The Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Public Service Commission (KPPSC) through its Chairman and others v. Mst. Bibi Aisha and another

PESHAWAR HIGH COURT, PESHAWAR

(Appellate Jurisdiction) Civil Revisions No. 1379 & 1221 of 2025

THE KHYBER PAKHTUNKHWA PUBLIC SERVICE

COMMISSION, THROUGH ITS CHAIRMAN AND OTHERS

Vs.

MST. BIBI AISHA AND ANOTHER

Petitioner(s) by: Mr. Bilal Khan AAG; M/s Ali Gohar Durrani, Advocate & Zarak Arif Shah, Advocates; Mr. Mehtab Gul, Law Officer, KPPSC.

Respondent(s) by: Mr. Zahid Ullah Zahid, Advocate.

Research assistance: Mr. Mazhar Ali Khan, Research & Reference Officer Date of hearing: 20.05.2026

JUDGMENT

MUHAMMAD FAHEEM WALI, J.‐

1.Through this judgment, the connected civil revisions, Civil Revision No. 1379 of 2025 and Revision Petition No. 1221 of 2025, shall be disposed of as they arise from a common background involving the selection and appointment for the post of Sister Tutor (BPS‐17).

2.The litigation originated from Advertisement No.

05/2013 issued by the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Public Service Commission (KPPSC)/Petitioner, which invited applications for five posts of Sister Tutor in the Health Department. The respondent, Mst. Bibi Aisha, applied for the post and was initially placed at the top of the merit list for Zone‐III.

However, her recommendation was eventually withheld because the KPPSC deducted marks for her additional qualifications on the grounds that her diploma was registered with the Pakistan Nursing Council (PNC) after the closing date of the advertisement, which was August 30, 2013. Due to this deduction, Mst. Bibi Aisha was dropped from the selection orbit, and the proforma respondent, Mst.

Farida, was recommended and appointed in her place.

3.Aggrieved, Mst. Bibi Aisha first approached this Court via Writ Petition No. 3908‐P/2015, which was disposed of on 03.05.2017. The High Court declined to interfere in its constitutional jurisdiction due to disputed

questions of fact but allowed her to approach a proper legal forum. Consequently, she filed Civil Suit No. 147/1 of 2017 for declaration and mandatory injunction. While the KPPSC contested the suit, Mst. Farida was proceeded against ex‐ parte. Vide Judgment/Decree dated 31.05.2024, learned Civil Judge‐XIII, Peshawar (trial court) decreed the suit in favor of the plaintiff, holding that the deduction of marks was illegal and that Mst. Farida’s appointment was void.

4.The KPPSC challenged this decree through Civil Appeal No. 120/13 of 2024, while Mst. Farida filed an application to set aside the ex‐parte decree. The Trial Court dismissed Farida’s application as time‐barred vide order dated 28.01.2025. Subsequently, on appeal, the learned Additional District Judge‐XIX, Peshawar (appellate court), dismissed the KPPSC’s appeal vide Judgment/Decree dated 04.09.2025, maintaining the trial court’s judgment. These concurrent findings and the dismissal of the setting‐aside ex‐ parte application are now the subject of the instant revision

petitions before this Court.

5.The primary legal controversy in these revision petitions centers on whether the KPPSC acted within its legal authority when it deducted marks from Mst. Bibi Aisha’s total for an additional qualification because it was registered with the PNC after the advertisement’s closing date. A secondary but equally critical issue pertains to the determination of the fate of marks for additional qualifications that a candidate has factually obtained and passed before the closing date but which remain unregistered with the relevant professional body, such as PNC, until after that cutoff. This controversy centers on whether the possession of a qualification under the regulatory framework strictly necessitates professional registration by the closing date, especially when such a requirement is not explicitly stated in the advertisement.

