Peshawar High Court

Collector Sales Tax on Services, KPRA, Hayatabad Peshawar Vs M/S Al-Maida Cafe

Outcome The reference was answered by modifying the Tribunal’s judgment: the Rs. 4,799,326/- demand was set aside, while the admitted Rs. 342,322/- liability was upheld.

Case
Sales Tax Reference No. 42-P of 2024 with CM No. 67/2024
Type
Revenue
Length
14 pages

Summary

AI-generated · quotes checked against the text

This reference concerned whether KPRA could seize a restaurant’s records under Rule 6 and Section 72 without first obtaining a judicial warrant under Section 74. The Court held that the warrantless raid was void and the tax demand based on the seized records could not stand, but it upheld the separately admitted liability of Rs. 342,322/-.

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Written by AI from the judgment's text and may miss nuance. Rely on the full judgment below and the court's official copy. Court's own note: (a) Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Finance Act (2013) & KP Sales Tax on Services Act (2022)--- ---Ss. 72 & 74 [Ss. 60 & 62 of 2022 Act] read with Sales Tax Act (1990) Ss. 38 & 40 and Rule 6 of KP Delegation of Enforcement Powers Rules (2017)--- Routine Inspection Access vs. Search under Judicial Warrant---Mandatory Nature of Magistrates Warrant for Coercive Raid.--- Section 72 of the Act of 2013 (Section 60 of the Act of 2022) merely authorizes routine administrative access to business premises for inspection. Conversely, Section 74 of the Act of 2013 (Section 62 of the Act of 2022) strictly governs coercive searches and seizures, requiring a search warrant from a Judicial Magistrate upon reasonable belief. Where the Revenue seeks to execute a coercive raid and seize private records, it cannot bypass the mandatory requirement of obtaining a judicial warrant under Section 74 by taking refuge under \"routine access\" under Section 72 or subordinate rules (Rule 6). A search conducted without a warrant is void ab initio. Ref: Messrs Ihsan Yousaf Textile Mills v. Federation of Pakistan (2003 PTD 2037); Collector of Sales Tax v. Messrs Mega Tech (Pvt.) Ltd. (2005 SCMR 1166); Chairman, CBR v. Messrs Haq Cotton Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. (2007 SCMR 1039); Commissioner Inland Revenue / Directorate of I&I v. Team A-Ventures (Pvt) Ltd. (2026 PTCL 320 Sindh). (b) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order (1984) & Constitution of Pakistan (1973)--- ---Art. 18 read with Art. 14(1) of the Constitution---Admissibility of Evidence---Sole Relevancy Test vs. Statutory Prerequisites & Fundamental Rights---Inadmissibility of Constitutionally Tainted Evidence.--- Relevancy under Article 18 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, does not serve as the sole criteria for admissibility when evidence is collected through an unlawful and unconstitutional search. General evidentiary rules of relevancy cannot override specific statutory prohibitions (Section 74 warrant prerequisite) or constitutional guarantees protecting dignity and privacy of home under Article 14(1) of the Constitution. Evidence gathered through executive lawlessness partakes the character of a coerced confession and must be excluded in adjudication proceedings to establish tax liability. Ref: Bisvil Spinners (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Pakistan (PLD 1992 SC 96); Kuruma v. R. [1955] AC 197; Pooran Mal v. Director of Inspection (AIR 1974 SC 348); United States v. Janis (428 US 433); K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India ((2017) 10 SCC 1). (c) Sales Tax / Constitutional Law--- ---Doctrine of Fruit of the Poisonous Tree---Exclusionary Rule in Fiscal Matters---Invalidity of Tax Demand Founded on Illegally Seized Records.--- Records seized during an illegal, warrantless search under Section 74 (Section 62) constitute the \"fruit of a poisonous tree\". Such evidence is poisoned at its source and cannot be received in evidence or relied upon by the Assessing Officer to create a tax demand against the taxpayer. Consequently, the tax demand of Rs. 4,799,326/- calculated exclusively on the basis of illegally seized records is legally unsupportable and set aside. Ref: Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States (251 US 385); Nardone v. United States (308 US 338); Messrs Ihsan Yousaf Textile Mills v. Federation of Pakistan (2003 PTD 2037); CIR / Directorate of I&I v. Team A-Ventures (Pvt) Ltd. (2026 PTCL 320 Sindh). (d) Sales Tax / Evidence Law--- ---Doctrine of Independent Source Exception---Voluntary Production of Financial Books & Admission of Tax Liability---Enforceability of Untainted Liability.--- The rule excluding illegally obtained evidence is subject to the recognized \"independent source\" exception. Facts and admissions derived from a separate, lawful, and independent source remain fully admissible. Where the taxpayer voluntarily produces its financial records during adjudication and explicitly admits sales tax liability (Rs. 342,322/-), such liability is untainted by the illegal raid and remains fully enforceable under the law. Ref: Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States (251 US 385); CIR / Directorate of I&I v. Team A- Ventures (Pvt) Ltd. (2026 PTCL 320 Sindh). Reference answered accordingly.

