Gulzar Ahmad Khan Vs The Director General, Provionial Housing Authority, KP Peshawar.

I

ruDGMEIVTSHEET

PESIIAWAR HIGH COIIRT, PESIIAWAR

(fudicial Deparanenrt FAO No. I 4&Pof 20at

Gulzar f,fusa{ Khen 311d 9 othen VEI l3.

The Director Geueral, hoviucial HousiDg A,uthority, Palhtrmlhrra Peshawer with 2 othe.rs, hesent:

For AJrpellants. M/S Gulzar Ahmad, Mulurnmad Isrnail, Muhamrnad Tariq, Shahzad Gul Khattak, Isaac AIi Qazi, Daru Salarn, Noor ul funin Khattak , Advocates For RespondenLs. M/S Sabah u<l Din Khatrak, Syed A,rnjad Makhdoorn, Ibr PHA and M/S Fazal Maula, Syed Mukhtar Ali Shah, Relurat AIi and Arshad Alunad, Additional & Assistant Advocates General Mr. Riaz Alunad Advocate, lbr FWO.

Date of'hearing. 08.06.2026 & FAO at serial N o.

65 66 67 & 68 of the list on 16.06.2026

JUDGMEIYT

MUHAMMAD NAEEM ANWAR J: - The present batch of seventy (70) appeals, including the instant appeal, raises an iurportant question concerning the scope of statutory compensation payable under the [.,.and Acquisition Act, 1894, "the Ac! 1894" urd the extent of an executing Court's jurisdiction while giving ellbct to a decree passetl by the Honourable Supreme Court. 'fhe particulars of the remaining sixty-nine (69) connected appeals are set out below:-

I FAO No. 132-P/2025 Arnir Haider etc vs. lanrd Acquisitiou Collector etc 2 FAO No. l3&P/2025 Muhamrnad Qasim etc vs. lanrd Acquisit.ion Collector 3 FAO No. 135-P/2025 Zu'afat Sail vs. The Diret:tol General PHA 4 FAO No. 137-P12025 " Shafique Alrrnad etc vs. The Direclor Gerreral PHA. 5 FAO No. 138-P/2025 * Nawazish Ali ct<: vs. Additional DisrictJudge ctc 6 FAO No. 139-P/2025 " Waqif Khan etc vs. Additional DistlictJudge, etc ,\ 7 FAO No. 140-P12025 Faizar ul Haqa etc vs. Additioual DistlictJudge, etc 8 FAO No. l4l-P/2025 Amir Muhamrnad etc vs. Additional DistlictJudge etc 9 FAO No. l5l-P12025 Dr. Saifullalr ctc vs. [,ald Acquisition Collector etc l0 FAO No. 152-P12025 Dr. Sail' I lllah etc vs. [,and Acquisition Collector etc

ll FAO No. l5i,-Pl2025 Msr. Zaheel I )ari ctc vs. Collector l,arxl A<rluisitiou et<: t2 FAO No. l5Ll,/2025 Haji Muhamrnad Sair Khal etc vs DG PHA and ot]rers.

l3 IAO No. 157-I>/2025Mini Wali Khiur vs. DC PHA ald othem t4 FAO No. 158-P/2025 Qazi Wajaha t Ullalr ek'vs. DG, PHA iurd orher.s l5 FAO No. 159-P12025 Falnarr Gul etc vs. DG, PHA ald others l6 FA O No. l60J'2025 !'azl e Hadi vs. l)G, PHA axl ot.hers t7 IAO No. l6l-P/2025 Said Wali Sha.h etc vs. DG PHA ald orhers l8 FAO No. 162-l'/2025 !'ida Muharnrnad etc vs. DG PHA zurd others l9 FA O No. l6&P/2025 Haji Yousaf Kha.rr etc vs. DG PHA ald orhers 20 FAO No. 164-P/2025 Abdul Mateeu etc vs. DG PHA aud other-s 2t FAO No. 165-P12025 Qaiser Khan ctc vs. DG PHA aud others 22 FAO No. l6GP/2025Javcd Iqbal etc vs. D() PHA arxl othcls 2ll IAO N<r, 167-P12025 Dil Shuklia etc vs. DG PHA arxl othels 24 FAO No. 168-P/2025 Naveed tll Haq etc vs. DG PHA zurd others 25 FAO No. 172-l'12025 Saif ul Malook ctc vs. DG PHA ald others 26 l-AO No. l7e-P12025 Faiz Muhamrnad etc vs. DG PHA and odrers 27 FAO No. 174-l>/2025 Siraj Gul etc vs. DG PHA and others 2tr !'AO No. 175-P/2025 Dil Nawu etc vs, DG PHA and othels 29 I AO No. 176-l'/2025 l)aural Shah ctc vs. D(; I'}HA aud othcrs it0 FAO No. 177-P/2025 Niaz Muharmna(l etc vs. DG PHA and others 3l FAO No. 178-P12025 Nisar Ahmad etc vs. DG PHA and others 32 !'AO No. 179-l'12025 Zilfiaqar Ali etc vs. DG PHA artd others 33 FAO No. 180-P/2025 llisrnillah Shah ctc vs. l)G PHA and othcm ll4 FA() No. 18l-P/2025 Shcr Alarn etc vs. I)G PHA a-rxl othels .-). ) lA() No. 183-P/2025 Sher Mau Shah ctc vs. I)G PHA ald othcrs 36 FAO No. 185-P/2025 Ahmad Ali etc vs. DG PHA artd others 37 FAO No. 186-P/2025 Khaista Rehmatr ctc vs. DG PHA and others 38 FAO No. 187-P/2025 Ih Urnal Khau ctc vs. DG PHA ald othcm 39 FAO No. 188-Pi2025 Dil Nawaz Khatt etc vs. DG PHA ald others 40 FAO No. l9l-P/2025 Mst. Saba Gul ctc vs. DG PHA iurd otltcls 4t FAO No. 198-P/2025 hntiaz Alrrnad etc vs' DG PHA artd otlters 42 l-AO No. 199-P/2025 Msl Gulnar etc vs. DG PHA and otl)ers 43 FAO No. 2N-P/2025 Mulnmrnad Nanaz etc vs DG PHA arxl othets 44 !'AO No. 201-P12025 Naeem Kh:ut ctc vs DG PHA and others 45 FAO No. 202-l'12025 Dildal Khan ctc vs. f) G PHA arxl otltcts tr6 !'AO No.207-l'12025 Huual Gul ctc vs. DG PHA zuxl othcls 47 FAO No. 20tl-P/2025 Miulraj Ali ctc vs. D C PHA zur<l odrcls 48 FAO No. 210-l'/2025 Mst. Aziz Begutn etc vs DG PHA artd othem ,19 F'A() No. 214"1'/2025 AIrwal Gul ctc vs. D G PHA rutd others

