United Municipal Workers Union, CBA/CBU, All TMA(s) Vs Registrar of Trade Unions.

JUDGMENT SHEET

LABOUR APPELLATE TRIBUNAL,

KHYBER PAKHTUNKHWA

(PESHAWAR HIGH COURT, PESHAWAR)

(Judicial Department) Labour Revision No.17-P/2026

United Municipal Workers Union, CBA/CBU, All TMA(s), Tehsils and Metropolitan Government, through Mr. Ismail Khan, President, Head Office, TMA Town-I, CMA Office, Bacha Khan Chowk, Peshawar Vs.

Registrar of Trade Unions, 3rd Floor, FC Trust Building, Sunehri Masjid Road, Peshawar Cantt and others Date of Hearing: 29.06.2026 Date of Announcement: _____________ For Petitioner(s): Mr. Bilal Ahmed Kakazai, Advocate.

For Respondent(s): Mr. Mir Zaman Safi, Advocate alongwith Muhammad Zahir Shah, Superintendent, Registrar Trade Unions, Labour Department.

Research Assistance: Mr. Riaz Aslam Daavi,

SRO PHCP.

JUDGEMENT

IJAZ ANWAR, J. The petitioner, United Municipal Workers Union, has invoked the revisional jurisdiction of this Tribunal under Section 51(4) of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Industrial Relations Act, 2010 (IRA, 2010), being aggrieved by the order dated 20.04.2026 (the impugned order), passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Peshawar,

whereby, its application challenging the Office-Bearers Certificate dated 16.02.2026, issued in favour of respondent No.2 (Mazdoor Ittehad Municipal Workers Union), was dismissed. The grievance of the petitioner is that Syed Qaiser Ali Shah, respondent No.3, has been included under the outsider quota amongst the office-bearers of Mazdoor Ittehad Municipal Workers Union, respondent No.2, despite serving as Mechanical Superintendent in BPS-17 and being, according to the petitioner, legally ineligible to hold such office in view of his official status under the IRA 2010. It is alleged that the Registrar of Trade Unions acted in disregard of the governing provisions of the IRA 2010 while approving his inclusion and that the learned Labour Court, instead of examining the legality of the certificate and the status of respondent No.3 in their correct legal perspective, dismissed the application without properly appreciating the relevant record, statutory scheme and material placed before it.

It was further vehemently asserted that permitting a person who is neither a worker nor a workman to hold office under the outsider quota would undermine the independence and representative character of trade unions by placing their affairs under the influence or control of persons unconnected with the workforce,

which, according to the petitioner, would defeat the object and spirit of the law. Learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance upon Muhammad Munir v.

Registrar, Industry-Wise Trade Unions, NIRC (2014 PLC 159 Lahore) and Habib Sugar Mills Ltd. v.

Registrar of Trade Unions (2001 PLC 441 Karachi), wherein it was held that even an office-bearer inducted under the outsider quota must be a worker or workman, though not necessarily employed in the particular establishment or industry concerned. The petitioner, therefore, seeks annulment of the impugned order and consequential invalidation of the certificate to the extent of respondent No.3, contending that his continued inclusion would unlawfully affect the composition of the rival Union and the forthcoming referendum for determination of the Collective Bargaining Agent.

2.The respondents contested the proceedings by raising preliminary objections regarding the maintainability of the application, the locus standi of the petitioner and the jurisdiction of the learned Labour Court. On merits, they maintained that respondent No.3 was neither an employer nor a managerial employee, but continued to perform technical duties, and that his post had merely been upgraded to BPS-17 without any

corresponding change in the nature of his functions or conferment of administrative, supervisory or disciplinary powers. It was further asserted that the status of an employee as a worker could not be determined solely on the basis of his pay scale and that mere upgradation of a post did not divest the incumbent of his status as a worker. They also contended that, under the 25% quota reserved for outsiders, the law did not require every such office-bearer to be a worker or workman and that any otherwise eligible person could be inducted against the said quota. On these premises, they defended the inclusion of respondent No.3 amongst the office-bearers of respondent No.2 and sought dismissal of the application as being devoid of merit.

3.Arguments heard and available record perused.

4.The following crucial questions arise for determination by this Tribunal in the present matter:-

1.Whether the petitioner, being a rival trade union operating within the same Collective Bargaining Unit, has the requisite locus standi to challenge the Office-Bearers Certificate issued in favour of respondent No.2?

2.Whether respondent No.3, having been inducted as an office-bearer under the 25% outsider quota, was nevertheless required to fall within the statutory definition of a worker or

workman?