6.In the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, this Court is primarily concerned with examining whether the

concurrent findings of the courts below suffer from any jurisdictional defect, material irregularity, or a patent misreading or non‐reading of the evidence on record. The scope of revision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) is limited to correcting errors of law and jurisdiction that lead to a miscarriage of justice. In the instant case, this Court must determine whether the lower courts correctly interpreted the 2003 Regulations, regarding the “possession” of professional qualifications by the closing date of an advertisement

7.The legal framework governing this selection process is found in the then applicable Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Public Service Commission Regulations, 2003 (now repealed through Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Public Service Commission Regulations, 2017) (2003 Regulations). Under Regulation 11, the Commission is mandated to determine eligibility, including age, qualifications, and experience, as they exist on the closing date of the advertisement. This principle is

further reiterated by Regulation 19(a), which explicitly states that “only the qualification possessed on the closing date of the advertisement fixed for the in country candidates shall be taken into consideration”. The controversy regarding the deduction of marks directly involves the application of Regulation 29(a), which provides the marking distribution for posts filled other than through a syllabus‐based examination, allocating:

i)Academic Record 30 Marks

ii)Distinction for standing first in 02 Marks Board/ University

iii)Hifz‐ul‐Quran 03 Marks

iv)Additional Relevant 02 Marks Qualification

v)Higher Relevant Qualification 03 Marks

vi)Experience 10 Marks

vii)Interview 50 Marks

8.Specifically, Regulation 29(k) outlines the mechanism for awarding these marks, stating that “the marks reserved for higher relevant qualification, shall be awarded at the rate of one mark for each higher relevant Diploma or Degree”. Furthermore, regarding the disputed

experience criteria, Regulation 30(1) clarifies that “prescribed experience means the experience gained in line in a regular full time paid job acquired after obtaining the prescribed qualification”. The core of the dispute rests on whether the “possession” of a qualification under Regulation 19 strictly requires professional registration by the closing date and whether the Commission’s interpretation was consistent with its duty under Regulation 11 to determine eligibility “in accordance with the advertisement of the post, service rules governing appointments to the relevant post and such other ancillary instructions issued by the Government and/or the Commission from time to time”.

9.A thorough analysis of the term “possession” in the context of professional degrees (such as Nursing, Medicine, or Law) reveals that it is not merely limited to the factual passing of an examination or the physical receipt of a degree or diploma. In these highly regulated and sensitive health sector professions, the “possession” of a qualification is

legally incomplete without formal registration from the relevant statutory regulatory body, such as PNC.

Professional registration is not a mere post‐selection formality; it is a foundational prerequisite that breathes legal life into an academic credential, authorizing the holder to practice and be recognized as a qualified professional in the eyes of the law. Without this validation, a degree or diploma remains a dormant credential, physically present but legally unusable for its intended professional purpose.

10.This interpretation of “possession” as a composite legal status is deeply anchored in the broader statutory framework of the province, specifically the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1989 (APT Rules). Rule 10(3) of the APT Rules categorically mandates:

“(3) A candidate for initial appointment to a post must possess the educational qualification or technical qualifications and experience [...]” Omission is mine

11.When the APT Rules and the 2003 Regulations

speak of “possessing” or “fulfilling” a qualification, they do so within the context of legal eligibility. In professional spheres, “possession” is a composite term; it entails the successful completion of the academic course and the subsequent validation of that course by the relevant regulatory authority. For a nurse, “possessing” a diploma without registration with PNC is akin to possessing a vehicle without a license, the physical object exists, but the legal right to use it for its intended professional purpose is absent.

The term “qualification” in the realm of professional recruitment cannot be decoupled from the legal right to practice, which only vests upon formal registration.

12.The legal necessity of registration is further mandated by the then applicable regime under Section 23 of the Pakistan Nursing Council Act, 1973 (PNC Act), which imposes a strict prohibition on the employment of unregistered nurses. Section 23(1) stipulates that no hospital maintained or aided by the Federal or Provincial Government

shall employ any person as a nurse, midwife, or health visitor unless such person is (a) registered in the register, or

(b)is a trainee at a recognized institution and is specifically certified by the head of that institution to have already received sufficient training to be able to perform his duties safely and satisfactorily. This section creates an absolute statutory bar against the professional utilization of any nursing qualification that is not either registered or covered by the specific training certification. Regarding the application of Section 23(b) to the instant case, a meticulous review of the record reveals that while Mst. Bibi Aisha produced various diplomas and DMCs (Ex‐PW‐4/6 to Ex‐PW‐ 4/16), these documents nowhere indicate that she was specifically certified by the head of her institution to perform her duties “safely and satisfactorily” as a trainee for the additional qualifications in question. In the absence of such a specific certification, she cannot claim the benefit of the trainee exception, and her additional qualifications remained legally paralyzed by the prohibition in Section 23

on the closing date of 30.08.2013.