50 FAO No. 2lCP/2025 Haji Muharnrnad Haloon etc vs. DG PHA and otlrcrs 5l FAO No. 217-P/2025 Khaista Gul etc vs. DG PHA aud others 52 FAO No. 218-P/2025 Nizun Ali etc vs. DG PHA and othels 53 FAO No. 219-P/2025 Z,ahid Gul etc vs. DG PHA zurd ot.hers 54 IAO No. 220-L'12025 Zahid ul Haq etc vs. DG PHA zurd others 55 FAO No. 221-Pl2025llaecs klran etc vs. DG PHA a-nd othei's 56 FAO No. 255-1'\12025 Zuklai<lel ctc vs. DG PHA and others 57 FAO No. 272-P/2025 Al'sar Ali ctc vs. DG PHA ald others 58 FAO No. 274-112025 'lali<1 Krun:rl ctc vs. l)G PHA ald otlrcrs 59 FAO No. 275-P/2025 Wali Z,.u'Khan etc rs. DG PHA zurtl othcrs 60 F-AO No. 2811ty2025 Khushal Khan khattak etc vs. DG PHA ruxl othcrs 6l FAO No. 284-P12025 Mst. llibi Rukhala etc vs. DG PHA aud othcrs 62 RFA No. 346-P/2025 Abdul Rashid etc vs. DG PHA and others 63 RFA No. 347-P12025 Fazal Mabood ctc vs. DG PHA ald othcls 64 RFA No. 427-P/2025 Nacctn Kltatt ctc vs' DG PHA urd othcrs 65 R!'A No. 677-1'j12025 Naz-irn Khan ct<'vs. DG PHA arxl others 66 RFA No. 678-P/2025 Mst. Maqsooda flegum etc vs. DG PHA a.ud otltets 67 R!'A No. 679-P/2025 Zahkl Khan etc vs. fXI PHA axl otlters 68 RFA No. 68GP/2025 Haq Nawaz etc vs. DG PHA and othels 69 FAO No. 22-P12026 F:ual [Jzdau ctc vs. DG PHA u rd others

2.All tlrese appeals arise out ot'the corluron or(ler <lated 22.05.2025 passed by the lqunetl Additional District JudgeJ/Executing Court, Nowshera, wftereby tfie olljectior-rs tiled by the judgrnent<le[tors were accepted, and it was [ekl t|at tfte <lecreejrolders were entitled only tc) cotnpensation at the rate of Rs. 40,000/- per lnalla, irs fletertniped by the Ho1<>urable Suprerle Ct>urt, alxl t)ot to tlte statutory lrcnelits 6l colnpulsory acquisition cha"rges or int€rest under the |an{ Acquisitkrn Act, 1894. Since all tltese appeals alise out of tfte sane land acquisition proceedings, involve i<lentical questions of fact and law, assail tlte uurte o1ler, an(l require tletertnination of colnlnop legal issues, t|ey are beipg disposed of tlrrough tltis consoliclated.iudguettt'

3.Although the controversy, at first glance, appears to concertr tlte the execution of a {ecree, ils true Courplexion lie s in deterrlinipg wltetlter statutory incidents of (rolnl)ensation, nallely, coupulsory acquisitioll c[a.rges (solatiurn), tfue a<l<litiolal atlount un{er Section 23(2), a"1<l

statutory interest, survive wltere tlte Suprerne Court, in appeal' Itas re-

detennined only the rnarket value ol'the acquired land without expressly ad<lressing those statutory cornponenls. 'fhe issue assumes considerable significance because it concerns the constitutional guarantee against the tleprivation o1' property except upon paylrlent of cornJrensation in acc<>rdance with law, as well as the correslx>nding statutory <lbligations irnllose<l upou the acquiring authority. 'l'he controversy lurther rerluires an exa:nination of' the distinction between the urarket value of' the acquired property, compulsory acquisition charges (solatiurn), the additional alnount payable under Sectiot 23(2), an<l interest un<ler Section 34 of the Act, 1894. Altlxrugh, these expressions are often l<xrsely arxl interclmngeably ernployed, they represent distinct statutory concepts, lbunded upon separate legal principles and intended to retnedy difl'erent c:onsequences arising liorn compulsory acquisition. l'heir independent character has repeatedly been recognize<l and explaine<l by the Honourable Suprerne Court. Nevertheless, the l)resent execution proc:eeding; dernonstrate the practical irnportance of rnaintaining that rlistinction.

4.'l'he rnaterial facts, arranged cluonologically, are liugely undisputed. l'he Provincial Housing Authority, Khyber P:tkhtunkhwa, initiated acquisition proceedings under the Act, 1894 lbr the establishrnent of a housing scherne intended fbr Goverrunent servants and the general public. The acquisition encornpassed land, siruated in Mauza Mera.lalozai, 'lehsil Publli, District Nowshera. Upon cornpletiorr of the requisite statutory lbrrnalities, the [,and Acquisition Collector zurn<rurrced Award No. 10059-65, dated 24.09.2011, whereby compensation was assessed accorrling to the respective revenue classilications of the acquired lan<I. In addition to detertnining its nrarket value , the Collector awartled cornpulsory acquisition ch:uges (solatiurn) at the statutory rate of filteen per cent and directed tltat cotnpensation lle <lisbursed to the landowners upon completion of the prescribed revenue fbrrnalities. 'l-he record further reveals that, notwithstanding the announcelnent of the award, neitlter the cotnpensation was paid to the lan<lowners nor it was deyxtsited lrclbre the cotnl>etettt Court, as conternplate<l by law. Ag1;rieved by the qualrtullr of cornpensati<ln, tlte

landowners souglrt rel'erences under secti<xr lu of the Act. Upon recor<ling the evidence arlduced by the piuties zurd evaluatiug the prevailing rnitrket conditions, the learned Ref'eree Court, by a consolidated judgrnent dated 03.06.2014, parrly allowed the relbrences, enlmnced the rnarket lalue of the acquired land, and, in addition thereto, awarded conrpulsory acquisition cluuges (solatiurn) at the rate of'filteen per cent together with simple interest at the statutory rate ol'six per cent per annuur until payment. Both sides f'elt aggrieved by the decision. 'l'he acquiring authoriry challenged the enhancernent of compensation, whereas the landowners sought a lurther increase. The appmls were disrnissed by this Court, which substantially allirrned the judgrnent of the learled Ref'eree Court. 'l'he litigation, however, di<l not conclude at that stage. Both parties approached the Honourable Suprerne Court, where the landowners prayed lbr further enhancernent of compensation and the acquiring authority praying firr its reduction. By .judgrnent dated 26.05.2022, the Honourable Suprerne Court a.llowerl the appeals llref'erred by the landowners, <lisrnissed those filed by the acquiring authority, set aside the judgnents of this Court to the extent of' deterrnination of rniuket value, and lixed the cornpensation unifbnnly at Rs. 40,000/- per urarla. A review petition, subsequently, filed by certain lartlowners was, likewise, disrnisserl on 03.01.2024, thereby rendering the judgrnent of the Honourable Suprerne Court final.