5.Before addressing the questions formulated above, it would be appropriate to trace briefly the historical development of trade union law in Pakistan.

Its roots lie in the labour movement of the pre- independence Indo-Pak subcontinent, which emerged with the expansion of railways, plantations, ports, mills and other organized forms of employment. The harsh working conditions prevailing during the colonial period gradually gave rise to collective labour action, while the establishment of the International Labour Organization (ILO) 1 in 1919 and the formation of the All India Trade Union Congress in 1920 provided institutional direction to the movement. The enactment of the Indian Trade Unions Act, 1926 marked a decisive legal development by granting formal recognition to trade unions and securing the right of workers to organize and obtain collective representation. A notable feature of this history is the association of Quaid-e- Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah with the labour movement. He attended the founding conference of the All India Trade Union Congress in 1920, was elected President of the All India Postal Staff Union in 1925, then having approximately 70,000 members, and, as a https://www.ilo.org/about-ilo

member of the Legislative Assembly, advocated a living wage, fair conditions of service, reasonable working hours, suitable allowances and other protections for workers, besides contributing to the legislative effort that culminated in the Indian Trade Unions Act, 1926. After independence, Pakistan initially retained the inherited labour legislation and, in furtherance of its commitment to freedom of association and collective bargaining, ratified the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No.87)2 on 14 February 1951 and the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No.98) on 26 May 1952.

These Conventions protect the right of workers and employers to form and join organizations of their choice, safeguard such organizations against interference and administrative dissolution, prohibit anti-union discrimination and recognize the right to collective bargaining. The Indian Trade Unions Act, 1926 was adapted for Pakistan through the Adaptation of Central Acts and Ordinances Order, 1949, whereby the word “Indian” was omitted from its title. The adapted Act continued to govern trade union matters until it was replaced by the West Pakistan Trade Unions https://portal.mohr.gov.pk/international_framew/ilo‐conventions/

Ordinance, 1968, which was shortly thereafter

superseded by the Industrial Relations Ordinance,

1969. The Ordinance of 1969 remained the principal

industrial relations law until its repeal by the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 2002, which was, in turn,

replaced by the Industrial Relations Act, 2008. At the federal level, the Act of 2008 was subsequently

repealed by the Industrial Relations Act, 2012.

Meanwhile, following the Eighteenth Constitutional

Amendment3 and the devolution of labour to the

Provinces,4 Khyber Pakhtunkhwa initially promulgated the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Industrial Relations

Ordinance, 2010, thereby repealing the Industrial

Relations Act, 2008 to the extent of its application within the Province. The Provincial Legislature

thereafter enacted the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Industrial Relations Act, 2010 (IRA 2010), which replaced the

Ordinance and established a distinct statutory

framework governing the formation, registration and functioning of trade unions, collective bargaining and the resolution of industrial disputes in Khyber

The Constitution (Eighteenth Amendment) Act, 2010 (Act No. X of 2010) Under the original Constitution of 1973, the Concurrent Legislative List contained in the Fourth Schedule comprised entries 1 to 47, including entry No.27 relating to “trade unions; industrial and labour disputes”, besides other labour-related entries. Section 101(3) of the Constitution (Eighteenth Amendment) Act, 2010 omitted that List in its entirety; consequently, such matters, not having been retained in the Federal Legislative List, fell within the legislative competence of the Provinces under Article 142(c) of the Constitution.

Pakhtunkhwa. The present controversy is, therefore, to be examined and determined in the light of the provisions, scheme and object of the said provincial enactment

6.As regards Question No.1, its determination requires a careful examination of the statutory scheme of the IRA 2010, which establishes a three-tier mechanism for the regulation, adjudication and supervision of trade union matters. At the first level, the Registrar5 acts as the primary regulatory authority. He is empowered to register trade unions, maintain the statutory register, examine applications and deficiencies, approve or refuse changes in the constitution or office-bearers of a union, inspect its accounts and record, hold inquiries into its affairs, initiate proceedings before the Labour Court for violations of the IRA 2010 or unfair labour practices, and determine which union is entitled to be certified as the Collective Bargaining Agent through election.

Thus, while approving the election or change of office- bearers, the Registrar is required to satisfy himself that the proposed arrangement conforms both to the IRA 2010 and to the constitution of the union; where it violates either, he may refuse approval under section “Registrar” means a Registrar appointed under section 14 of the IRA

9(5). At the second level, the Labour Court6 exercises original judicial jurisdiction over industrial disputes, individual grievances, unfair labour practices, violations of settlements, offences under the IRA 2010 and such other matters as are specifically assigned to it.

