapable that the decision of the Mineral Title Committee dated 16.10.2025 directing constitution of a duly constituted Dispute Resolution Committee was fully consistent with the scheme, object and purpose of the Act of 2017. The learned Tribunal, while interfering with that decision, failed to appreciate the mandatory nature of the statutory mechanism and thereby committed a manifest error of law in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.

Effect of Earlier Proceedings, Jurisdiction of the Appellate Tribunal, Scope of Judicial Review under Article 199, and Applicability of Writ of Certiorari.

13.The learned counsel for respondent No.6 has strenuously contended that the controversy stood concluded by virtue of the earlier order of the Appellate Tribunal dated 12.09.2024 and that the Mineral Title Committee was under a legal obligation to implement the said order without reopening the matter. It has further been argued that the dismissal of Writ Petition No. 6508-P of 2024 and the review petition arising therefrom lends finality to the recommendations of the Dispute Resolution Committee as well as to the directions issued by the Tribunal. The submission, though attractive at first glance, does not withstand judicial scrutiny. A careful reading of the judgment rendered by this Court in Writ Petition No. 6508-P of 2024 leaves no room for ambiguity that the constitutional petition was dismissed solely because no final decision had yet been rendered by the Mineral Title Committee. This Court categorically observed that the recommendations of the Dispute Resolution Committee were merely recommendatory in character and that the rights of the parties would crystallize only after the competent statutory authority, namely the Mineral Title Committee, passed a final order in accordance with law.

Simultaneously, liberty was expressly reserved in favour of every aggrieved party to challenge the ultimate decision of the Mineral Title Committee before the appropriate forum. The consequence of the said judgment is self-evident. Neither the recommendations of the Dispute Resolution Committee nor the earlier directions of the Tribunal attained finality so as to foreclose further statutory consideration by the Mineral Title Committee. Rather, the MTC remained under a continuing statutory obligation to independently evaluate the recommendations, examine the factual and legal aspects of the dispute, and pass an order strictly in accordance with the Act of 2017. Consequently, the decision subsequently rendered by the MTC on 16.10.2025 constituted a fresh and independent exercise of statutory jurisdiction, giving rise to a distinct cause of action capable of being examined by the appellate forum and, thereafter, by this Court in exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction. The doctrine of res judicata or constructive finality has no application in such circumstances. A judicial order declining interference on the ground that no final adjudication has yet taken place cannot be construed as an affirmation of the correctness of intermediate proceedings or recommendatory observations. Nor can such dismissal be interpreted as fettering the statutory discretion subsequently exercisable by the competent authority. To hold otherwise would amount to attributing finality to proceedings which this Court itself had expressly declared to be non-final.

14.Equally misconceived is the Tribunal's assumption that the Mineral Title Committee had no option except to implement the Tribunal's earlier observations. The appellate jurisdiction vested in the Tribunal undoubtedly authorizes it to examine the legality and propriety of decisions rendered under the Act. However, such jurisdiction cannot be exercised in a manner that nullifies or renders redundant a mandatory statutory procedure prescribed by the Legislature itself. The appellate authority derives its powers exclusively from the statute and remains equally bound by its

limitations. It cannot compel the statutory authority to disregard a mandatory provision of law merely because, in its opinion, the matter has remained pending for a considerable period. The record unmistakably demonstrates that while examining the report of the nominated team, the Mineral Title Committee noticed serious deficiencies in the earlier proceedings before the Dispute Resolution Committee. Questions relating to proper demarcation of the disputed area, availability of free area, overlapping claims, and compliance with Clause 8 of Schedule VIII remained unresolved. Instead of deciding the controversy on an incomplete factual foundation, the MTC adopted the legally safer and statutorily correct course by directing the Deputy Commissioner to convene a duly constituted Dispute Resolution Committee for fresh recommendations. Such an approach neither amounted to refusal to exercise jurisdiction nor constituted disobedience of the Tribunal's earlier order. On the contrary, it represented faithful adherence to the statutory framework established by the Legislature. The Tribunal, however, failed to appreciate the distinction between refusal to decide and postponement of decision pending completion of a mandatory statutory process. By treating the remand to the DRC as an abdication of jurisdiction, the Tribunal overlooked the elementary principle that where the law prescribes a particular procedure for exercise of statutory power, that procedure alone must be followed. Any departure therefrom, however well-intentioned, renders the ensuing decision vulnerable to judicial review.