13.The aforesaid reasoning is further fortified by the established principles of statutory construction, which mandate that words in a statute or regulation must be understood in their legal and functional context to avoid an interpretation that would lead to an absurdity or render the law redundant. The principle of ut res magis valeat quam pereat mandates that a construction be adopted that gives efficacy to the statute rather than having it fail. Reference may be made to Employees Old Age Benefits Instittuion, Lahore v. Muhammad Rafique (2026 PLC (Labour) 107 FCC) & Sui Northern Gas Pipelines Ltd. (SNGPL), Islamabad v. S.K. Pvt. Limited (2025 SCMR 570).

Therefore, the term “possession” in Regulation 19(a) and Rule 10(3) must be construed in a manner that makes the requirement meaningful within a professional regulatory framework. Applying this rule of strict construction, the “possession” of a professional qualification is not a

fragmented concept but a unified legal state. If the law, such as the PNC Act, requires registration for the recognition of a qualification, then any interpretation that allows an unregistered degree to suffice would defeat the very object of the regulatory statute. This follows the rule of “purposive interpretation,” where the court looks to the mischief the law seeks to prevent, in this case, the entry of legally unverified individuals into sensitive professional roles.

Consequently, the “possession” of the qualification is only complete when the academic achievement and the statutory registration coincide on or before the closing date.

14.Moreover, the legislative intent and overarching purpose of the PNC Act, are explicitly defined in its Preamble, which characterizes the statute as an “Act to amend and consolidate the laws relating to registration and training of nurses, midwives and health visitors”. This dual focus on both training and registration signifies that the legislature never intended for academic degrees or training certificates alone

to suffice for professional recognition. If individuals were permitted to earn degrees from institutions recognized under the Act but were not required to formally register them before claiming professional merit, it would effectively frustrate the purpose of the law and render the statutory oversight of the Council redundant. Registration is the legal mechanism through which the Council fulfills its expedient duty to maintain professional standards; thus, an academic achievement without the accompanying registration is an inchoate credential that fails to meet the unified standard of “possession” intended by the regulatory framework.

15.An identical issue regarding medical registration came before the worthy Islamabad High Court in Dr.

Mumtaz Ahmed vs. Federation of Pakistan (2015 CLC 577), where the court observed that the relationship between a healthcare professional and the public is inherently “fiduciary” in nature. This relationship is founded on the principle that the practitioner is learned and skilled in

matters of vital importance to the patient, who must necessarily place great reliance and faith in the professional’s verified ability. Consequently, the protection of the vulnerable public and the preservation of human life are of paramount consideration, which far outweighs any individual hardship claimed by a candidate. Aligning these findings with the present case, it is evident that formal registration is the only legally recognized method to verify that a professional possesses the “sufficient knowledge and skill” required to handle the lives of the public. Any interpretation that treats registration as a remediable technicality would compromise public safety and undermine the trust reposed by the people in healthcare professionals.

16.In Irshad Ali v. Province of Sindh (PLD 2019 SC 596), the Worthy Sindh High Court observed that there exists a fundamental legal distinction between being academically “qualified” and being legally “authorized” to practice, noting that while the Provincial Nursing

Examination Boards award diplomas under Section 11 of the PNC Act, these credentials do not, by themselves, constitute a permit to practice. The Court clarified that under Sections 15 and 20 of the Act, the possession of a recognized qualification merely “entitles” a person to be registered with the Council, but it is the act of registration itself that fulfills the statutory mandate for professional employment. This is evidenced by the prohibitive command of Section 23, which explicitly bars any hospital or dispensary maintained or aided by the government from employing any nurse, midwife, or health visitor unless they are formally registered in the register or covered by the narrow trainee exception under Section 23(1)(b). Furthermore, the Court highlighted that the legislature has vested the Council with the power under Sections 24 and 26 to regulate professional practice and specifically prohibit unregistered persons from practicing, providing for criminal penalties in cases of contravention. Consequently, an academic degree remains a legally dormant certificate until it is validated through

registration; to hold otherwise would enable individuals to circumvent the protective oversight of the Council and practice in a professional capacity without the necessary statutory authorization.