For deciding industrial disputes, it possesses the powers of a Civil Court, including summoning and examining witnesses, compelling production of documents and issuing commissions, whereas, while trying offences, it exercises the powers of a specially empowered Magistrate of the first class. In disputes relating to the election or change of trade union office-bearers or alteration of its constitution, section 9(7) authorizes the Labour Court to direct the Registrar to register the lawful change or, for reasons recorded in writing, to order fresh elections under his supervision. At the third level, the Labour Appellate Tribunal7 exercises appellate as well as supervisory jurisdiction. In appeal, it may confirm, set aside, vary or modify the orders falling within its appellate competence; and under section 51(4), it may, on its own motion, call for the record of any proceedings in which a Labour Court has passed an order, examine its correctness, legality or “Labour Court” means a Labour Court established under section 48 of

IRA 2010.

“Tribunal” means a Labour Appellate Tribunal constituted under section 51 of IRA 2010.

propriety, and pass such order as it considers fit, after affording a reasonable opportunity of hearing to any person likely to be adversely affected. The Tribunal also possesses powers to punish for contempt and to transfer proceedings from one Labour Court to another.

The IRA 2010 thus assigns regulatory scrutiny to the Registrar, original adjudication to the Labour Court, and appellate and revisional supervision to the Tribunal, each authority being required to act within the powers expressly conferred upon it by the statute.

7.The respondents contended that the application before the learned Labour Court was not maintainable, as the petitioner could not be regarded as a person aggrieved by the Office-Bearers Certificate issued in favour of a rival union, namely respondent No.2. The objection falls to be examined in the light of section 9 of the IRA 2010, which is reproduced below:

“9. Registration. ---(1) The Registrar, on being satisfied that the trade union has complied with all the requirements of this Act, shall register the trade union in a prescribed register and issue a registration certificate in the prescribed form within a period of fifteen days from the date of receipt of the application. In case the application is found by the Registrar to be deficient in a material respect, he shall communicate in writing his objections to the trade union within a period of fifteen days from the receipt of the application and the trade union shall reply thereto within a period of fifteen days from the receipt of the objections.

(2)When the objections raised by the Registrar have been satisfactorily met, the Registrar shall register the trade union as provided in sub-section (1) and issue a certificate of registration in the prescribed form within three days of the date of the objections having been so met. In case the objections are not satisfactorily met,

the Registrar may reject the application.

(3)In case the application has been rejected or the Registrar has delayed disposal of the application beyond the period of fifteen days provided in sub- section (1) or has not issued a certificate of registration within a period of three days as provided in sub-section (2), as the case may be, the trade union may appeal to the Labour Court who for reasons to be stated in its judgment may pass an order directing the Registrar to register the trade union and to issue a certificate of registration or may dismiss the appeal.

(4)Notwithstanding anything contained in any other provision of this Act, every alteration or change made in the constitution of a registered trade union and every proceedings of election of its officers or change of its officers or otherwise shall be notified by registered post by the trade union to the Registrar within fifteen days of such election or change for approval.

(5)The Registrar may refuse to register such election of officers or change of officers or alteration or change made in the constitution, if it is in contravention of any of the provisions of this Act, or if it is in violation of the constitution of the trade union.

(6)Subject to the provision of sub-section (5), every inclusion or exclusion of any constituent unit of a federation of trade unions or confederation of federations shall be notified by registered post by the federation or confederation to the Registrar within fifteen days of such inclusion or exclusion.

(7)In case there is a dispute in relation to the election of the officers or change of officers or alteration made in the constitution of a trade union, the Registrar or any trade union aggrieved by the refusal of the Registrar under sub-section (5), any office bearers or member of the trade union may apply or appeal to the Labour Court, who shall within seven days of receipt of the application or appeal, as the case may be, pass an order either directing the Registrar to register the change or alteration in the constitution or in the officers of the trade union or may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, direct the Registrar to hold fresh elections of the union under his supervision.”

A plain reading of section 9(7) shows that the right to approach the Labour Court is not confined to the union whose own certificate is under challenge. The provision is couched in broad terms and permits the Registrar, any aggrieved trade union, any office-bearer, or any member of the trade union to apply or appeal where a

dispute arises concerning the election or change of office-bearers. In the present case, the petitioner does not challenge its own Office-Bearers Certificate but the certificate issued in favour of respondent No.2, wherein respondent No.3 has been included as an office-bearer.