15.At this juncture, it is appropriate to examine the constitutional parameters governing interference by this Court under Article 199 of the Constitution. It is by now a settled proposition that the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court is supervisory and corrective in nature. While exercising jurisdiction under Article 199, the High Court does not function as a Court of appeal. It neither substitutes its own opinion for that of the

statutory authorities nor undertakes a fresh appraisal of disputed questions of fact merely because another view may also be possible. Constitutional jurisdiction is invoked not to correct every error, but to correct those errors which strike at the legality of the decision- making process itself. The jurisprudential foundation of the writ of certiorari has consistently remained that an inferior Court, Tribunal or quasi-judicial authority must act within the limits of the jurisdiction conferred upon it by law. Whenever such authority acts without jurisdiction, exceeds its jurisdiction, declines to exercise jurisdiction vested in it, misconstrues a mandatory statutory provision, violates the principles of natural justice or commits a manifest error of law apparent on the face of the record, the High Court is constitutionally empowered to intervene by issuing a writ of certiorari.

16.In Darvesh Khan v. Muhammad Sher Khan and others (1986 SCMR 352), the august Supreme Court authoritatively held that issuance of a writ in the nature of certiorari is discretionary and is exercised in furtherance of the ends of justice and sound public policy. The judgment recognizes that the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court exists to ensure that inferior Courts and Tribunals remain within the limits prescribed by law. Likewise, the celebrated decision in Rex v. Northumberland Compensation Appellate Tribunal (1952 1 KB 338) lucidly explained that certiorari cannot be employed as a substitute for an appeal. Its purpose is not to reopen factual controversies but to quash decisions suffering from jurisdictional infirmity, manifest error of law or procedural illegality. The governing principles were further crystallized in Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan (AIR 1964 SC 477), wherein it was held that certiorari lies to correct jurisdictional errors where an inferior Tribunal acts without jurisdiction, exceeds the jurisdiction vested in it or fails to exercise jurisdiction lawfully conferred. The judgment further recognizes that violation of the principles of natural justice and patent errors of law apparent on

the face of the record equally attract the supervisory jurisdiction of the constitutional Court.

17.The Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan has recently reaffirmed these settled principles in Saeed Ahmad v. Nestlé Pakistan Limited and others (2026 SCMR 105) by holding that certiorari is maintainable where an inferior Court or Tribunal exercises jurisdiction illegally, misconstrues a statutory provision, violates natural justice or commits a manifest error of law. The Supreme Court further clarified that although the High Court does not ordinarily reappraise evidence, interference becomes justified where findings are founded upon non-reading or misreading of material evidence or where factual errors assume the character of jurisdictional or legal errors. Tested on the touchstone of the above principles, the impugned order cannot be sustained. The learned Tribunal proceeded on the erroneous premise that the Mineral Title Committee was legally bound to implement the earlier recommendations without insisting upon compliance with Clause 8 of Schedule VIII. In doing so, the Tribunal completely overlooked that the Legislature itself had made reference to a duly constituted Dispute Resolution Committee an indispensable component of the statutory process wherever disputes arise amongst stakeholders of a mineral-bearing area after grant of a mineral title. The Tribunal further failed to appreciate that the recommendations already submitted had not resolved the principal controversies relating to demarcation, overlapping claims and availability of free area. Instead of requiring completion of the statutory process, it directed implementation of its earlier order, thereby effectively bypassing the mandatory jurisdiction entrusted to the Dispute Resolution Committee and compelling the Mineral Title Committee to decide the controversy on an admittedly incomplete factual foundation. Such an approach is legally unsustainable. It amounts to misinterpretation of the statutory framework, failure to give effect to a mandatory provision of law

and material jurisdictional irregularity in exercise of appellate powers. The Tribunal, in effect, exercised jurisdiction in a manner not sanctioned by the Act itself. Once such jurisdictional error becomes apparent on the face of the record, constitutional intervention by issuance of a writ of certiorari becomes not only permissible but imperative to preserve the rule of law and ensure faithful implementation of the legislative scheme. This Court is, therefore, satisfied that the challenge raised by the petitioner does not seek reappraisal of disputed facts nor invite this Court to sit as an appellate forum over the findings of the Tribunal. Rather, the challenge is directed against a manifest jurisdictional error arising from disregard of a mandatory statutory procedure, misinterpretation of the governing provisions of the Act of 2017 and consequent failure to exercise jurisdiction in the manner prescribed by law. The case, therefore, falls squarely within the well-recognized parameters governing issuance of a writ of certiorari under Article 199 of the Constitution.

18.In view of the discussion made in preceding paragraphs, the questions framed for determination are answered as follows:

(i)Clause 8 of Schedule VIII to the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Mines and Minerals Act, 2017 prescribes a mandatory statutory mechanism for resolution of disputes arising amongst stakeholders of a mineral-bearing area after the grant of a mineral title.

(ii)The recommendations dated 20.12.2023 do not satisfy the statutory purpose of Clause 8, as the Dispute Resolution Committee failed to undertake proper demarcation, determine the extent of overlapping claims, identify the free area available, or resolve the principal disputes entrusted to it by law.

(iii)The Mineral Title Committee acted strictly within its lawful jurisdiction in remitting the matter to the Deputy Commissioner for convening a duly constituted Dispute Resolution Committee in accordance with Schedule VIII to the Act of 2017.

