Ayub Ali Vs Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through Secretary, Home & Tribal Affairs Department, etc

Judgment Sheet

A PESHAWARHIG HCOURT. BANNUBENCH

(Judicial Department)

WP No.475-Bl2026

Ayub Ali Vs

Government of KhYber Pakhtunkhwa through Secretary, Home & Tribal Affairs Department, etc.

JUDGMENT

For petitioner(s): Mr. Masood lobal Khattak Advocate Date of hearing: 09.09.2026

MUHAMMAD TARI o AFRIDI. J.- Throu gh the instant writ petition, filed under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, the petitioner has prayed for the following relief:

It is, therefore, most humbly prayed that, on ? acceptance of the writ petition and in exercise of the extraordinary constitutional jurisdiction, this court may graciously be pleased to:

a. Declare that the impugned inaction of respondent No. 5 in incorporating the correct CNIC particulars in the official record is illegal, unlawful, void ab initio and without lawful authority;

consequently, set aside the same and allow the petitioner to continue his service in accordance with the correct date of birth recorded in his CNIC.

b. Grant any other efficacious relief to which the petitioner may be found entitled under the law and in the circumstances of the case

2.The facts giving rise to the instant petition, as gathered from the record, are that the petitioner, a resident of North

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Waziristan, initially joined the Levies Force. Upon absorption of the Levies personnel into the Police Department, his services were accordingly absorbed therein, whereafter he successfully completed the prescribed training course at the Police Training School, Swat.

3.The petitioner subsequently instituted Civil Suit No. 953/1 of 2024, seeking a declaration that his correct date of birth was 01.01.1976 and that the date recorded in the relevant official record required correction. Upon receipt of the summons, the National Database and Regisffation Authority (NADRA) entered appearance and filed its written statement. However, the leamed trial Court, vide judgment and decree dated 29.01.2025, summarily decreed the petitioner's suit against NADRA. Pursuant thereto, the petitioner's CNIC was ? corrected so as to reflect his date of birth as 0l .01 . 1976.

4.The Police Department thereafter endorsed the corrected particulars and requested respondent No.5, (the District Accounts Officer, North Waziristan) to incorporate the same into the petitioner's official service record. Respondent No. 5, however, withheld the requisite clearance through letter dated 21.10.2025. The said communication was responded to by the competent authorities of the Police Department through letters dated 01.01.2026 and 04.02.2026, reiterating the request for endorsement and incorporation of the corrected CMC particulars.

5.The petitioner claims that, despite the decree passed by the competent Civil Court and the consequential correction and endorsement of .his CNIC by NADRA and the Police Department, respectively, respondent No. 5 has failed to incorporate the corrected date of birth into his official record. Feeling aggrieved by such inaction and asserting that no other adequate and efficacious remedy is available to him, the

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petitioner has invoked the constitutional jurisdiction of this Court through the instant petition.

6.Arguments heard and record perused.

7.The controversy raises two interrelated questions: whether the civil decree relied upon by the petitioner binds respondent No. 5 and the employing department, neither of whom was a party to the sui! and whether in view of Anicle 212 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, a constitutional petition seeking alteration of a civil servant's date of birth, on the strength of that decree, for purposes of continuation in service, is maintainable.

8.Examination of the record of the petitioner's suit for declaration seeking correction of his date of birth reveals t, material discrepancies. The plaint names only the "Swift Centre through NADRA, Miranshah, Mir Ali" as defendant, whereas the written statement purports to have been filed on behalf of two defendants and also bears the signatures of the presiding officer. The judgment neither explains this discrepancy nor records that the written statement was filed or formally taken on record; it merely notes the appearance of Akbar Jan as NADRA's representative.

9.The manner in which the suit was disposed of also calls for scrutiny. On the date fixed for submission of the written statement, the petitioner moved an application for summary judgment. Instead of service upon NADRA through its duly authorized officer or counsel, notice was delivered that day to the departrnental representative present in Court. Upon his expressing no objection, the leamed Civil Judge allowed the application and decreed the suit. Thus, the application, notice, response and adjudication were all completed on the same day.

1 10. Expeditious disposal is undoubtedly desirable, but it does not absolve the Court of its duty to examine jurisdiction, maintainability, the pleadings and the legal entitlement to the relief claimed. The representative's no-objection could not substitute for such scrutiny, particularly when the judgment discloses no examination of his authority to make a concession affecting the petitioner's service record. In any event, consent or acquiescence cannot confer jurisdiction where the law withholds it.