Although no office-bearer or member of respondent No.2 has questioned that certificate, the petitioner is a rival trade union operating within the same Collective Bargaining Unit8 and is required to contest against respondent No.2 in the secret ballot contemplated by section 249 for determination of the Collective

Bargaining Agent.10 Since the union securing the

prescribed support becomes the statutory representative of the workmen for collective bargaining, the lawful constitution of each contesting union directly affects the rights and electoral position of the other. The petitioner may, therefore, be regarded as an aggrieved trade union within the meaning of section 9(7),

provided it raises a bona fide and legally sustainable “collective bargaining unit” means those workers or class of workers of an employer in one or more establishments falling within the same class of industry whose terms and conditions of employment are, or could appropriately be, the subject of collective bargaining together.

Where two or more registered unions exist, any qualifying union having at least one-fifth of the total workmen as members, or the employer or Government, may apply to the Registrar, who must ordinarily hold a secret ballot within fifteen days to determine which union enjoys the support of the workers.

“Collective bargaining agent” in relation to an establishment or group of establishments or industry, means the trade union of the workmen which under section 24 is the agent of workmen in the establishment or, as the case may be, industry, in the matter of collective bargaining.

objection that the executive of respondent No.2 has not been constituted in accordance with the IRA 2010. The objection to the locus standi of the petitioner is, therefore, without merit. Question No.1 is answered accordingly by holding that the petitioner, being an aggrieved rival trade union, was competent to challenge the impugned certificate before the Labour Court, the statutory forum vested with jurisdiction over such trade union disputes.

8.As regards Question No.2, its determination requires a brief examination of the historical development and legislative purpose of the outsider quota in trade union law. The earliest relevant enactment was the Indian Trade Unions Act, 1926.

Section 22 thereof originally provided:

“22. Proportion of officers to be connected with the industry. Not less than one-half of the total number of the officers of every registered Trade Union shall be persons actually engaged or employed in an industry with which the Trade Union is connected: Provided that the Local Government may, by special or general order, declare that the provisions of this section shall not apply to any Trade Union or class of Trade Unions specified in the order.”

A plain reading of the original provision shows that at least one-half of the officers were required to be actually engaged or employed in the industry with which the union was connected. The provision did not expressly prescribe any qualification or condition for the remaining half, who could be drawn from outside

the concerned industry. Section 22 was subsequently substituted by section 3 of the Trade Unions (Amendment) Ordinance, 1961, as follows:

“22. Election of officers. (1) No person shall be elected as an officer of the Trade Union who—

(a)has at any time been convicted of an offence under this Act or under section 23 or section 24 of the Industrial Disputes Ordinance, 1959; or (b) has at any time been dismissed from employment in any industry on the ground of conviction for an offence—

(i)involving, in the opinion of the appropriate Government, moral turpitude; or

(ii)relating to activities prejudicial to the defence or security of Pakistan; or

(c)in the case of a person referred to in sub-section (2), is not a paid full-time Trade Union worker.

(2)A registered Trade Union shall not elect more than twenty-five per cent of the total number of its officers from amongst the persons who are not, for the time being, employed or engaged in the industry with which the Trade Union is connected:

Provided that the Central Government may, on the grounds of security, by notification in the official Gazette, prohibit any Trade Union in any industry connected with defence carried on by or under the authority of the Central Government, from electing any officer from amongst such persons.”

This amendment reduced the permissible representation of outsiders from one-half to twenty-five per cent and, through section 22(1)(c), clarified that the remaining seventy-five per cent of the executive body were to be paid full-time trade union workers. No separate qualification or condition, however, was prescribed for the twenty-five per cent outsider quota.

The said law remained in force until 1968, when it was repealed by the West Pakistan Trade Unions Ordinance, 1968. The subject previously dealt with under section 22 was substantially re-enacted in section

29 of the new Ordinance, which was almost pari materia with the earlier provision and read as follows:

“29. (1) No person shall be elected as an officer of a registered Trade Union, who—

(a)has at any time within the preceding 3 years, been convicted of an offence under this Ordinance or under section 23 or section 24 of the Industrial Disputes Ordinance, 1959 (Ordinance LVI of 1959), or under section 30 or section 31 of the West Pakistan Industrial Disputes Ordinance, 1968;

(b)has been convicted of an offence involving moral turpitude, or for any act prejudicial to the defence or security of Pakistan, or public order, and sentenced to imprisonment for a term of not less than 6 months, unless 3 years or such less period as Government may, by notification in the official Gazette, specify in this behalf has elapsed from the date of expiration of the sentence.

