Saddam Khan Vs State & others

JUDGMENT SHEET

PESHAWAR HIGH COURT

MINGORA BENCH

(Judicial Department) Cr.A No. 319-M/2025 With M.R No. 08-M/2025 Saddam Khan son of Khan Sherin (Appellant) Versus State & others (Respondents) Present: M/S Sabir Shah, ASC and Jamal Shah, AHC, for appellant/convict.

Mr. Naeem Khan, Astt: A.G, for State.

Mr. Mohd. Sohaib, AHC, for respondent/ complainant.

Dates of hearing: 12.5.2026

JUDGMENT

SALAH-UD-DIN, J.- Through the instant criminal appeal preferred U/S 410 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (“Cr.P.C”), the appellant namely Saddam Khan has called in question the judgment of his conviction and sentence dated 11.11.2025, handed down by the learned Additional Sessions Judge/I.Z.Q, Malakand at Dargai, in case FIR No. 231 dated 05.7.2023, registered U/Ss 302, 427 PPC, R/W section 15-AA at Levies Post Dargai, District Malakand. In the ibid criminal trial bearing trial No.35/VII of the year 2024, the appellant was convicted and sentenced as follows: -

Nawab (D.B.) Hon’ble Mr. Justice Dr. Khurshid Iqbal Hon’ble Mr. Justice Salah-ud-Din

“Resultantly, the accused facing trial Saddam Khan son of Khan Sherin is hereby convicted and sentenced as Under: -

1.Under Section 302 (b) PPC the convict Sadam khan son of Khan sherin is found guilty of committing the Qal-i-Amd (murder) of deceased Tariq Zaman (CTD Constable) and hereby sentenced to death and to pay Rs.1,000,000/- as compensation to the Legal heirs of the deceased. In default of payment of compensation, he shall further undergo (06) month Simple imprisonment. The convict shall be hanged by the neck till his death within the meaning of section 368 Cr.PC, however, his sentence of death shall not be executed unless confirmed by the Hon'ble Peshawar High Court.

2.Under Section 15 Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Arms Act the convict Sadam khan son of Khan sherin is found guilty and hereby sentenced to one-month simple imprisonment and fine Rs.1,000/-, in default of fine he shall further undergo seven days simple. imprisonment.

3.Under Section 427-PPC the accused Sadam Khan is acquitted.

4.Benefit of section 382-B Cr.PC is extended to the convict.

5.Case property in shape of thirty-bore pistol is confiscated to State whereas rest of the case property shall be kept intact till expiry of period of appeal / revision.

6.Death reference for confirmation of the death sentence shall separately be prepared along with the proceedings and the same shall be submitted before the Honorable Peshawar High Court Mingora Bench as per the mandate of section 374 Cr.PC.”

2.Arguments of learned counsel for parties, as well as learned Astt: A.G for State were heard in considerable detail and requisitioned record gone through with their valuable assistance.

3.As per the prosecution case, the then injured/complainant now deceased namely Tariq Zaman, lodged a report with the officials of Levies Nawab (D.B.) Hon’ble Mr. Justice Dr. Khurshid Iqbal Hon’ble Mr. Justice Salah-ud-Din

Post Dargai, alleging therein that he was serving as a Police Constable in the Counter Terrorism Department (CTD), Malakand. On the day of the occurrence, while performing his official duties in plain clothes near the shop of one Islam Khan in Tehsil Dargai, his cousin, namely Saddam Khan (the appellant herein), arrived at the spot armed with a pistol and, with the intention to commit his murder, opened indiscriminate fire upon him. As a consequence, the complainant sustained multiple firearm injuries on different parts of his body and seriously got injured. He was immediately shifted to the Dargai Hospital in a private vehicle for medical treatment. The occurrence was allegedly witnessed by several persons of the locality, who were present at the scene. The motive behind the occurrence was attributed to prior animosity arising out of a domestic dispute involving the womenfolk of the parties. It was alleged that the complainant's sister, Mst. Noor Hadia Bibi, who is the sister-in-law of the appellant, was frequently subjected to quarrels and maltreatment by the appellant over petty domestic issues. A day before the occurrence, the complainant Nawab (D.B.) Hon’ble Mr. Justice Dr. Khurshid Iqbal Hon’ble Mr. Justice Salah-ud-Din

had lodged a protest against such conduct, which allegedly enraged the appellant and ultimately prompted him to commit the offence. On the basis of the statement of the injured complainant, treated as a “dying declaration”, a Murasila (Ex.PW-PA/1) was prepared, which culminated in the registration of the instant FIR (Ex.PA) at the concerned Levies Post U/S 324 PPC. Subsequently, on 14.07.2023, i.e., nine days after the occurrence, the injured succumbed to the firearm injuries while under treatment in the hospital, whereupon section 302 PPC was incorporated into the already registered FIR, qua murder of the deceased constable Tariq Zaman.

4.In the present case, in order to

substantiate the accusations levelled by the then injured/complainant now deceased, the prosecution has principally relied upon three distinct categories of evidence:- (i) the dying declaration of the injured complainant, who subsequently succumbed to his injuries; (ii) the ocular account furnished through the statements of private prosecution witnesses, namely Afsar Ali, Muhammad Islam, shopkeeper (since Nawab (D.B.) Hon’ble Mr. Justice Dr. Khurshid Iqbal Hon’ble Mr. Justice Salah-ud-Din

abandoned as a prosecution witness), and Muhammad Zaman, father of the deceased; and (iii) certain recoveries of incriminating articles allegedly effected at the pointation of the appellant.

5.For a proper appreciation of the

available record and for determining the legality and propriety of the extreme penalty of death awarded to the appellant, it would be appropriate to examine and evaluate each category of evidence separately and in the light of the settled principles of law.

Dying Declaration:-

To properly appreciate and assess the dying declaration of the deceased-then-injured, it would be appropriate to examine the same under the following two distinct and separate categories: -

(i)The status of the dying declaration as evidence, including its evidentiary value, reliability, and whether it can, by itself, constitute a sufficient basis for conviction as substantive evidence.

(ii)Whether, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case in hand, the dying declaration of the deceased-then- Nawab (D.B.) Hon’ble Mr. Justice Dr. Khurshid Iqbal Hon’ble Mr. Justice Salah-ud-Din

injured is admissible and can safely be relied upon as a substantive and credible piece of evidence.