5.Following cuhnination of the litigation, the decree-holders initiated execution proceedings. During execution, the acquiring authority <lisclosed that only a part of the decretal a.ulount ltatl been released atd requestetl tirne lbr payrnent ol'tlte retnaining liability. Interitn directions were consequently issued regarding distribution of the available iunount' Thereafter, the .judgrnent<lebtors objected to the statements of clainr subrnittecl by the decreeJrolders, asserting that tlte judgrnent of the Honourallle Supreure Court conlined the entitletnent of tlte landowrers exclusively t() colnl)ensation at Rs. 40,000/- lter tniula and did n<>t award either corppulsory acquisitign charges or statutory interest. Accepting that contention, tlte learne<l Executing Court, vide impugned ortler dated 22.05.2025, <lirected the decree-holders to subtnit I'resh calculations

strictly on the basis ol' the miuket value fixed by the Hor.rourable supreure court, exclu<ling all statutory additions. It is this order whiclr has given rise to the present appeals.

6' The learne<l counsel appeari'g lbr the appellants contended that the controversy belbre the Honourable suprerne court was confined exclusivelv to the deterrnination ol'the rnarket va.lue of the acquired land.

Accordiry; to the leiurerl counsel, the statut<rry entitlement to cornpulsory acquisition charges ard interest neither fbrmed part of t]te confoversy lrclbre the apex court nor was expressly withdrawn or r,odified by its judgrnent' It was argued that these llenelits ACCrue by operation of raw an<I, once awarde<l by the Rel'eree Court ancl lelt untoucherl by the appellate rlecree, continue t. rertrair.r entbrceable. Conversely, the learned Additional Advocate General and the learned counsel representing the respondents rnaintained tlnt once the judgurents of the Refbree Court anrl this Court stood set aside, every cornponent of the e;trlier <lecree autornatically ceased to exist except what was specilically incorporated in the iudgrnent of the Honourable Supreme CourL On this prernise, it was argued that the executing Court rightly conlined execution to tlte rnarket value of Rs. 40,000/- per rnarla. The rival submissions give rise to the fbllowing principal questions lbr detcrrninatiou:

(r)Whether the apoeals aeainst the order of the executrns Court are meintainahle under s&eme ef 1fos r qnd Acquisition Act 1894 read with the Code of Civil hocedure. 1908:

(ii)Whether the contoversy before the Honourable Supreme C,ourt was confined solely to the deterrnination of the market value of the acquired land:

(ur)Whether comoulsorv acouisition charres under Section 2i1(2). the additional amount nnder Section 28 and interest rmder Section 34 consti[rte distinct stahrtorv indeoendent of the of rrarketralue (ro Whether the of the iud.urent of the Honourable Sunreme benefits can be

theirimolied withdrawak and \ (v) Whether the Executinc Court acted iurisdiction in excludinc the statrrtorv benefits while executinc the decree.

The resolution of these questions necessruily requires an exarnination ol'the statutory scherne of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, particularlySections 23,2t],31, and 34, read in the liglrtol'the authoritative pronoullcelnents <>l' the Honourable Supreure Court elucidating the principles governing cornpulsory acquisition iurd the paylnent of cornpensation.

7.Belbre adverting to the rnerits ol' the controversy, we deeru it appropriate to lirst exaJr)ine the prelirninary objection raised by leiunerl counsel lbr the responrlenls regarding the rnaintainabiliq, of the present appeals. It has been contended that neither the [,and Acquisition Act, 1894 ("the Act") nor the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Land Acquisition Rules, 2020 ("the Rules") expressly provitles an appeal against an order Jriussed by an Executing Court in proceedings arising frorn an award/decree rna<le under the Act. According to learned counsel, in the absence o1' an express statutory provision c<lnl'erring such riglrt of appeal, the present appeals are incornpetent. 'fhe objection, though attractive at first irnyrression, does not withstald closer scrutiny of the statutory scltetne. It is correct that the Act <krcs uot contain a specific provision c<lnl'erring a right of appeal against every ortler passed by an Executing Court, and tlnt the Rules are likewise silent on the sullject. Ttte absence of an express appellate provision in the special statute, ltowever, does not by irself conclude the matter. 'l'he <luestion has to be exatnined in the context ol'section 53 of the AG which expressly tnakes tlte provisions o1' tlte Code of Civil Procedure, 1008 applicable to proceedings beltrre the Court under the Act, save to the extent that they are inconsistent with iurything containe<l in the Act. The significance of Section 53 citnnot lle urxlerstate<I. ()nce a ref'erence under the Act luts cultninated in adjudication by the Rel'ereuce Court atrd the resultant award has assullre(l tfie clnracter of a decree, tlte execution an<l enfbrcenent of tftat {ecree are governed, subject to tlte special provisions of tfte Act, by tlte ordilary procedural law contained in the C.P.C. 'lhe Executing Court, wltile N <leitlipg witfi suc[ pr<>ceerlirt14s, tfteref<>re exercises the jurisditiotl ot' a Civil Court anrl is retlrire(l to (leterlnine <luestions arising in execution itl accordance with the provisions ol'the C.P.C. This is particularly eviclent

fiorrrSection 47, C.P.C., which nra.rxlates that all questions arising between the parties to the suit, or their reJrresentatives, and relating to the execution, dischiuge or satisfhction of the decree, shall be tleterrnined by the Court execut.ing the decree arxl not by a separate suit. An orrler passe<l upon such an objection is thus not a lnere a<hninistrative or rninisteria.l order; it is a judicial determination of the rights and liabilities of the parties in relation to the <lecree. The consequential reme<ly must, therefirre, be deterrtrined with ref'erence to the C.P.C. as incorporated by Section 53 of the Act. 'l'he right ol' appeal, where the order under challenge answers the statutory <lescription ot'a decree or otherwise falls within the appellate scherne of the C.P.C., llows liour rhe Code irsell. It is not necessary tlnt the sarne right of appeal should also be separately and expressly created by the Land Acquisition Act. To hokl otherwise woukl ren<ler tlte inc<>rporation of the C.P.C. by Section 53 substantially inefl'ective iu rnatters ol' execution and would create an iurornalous situation in which a decree passed under the Act could be executerl according to the C.P.C., yet a judicial deterrnination rnade in the course of such execution would, merely because the special statute is silent, lle insulate<l lrour zur otherwise available appellate rerne<ly un<ler the Co<le. 'lhe approach finds substantial supl)ort lioru the judgrnent of the Suprerne Court in Director C,eneral (HOS). Civil Works Orsanization (CWO). Rawaloindi tluoufi reDnesentative v. Sved \Mali Shah and othen (PLD 20fli SC 49). In tlnt case, proceedingi arising fioln execution of a rnoney decree in a lar-rd-acquisition lllatter travelle<l tluough the appellate hierarchy and were adjudicated on tlteir tnerits. 'l-he Supreure Court, while declining interl'erence in its leave jurisdiction under Article 185(3) of the Constitution, observed tlnt questious concerning the discharge or satisf'action of a tlecree lall ttlr <letentrinatiott belbre the l'lxecuting Court un<ler Section 47, C.P.C. 'l'he Court I'urther uphekl the concurrent tindings of the Executing Court zurd the High Court and, in the context of the objections raised in execution, Iteld that the objections could not be entertaitre<l without cotnpliance with Order XXI, Rule 23-A, C.P.C., narnely, <leposit of the decretal iul)ount or

t-/ Iurnishing o1' security. 'l}e Court also considered the provisions ot Section 3l o1'the lard Acquisition Act in tirat context.