(iv)The Appellate Tribunal committed a material jurisdictional and legal error in setting aside the decision of the Mineral

Title Committee dated 16.10.2025 and directing implementation of its earlier order without ensuring compliance with the mandatory statutory mechanism provided under Clause 8 of Schedule VIII.

(v)The impugned order dated 23.01.2026 suffers from patent misinterpretation of the statute, failure to give effect to a mandatory provision of law, and material jurisdictional irregularity, and is therefore amenable to correction in exercise of this Court's constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 by issuance of a writ of certiorari.

19.The cumulative effect of the record leaves no manner of doubt that the dispute between the parties’ concerns overlapping mineral claims, demarcation of mineral-bearing land, availability of free area, validity of the No Objection Certificate issued in favour of respondent No.6, and reconciliation of competing rights arising from a subsisting Prospecting Licence originally granted to the petitioner in the year 2008. Such matters lie at the very heart of the statutory functions assigned to the Dispute Resolution Committee. The Legislature, while enacting Clause 8 of Schedule VIII, consciously provided a participatory mechanism involving the district administration, local mining stakeholders, tribal representation and the Minerals Department so that disputes of this nature may first be subjected to local inquiry, technical verification and customary reconciliation before any final administrative determination is made. The learned Tribunal, by directing implementation of its earlier order and by effectively bypassing that mechanism, frustrated the legislative intent and rendered the statutory safeguard illusory. It is also important to emphasize that the Mineral Title Committee did not finally adjudicate the rights of the parties. It merely postponed final determination until completion of the mandatory statutory process. Such postponement cannot be equated with refusal to exercise jurisdiction. On the contrary, it represented a cautious and lawful exercise of jurisdiction intended to ensure that no mineral title is granted in derogation of existing rights or without proper demarcation and determination of free area.

20.The earlier dismissal of Writ Petition No. 6508-P of 2024 and the review petition arising therefrom has no adverse bearing on the present controversy because, at that stage, no final order had been passed by the Mineral Title Committee and this Court had expressly reserved the right of the aggrieved party to challenge the final decision before the appropriate forum.

21.For the foregoing reasons, this Court has reached the irresistible conclusion that the impugned order dated 23.01.2026 cannot be sustained in law. The same is unconstitutional, without lawful authority, suffering from jurisdictional and legal infirmities, and liable to be struck down in exercise of the constitutional power of judicial review. Consequently, this constitutional petition is allowed in the following terms:

a) A writ of certiorari is issued and the impugned order dated 23.01.2026 passed by respondent No.1 in Appeal No. 1991-FRK/2025 is hereby set aside.

b) The decision of the Mineral Title Committee dated 16.10.2025 is hereby restored.

c) The Deputy Commissioner, District Kohat, shall, within thirty (30) days from receipt of a certified copy of this judgment, convene a duly constituted Dispute Resolution Committee strictly in accordance with Clause 8 of Schedule VIII to the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Mines and Minerals Act, d) The DRC shall issue notices to all stakeholders, including the petitioner, respondent No.6 and any other affected person, and shall afford them a fair, meaningful and effective opportunity of hearing.

e) The DRC shall undertake or cause to be undertaken proper demarcation of the disputed mineral-bearing area, determine the extent of any overlapping claims, identify the free area available, examine the validity and effect of the No Objection Certificates, and resolve all disputes falling within its statutory jurisdiction, including issues relating to tribal shares and customary rights, if any.

f) The DRC shall be at liberty to obtain assistance from the Revenue Department, Survey authorities, Minerals

Department or any other relevant Government department for effective discharge of its functions.

g) The DRC shall submit a reasoned report and recommendations to the Mineral Title Committee within sixty (60) days of its first meeting.

h) Upon receipt of the recommendations, the Mineral Title Committee shall decide the matter afresh strictly in accordance with law, after independently evaluating the recommendations and the material available on record, and shall pass a speaking order uninfluenced by any observation made by the learned Tribunal in the impugned order.

i)Until final decision by the Mineral Title Committee, no mineral title shall be granted, renewed, converted or otherwise created in favour of respondent No.6 in respect of the disputed area in derogation of the petitioner's subsisting rights, if any, as may ultimately be determined by the competent authority.

Before parting with the case, it is observed that disputes concerning mineral-bearing areas in the merged districts frequently involve not only statutory mining rights but also customary tribal claims and local land arrangements. The authorities concerned are, therefore, expected to ensure strict adherence to the statutory mechanism provided under Schedule VIII so that such disputes are resolved through transparent, participatory and legally sustainable processes rather than through fragmented administrative proceedings. The petition stands disposed of in the above terms. No order as to costs.

Announced on 02.07.2026.

Released on 30.07.2026.

JUDGE

Ashfaq Ahmad (SB) Hon’ble Mr. Justice Muhammad Naeem Anwar

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