6.Dying declaration is governed by and becomes relevant under Article 46 of the Qanun-e- Shahadat Order, 1984. For a better understanding of the legal position and for ready reference, the relevant provision is reproduced hereinbelow: -

46.Cases in which statement of relevant fact by person who is dead or cannot be found, etc., is relevant.— Statements, written or verbal, of relevant facts made by a person who is dead, or who cannot be found, or who has become incapable of giving evidence, or whose attendance cannot be procured without an amount of delay or expense which under the circumstances of the case appears to the Court unreasonable, are themselves relevant facts in the following cases:-

(1)When it relates to cause of death. — When the statement is made by a person as to the cause of his death, or as to any of the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death, in cases in which the cause of that person”s death comes into question. Such statements are relevant whether the person who made them was or was not, at the time when they were made, under expectation of death, and whatever may be the nature of the proceeding in which cause of his death comes into question.

In a number of cases, the Hon”ble

Supreme Court has observed that a dying declaration carries a high degree of sanctity in the eyes of law, being the statement of a person who, at the relevant time, is believed to be confronted with the prospect Nawab (D.B.) Hon’ble Mr. Justice Dr. Khurshid Iqbal Hon’ble Mr. Justice Salah-ud-Din

of death, and is, therefore, presumed to have little or no motive to speak falsely. Nevertheless, the said presumption cannot dispense with the judicial duty of subjecting such a declaration to the strictest scrutiny. It remains an exception to the ordinary rule of evidence, particularly because its maker is not available before the Court to affirm the statement on oath or to withstand the test of cross-examination.

Consequently, despite the special evidentiary status attached to a dying declaration, it cannot be accepted merely on account of the fact that it emanated from a deceased person. Its truthfulness, voluntariness, mental fitness of the declarant, absence of tutoring or external influence, and consistency with the surrounding circumstances must be carefully examined. Where the declaration suffers from material infirmities or lacks independent corroboration from other reliable and confidence- inspiring evidence, it would be unsafe, particularly in a case involving the extreme penalty of death, to make it the sole basis for maintaining a conviction.

It has been observed by the Hon”ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in case titled “Zarif Khan v/s State” Nawab (D.B.) Hon’ble Mr. Justice Dr. Khurshid Iqbal Hon’ble Mr. Justice Salah-ud-Din

reported as PLD 1977 Supreme Court 612 that “dying declarant not having a deep sense of accountability to his Maker, feelings of anger or revenge, or in case of mutual conflict natural desire of screening his own misconduct may affect accuracy of his statement and give false colouring to whole transaction. Presumption that truth sat upon lips of a dying man, held, applicable only to a dying declaration made by a person knowing his death to be imminent and when author of dying declaration a man of unquestionable integrity and persons giving evidence about such declaration also persons of integrity”. Likewise, the Hon”ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in its landmark judgment, rendered in case titled “Tawaib Khan & another v/s State” reported as P L D 1970 Supreme Court 13, has formed the following in respect of evidentiary value of the dying declaration: -

“Dying declarations have sanctity under law but no rigid rule can be laid down that person under immediate apprehension of death would utter nothing but truth. Dying declaration like statement of interested witness requires close scrutiny. The dying declarations of the deceased have a degree of sanctity under the law, being the statements of a dying man, on the belief that he being placed in a situation of immediate apprehension of severance of his ties with the Nawab (D.B.) Hon’ble Mr. Justice Dr. Khurshid Iqbal Hon’ble Mr. Justice Salah-ud-Din

mundane affairs, he would not tell a lie and implicate innocent persons on false charges. But, in the matter of the administration of criminal justice, taking in view the present state of our society, the assessment of evidence, whether it is the statement of a witness or the statement of a person who is dead, is essentially an exercise of human judgment to evaluate the evidence so as to find out what is true and what is false therein. In this effort, the case has to be considered in all its physical environments and circumstances to find out how far the evidence or its different parts fit in with the circumstances and possibilities that can be safely deduced in the case. In this country, the habit, unfortunately, is quite common, now judicially recognized, that people do add innocent persons along with the guilty to satisfy their sense of revenge and to put the other side to the utmost grief. It is difficult to lay down a rigid rule that a person who is injured and is under an apprehension of meeting his death, would suddenly be gifted, as if by a magic transformation, with a clean conscience and a purity of mind to shed all the age-old habits and deep rooted rancours and enmities. Even, assuming that the pangs of conscience are there at the time to prohibit making of false charges, the question arises whether these pangs are strong enough to fortify him to resist the promptings and persuasions of his relations and others who may be surrounding him at the time and incite him to support the pattern of the charge which they have chosen to make against the accused persons, whether innocent or guilty? It is for this reason that a close scrutiny of the dying declarations like the statements of interested witnesses, becomes absolutely necessary.”

Even otherwise, dying declaration is a weak type of evidence and the same alone cannot be made a basis for conviction of an accused person.

For instance, in case titled “Rajesh alias Rajoo v/s State” reported as 2025 SCMR 1876, it was held by the Hon”ble apex Court that: -

“Dying declaration is, at best, a weak type of evidence which requires cautious appraisal and Nawab (D.B.) Hon’ble Mr. Justice Dr. Khurshid Iqbal Hon’ble Mr. Justice Salah-ud-Din

must ordinarily be corroborated by other reliable and confidence-inspiring material. Conviction cannot rest solely on a dying declaration if the same is shrouded in mystery or is fraught with infirmities. Credibility, voluntariness and the mental fitness of the declarant, along with the absence of extraneous influence, are sine qua non for its evidentiary acceptance. Dying declaration must not only be truthful and free from external coercion but also supported by surrounding circumstances.”

Similarly, in case titled “Muhammad Saeed & another v/s State & another” reported as 2024 SCMR 1421, the same rational was expounded by the august Supreme Court of Pakistan, in the following words: -

“Dying declaration is a question of fact which has to be determined on the facts of each case. To find out truth or falsity of a dying declaration, a case is generally to be considered in all its physical environment and circumstances. Dying declaration can be made before a private person but it should be free from any influence and the person before whom it is made has to be examined. It is necessary to ascertain that the dying declaration was made honestly, its maker was in a fit state of mind to make the statement, its maker was free from outside influence, its maker was fearing death and had made a truthful statement.”

In case titled “Somaid & another v/s Ali Gohar alias Gohar Zaman & others” reported as 2019 SCMR 1008, the Hon”ble Supreme Court of Pakistan has held that: -

“Person recording dying declaration as the most important witness. Dying declaration, in legislative wisdom, was an exception to the general rule of direct evidence; it was admitted to Nawab (D.B.) Hon’ble Mr. Justice Dr. Khurshid Iqbal Hon’ble Mr. Justice Salah-ud-Din

the detriment of an accused without opportunity of cross examination upon the declarant under the belief that a person, face to face with God, would tell nothing but the whole truth. Notwithstanding such sanctimonious hypothesis, before a conviction was based upon such a declaration, prosecution must demonstrate beyond shadow of doubt that it comprised of the words of declarant alone without extraneous prompting or additions. Person who recorded dying declaration was therefore the most important witness to verify veracity thereof.