8.'Ihe signilicance of the aJbresaid precedent lbr the present controversy lies not merely in the ultirnate disrnissal of the petition for leave to appeal, but also in the procedural course adopted in the litigation. 'fhe or<ler of the Executing Court was subjected to appellate scrutiny by the High Court ald was therealier exarnir.red by the Suprerne Court in its jurisdiction under Article 185(3) of the Constitution. The superior Courts thus proceeded on the prernise tlmt an order arising lrorn execution o1'a decree in a lzurd-acquisition uratter was capable of being brouglrt lrcfbre the appellate lbrurn. Had the order of the Executing Court been inherently non-appealable or the appellate proceedings incornpetent for want of jurisdiction, the lnatter would necessarily have been tlisposed of at tlte threshold rather than adjudicated upon on its rnerits. We are conscious that a judgrnent is an authority lbr what it actually rlecides ancl not ruecessarily fbr every proposition wlich rnay be inf'erred fiorn the course of proceedings. We, tlterefbre, d<l not treat tlte albresaid decision as creating, by irnplication, a right of appeal where none exists in law, ratlter, the decision is relevant as detnonstrating the application of the orrlitritry appellate atrd executiou provisions o1'the C.P.C. to execution proceedings arising frorn a lzurd-acquisition decree, sullject always to the express provisions of the Act. 'fhe {ecisive consideration, tfterelbre, is not wltetlter the Act or tlte Rules contain a selflcontained provision expressly captioned as zur "appeal against an orfler of t|e I'lxecutitrg Court", llut wltetlter t|e ilnpugled or{er is one against whic[ an appellate rel]te(ly is available under tlte C.P.C., as applied tlrrough Section 53 of the Act. 'l'he special statute and the C<xle must be read hannoniously. The Act governs tlte su[sturtive and special aspecls of acquisition, compellsation an{ ref'erence; w[ereas, in rnatters 9f procedure lrot inconsistelt witfi the Act, the c.P.c. supplies the governing procedural liarnework. In the present case, tlte itrlpugned <lrder is not a mere interlocutory or rninisterial rlirection. It linally <letertnines the olljections raise{ in

execution and adjudicates the parties' courpeting clairns concerning the benelits and ar,ounls payable under the decree. It co.seque'tly :tfl'ects substantive civil rights o1' the parties an<l constitutes a judicial detennination rnade in exercise ol'the Executing Court's jurisdiction under the C.P.C. Such an adjudication czurnot be placed beyond appellate scrutiny merely because the Act does not contain an independent provision expressly conf'erring an appeal against it.

9.It is also irnporlurt to distinguish between maintainability of the appeal and meris of the objections raised in execution. Wrether the appellant has cornplied with the conditions governing enteriainurent of objections in execution, including the requirernenLs of Order XXI, Rule 23-A, C.P.C., is a rnatter going to the corrq)etence or rneriLs of the particular olljection and does not, by itselt, ren<ler the appellate remedy igainst a.iudicial detennination of the llxecuting Court non-rnaintainable. Ukewise, the allplicability of Section 3l of the Act concerns the statutory mechanism relating to deposit of cornpensation in specifierl circurnstances a:rd cannot be ernployed to negate an allpellate rerne<ly otherwise available under the C.P.C. For these reAsons, we are unable t() accept the contention tltat the present apJreals are incourpetent rnerely because neither the [,and Acquisition Act, 1894 nor the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa [and Acquisition Rules, 2020 expressly provides an appeal against an or<ler passe<l in execution. 'fhe appellate reuredy, wltere otlterwise available un<ler the C.P.C., derives its legal lbundation lrorn the Code as iucorporated and urade applicable lly Section 53 of the Act. Acc<lrdingly, the prelirninary olrjection regarding uraintainability isovem:led.'l'he present appeals are hekl to be tnain[ainable, and we shall now llroceerl to exarnine tlte controversy on its tnerits.

10.Having exatnined the firctual background giving rise to the present appeals, it is now necessary to exatnine the statutory schetne governing cornpulsory acquisitit-rn uncler the Act, 1894, Ibr the contr()versy befbre this Court canlx)t be resolverl without appreciating the distinction rnainrained by the legislature between the various statutory colnponents constituting cotnpensation. 'llte Act does not

Eeat every lr)onetary benefit payable to a lan<lowner as one indivisible amount, rather, it creates sepa.rate arxl imlependent statutory riglrts, each lbunded upon a distinct legal principle and intended to courpensate the landowner fbr a dillbrent consequence ol'cornpulsory acquisition. 'l'he lailure to appreciate this legislative distinction has largely contributed to the controversy presently befbre this Court. At the outset, it rnust be rernernbered that conrpulsory acquisition is an exercise of the State's power of erninent dornain. Such acquisition is neither voluntary nor fbunded upon consensus between the p:uties. 'l'he owner is divested of'his proprierary riglrts by olteration of law lbr a public purpose and not by lree negotiation. Recognizing the hardship inherent in cornpulsory deprivation of private property, the Iegislature has <levised a cornprelrensive statutory rnechanistn intended to ensure that the liur<lowner receives not merely the rnarket. price of his property but every additional statutory benetit necessa.ry to secure just cornpensation" within the conternplation of Articles 23 anrl 24 of the Constitution. The statutory benelis provided under the Act are, therefbre, not lnatters of judicial discretion or equitable indulgence but legirl righls llowing directly ti<xr the statute itself.

11.The statutory lrzunework deuronstrates that cornpensation llayallle un<ler the Act coruprises lbur separate coulponens operating in difl'erent spheres:

o the market ralue of the acouired DroDertv determined rmder Section 23(1):

(D comoulsorv acouisition dlarrcs oavable rmder Sec{ion 23Qt;

(ur)the additional amormt under Ser.finn 9R u#pre compensation awarded bv the C.ourt exceeds thrt aq,arded bv the and

(rv)stahrtorv interest under Section wlrere oossession has been frten without contemporaneous pavment or deposit of compensation. Altlrcugh these cornponents togetlter constitute the arnount ultirnately receivable by the landowners, each <lerives liorn an indellendent statutory source, accrues uport lirlfilruent of difl'erent conditions zurd serves a distinct legislative purpose. Consequently,

rnodilication of one colnponent does not autornatically extinguish the others unless the statute so provides or the appellate Court expressly so directs.