11.The leamed Civil Judge was required to ascertain the true nature and consequences of the declaration sought. The plaint disclosed that the petitioner was a serving govemment employee, and the alteration of his date of birth was subsequently invoked to secure continuation in service. Yet, the i judgment does not meaningfully distinguish between correction of NADRA particulars and alteration of the date of birth goveming public employment. Nor does it examine jurisdiction or limitation, particularly with reference to the petitioner's entry into service and the applicable period for seeking such correction. These questions could not be left unanswered merely because the suit was decided summarily, especially when NADRA had expressly challenged jurisdiction in its written statement, an objection neither noticed nor decided by the Civil Court.

12.Of equal importance is the non-joinder of the employing department and the accounts authorities. The suit was instituted against the Swift Centre through NADRA, without impleading the Police Department or respondent No.5. Consequently, they had no opportunity to produce the original service record, contest the proposed alteration, or raise objections concerning jurisdiction and limitation. Nor was any employee whose accrued service rights were demonstrably liable to be affected

joined as a party. The decree could not, by implication, impose obligations upon or prejudice the rights ofpersons who had not been heard.

13.Section 43 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877, confines the binding effect of a declaration to the parties to the suit, persons claiming through them. Respondent No.5, the District Account Officer, Miranshah North Waziristan, was neither a party nor a person claiming through NADRA. His statutory functions conceming the petitioner's service and accounts records are independent of NADRA. Consequently, NADRA's implementation of the decree does not render the declaration binding upon him.

14.The petitioner's contention that the Police Department endorsed the civil decree is not bome out by the record. Any r) subsequent endorsement of the corrected CNIC would neither enlarge the scope of the decree nor render it enforceable against a non-party. Alteration of the service record is govemed by the applicable service law, and a corrected CNIC does not, by itself, confer an enforceable right to a corresponding change in the date of superannuation. Respondent No. 5's failure to implement the decree cannot, therefore, be declared unlawful on that ground alone.

15.The petition also faces a fundamental bar to maintainability under Article 212 of the Constitution, which vests exclusive jurisdiction in the appropriate administrative tribunal over service matters falling within its jurisdiction and excludes the jurisdiction of other courts. The petitioner expressly seeks continuation in government service on the basis of an altered date of birth. The dispute thus concems his tenure and superannuation and falls within the ambit of service adjudication contemplated by Arl.icle 212.

16.The substance ofthe reliefsought, rather than the form of the proceedings, determines the nature of the controversy. Describing the grievance as a failure to endorse a corrected CNIC does not alter the fact that the petitioner seeks amendment of his service record to secure continuation in service. The constitutional bar cannot be circumvented by obtaining a declaration against a NADRA Center and then seeking its enforcement against the employing and accounts authorities through a constitutional petition.

17.Insofar as the civil decree is relied upon to establish entitlement to alteration of service particulars and consequent continuation in office, the Civil Court could not assume jurisdiction over a matter reserved for the competent service forum. The decree neither confers jurisdiction upon this Court nor warrants relief barred by Article 212 of the Constitution.

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For disposal of this petition, it is unnecessary to determine its effect on NADRA's record or to formally set it aside.

18.The petitioner has thus failed to establish that the civil decree binds respondent No. 5 or creates an obligation enforceable against him in these proceedings. The substantive relief concems the petitioner's terms and conditions of service and falls outside this Court's constitutional jurisdiction. The irregularities identified in the civil proceedings further undermine reliance on the decree as a sufficient basis for the directions sought.

19.Before parting with this judgment, this Court considers it necessary to observe that, in the present case and several other matters, suits involving disputed questions of fact requiring evidence have been improperly disposed of through summary judgments. In some instances, such judgments have even been upheld in appeal, reflecting either the exercise ofjurisdiction

not vested in the courts concerned or a failure to exercise jurisdiction vested in them.

20.A11 civil courts, whether exercising trial or appellate jurisdiction, must carefully scrutinize the pleadings and record to determine whether the matter lawfully admits of summary disposal. Where material factual disputes require evidence, the parties must be afforded an opportunity to lead such evidence, and the controversy must be adjudicated in accordance with law. Failure to observe these requirements prejudices the valuable rights of litigants. Remands occasioned by such fundamental errors increase the courts' workload, consume judicial time, prolong litigation and impose avoidable financial burdens upon the parties and the public exchequer' Judicial officers must, therefore, exercise due care and diligence in discharging their duties. Lapses warranting disciplinary action may lead to proceedings under the applicable law and rules'

21.For the foregoing reasons, the writ petition is dismissed in limine as not maintainable. Any remedy otherwiSe available to the petitioner before the competent service forum shall remain subject to the applicable law, limitation and requirements of maintainability.

Announced llb

(Ghafoor Zamar)

JUDGE

JU GE

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(D.8.)

xF^-:ipJ bt t$ Hon'ble Mr. Justice Muhammad Tariq Afridi Hon'ble Mr, Justic€ Sabit Ullah Khan ecl'; ,Nu,.., l'""n"*