This Court in case titled “Siraj v/s State & another” reported as 2016 P Cr. LJ Note 36, has formed the following view, in respect of a corroboratory nature of the dying declaration:- Dying declaration by itself is not a strong evidence being not tested by way of cross- examination. Only reason for accepting a dying declaration is the belief of the court that a person apprehending death due to the injuries caused to him is ordinarily not expected to speak a falsehood. To believe or not to believe a dying declaration, thus, is left to the ordinary human judgment; however, courts always insist upon strong, independent and reliable corroboratory evidence for the sake of safe dispensation of justice. Relying blindly without proper scrutiny on such statement would be no less dangerous approach on the part of the courts of law.”

This Court in case titled “Sher Umar Khan v/s Khan Pur alias Khaney & 02 others” reported as PLD 2015 Peshawar 143 has held as under: -

“Fair hearing was the cardinal and fundamental principle in criminal administration of justice. Individual whose life, liberty or property, were in legal jeopardy, had a vested legal right to confront the evidence against him. Status of statement of the deceased then injured would not Nawab (D.B.) Hon’ble Mr. Justice Dr. Khurshid Iqbal Hon’ble Mr. Justice Salah-ud-Din

be more than a statement under S.161, Cr.P.C., and not a dying declaration. Dying declaration or a statement of a person without the test of cross- examination, was weak kind of evidence, and its credibility depended upon the authenticity of the record; and the circumstances under which it was recorded. Dying declaration like the statement of an interested witness, required close scrutiny; and was not to be believed merely for the reason that dying person was not expected to tell a lie.”

Needless to observe, it is also a settled proposition of law that, although a dying declaration may constitute substantive evidence if found to be genuine, voluntary and confidence-inspiring, however, it is a weaker form of evidence and ordinarily requires corroboration from other reliable and independent evidence. Thus, where the dying declaration suffers from any material infirmity, inconsistency or other circumstance casting doubt upon its truthfulness, it would be unsafe to place reliance upon it as the sole basis for maintaining a conviction, particularly where the charge carries the extreme penalty of death. In this respect, reference can be made to the judgment of Hon”ble apex Court rendered in case titled “Tahir Khan v/s State” reported as 2011 SCMR 646, wherein it was held that: -

“Mere dying declaration shrouded by mystery and fraught with so many infirmities is not Nawab (D.B.) Hon’ble Mr. Justice Dr. Khurshid Iqbal Hon’ble Mr. Justice Salah-ud-Din

enough to convict a person. Dying declaration is weaker type of evidence, which needs corroboration when fully corroborated by other reliable evidence. Facts and circumstances of each case have to be kept in view and also credibility, reliability and acceptability of such declaration by court.”

In view of the above-quoted ratio-

decidendi, the superior Courts have consistently drawn a distinction between an ordinary statement made by a private witness and a dying declaration, keeping in view their respective legal significance and the circumstances in which they are made. A dying declaration is a statement made by a person concerning the cause of his or her death or the circumstances resulting in the death. Such a statement is accorded a special evidentiary status on the rationale that a person who is conscious of his or her impending death is ordinarily not expected to falsely implicate another person or suppress the truth. Nevertheless, the evidentiary value of a dying declaration depends upon the circumstances attending its recording and the intrinsic reliability of its contents. For a dying declaration to command judicial confidence, it must, inter alia, be shown that the maker was conscious, mentally alert and sufficiently oriented to understand the questions and Nawab (D.B.) Hon’ble Mr. Justice Dr. Khurshid Iqbal Hon’ble Mr. Justice Salah-ud-Din

to make a coherent statement; that the statement was voluntary and free from tutoring, prompting or undue influence; and that it was recorded in a manner which inspires confidence. Although the maker of such a statement is not available for cross- examination, however, this circumstance by itself does not render the declaration inadmissible or devoid of evidentiary value. The Court, however, is required to subject it to a careful and cautious scrutiny and to determine whether, in the peculiar circumstances of the case, it can safely be relied upon. It may, therefore, safely be concluded that a “dying declaration” is not to be accepted mechanically merely because it purports to have been made by a dying person. Its probative value must be assessed on the touchstone of the surrounding circumstances, the mental and physical condition of its maker, the manner of its recording, and the consistency and inherent truthfulness of its contents. Where the declaration suffers from material infirmities, unexplained inconsistencies, suspicion of tutoring, or other circumstances affecting its credibility, it would be unsafe to base a Nawab (D.B.) Hon’ble Mr. Justice Dr. Khurshid Iqbal Hon’ble Mr. Justice Salah-ud-Din

conviction upon it without independent corroboration. Conversely, where a dying declaration is found to be voluntary, truthful, coherent and otherwise confidence-inspiring, the law does not invariably require corroboration as a condition precedent to acting upon it.

7.In view of the foregoing yardstick, this Court shall now examine whether, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case in hand, the dying declaration allegedly made by the deceased, then in an injured condition, can be treated as a valid and reliable piece of evidence and, further, whether the prosecution has succeeded in establishing its authenticity and due proof in accordance with law.

The question, therefore, is not merely whether such statement falls within the ambit of Article 46 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, but whether, upon a careful appraisal of the attending circumstances, it inspires confidence and can safely be relied upon against the appellant.

8.First and foremost, it is pertinent to clarify that the deceased-then-injured was not an ordinary individual; rather, he was a police official Nawab (D.B.) Hon’ble Mr. Justice Dr. Khurshid Iqbal Hon’ble Mr. Justice Salah-ud-Din

serving in the Counter Terrorism Department (C.T.D.), therefore, he was expected to have a greater degree of awareness regarding legal formalities than an ordinary person, particularly those relating to the recording of his initial report in the form of a dying declaration. The matter assumes significance from the fact that the deceased-then- injured, namely Tariq Zaman, was brought to Dargai Hospital in a private motorcar, where he recorded his initial report in the shape of a Murasila (Ex. PA/1) before IHC Wahid Islam, PW-4. Needless to observe, the said initial report, which has been relied upon as a dying declaration, contains no particulars regarding the Glasgow Coma Scale (GCS), including the precise time at which the GCS assessment was conducted. It merely mentions the GCS as 13/15.