12.'l'he first component is the tnarket value conternplated by Section 23(l). It represenls the price which a willing purchaser would reasonallly pay to a willing seller in ar open rnarket, taking into considerati<xr the nature, location, potentiality and other relevant attributes of the property on the date of publication of the notification under Section 4 of the Act. It cornpensates the owner only fbr the intrinsic value of the property compulsorily acquired. The deterrnination of rnarket value is thus a question of evidence depending upon the facts and circurnstances of each case.

13.'l'he second component is the additional arnount prescribed by Section 23(21, comrnonly known as solatiurn or cornpulsory acquisition cltarges. Unlike urarket value, solatiurn is not dependent upon evidence regarcling valuation. It arises solely because the acquisition is compulsory. 'flre legislature has consciously ernployed mandatory language by providing that the Court "slmll award" an additional sum equiva.lent to lilteen per cent of the tnarket value where the acquisition is lbr a public purpose and twentyJive per cent where the acquisition is fbr a colnpany. 'fhe ollject of this provision is neither to enhance rnarket value nor to award damages; ratller, it recognizes tltat compulsory deprivation of property without the owner's consent inevitably causes hardship which deserves statutory recourpense <>ver zurrl above tlte tnarket value. The Honourable Suprerne Court lns consistent.ly hekl that the grant of cotnl>ulsory acquisition cltitrges is tnzurdatory and fbnns iur inseparable statutory component of cotnpensation. In Haii Muhammad oob v. Collector Iand uisition. Peshawar 1997 1670 and

subsequently in Irtrd Acouisition Collector v. MsL Mehmood fan 2015 SCMR 28 , it was authoritatively declared that once ac<luisition is lbund to be fbr a public purpose, tlte Court possesses no discretion to withhold the statutory percentage

prescribed under Section 23(2). The entitletnent flows directly liorn the statute iurtl not liorn any equitable consideration.

14.The third component concerns the arklitionitl arnount payable under Section 28 where the Ref'erence Court determines that the Collector awarded cornpensation below its lawfut measure. Historically, Section 28 provided fbr payrnent of interest on the excess arnount. However, lbllowing the .ludgr nent o[' the Shariat Appellate Bench inAslam Khaki (PLD 2000 SC 2251utd the subsequent legislative iunendrnents applicable to Khyber Paklrtunkhwa, the legaJ cltaracter of this alnount underwent a signilicant transfbrrnation. The Honourable Suprerne Court, while interpreting the arnended provision in Government of Khvber Pakhtrrnkhwa throush Chief Secretary u Yousaf Khan 2022 SCMR 1836 , authoritativell' explained that the iunendrnent enacted by the Provincial l,egislature remained valid notwithstanding the subsequent review ol Aslant Khaki. The Court hekl that the additional zunount payable under Secti<ln 28 is no longer to be regarded as interest in is conventional Iegal sense. Instead, it represeuls the lair rental value or usuliuct of the acquire<l property fbr the period during which the acquiring authority remained in possession witlnut having paid the enhanced courpensation adjudged by the Court. Wltere evidence regarding actual renhl value is available, the Court is requirerl to awar<l the proved renLd value. In tlte absence o1'such evidence, the Court tnust awa.rd, at tlte rninitrluln' all atlrount equivalent to six per cent per annurn of tfue enlmnced cotnpensation |iotn the {ate possession was takel until actual payrlent. T[us, t|e expression "interest' eqrploye{ ip uulier <lecisiops low sL.ur<ls substituted by "rent'' in orrler to preserve confbrrnity with t|e legislative intent an{ tfie constitutional principles enunciated in,4slam Khaki.

15.The leral position prior to the constitutional ransfbnnation brought about by Aslatt Kltakiwas explained in of v. s Shakir AIi afri 19 136r and

Muhamrnad oob SCMR 1670 wherein it was hekl that

wfiere tfte cornpensation {eterrnine{ by tfte Referee Court exceede{

that awarded by the Collector, Section 28 governed payment on the enluurced atnount fiorn the date possession was taken until paylnent into Court. 'l-hese authorities continue to explain the historical developrnent of Section 28, though ils present interpretation in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa rnust necessarily be understood in the light of Yousal Klwr (2022 SCMR 1836).

16.The fourth and distinct stanrbrv comDonent is interest under Section 34, which operates in an entirely difl'erent lield, \44rereas Section 28 concerns the enhiurce<l arnount detennine<l by the Court, Section 34 addresses the failure of the Collector to pay or deposit cornpensation belbre taking possession of the acquired property. 'l)re provision embodies the salutary principle that the State cannot lawlully enjoy yrossession of private property while sirnulraneously withholding the corullensation which the statute obliges it to pay. Section l')l of the Act casts a rnandatory dug upon the Collector, irnurediately alter making the award under Section 11, to tender payrnent of cornpensation to the persons entitled thereto. Where paytnent cannot vali<lly be urade because of any statutr>ry iurpedirnent, the Collector rnust dellosit the zurxrunt belbre the Court courpetent to entertain a rel'erence under Section 18. Colnpliance witl Section lll is irnperative because lailure to discharge that obligation imrnediately attracts the consequences prescrilled by Section 34. 'l-hus, the liability unrler Section 34 does not arise lrccause cornpensation is enhanced by the Court; it arises because the Collector lns taken possession without paying or depositing the courpensation which the law required hirn to pay. 'l-his principle has repeatedly been allirrned by the Honourable Suprerne Court, piuticularly in Mst Nasreen Zahra v. Multan Development Authoritv 2015 CMR 1440 an<l Nasreen Z,afua throud I.eEl Heirs v. Government of hrniab (2022 SCMR 8e0.