17.Furthermore, Section 15 of the PNC Act, defines the legal effect of recognition, stating in Section 15(b) that a person possessing a recognized higher qualification is entitled to have such qualification “entered as a supplementary qualification in the register”. This implies that the legal right to be recognized for a higher qualification for professional merit and the subsequent right to be employed in that capacity, only manifests upon this formal entry. In the present case, Mst. Bibi Aisha’s registration of her additional qualifications only occurred on 10.02.2014, well after the closing date in the advertisement. Under the combined operation of Section 15 and Section 23 of the PNC Act, she did not legally “possess” the usable status of those qualifications on the closing date.

18.The reasoning adopted by the trial and appellate courts that the registration requirement was not explicitly mentioned in the advertisement, is legally unsustainable.

Under Regulation 11 of the 2003 Regulations, eligibility is determined not only by the advertisement but also by the “service rules governing appointments... and such other ancillary instructions”. An advertisement is merely an invitation to apply under the existing law of the land, which includes the regulatory prohibitions of the PNC Act and the mandatory cutoff in Rule 10(3) of the APT Rules. Statutory requirements and professional prohibitions do not lose their force simply because they are not reiterated in a newspaper advertisement; they are inherent in the legal framework governing the profession.

19.Moreover, the contention of the respondent regarding discrimination is refuted by the material on record. The Commission’s action was not an arbitrary or singular act against Mst. Bibi Aisha, but rather the execution

of a uniform policy applied to all candidates whose qualifications were registered after the cutoff. Notably, a similar challenge by another candidate, Mst. Nazima Bibi, was dismissed by this Court vide judgment dated 13.06.2017 in W.P. No. 2474‐P/2014, where the court upheld the KPPSC’s policy of requiring registration of qualifications before the closing date. In that case this Court observed that the Commission had treated the candidates even‐handedly by applying the registration cutoff consistently, thereby negating any claim of favoritism or discriminatory treatment. The same principle of uniform application of rules must apply here, as the respondent was treated in parity with other candidates who failed to meet the statutory registration deadline.

20.Therefore, this Court finds that the concurrent findings of the lower courts suffer from a material misreading of the statutory framework and a failure to appreciate the mandatory nature of professional

registration. The lower courts erred by treating late registration as a remediable technicality, overlooking that eligibility is a “static snapshot” taken at the moment the closing date expires. Any credential that is not legally fully‐ vested and registered or specifically certified under Section 23(b) of PNC Act read with Regulation 19(b) of 2003 Regulations by that cutoff cannot be factored into the merit calculation. The KPPSC’s decision to deduct the marks was a valid corrective measure to ensure the merit list complied with the 2003 Regulations, the APT Rules, and the PNC Act.

21.For the reasons discussed above, the instant revision petition, Civil Revision No. 1379 of 2025, is hereby allowed. Consequently, the impugned judgment and decree dated 04.09.2025, passed by the learned Additional District Judge‐XIX, Peshawar, as well as the judgment and decree dated 31.05.2024, passed by the learned Civil Judge‐XIII, Peshawar, are set aside. The Civil Suit No. 147/1 of 2017 filed by the respondent/plaintiff, Mst. Bibi Aisha, stands

dismissed. The connected Revision Petition No. 1221 of 2025, filed by Mst. Farida, is also disposed of in the above terms.

Parties shall bear their own costs.

Announced

JUDGE

(SB)Hon’ble Mr. Justice Muhammad Faheem Wali, J.