Although the report bears the thumb impression of the injured as well as his signature in English, however, the mere presence of such

impressions/signature, by itself, does not conclusively establish that he was in a fit and conscious state of mind to make a voluntary and reliable statement. It is also borne out from the Nawab (D.B.) Hon’ble Mr. Justice Dr. Khurshid Iqbal Hon’ble Mr. Justice Salah-ud-Din

record that, on the same day at about 16:30 hours, the injured was examined by Dr. Rahim Khan at the Emergency Ward of Dargai Hospital. The said doctor appeared before the learned trial Court as PW-6. He prepared his report, Ex. PW-6/3, consisting of two pages, on the injured sheet, Ex.

PW-6/2. It is significant to note that, in the instant case, the Investigating Officer neither obtained any opinion from the concerned medical officer regarding the consciousness and fitness of the injured at the time when his initial report was recorded, nor was any separate certificate regarding his consciousness or fitness of mind made part of the record. It is equally important that PW-6, Dr. Rahim Khan, recorded a detailed account of the injuries sustained by the injured/complainant on the injury sheet, which necessarily indicates that the said injury sheet was prepared after the injured had been medically examined. During cross-examination, PW- 6 categorically stated that he had not mentioned the names of the persons who brought the injured to the hospital and had instead used the general expression “general public”. At the same time, he stated that Nawab (D.B.) Hon’ble Mr. Justice Dr. Khurshid Iqbal Hon’ble Mr. Justice Salah-ud-Din

five persons were present at the time of examination of the injured. More importantly, PW-6 deposed that he initially spent about five minutes examining the injured and thereafter consumed another 20 to 30 minutes in preparing the medical report. This circumstance assumes considerable significance, as it prima facie indicates that the detailed medical report containing the description of the injuries was not prepared in the presence of the injured. He further admitted that no separate certificate regarding the consciousness or fitness of the deceased-then- injured was prepared. Although he stated that first aid was administered to the injured, however, no receipt or other documentary evidence regarding such treatment is available on the record. Even more significantly, PW-6 stated during cross-examination that the injured was referred to MMC, Mardan, merely 15 minutes after his medical examination.

This aspect creates a further circumstance requiring cautious scrutiny, particularly when the medical record does not contain any separate certification regarding the mental and physical fitness of the injured to make a voluntary and conscious statement.

Nawab (D.B.) Hon’ble Mr. Justice Dr. Khurshid Iqbal Hon’ble Mr. Justice Salah-ud-Din

In these circumstances, the evidentiary value of the Murasila (Ex. PA/1), sought to be treated as a dying declaration, cannot be determined merely on the basis of the fact that it bears the thumb impression and signature of the injured. Rather, its reliability has to be assessed in the light of the surrounding medical circumstances, the absence of a specific fitness certificate, the unexplained absence of a contemporaneous opinion regarding his consciousness, and the manner and timing in which the statement was allegedly recorded.

9.The Glasgow Coma Scale (“GCS”) is a widely recognized clinical assessment tool used for evaluating the level of consciousness of a patient.

Introduced in 1974, the GCS was initially developed principally for the assessment of patients suffering from traumatic brain injuries; however, its application has subsequently extended to a broad range of medical conditions and clinical settings where assessment of consciousness is required.

There are three distinct components of scale assessment, i.e. (i) eye-opening response; (ii) verbal response; and (iii) motor response. Each component Nawab (D.B.) Hon’ble Mr. Justice Dr. Khurshid Iqbal Hon’ble Mr. Justice Salah-ud-Din

is assigned a numerical score, with the aggregate score ranging from 3 to 15. A score of 3 represents the lowest level of responsiveness, whereas a score of 15 denotes that the patient is fully conscious and responsive. The GCS is therefore routinely employed both for the initial assessment of a patient's neurological status and for monitoring changes in the level of consciousness during the course of treatment. In the context of judicial proceedings, particularly where a statement is proposed to be recorded as a dying declaration, assessment of the declarant's mental and physical capacity to understand questions and furnish rational answers assumes considerable significance.

Although the GCS is primarily a medical assessment instrument and does not, by itself, constitute a legal test for determining the validity or admissibility of a dying declaration, however, the patient's recorded level of consciousness may constitute an important medical circumstance in assessing whether the declarant was in a fit condition to make a voluntary, coherent and intelligible statement. Accordingly, the medical assessment of consciousness, including Nawab (D.B.) Hon’ble Mr. Justice Dr. Khurshid Iqbal Hon’ble Mr. Justice Salah-ud-Din

reference to the GCS where appropriate, may assist the Court in determining the reliability and evidentiary worth of such a statement. The clinical principles underlying the GCS are discussed in standard medical literature, including Bailey & Love's Short Practice of Surgery and Current Diagnosis & Treatment: Neurology, wherein assessment of consciousness and neurological function is addressed as part of the clinical examination of patients. Before rendering any findings in respect of GCS, it would be in the fitness of things to reproduce, its introduction and essential components of the same for ready reference: - The Glasgow Coma Scale (GCS) is a neurological scale used to objectively assess a person's level of consciousness after a brain injury, trauma, stroke, or other medical condition. It helps doctors and paramedics quickly evaluate the severity of brain dysfunction.

Components of GCS The GCS is based on three components that are scored separately and then added together for a total score (ranging from 3 to 15):- Component What it Assesses Score Range Eye Opening (E) Ability to open eyes 1-4 Verbal Response (V) Ability to speak and Communicate 1-5 Motor Response (M) Ability to move (best limb response) 1-6 Total GCS = E+V+M (Minimum 3, Maximum 15) Detailed Scoring

1.Eye Opening (E)  4 = Spontaneous (opens eyes on own)  3 = To speech (opens to verbal stimuli)  2 = To pain (opens only to painful stimuli)  1= None (no eye opening)

2.Verbal Response (V)

Nawab (D.B.) Hon’ble Mr. Justice Dr. Khurshid Iqbal Hon’ble Mr. Justice Salah-ud-Din

 5 = Oriented (knows person, place, time)  4 = Confused (converses but disoriented)  3 = Inappropriate words (random words, no conversation)  2 = Incomprehensible sounds (moans/groans only)  1 = None (no verbal response)

3.Motor Response (M)  6 = Obeys commands (follows instructions)  5 = Localizes pain (moves toward painful stimulus)  4 = Withdraws from pain (pulls away)  3 = Abnormal flexion (decorticate posturing)  2 = Abnormal extension (decerebrate posturing)  1 = None (no movement) Interpretation (Rough Guide)  13-15: Mild brain injury  9-12: Moderate brain injury  3-8: Severe brain injury / Coma Note: Sometimes written as GCS E4V5M6 = 15 (fully conscious) or GCS 8 (intubation level). This is the standard and most widely used meaning of GCS in clinical medicine world.