17.The nature of interest under Section 34 has likewise been settled beyond controversy. It is neither penal nor punitive. It is purely compensatory. It indernnifies the landowner fbr the financial loss resulting liorn deprivation of lnth tlte property and the use of the

colr4)ensation during the period <lf <lelay. 'l'he Honourable Supreure Court in N Abdul Oedir Khan v. Irnd Collector. Mardan (2023 SCMR 950) ernplnsized that compulsory acquisition is lundarnentally diflbrent fiom an ordinary cornmercial transaction. 'l'he owner never consents to the transf'er of his properry; nor rlo the piuties negotiate fiour equal hugaining positions. 1'he statutory interest payable under Section 34, therelbre, ensures that the State does rct derive an unf'air advantage by retaining both possession of the land and the cornpensation lavr{'ully payable therelbr. 'fhe same pnnclp le received further aJlirrnation in B.P. Pakistan Exploration & hoduction Inc. v. Ashique Hussain Halepoto (2024 SCMR 833) The distinction between cornpensation and interest is, therefbre, both statutory and conceptual. Cornpensation represents the value of the property cornpulsorily acquired. Solatiurn compensates fbr the cornpulsory nature of the acquisition.'l'he amount un<ler Section 28 represents the renral value or usuliuct o1'the property rluring the period specified by law. Interest under Sect.ion 34 cornpensates the landowner fbr delayed paytnent of cornpensation alter possession has been taken. Each rernedy adclresses a difl'erent legal injury, arises un<ler a separate statutory provisiolr arxl lulfils a separate legislative purJ)ose. None is a substitute lbr the other. 'fhis distinction assulnes decisive irnportance in the llresent appeals because the controversy belbre the learnetl lixecuting Court proceeded upon the erroneous assurnption tltat once the Honourable Supretne Court re-deterrnined the rnarket value, every otlter statut<)ry cotnponent aut<xnatically st<xxl extinguished. Such an assutnption overlooks the irulependent statutory character of eaclt entitletnent and iglores the consistent jurisllrudence of the Honourable Suprerne Court holding tlmt these statutory incidents accrue by <>peration of law and cannot be denie<l unless expressly excluded by statute or sllecifically withdrawn by a cornpetent Court. Having exarnined the legislative schetne and the governing principles enunciated by the Honourable Supretne Court, the next rluestion requiring tleterrnination is whetlter, on tlte lacs o[ the present case, tlte judgment dated 26.05.2022 passe<l by the

w Honourallle Suprerne Court rnerely substituted the rnarket value of the acquired lantl or whether it als<l harl the efi'ect of irnpliedly witlxlrawing the statut<rry benefis awarded under Sections 2B(2), 28 and 34 of the AcL It is to that question that the discussion now turns.

18.Having examined the legislative scherne and the governing principles laid down by the Hon<lurable Suprerne Court, it now becornes ltecessa.ry to detennine whether the learned Executing Court correctly interpreted the.iudgrnent dated 26.05.2022 rendered by the Honourable Suprerne Court or whether it travelled beyond the true scope and irnport of that judgnrent. The controversy, therefore, is not whether the landowners are ge nerally entitled to cornpulsory acquisition charges or statutory interest un<ler the land Acquisition Act, 1894; tlnt proposition strutds authoritatively settled. 'l-he real question is whether those statutory entitlernents stood extinguished tnerely because tlte Honourable Supreme Court, while deterrnining tlte appeals, re-lixed the rnarket value of the acquired Lurd without expressly ref'erring to tltose statutory comp()nents. 'l'he answer to this question necessarily depends uJron the true scope of the controversy that travelled belbre the Honourable Supreure Court. A judgment rnust always lrc read as a whole and in the context of the issues that arose fbr <letennination. It is neither perrnissible to isolate iur observation liorn its setting nor to inf'er conclusions regarding questions which neither arose nor were adjudicated. Erlually settled is the principle that zur appellate Court rnodilies only that part of the <lecree which it expressly or by necessary irnplication interf'eres with;

every other part of the <lecree, not inconsistent with tlte appellate deterrninati<>n, continues to retnain operative. Keeping these principles in view, the record of the present case deserves careful exarnination. It is not disputed tlmt the [,and Acquisition Collector, while announcing Award No. 1005965 dated 24.09.2011, awarded cornpensatit>n together with filieen l)er ceut cotnpulsory acquisition charges and directed l)ayrnent thereof to the landowners alter N cornpletion of tlte prescribed tonniilities. ltlually undisputed is the lact tlnt despite announcerlrent of the award, neither was the

corr)pensation paid to the landowners nor <leposited belbre the cornpetent Court as conternplated by Sections 31 and 34 of the Act. The acquiring authority has also never rlisputed these factual aspects. Ukewise, the .jurlgrnent o1'the learned Ref'eree Court dernonstrates that alter enltzurciug the rnarket value of the acquired land, it expressly awarded the statutory benelits available under the Act, including cornpulsory acquisition clnrges and sirnple interest at the prescribed rate. Both parties challenged that judgnent belbre this Court; however, neither side <luestioned the legaliry o1' awarding those s[atutory benelits. The acquiring authority confined its challenge to the quanrum of cornpensation deterrnined by the Relbree Court, whereas the ktndowners sought I'urther enhancernent of urarket value.

Consequently, wlten this Court disrnissed both seLs of appeals, the statutory benelits awarded by the Ref'eree Court also rernained undisturbed. 1-he litigation thereaf'ter travelled to the Honourable Suprerne Court. A carelirl reading of the .judgrnent dated 26.05.2022 unrnisrakably reveals that the entire controversy belbre the apex Court centered upon the proper <letennination of the market ralue of the acquired lzurd. 'l'he princ\lal grievance advance<l by the lanclou,ners was tlnt the Courts below had assessed colnpensation on the basis of revenue classification instead of the true rnarket potential of the land. Corresgrndingly, the issue fbnnulated md decided by the Honourable Supretne Court was wltetlter coutpensation under the [,and Acquisition Act could law{ully be detennined on the basis ol' revenue classilications suclt as Barani, Banjar Qadeem, Dag-aba, Ghair Murnkin Abadi and Abadi, or whether the entire block of Iand shoul<l lrc evaluated accor<ling to its tnarket and potential value. While deciding tltat issue, the Honourable Supreme Court relied upon ils earlier ju<lgrrrent rendered in Fedenl Govemment of Pakisan u. Mst 7^kiz wherein it had already held that classilications prescribe{ un{er t|e West Pakistan [,an{ Revenue Assessrnent Rules are inten<letl fbr liscirl antl revenue purposes anfl cannot constitute t|e basis for fletertlining cqtnlrcnsation under Sections 23 zurd 24 of the L,and Acquisition Act. Applying that

principle, the Honourable Suprerne Court held that the High Court had failed to appreciate the irreleviurce of such revenue classifications zurd accordingly substituted the varying rates awarded by the Courts below with a unilbrrn market value ol'Rs. 40,000/- per rnarla. The relevant observations of the Honourable Suprerne Court leave no roorn fbr zunbiguity that the only sutlject of a<ljudication was the proper detennination of rnarket value.