(2)A registered Trade Union, shall elect not less than 75 per centum of the total number of its officers, from amongst the persons, who are for the time being employed or engaged in the industry with which the Trade Union is connected.

(3)No person shall be elected as an officer of a registered Trade Union who has not—

(a)in case he is employed or engaged in the industry with which the Trade Union is concerned attained the age of 21 years; and

(b)in any other case, attained the age of 25 years, and is a paid full time Trade Union worker.” Section 29 lays down three basic rules regarding the election of trade union officers. First, a person cannot be elected if, during the preceding three years, he has been convicted of specified labour offences. A person convicted of an offence involving moral turpitude, or of an act prejudicial to the defence, security or public order of Pakistan, is also disqualified for the prescribed period. Second, at least seventy-five per cent of the officers must be persons presently employed or engaged in the industry with which the trade union is connected. This means that not more than twenty-five

per cent may come from outside that industry. Third, a person employed in the relevant industry must be at least twenty-one years of age. A person coming from outside the industry must be at least twenty-five years of age and must be a paid full-time trade union worker.

Thus, while the twenty-five per cent quota was retained, the 1968 Ordinance also imposed express qualifications upon an outsider: he had to be at least twenty-five years of age and a paid full-time trade union worker.

However, the West Pakistan Trade Unions Ordinance, 1968 was shortly thereafter repealed by section 67 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 (IRO 1969).

The subject was then dealt with in section 7(d), which provided:

“7. Requirements for registration. A trade union shall not be entitled to registration under this Ordinance unless the constitution thereof provides for the following matters, namely:—

(a)the name and address of the trade union;

(b)the objects for which the trade union has been formed;

(c)the purposes for which the general funds of the union shall be applicable;

(d)the names of the persons forming the executive committee including the officers, of whom seventy- five per cent shall be from amongst the workers actually engaged or employed in the establishment with which the trade union is connected, and the manner of their election;

(e)the conditions under which a member shall be entitled to any benefit assured by the constitution of the trade union and under which any fine or forfeiture may be imposed on him;

(f)the maintenance of a list of the members of the trade union and of adequate facilities for the inspection thereof by the officers and members of the trade union;

(g)the manner in which the constitution shall be amended, varied or rescinded;

(h)the safe custody of the funds of the trade union, its

annual audit, the manner of audit and adequate facilities for inspection of the account books by the officers and members of the trade union; and (i) the manner in which the trade union may be dissolved.”

A bare reading of section 7 shows that at least seventy- five per cent of the executive had to consist of workers actually employed in the establishment concerned, leaving the remaining twenty-five per cent for persons from outside it. Unlike the 1968 Ordinance, section 7 neither required such outsiders to be paid full-time trade union workers nor prescribed any separate age qualification for them. The IRO 1969 remained in force until 2002 when it was repealed by section 80 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 2002 (IRO 2002). The subject previously dealt with under section 7 was substantially re-enacted in Section 6 of the new Ordinance and read as follows:

“6. Requirements for registration. (1) A trade union shall not be entitled to registration under this Ordinance unless the constitution thereof provides for the following matters, namely:—

(a)the name and address of the trade union;

(b)the objects for which the trade union has been formed;

(c)the purposes for which the general funds of the union shall be applicable;

(d)the number of persons forming the executive which shall not exceed the prescribed limit and shall include not less than seventy-five per cent from amongst the workmen actually engaged or employed in the establishment or establishments or the industry for which the trade union has been formed;

(e)the conditions under which a member shall be entitled to any benefit assured by the constitution of the trade union and under which any fine or forfeiture may be imposed on him;

(f)the maintenance of a list of the members of the trade union and of adequate facilities for the inspection

thereof by the office-bearers and members of the trade union;

(g)the manner in which the constitution shall be amended, varied or rescinded;

(h)the safe custody of the funds of the trade union, its annual audit, the manner of audit and adequate facilities for inspection of the account books by the office-bearers and members of the trade union;

(i)the manner in which the trade union may be dissolved;

(j)the manner of election of office-bearers by the general body of the trade union and the term, not exceeding three years, for which an office-bearer may hold office upon his election or re-election through secret ballot;

(k)the procedure for expressing want of confidence in any office-bearer of the trade union; and (l) the meetings of the executive and of the general body of the trade union, so that the executive shall meet at least once in every four months and the general body at least once every year.