GCS Scoring Examples (Glasgow Coma Scale) Here are clear, practical examples showing how GCS is calculated in real-life situation

1.Fully Conscious/Normal Person  Eyes: Open eyes spontaneously → 4  Verbal: Oriented (knows name, place, date) → 5  Motor: Obeys commands (e.g., "squeeze my hand")→6 Total GCS-4+5+6=15

2.Mild Head Injury (Confused but responsive)  Eyes: Opens eyes when you speak to him→ 3  Verbal: Confused conversation (answers but disoriented) 4  Motor: Obeys commands→6 Total GCS-3+4+6-13

3.Moderate Head Injury  Eyes: Opens eyes only to pain → 2  Verbal: Inappropriate words (shouts random words)  Motor: Localizes pain (tries to push your hand away when painful stimulus given) → 5 Total GCS =2+3+5=10

4.Severe Head Injury / Coma  Eyes: No eye opening even to pain 1  Verbal: Incomprehensible sounds (groans only) →2  Motor: Abnormal flexion (decorticate posturing) → 3 Total GCS =1+2+3=6

5.Deep Coma / Very Critical  Eyes: None → 1  Verbal: None → 1  Motor: No movement even to pain → 1 Total GCS = 1+1+1=3 (Lowest possible score) 6. Common Emergency Scenario (Road Traffic Accident) Nawab (D.B.) Hon’ble Mr. Justice Dr. Khurshid Iqbal Hon’ble Mr. Justice Salah-ud-Din

Patient is brought unconscious after a car accident:-  Opens eyes only when you press on the sternum (pain) → 2  Makes groaning sounds only→2  Withdraws leg when you press on nail bed → 4 Total GCS = 2+2+4=8 Quick Reference Table

Situation Eye Verbal Motor Total Severity Normal / Alert 4 5 6 15 Normal Mild injury 3 4 6 13 Mild Moderate Injury 2 3 5 10 Moderate Severe (typical coma) 1 2 4 7 Severe Deep coma 1 1 1 3 Critical

In the context of the case in hand, it is significant to note that in the initial report of the injured/complainant, recorded through a Murasila in the form of dying declaration, his Glasgow Coma Scale (GCS) was recorded as 13/15. Likewise, in the medico-legal report of the then injured, now deceased, the GCS was mentioned as 15/15.

However, conspicuously, neither of these documents specifies the particular time at which the GCS assessment was conducted. More importantly, neither document contains any details regarding the clinical parameters or the actual process through which the GCS was assessed, including the response of the injured to verbal commands, motor response, or other relevant clinical stimuli. Instead, the reports merely contain the numerical scores of 13/15 and Nawab (D.B.) Hon’ble Mr. Justice Dr. Khurshid Iqbal Hon’ble Mr. Justice Salah-ud-Din

15/15, respectively. Such mechanical recording of a GCS score, without disclosing the underlying clinical findings, does not, by itself, furnish a satisfactory basis to conclude that the injured was in a fit and conscious state of mind so as to make a voluntary, coherent and reliable declaration. It is true that PW-6, Dr. Rahim Khan, during his cross- examination, stated that although he had not prepared any separate certificate regarding the fitness and consciousness of the injured at the time of his examination, however, he had correctly recorded the GCS of the then injured, Tariq Zaman, as 15/15 on the injury sheet. He further stated that the GCS recorded in the Murasila was 13/15 and, according to his expert opinion, such a minor difference would not materially affect the assessment. Nevertheless, the said explanation does not satisfactorily address the more fundamental deficiency in the prosecution evidence, i.e., the failure to record the time, clinical basis and detailed observations forming the foundation of the respective GCS assessments. The medical officer has also not explained why, despite the alleged recording Nawab (D.B.) Hon’ble Mr. Justice Dr. Khurshid Iqbal Hon’ble Mr. Justice Salah-ud-Din

of the injured”s GCS, the necessary particulars relevant to his mental fitness and capacity to make a statement were not documented contemporaneously.

It is a settled principle that, for purposes of Article 46 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, the decisive consideration is not merely whether the declarant was medically conscious, but whether he was in a sufficiently fit and oriented state of mind to understand questions, comprehend the circumstances and make a voluntary, coherent and reliable statement. Thus, a mere numerical GCS score, or a bare endorsement that the patient was “fit for statement”, cannot, in isolation, be treated as conclusive proof of the declarant”s mental fitness where the surrounding medical record does not disclose the clinical basis of such conclusion. The Court is required to examine the entire medical condition of the declarant and the circumstances in which the statement was recorded. Where the medical evidence itself contains unexplained discrepancies, lacks the necessary particulars of the assessment, or fails to demonstrate through contemporaneous clinical findings that the declarant Nawab (D.B.) Hon’ble Mr. Justice Dr. Khurshid Iqbal Hon’ble Mr. Justice Salah-ud-Din

possessed the requisite mental faculties to make a rational statement, such omission assumes considerable significance. In the present case, therefore, the recording of GCS as 13/15 in the Murasila and 15/15 in the medico-legal report, without disclosure of the time and manner of assessment and without recording the underlying clinical findings, cannot be treated as an unimpeachable certification of the mental fitness of the then injured. The subsequent explanation of PW- 6 that the difference between 13/15 and 15/15 was insignificant may explain the numerical variation, but it does not cure the fundamental omission regarding the declarant”s actual cognitive and mental capacity at the precise time when the alleged dying declaration was recorded. This deficiency assumes added significance when the prosecution seeks to place substantive reliance upon the declaration as the foundation of its case. Consequently, the medical material, instead of independently corroborating the fitness of the declarant, leaves a material doubt as to whether the requisite mental capacity for making a valid and reliable dying declaration under Article 46 Nawab (D.B.) Hon’ble Mr. Justice Dr. Khurshid Iqbal Hon’ble Mr. Justice Salah-ud-Din

of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, had in-fact been established. Reference can be made to the judgment of Hon”ble Lahore High Court, rendered in case titled “Sher Azam Khan & others v/s State & others” reported as 2025 YLR 930, wherein it was held that: -

"Medical Officer had specifically stated in his Medico-Legal Report as well as before the Trial Court that during medical examination, deceased/the then injured was not well-oriented in space and time. Glasgow Coma Scale (GCS) was 13/15. In such circumstances, statement of deceased/the then injured statedly recorded by the Investigating Officer on the same day in the hospital along with endorsement of the Medical Officer was not free from doubt and had rightly not been considered by the Trial Court as his dying declaration. 2016 SCMR 1233 "Muhammad Ameer and another v. Riyat Khan and others "

This Court in case titled “Jabir Khan v/s State” reported as 2025 P Cr. LJ 2140, has held as follows: -

"The GCS of patient was 14/15. The patient was in hypovolemic shock at the time of examination. If a person is in hypovolemic shock with effected brain functioning, he cannot talk with sanity. Self-stated that GCS 14/15 which is mentioned only denotes the response of a patient by opening his eyes obeying certain commands, moving his limbs and talking."