19.Significa.ntly, neither the judgrnent dated 26.05.2022 nor rhe order passed in review dated 03.01.2024 contains any discussion whalsoever regarding cornpulsory acquisition chiuges under Section 23(2), the statutory entitlernent under Section 28, or interest under Section 34. No ground of appeal challenging those statutory benetits was urged belbre the Honourable Suprerne Court. No issue regarding their legality was fiarned. No argurnent concerning their witlxlrawal lvas a<lvanced. Above all, n<> fin<ling was recorrled setting asi<le or rnodilying those statutory entitlernents. 'fhe silence of the ju<lgrnent on these rnatters is, therelbre, entirely unclerstandable because those issues never lbrrned part of the controversy requiring adjudication. 'l'he learned lixecuting Court, however, proceeded upon the ilssumption tlmt since the judgrnents of the Ref'eree Court and this Court stood set aside, every statutory component contained therein autouratically disappeared except the revised market value cleterrnined by the Honourable Suprerne Court. With profbuntl respect, such an approaclt overlooks the settled doctrine governing appellate decrees. A judgrnent canr)ot be construed as deciding questions which neither arose nor were arguerl befbre the Court.

Frlually, riglrts conf'erred directly by statute cannot be regarded as having lrcen irnpliedly witlxlrawn tnerely because the appellate judgment rernains silent reguding tltern. Statutory righls stand on a dill'erent lboting lrorn discretionary relief' Unless tlte statute itself so provides, or unless the appellate Court expressly rnodifies or necessarily excludes suclt rights, tltey continue to accolnpany the decree as incidents flowing liorn the statute irself. This llrinciple irssurnes even greater lbrce itt the context of the l;ur<l Acquisition Act.

As already notice<I, cornpulsory acquisition charges under Section 23(2), the a<l<litional arnount under Section 28 and interest under Section Il4 arise liorn separate statutory provisions, tulfil distinct legislative purposes and accrue independently upon satislhction of their respective s[atutory conditions. None of thern is dependent upon .iudicia.l <liscretion.'l'heir source is the statute itsell.'I'he Court merely declues and quantilies the statutory entitlernent. Consequently, rnodification of the rnarket value does not, by itself, obliterate the statutory incidents attached to tlmt rnarket value.

20.In addition, the distinction becornes even clearer if the nature of each entitlernent is examined separately. 'I'he market value represents the value of the l:ur<l iLself. Corrrpulsory acquisition charges cornpensate the owner because the acquisition is involuntary. 'fhe additional amount under Section 28 cornpensates fbr the deprivation of the benellcial enjoyrnent of the enlutnced cornpensation. Interest under Section 34 crmpensates the owner lbr delayed papnent alter possession has treen taken. 'fhese a-re sepa.rate legal consequences arising fiorn separate statutory events. 'fhe modilication of one does not extinguish the others. On the contrary, where the market value is enhzurced, cornpulsory acquisition clnrges necessarily stand recalculated upon the enhanced rnarket value because Secti<ln 23(2) expressly links thern with the cornpensation deternrined under Section 23(1). l,ikewise, where possession admittedly remained with the acquiring authority without paynent or deposit of compensation, the statutory consequences envisagerl by Section 34 continue to operate ur-rtil the statutory obligation is dischargetl. It is equally signiliciurt that the respondents never cltallenged belbre any fbrunt the original award of cornpulsory acquisition charges or the liability arising under Section 34. Their objection was raised fbr the lirst time during execution proceedinlp alter the judgnent of the Honourable Supreure Court ha<l attaine<l linality. An executing Court, Itowever, cannot enlarge or curtail substantive riglrts declared by the <lecree. Its function is conlinecl to enfbrcing the decree in accordance with its true legal effect. It cannot inl'er withdrawal of statutory rights rnerely

because the appellate Court did not consider questions which never arose befirre it.

21.'fhe expression "compensation" occurring in the tfld Acquisition Act ltas repeatedly been helcl by the Honourable Suprerne Court to be of wide iurport. In Chairman. Sarhad Develooment u Tafoor-ur-Rehman (2023 SCMR 2t421.

the apex Court reaflirrned tlnt cornpensation payable under the Act encorq)ass every statutory c()lnponent, whiclr t]re legislature has directed to be paid to the Lurrlowner. 'I-his interpretarion also accords with Articles 23 and 24 of the Constitution, which guarantee that no citizen shall be deprived of property, except in accord;tnce with law a:rd upon payment of cornpensation detennined in the rniurner prescrilrcd by law. The constitutional rnandate woukl stand seriously diluted if statutory incidenls of cornpensation could be denied rnerely by drawing a(lverse irnplications liorn judicial silence. For these reasons, I aur unable to subscribe to the interpretation adopted by the learnerl Executing Court. 'fhe judgrnent date<l 26.05.2022 retrdered by the H<xourable Supreure Court rnerely substituted the market ralue ol' the acquired land. It neither expressly nor by necessary' implication interf'ered with the statutory entitletnent of the landowners to cornpulsory acquisition cha.rges under Section 23(2), the additional arnount contetnplated by Section 28, or the statutory consequences flowing fiour Section 34. 'l-ltose statutory benetits, tlterelirre, continued to remain enlbrceable, subject only to recalculation upon the revise<l market value detemrined by tlte Honourable Supreule Court. The inevitable consequence is that the learned lixecuting Court I'ell into a rnanil'est error of law in treating the silence of the .judgrnent o1' the Honourable Supretne Court as equiv:tletlt to an irnpliecl denial of statutory rights. Such zur inl'erence finds no support eitlter liolt tfie language of t|e judgrnent, t|e scfueure of tfie [and Acquisitiop Act, or the consistent jurisprutlepce of tlte Honourable Suprerne Court governing corrlpulsory acquisition.

22.'l'he curnulative etl'ect of the lbregoing <liscussion adurits o[ only one legal conclusion. 'l'he controversy befbre the Honourable

2L

Sutrrerrre Court in Gouenment of Khuhr Pakhdnkhwa hrcudl Chief Seaearu. Peshawar and othen v. Yousaf Khan and othen 2022 I was confined exclusively to the detennination of the rnarket value o{' the acquired land. The apex Court neither exarnine<l nor a<lludicated upon the statutory entitlernent of the lzuxlowners t<r cornpulsory acquisition cluuges under Section 23(2), the additional amount payable under Section 28, or interest under Section 34 of the t.,,and Acquisition Act, 1894. Consequently, the judgrnent o1' the Honourable Supretne Court cannot, either expressly or by necessa.ry irnplication, be construed as depriving the landowners of those statutory benelits. It is a settlecl principle thaf every judgrnent tnust be read in the context of the controversy decided tlterein. A Court decides only those issues which are raised befbre it and necessitrily arise fbr adjudication' Judicial silence on an issue cannot be elevated to a judicial deterulination thereof. Equally well-settle<l is the doctrine tlnt statutory righrs cannot be taken away by iurplication. llnless the legislature expressly excludes a statutory entitletnent, or a cotnpetent Court specifically rnodilies or witlrtlraws it, sucfu entitletlent contiuues to operate accor<ling to its own fbrce.