(2)Without prejudice to the provisions of sub-section (1), a trade union of workmen shall not be entitled to registration under this Ordinance—

(a)unless all its members are workmen actually engaged or employed in the establishment or industry with which the trade union is connected; and (b) where there are two or more registered trade unions in the establishment, group of establishments or industry with which the trade union is connected, unless it has as its members not less than one-fourth of the total number of workmen employed in such establishment, group of establishments or industry, as the case may be.”

A bare reading of Section 6 shows that it prescribes the essential conditions for the registration of a trade union.

Sub-section (1) requires its constitution to contain the specified matters, including not less than seventy-five per cent representation of workmen in the executive, whereas sub-section (2) imposes the additional conditions that all members must be workmen of the concerned establishment or industry and, where two or more unions already exist, the applicant union must represent at least one-fourth of the total workforce.

Thus, clause (d) of sub-section (1) concerns the composition of the executive, while clause (a) of sub- section (2) governs the general membership of the union. The IRO 2002, therefore, retained the same ratio without prescribing any independent qualification for the remaining twenty-five per cent of the executive under clause (d). This law remained in force until its repeal by section 87 of the Industrial Relations Act, 2008 (IRA 2008). The IRA 2008, however, substantially retained the scheme embodied in section 6 of the IRO 2002.

9.Following the Eighteenth Constitutional Amendment and the consequent devolution of the subject of labour to the Provinces, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa initially promulgated the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Industrial Relations Ordinance, 2010, thereby repealing the Industrial Relations Act, 2008 to the extent of its application to the Province. The said Ordinance was shortly replaced by the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Industrial Relations Act, 2010 (IRA 2010). Section 6 of the Act, being directly relevant to the controversy at hand, is reproduced below:

“6. Requirements for registration. (1) A trade union shall not be entitled to registration under this Act unless the constitution thereof provide for the following matters, namely,

(a)the name and address of the trade union;

(b)the objects for which the trade union has been

formed;

(c)the purposes for which the general funds of the union shall be utilized;

(d)the number of persons forming the executive which shall not exceed the prescribed limit and shall include not less than seventy-five percent from amongst the workmen actually engaged or employed in the establishment or group of establishments or the industry for which the trade union has been formed; (e) the conditions under which a member shall be entitled to any benefit assured by the constitution of the trade union and under which any fine or forfeiture may be imposed on him;

(f)the maintenance of a list of the members of the trade union and of adequate facilities for the inspection thereof by the officers and members of the trade union;

(g)the manner in which the constitution shall be amended, varied or rescinded;

(h)the safe custody of the funds of the trade union, its annual audit, the manner of audit and adequate facilities for inspection of the account books by the officers and members of the trade union;

(i)the manner in which the trade union may be dissolved;

(j)the manner of election of officers by the general body of the trade union and the term, not exceeding two years, for which an officer may hold office upon his election or re-election;

(k)the procedure for expressing no confidence in any officer of the trade union; and

(l)the meeting of the executive and of the general body of the trade union so that the executive shall meet at least once in every three months and the general body at least once a year.

(2)Without prejudice to the provisions of sub-section (1), a trade union of workmen shall not be entitled to registration under this Act,—

(a)unless all its members are workmen actually engaged or employed in the establishment or group of establishments or industry with which the trade union is connected; and

(b)where there are two or more registered trade unions in the establishment, group of establishments or industry with which the trade union is connected, unless it has as its members not less than one-fifth of the total number of workmen employed in such establishment, group of establishments or industry, as the case may be.”

Section 6 of the IRA 2010 clearly retains the composition of the executive body at a minimum of seventy-five per cent serving workmen, leaving up to twenty-five per cent for outsiders. Membership of a

trade union is distinct from membership of its executive body. While section 6(2)(a) regulates the general membership of the union, section 6(1)(d) governs the composition of its executive. No separate qualification or condition has been prescribed for the outsider quota.

It is a settled principle of statutory interpretation that where the language of a provision is clear and unambiguous, it must be given its plain meaning.

Accordingly, in the absence of any express statutory qualification for outsiders, none can be read into the law, for the Court cannot supply an omission or add words which the legislature has deliberately not enacted. The superior courts of Pakistan have consistently upheld the "plain meaning" rule and the doctrine of casus omissus,11 establishing that when the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, it must be applied as written. Courts are strictly prohibited from adding words, supplying omissions, or reading in qualifications that the legislature did not explicitly enact, as doing so would constitute legislation rather than judicial construction. In Syed Saad Ali v.