"In medical science there are two stages one of consciousness and the other of fit state of mind... the doctor's certificate only said that the patient was conscious, it did not say that the patient was in a fit state of mind.”

Nawab (D.B.) Hon’ble Mr. Justice Dr. Khurshid Iqbal Hon’ble Mr. Justice Salah-ud-Din

The aforesaid rational was also affirmed by the Hon”ble Lahore High Court in case titled “Zeeshan Ali & others v/s State & others” reported as 2025 YLR 822, wherein it was held that: -

"MLR (Exh. PC) of Tehmina Bibi (deceased/the then injured) shows that she reached hospital on 26.08.2021 at 03:55 p.m. (soon after 1 hour and 25- minutes of the occurrence) and was conscious, well oriented in time, place and person having GCS (Glasgow Coma Scale) 15/15. Naeem Maqsood ASIPW-10 after getting the information regarding the present occurrence also reached T.H.Q. Hospital, Kallar Syedan and moved written application (Exh.PE) to obtain permission from Medical Officer for recording the statement... whereupon Dr. Humairah Khalid Pw-4 (Medical Officer) has specifically stated in writing at the bottom of said application (Exh.PE) that she (deceased/ the then injured) is able to make her statement. A dying declaration is valid when the declarant has GCS of 15/15 and is certified by a doctor as being able to make a statement.”

10.Now coming to the testimony of the scribe of the initial report of the injured/complainant, namely Wahid Islam, IHC, PW-4, it is his deposition that on 05.07.2023 at about 16:30 hours, the then injured, now deceased, Tariq Zaman was brought to Dargai Hospital in a private motorcar, whereupon he recorded his statement in the shape of Murasila (Ex.

PA/1). According to him, the said statement was correctly thumb-impressed and signed by the Nawab (D.B.) Hon’ble Mr. Justice Dr. Khurshid Iqbal Hon’ble Mr. Justice Salah-ud-Din

injured. However, significantly, his deposition is conspicuously silent about compliance with the essential requirements governing the recording of a dying declaration. In particular, he did not state that the statement was recorded by him verbatim, word for word, according to the actual words, version and wishes of the maker, nor did he explain the manner in which he satisfied himself that the contents being reduced into writing truly represented the statement voluntarily made by the injured. More importantly, PW-4 candidly admitted in his cross-examination that, before recording the statement of the injured, he neither got examined by the doctor concerned, nor obtained any separate certificate regarding his consciousness or fitness to make a statement. The only material relied upon by him in this regard was the mere mention of the GCS score of the injured on the Murasila. He further admitted that the Murasila contains no recital to the effect that, at the time of recording the alleged dying declaration, the injured was well oriented in time and space. He also conceded that although the GCS of the injured was mentioned as 13/15, however, the Murasila does not Nawab (D.B.) Hon’ble Mr. Justice Dr. Khurshid Iqbal Hon’ble Mr. Justice Salah-ud-Din

disclose the particular time at which such GCS assessment was carried out. Thus, even the scribe of the alleged dying declaration was unable to demonstrate from the contemporaneous record that, at the precise time of recording the statement, the injured possessed the requisite mental faculties to comprehend the questions, understand the consequences of his statement and furnish a coherent and voluntary account of the occurrence. There is yet another circumstance which cannot be lost sight of.

PW-4 admitted in his cross-examination that, while making the alleged initial report, the injured did not disclose the names of any private witnesses and, significantly, did not apprise him of his official status as a police constable, serving in the CTD Department. This omission assumes considerable significance in the peculiar facts of the present case, particularly when the prosecution seeks to attribute to the deceased an extraordinary degree of awareness regarding the legal and procedural consequences of making such a statement. If the injured was indeed in a sufficiently alert, oriented and mentally fit condition to make a detailed and legally conscious Nawab (D.B.) Hon’ble Mr. Justice Dr. Khurshid Iqbal Hon’ble Mr. Justice Salah-ud-Din

dying declaration, his failure to disclose even his official status, coupled with the absence of any mention of private witnesses, becomes a circumstance requiring a satisfactory explanation from the prosecution. Furthermore, PW-4 stated that, at the time of recording the report of the complainant, he was accompanied by two private persons, as well as other staff members. The presence of several persons around the injured at the relevant time, coupled with the absence of any independent certification regarding his fitness and the failure to record the statement in a manner demonstrating that it was the spontaneous and unprompted account of the maker, introduces a further possibility of consultation, prompting or deliberation before the report was reduced into writing. Although the mere presence of other persons may not, by itself, invalidate a dying declaration, in the peculiar circumstances of the present case, yet it assumes material significance when considered cumulatively with the unexplained discrepancy in GCS, absence of the time of its assessment, non- recording of the injured's orientation in time and Nawab (D.B.) Hon’ble Mr. Justice Dr. Khurshid Iqbal Hon’ble Mr. Justice Salah-ud-Din

space, absence of a separate fitness certificate, and the scribe's failure to state that the declaration was recorded verbatim and without interpolation or prompting. Viewed cumulatively, the testimony of PW-4 does not provide the requisite assurance regarding the voluntariness, spontaneity, mental fitness and reliability of the alleged dying declaration. Rather, his own admissions expose material deficiencies in the manner in which the Murasila was recorded, thereby rendering it unsafe to place substantive reliance upon the same in the absence of strong, independent and confidence- inspiring corroboration. It would not be out of place to reiterate that, in cases involving a dying declaration, the testimony of the reporting officer assumes paramount importance. The evidence of the reporting officer or scribe, particularly during examination-in-chief, constitutes the very foundation upon which the authenticity and reliability of such declaration rests. The prosecution is, therefore, required to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the declaration faithfully represents the exact words and narration of the declarant, without any Nawab (D.B.) Hon’ble Mr. Justice Dr. Khurshid Iqbal Hon’ble Mr. Justice Salah-ud-Din

extraneous prompting, tutoring, interpolation or embellishment on the part of the scribe or any other person. Any material doubt in this regard would necessarily impair the evidentiary value of the dying declaration. Reference can be made to the judgment of Hon”ble apex Court in case titled “Somaid v/s Ali Gohar alias Gohar Zaman” reported as 2019 SCMR 1008, wherein it was held that: - “Prosecution must demonstrate beyond shadow of doubt that it comprises of the words of declarant alone without extraneous prompting or additions; the person who records dying declaration is therefore a most important witness to verify veracity thereof."