23.The tand Acquisition Act, 1894, umnistakably treats market value, cornpulsory acquisition cltarges, t[e a{ditional amount un{er Section 28 and ilterest uncler Section 34 as distinct statutory inci{ents flowing liorn difl'erent provisious zurd serving diflerent legislative purposes. M:uket value colrpellsates the owner fbr t|e value of t|e property acquired. Cotnpulsory acquisition charges courpensate him lbr tfte cornpulsory nature of tlte acquisition. 'lhe additional ?unount contemplated by section 28 represenls the statutory reconlpense, now interprete{ in K[yber Paklrtunkhwa as t|e thir rental value or usul'ruct of the enhzurcetl co[rpensation during the relevant period. Interest under Section 34 inflernnilies tfte landowner fbr the delay in paylnent 'I'[ese or {eposit of corlpensation after possession fias been taken. statutory entitlerlepts neitlter overlap gor substitute one alotlter; eaclt operates independently ul)on l'ultilrnent of its own stahJtory

conditions. 'l'he distinction assurnes particular significance in the present case. 'l'he respondents have cor.rsistently treated the revised market value detennined by the Honourable Supreme Court as though it constituterl the entirety ol'the compensation payable under the Act. Such an approach overlooks the statutory architecture of the Iegislation. 'l}e amount of Rs. 40,000/- per rnarla detennined by the Honourable Suprerne Court represents only the urarket value of the acquired property. Once that rnarket value stands judicially determined, every other statutory cornponent prescribed by the Act, necessarily fbllows accor<ling to law, unless specilically excluded.

Since no such exclusion exists either in the stahrte or in the.judgrnent ol'the Honourable Suprenre Couft, the statutory inci<lents attached to the c:ornpensation reurained intact. 'l'he record f'urther dernonstrates that the [,and Acquisition Collector himself, while announcing the original awar(I, awarded cornpulsory acquisition charges in accordance with Section 23(2) and directed payurent thereof to the landowners. It is equally aduritted that the comJrensation was neither paid nor deposited conternporaneously with the taking of possession. Tltese fbuntlation:rl facts, giving rise to tlte statutory consequences under Sections 23 iurd 34, Itave never been disputed by the respondents. Nor did the ac<luiring authority clmllelrge the legality of tltose statutory benelils befbre the Rel-eree Court, this Court, or the Honourable Suprerne Court. 'fheir objection surfaced lbr the lirst time during execution proceedings. Such iur objection could not legally enlarge the scope of execution or curtail righfs w[ich [a<l accrued to tfte decree- holders by operation of law.

24, The learned Executing Court, witl utrnost respect' I'ell into jurisdictional error in treating t|e silence of the judgnent of tfte Honoura|le Supreure Court as an irnplied prohillition against tfie grzurt of statutory benelits. 'l'he jurisdiction of an executilg Court is c<lltine{ t<l enlilrcing tlte <lecree accor<ling to its true legal et}'ect. Wrile it calnot travel beyonfl tfue <lecree, it is equally precluded frorl rea{ing into t|e clecree a restriction which tlle decree itself does not contain. The learne<l Executing court, by denying statutory benefits

expressly conl-erred by the lancl Acquisition Act, 1894, and never witlrdrawrr by the appellate decree, efl'ectively altered the legal efl'ect of the <lecree instead of enlbrcing it. It is equally irnportant to reiterate that the sLatutory liability under Section ll4 is courpensatory and not punitive. 'ilre legislature ltas consciously irnposed that Iiability because cornpulsory acquisition places the citizen in an unequal position vis-i- vis the State. The acquiring authoriq, enjoys irnrne<liate possession ol' private property by virtue of'statutory [)ower, whereas the landowner Ioses both possession and the benelicial use of the compensation unless prornpt payrnent is urade. Section 34 seeks to restore that irnbalance by ensuring that the acquiring authority does not derive an unjust adv:urtage fiorn its own lailure to pay or deposit cornpensation as required by law. Likewise, the cornpulsory acquisition charges prescribed by Section 23(2) are intended to solten the hardship inevitably occasioned by cornpulsory deprivation of property without the owner's consent. Both siatutory benefils, tlterefbre, constitute integral colnponenls of the legislative schetne designed to ensure just cornpensation in conlbrrniy with Articles 23 iurd 24 of the Constitution.

25.Accordingly, the questions fbrrnulated fbr detennination are answerecl as lbllows:

(i)The present appcals are rnaintainable under Sections 53 and 54 of the [.and Acquisition Act, 1894, read with the relev:u.tt provisions ol'the Code ol' Civil Procedure, 1908.

(iil The conhoversy belbre tlte Honourable Supreme Court was collined exclusively to t[e deternrilration of the market va]ue of t[e acquired land.

(iii)'lhc statutory bcncfits cotrtelnplatetl by Scctions 2:l(2), 28 and 34 o[thc Lurd Acquisition Act, 1894, are indepentlent statutory cntitlements operating in scpa-rate liekls and are legally distinguishable liorn the determination of market value under Section 23(l).

(iv)'lhc leametl l-xccuting Court rnisdirectcd itsell' in law by hokling that the decreeiolders wcre entitled only to the reviscd

-lf

nuukct value while cxcluding the statutory benelits llowing lrom the Act.

For the lbregoing reAsolls, this and the connected appeals are allowed. 'lhe irupugned order dated 22.05.2025 passed by the learne<l Additional District JudgeJ/llxecuting Courr, Nowshera, is hereby set aside. 'l)re objections prel'erred by the judgmentdebtors stand <lisrnissed. It is held that the decree-holders shall be entitled to cornpensation calculated on the basis of the utarket v:tlue of Rs. 40,000/- per lr)arla, as detennined by the Honourable Supreure Court, together with all shtutory lrcnelits lawfully accruing un<ler the [,and Acquisition Act, 1894, including:

(a)appe llants arc cntitled lbr cornpulsory acquisition charges (solatium) under Section 23(2r, on the enhanced cornpensation of Rs. 40,000/- pcr rnarla as modilied by the Hon'ble Suprcrnc Court.; ruxl

(b)tlte statutory conscquenccs cnvisaged by Scct.iorr 34, i.e., six per centum as provided therein,

The learned Executing Court shall proceed with the execution towards satislhction in accor<lance with law.

llelbre piuting with the case, it is observed that the slatutory benefits conferred under the tand Acquisition Act, 1894, are intended to ensure lairness in the exercise of the sovereign 1>ower of erninent dornain. They are not rnatters of grace, concession or discretion. Once the statutory conditions starxl fulfilled, the lan<lowner l>ec<>rnes entitled to thern as a lnatter o1'legal riglrt. Courts, particularly wltile exercising execution jurisdiction, are under a corresponding duty to ensure tltat such statutory rights are neitlter diluted by irnplication nor delbated tlrrough iut unduly restrictive interpretation of appellate decrees

Announced & released ou

"t r0.08.9026.

M. Zrfial C.S

JUDGE