Federation of Pakistan (2026 SCMR 22), the Supreme Casus omissus is a Latin expression meaning “an omitted case” or “a situation not provided for by the law.” In statutory interpretation, it refers to a matter that the legislature has unintentionally or deliberately left out of a statute. Courts generally cannot fill such a gap by adding words to the law; the omission must ordinarily be corrected by the legislature itself.

Court explained the principle of statutory interpretation in the following terms:

“The function of the judiciary is not to legislate or question the wisdom of the legislature in making a particular law, nor can it refuse to enforce a law. The doctrine of severability permits the court to sever the unconstitutional portion of a partially unconstitutional statute in order to preserve the operation of any uncontested or valid remainder. The words contained in statutes, rules, or regulations, are first to be understood in their natural, ordinary, or popular sense, and phrases and sentences are construed according to their grammatical meaning, unless that leads to some absurdity or unless there is something in the context, or in the object of the statute, to suggest the contrary.”

In Collector of Customs, Model Customs Collectorate, Peshawar v. Waseef Ullah (2023 SCMR 503), the Supreme Court explained the rule of plain construction in the following terms:

“If the words of the section are plain and unambiguous, then there is no question of interpretation or construction. The duty of the Court then is to implement those provisions with no hesitation. When the material words are capable of two constructions, one of which is likely to defeat or impair the policy of the Act whilst the other construction is likely to assist the achievement of the said policy, then the Courts would prefer to adopt the latter construction. The Court cannot supply casus omissus and while interpreting a statute, the Court cannot fill in gaps or rectify defects and cannot add words to a statute or read words into it which are not there, especially when the literal reading produces an intelligible result. The legal maxim, "absoluta sententia expositore non indigent" also reminds us that, when the language is not only plain, but admits of but one meaning, the task of interpretation can hardly be said to arise. It is not allowable to interpret what has no need of interpretation. Whereas another maxim "generalia verba sunt generalita intelligenda" expresses that general words are to be understood generally and what is generally spoken shall be generally understood unless it be qualified by some special subsequent words or unless there is in the statute itself some ground for restricting their meaning by reasonable construction, not by arbitrary addition or retrenchment [Ref: N. S. Bindra's interpretation of Statutes (Tenth Edition), (Page No.609-610) and (Page No.656-657)].

In Nadeem Ahmed, Advocate v. Federation of Pakistan (2013 SCMR 1062), the Supreme Court expounded the principle of statutory interpretation in the following terms:

“A Casus Omissus can, in no case, be supplied by the Court of law as that would amount to altering the provision. "It is not our function, as was held by Mr. Justice Walsh, in the case of "Attorney-General v. Bihari, re Australia Factors Limited (1966) 67 S.R. (N. S. W) 150; to repair the blunders that are to be found in the legislation". They must be corrected by the legislator". A Court of law is not entitled to read words into the Constitution or an Act of Parliament unless clear reason is found within the four corners of either of them.”

Thus, in the light of the principles enunciated above, section 6 of the IRA 2010 does not prescribe any qualification, restriction or condition in respect of the remaining twenty-five per cent of the executive body who may be drawn from outside the establishment or industry concerned. The provision is clear and admits of no ambiguity. Accordingly, no additional qualification or limitation can be introduced through judicial interpretation, as doing so would amount to supplying a casus omissus and rewriting the statute.

The provision must, therefore, be given effect in accordance with its plain and ordinary meaning, and the legislative choice embodied therein must be respected and enforced as enacted.

10.The petitioners have relied upon two judgments in support of their contention that a person

falling within the twenty-five per cent outsiders quota must also be a workman. The reliance, however, appears to be misplaced. In Habib Sugar Mills Ltd. v.

Registrar of Trade Unions (2001 PLC 441), the Sindh High Court held that persons included within the twenty-five per cent outsiders quota must possess the status of workmen, although they need not be employed in the particular establishment concerned. That judgment, however, was rendered in the context of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, which has since been repealed and replaced by subsequent legislation, whereas the present controversy is governed by the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Industrial Relations Act, 2010, whose language and legislative scheme warrant an independent examination. Likewise, in Muhammad Munir v. Registrar, Industry-Wise Trade Unions, NIRC (2014 PLC 159), the Lahore High Court held that a person falling within the outsiders quota need not be employed in the establishment for which the trade union is formed, but must nonetheless retain the status of a workman. That decision, however, was rendered with reference to the Industrial Relations Act, 2012, while the controversy at hand is governed by the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Industrial Relations Act, 2010.