Likewise, in case titled “Farman Ullah v/s Qadeem Khan” reported as 2001 SCMR 1474, it was earlier held by the august Supreme Court of Pakistan in respect of the matter-an-issue: - "Exact contents of the dying statement should be proved by reliable evidence, and for this reason a dying statement recorded by a competent Magistrate in the proper manner in the words of the maker of the declaration"

In case titled “Zarif Khan v/s State” reported as PLD 1977 Supreme Court 612, it was held by the august Supreme Court of Pakistan: - "Exact contents of the dying statement should be proved by reliable evidence, and for this reason a dying statement recorded by a competent Nawab (D.B.) Hon’ble Mr. Justice Dr. Khurshid Iqbal Hon’ble Mr. Justice Salah-ud-Din

Magistrate in the proper manner in the words of the maker of the declaration"

11.Now coming to the testimonies of the private prosecution witnesses, namely Afsar Ali, PW-7, Muhammad Islam, shopkeeper, an abandoned PW, and Muhammad Zaman, PW-9, father of the deceased then injured. First and foremost, it is pertinent to observe that the names of none of the aforesaid witnesses find mention in the initial report of the occurrence recorded in the shape of “Murasila” by the deceased then injured. So far as PW-7, Afsar Ali, is concerned, he is admittedly a maternal cousin of the deceased and was a taxi driver by profession.

According to his testimony, on the day of occurrence, i.e. 05.07.2023, he was present at the place of occurrence, commonly known as Meharday Chowk, near the shop of one Muhammad Islam. He further deposed that at about 04:15 p.m., the appellant came there duly armed with a pistol and started firing upon the deceased Tariq Zaman, as a result whereof, he sustained severe injuries. He also stated that due to the firing, the showcase of the shop of Muhammad Islam was damaged and that immediately after the occurrence, he shifted the Nawab (D.B.) Hon’ble Mr. Justice Dr. Khurshid Iqbal Hon’ble Mr. Justice Salah-ud-Din

deceased then injured to the hospital in his taxi motorcar. The aforesaid version of PW-7, however, does not inspire confidence. A pertinent question arises as to what occasion or circumstance brought this witness to the crime scene. The place of occurrence was admittedly not a taxi stand, but a busy chowk. Therefore, his mere presence there, without any plausible explanation, creates a serious doubt regarding his availability at the spot.

Significantly, in his statement before the Court, he did not furnish any explanation as to whether he had gone there for picking up or dropping off any passenger or for any other specific purpose. This omission assumes greater significance when his presence is projected as that of a natural and independent eyewitness. It is also noteworthy that, according to the consistent version of the injured/complainant as well as the scribe of the “Murasila”, the deceased then injured was shifted to Dargai Hospital in a private motorcar. For the sake of argument, even if it is assumed that the deceased then injured, being in an extremely critical condition, was shifted to the hospital by his close relative, i.e.

Nawab (D.B.) Hon’ble Mr. Justice Dr. Khurshid Iqbal Hon’ble Mr. Justice Salah-ud-Din

PW-7 Afsar Ali, in his taxi, his name ought to have been mentioned by the deceased then injured in his initial report, particularly when PW-7 claims himself to be an eyewitness of the occurrence and also the person who immediately attended upon and shifted the injured to the hospital. The omission to mention his name, therefore, cannot be brushed aside as a mere inconsequential lapse. More importantly, during cross-examination, PW-7 deposed that the complainant-party had been called by him and the injured/complainant Tariq Zaman to the hospital, thereby suggesting that he remained in the company of the injured from the very inception of the occurrence. If that were so, the failure of the deceased then injured to disclose his name in his initial report becomes all the more significant and casts a serious shadow upon his subsequent introduction as an eyewitness. PW-7 further stated that, at the relevant time, he (PW-7), the shopkeeper Muhammad Islam and the deceased Tariq Zaman were present at the place of occurrence. However, the prosecution has not produced Muhammad Islam, the alleged shopkeeper whose showcase was Nawab (D.B.) Hon’ble Mr. Justice Dr. Khurshid Iqbal Hon’ble Mr. Justice Salah-ud-Din

purportedly damaged in the firing, to corroborate this version. Such non-production of a witness, who according to PW-7 was present at the spot and whose property allegedly suffered damage during the occurrence, further weakens the evidentiary value of his testimony. So far as PW-9 Muhammad Zaman, father of the deceased then injured, is concerned, his testimony is of little assistance to the prosecution, as admittedly he was not an eyewitness of the occurrence. His evidence is, at best, in the nature of last-seen or post-occurrence evidence. According to him, on the day of occurrence, at Asar Vela, he was present in the vicinity of his house when, in the meanwhile, his nephew Saddam Khan, the appellant herein, came there duly armed with a pistol and was running towards his house. He further stated that the appellant apprised him that he had made firing upon the deceased at Meharday Chowk, in front of the shop of Muhammad Islam. Significantly, during cross-examination, PW-9 candidly admitted that he was not an eyewitness to the occurrence. Even otherwise, the conduct attributed to the appellant by PW-9 does not appeal to reason. If, for the sake of Nawab (D.B.) Hon’ble Mr. Justice Dr. Khurshid Iqbal Hon’ble Mr. Justice Salah-ud-Din

argument, it is accepted that the appellant had actually fired upon the deceased at Meharday Chowk, there appears to be no plausible explanation as to why, instead of making good his escape from the place of occurrence, he would voluntarily proceed towards the vicinity of house of his uncle and disclose to him that he had fired upon the deceased. Such conduct is wholly unnatural and does not conform to ordinary human behaviour, particularly in the aftermath of a serious firearm assault. Consequently, the testimony of PW-9, being admittedly non-ocular and resting mainly upon the alleged conduct and disclosure of the appellant, cannot safely be relied upon to connect the appellant with the commission of the offence. Viewed cumulatively, the unexplained presence of PW-7 at the place of occurrence, his close relationship with the deceased, the material omission of his name from the initial report, the doubtful account regarding the shifting of the injured to the hospital, the non- production of the alleged shopkeeper Muhammad Islam, and the inherently unnatural conduct attributed to the appellant by PW-9 render the Nawab (D.B.) Hon’ble Mr. Justice Dr. Khurshid Iqbal Hon’ble Mr. Justice Salah-ud-Din

testimonies of these private witnesses highly doubtful. Their evidence, therefore, does not furnish the prosecution with the independent and confidence-inspiring corroboration necessary to sustain the charge against the appellant.