The aforesaid judgments are, therefore, distinguishable,

as they were rendered in the context of different statutory frameworks. Moreover, having been rendered by High Courts exercising coordinate jurisdiction, they carry persuasive value and are entitled to due respect, but are not binding upon this Court under the

Constitution.12 The issue at hand must, therefore, be determined independently in the light of the plain language, structure and legislative scheme of the IRA

11.Another contention raised by the petitioner is that respondent No. 3, being an officer in Grade 17, does not fall within the definition of a worker and is instead an employer, rendering him ineligible. The contention is misconceived. It is well settled that designation, grade or pay scale is not conclusive in determining whether a person is a worker or an employer. The decisive test is the nature of the duties actually performed and the powers exercised by the person concerned. The relevant definitions are reproduced below:

Section 2(vii) — “Employer” “employer” in relation to an establishment, means any person or body of persons, whether incorporated or not, who or which employs workmen in the

Article 201 commences with the words Subject to Article 189 which removes all doubts (if at all there could be any) that the decisions of the High Court are only binding on all courts subordinate to it, which are those within its territorial jurisdiction. Therefore, while a decision of a High Court is persuasive and may be followed by another High Court it is not binding on it, and another High Court may make a different decision. (2024

SCMR 1656).

establishment under a contract of employment and includes,—

(a)an heir, successor or assignee, as the case may be, of such person or body as aforesaid;

(b)any person responsible for the management, supervision and control of the establishment;

(c)in relation to an establishment run by or under the authority of any department of the Government, the authority appointed in this behalf or, where no authority is so appointed, the Head of the department; and

(d)in relation to an establishment run by or on behalf of a local authority, the officer appointed in this behalf, or where no officer is so appointed, the chief executive officer of that authority;

(e)in relation to any other establishment, the proprietor of such establishment and every director, manager, secretary, agent or officer or person concerned with the management of the affairs thereof;

Explanation. For the purpose of distinction from the category of “workers” or “workmen”, officers and employees of a department of the Government or local authority who belong to the superior, managerial, secretarial, directorial, supervisory or agency staff and who have been notified for this purpose in the official Gazette shall be deemed to fall within the category of “employers”;

Section 2(xxxiii) — “Worker” and “Workman” “worker” and “workman” mean a person not falling within the definition of employer who is employed (including employment as a supervisor or as an apprentice) in an establishment or industry for hire or reward either directly or through a contractor whether the terms of employment be express or implied, and, for the purpose of any proceedings under this Act in relation to an industrial dispute includes a person who has been dismissed, discharged, retrenched, laid-off or otherwise removed from employment in connection with or as a consequence of that dispute or whose dismissal, discharge, retrenchment, lay-off, or removal has led to that dispute but does not include any person who is employed mainly in managerial or administrative capacity.

Under section 2(vii) of the IRA 2010, the term “employer” includes any person responsible for hiring or recruitment, or for the management, supervision or control of an establishment, as well as any person concerned with the management of its affairs. In

relation to a Government department or local authority, however, officers belonging to the superior, managerial, secretarial, directorial, supervisory or agency staff are deemed to be employers only if they have been duly notified as such in the official Gazette.

Conversely, section 2(xxxiii) defines a worker or workman as a person employed for hire or reward who does not fall within the definition of employer and is not mainly engaged in managerial or administrative functions. The definition expressly includes a supervisor or apprentice. Thus, supervisory status by itself does not exclude a person from the category of worker; exclusion arises only where the person mainly performs managerial or administrative functions or otherwise satisfies the statutory definition of employer.

The status of respondent No.3 cannot, therefore, be determined merely from his Grade 17 designation. The status of respondent No.3 must be determined from the actual nature of his duties, the extent of his managerial, administrative or supervisory authority, his role in hiring or recruitment and, where applicable, whether he has been duly notified as an employer in the official Gazette. No material is available on the record to establish that respondent No. 3 acquired the status of an employer merely upon his placement in Grade 17.

12.Thus, for the foregoing reasons, Question No.2 is answered in negative. Section 6 of the IRA 2010 does not prescribe any qualification or restriction requiring a person inducted against the twenty-five per cent outsiders’ quota to fall within the statutory definition of a worker or workman. In the absence of any such express requirement, no additional condition can be introduced through interpretation. Respondent No.3 was, therefore, not required to possess the status of a worker or workman for induction against the said quota. Consequently, the instant Labour Revision, being devoid of merit, is dismissed.

Announced Dt:__________ Senior Puisne Judge

(SB)Hon’ble Mr. Justice Ijaz Anwar