12.It is an admitted feature of the record that Muhammad Islam was one of the most material and relevant witnesses of the prosecution, as the occurrence allegedly took place in front of his shop and his presence at the place of occurrence stands prima facie established. It is further borne out from the record that, allegedly on account of the firing made by the appellant, the showcase of the shop of said Muhammad Islam was also damaged. During the course of investigation, his statements were recorded U/Ss 161 and 164, Cr.P.C., and, significantly, he was also examined as a prosecution witness before the Court during the proceedings- initiated U/S 512, Cr.P.C. Thus, his evidence was not only available to the prosecution but assumed considerable significance in determining the truthfulness of the prosecution case. However, despite the aforesaid material developments and the Nawab (D.B.) Hon’ble Mr. Justice Dr. Khurshid Iqbal Hon’ble Mr. Justice Salah-ud-Din

arrest of the appellant, the prosecution, for reasons neither disclosed nor satisfactorily explained, chose to abandon the said material witness and withheld him from the witness-box. Such unexplained withholding of a natural, independent and material witness, particularly one whose presence at the crime scene and whose connection with the occurrence are otherwise established from the record, cannot be viewed lightly. In these circumstances, an adverse inference under Article 129(g) of the Qanun-e- Shahadat Order, 1984, is legitimately attracted against the prosecution, to the effect that had Muhammad Islam been produced and examined after the arrest of the appellant, his testimony would not have supported the prosecution case. The deliberate non-production of such a material witness, therefore, casts a serious doubt upon the veracity and reliability of the prosecution version. Reliance is placed on the judgment of the Hon”ble apex Court, rendered in the case of “Muhammad Rafique & others v/s State”.

In the cited judgment, it was held by the Hon”ble apex Court that it is well-settled that if any party withholds a best piece of evidence, then it can fairly Nawab (D.B.) Hon’ble Mr. Justice Dr. Khurshid Iqbal Hon’ble Mr. Justice Salah-ud-Din

be presumed that said party had some sinister motive behind it. Presumption under Article 129(g) of Qanun-e-Shahadat Order can fairly be drawn in terms that that if P.W. Amir Ali would have been examined, his evidence would have been unfavorable to the prosecution [1]. Further guidance is also sought from the judgment of Hon”ble Supreme Court of Pakistan, rendered in case titled “Lal Khan v/s State” reported as 2006 SCMR 1846 and judgment of this Court, delivered in case titled “Wakil Khan v/s State & others” reported as 2021 YLR Note 62.

13.Insofar as the circumstantial evidence is concerned, the alleged recovery of the weapon of offence, i.e. a .30-bore pistol, was effected at the instance of the appellant after his arrest, vide recovery memo Ex. PW-1/5 dated 28.01.2024.

Although the FSL report (Ex. PY) is positive, wherein it was opined that the four crime empties, marked C-1 to C-4, had been fired from one and the same .30-bore weapon, however, such report is of little consequence in the peculiar circumstances of “Muhammad Rafique and others Vs. State and others” (2010 SCMR 385 Nawab (D.B.) Hon’ble Mr. Justice Dr. Khurshid Iqbal Hon’ble Mr. Justice Salah-ud-Din

the present case. This is so because the crime empties recovered from the place of occurrence were sent to the FSL only after the arrest of the appellant and, significantly, after the alleged recovery of the firearm from his possession. Thus, the subsequent positive FSL report merely establishes a nexus between the crime empties and the recovered weapon; it does not, by itself, establish that the recovered pistol was the very same weapon used by the appellant in the commission of the offence, particularly when the recovery itself stands effected after his arrest and the prosecution evidence otherwise fails to furnish an independent and unimpeachable link connecting the appellant with the alleged weapon. Reference can be made to the judgment of Hon”ble apex Court rendered in case titled “Khuda-e-Dad alias Pehlwan v/s State” reported as 2017 SCMR 701. Even otherwise, it is otherwise well settled by now that “when substantive evidence fails to connect an accused person with commission of an offence or is disbelieved, corroborative evidence is of no help to prosecution”s Nawab (D.B.) Hon’ble Mr. Justice Dr. Khurshid Iqbal Hon’ble Mr. Justice Salah-ud-Din

case” [2]. The Hon”ble Supreme Court of Pakistan also reiterated the same rational by holding that “recovery of incriminating articles is used for the purpose of providing corroboration to the ocular testimony” [3].

14.In view of the above discussion, when neither any direct nor any circumstantial evidence is available on face of the record, as such, case of prosecution is full of doubts all-around, therefore, the appellant has to be extended its benefit.

15.Even otherwise, it is well settled that even a single worth reliable doubt is sufficient enough to extend its benefit to an accused person [4 ]. Further reliance is placed on the judgments of Hon”ble apex Court cited as “Daniel boyd (Muslim name Saifullah) vs the State” (1992 SCMR 196), case titled “Ghulam Qadir and 2 others vs the State” (2008 SCMR 1221) and case titled “Muhammad Zaman vs. the State” (2014 SCMR

16.For what has been discussed above, this Court is of the firm view that the prosecution has Muhammad Afzal alias Abdullah and others vs. The State and others” reported as 2009 SCMR 639

“Imran Ashraf & 7 others v/s The State” reported as 2001 SCMR 424 “Tariq Pervaiz v/s State” reported as 1995 SCMR 1345.

Nawab (D.B.) Hon’ble Mr. Justice Dr. Khurshid Iqbal Hon’ble Mr. Justice Salah-ud-Din

failed to prove its case against appellant namely Saddam Khan, beyond reasonable doubt, therefore, his conviction cannot be maintained. Resultantly, while extending him the benefit of doubt, the instant criminal appeal bearing No. 319-M of 2025 is allowed and the impugned order/judgment of conviction and sentence dated 11.11.2025 recorded by learned trial Court is set aside and consequently appellant named above is acquitted of the charges leveled against him. The appellant shall be released forthwith from the jail, if not otherwise required in any other case.

17.On eve of acceptance of the instant criminal appeal, the Murder Reference No.08-M of 2025 is answered in negative.

18.These are reasons of our short order of even date.

Announced -Sd- Dt. 12.5.2025 JUDGE

-Sd-

JUDGE

Nawab (D.B.) Hon’ble Mr. Justice Dr. Khurshid Iqbal Hon’ble Mr. Justice Salah-ud-Din