Full judgment

Official copy

PESHAWAR HIGH COURT, PESHAWAR

(Reference Jurisdiction) Sales Tax Reference No.42-P/2024 with CM No.67/2024 Collector Sales Tax on Services, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Revenue Authority, Hayatabad, Peshawar.

V.

M/S Al-Maida Café, Shop No.22, Zangal Market, Street-01, Sector F-8, Peshawar and others.

Petitioner(s) by: Mr. Atta Ullah Khan, Advocate. Respondent(s) by: Mr. Hakeem Khan, Advocate. Date of hearing: 09.06.2026

JUDGMENT

SYED ARSHAD ALI, J.-

1.This Sales Tax Reference has been filed by the petitioner under Section 71 of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Sales Tax on Services Act, 2022 (“the Act of 2022”), seeking the opinion of this Court on the questions of law framed in the memo of reference, which are alleged to arise out of the judgment dated 30.04.2024 passed by the worthy Appellate Tribunal for Sales Tax on Services, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Peshawar (“the Tribunal”).

2.M/S Al-Maida Café is providing restaurant/food services at Shop No.22, Zangal Market, Street No.01, Sector F- 8, Phase-6, Hayatabad, Peshawar; therefore, its economic activity is subject to tax on services in terms of Entry No.1 of the Second Schedule to the Finance Act, 2013 (“the Act of 2013”). The respondent was enrolled with the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Revenue Authority on 16.03.2020; however, it had failed to file any tax returns despite its registration.

3.The record placed before us shows that, on 25.02.2021, the Assistant Collector sought permission from the

Additional Collector (Headquarters) to proceed under Rule 6 of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Delegation of Enforcement Powers Rules, 2017 (“the Rules”), for visiting the premises and taking into possession the record of the respondent/restaurant. The requisite permission was granted on 26.02.2021 and was formally communicated vide Order No.7(3-2)/KPRA/AC-Non- Corporate/2021/12797, dated 01.03.2021. Pursuant to the said order, the Assistant Collector (Non-Corporate) visited the premises of the respondent/restaurant and took the following record into custody, copies whereof were provided to the Manager/owner of the restaurant:

Description Quantity Pad 07 Bills 15 Registers 10 Copies 08 Box file 01 Simple mobile 03

4.The recovering officer was of the opinion that, upon analysis of the sales tax record, it was found that M/S Al-Maida Café/respondent had not paid sales tax on its taxable services for the period from 16.03.2020 to February 2021. Accordingly, on the basis of the record obtained from the premises, he calculated the tax liability of the respondent as follows:

S.No. Tax Periods (On the Sales Value record) 1 Mar-20 (16 days) 2,059,030 2 Apr-20 3,404,420 3 May-20 3,706,480 4 Jun-20 5,039,140 5 Jul-20 5,888,860 6 Aug-20 4,248,060 7 Sep-20 5,529,850 8 Oct-20 5,968,290 9 Nov-20 6,423,840 10 Dec-20 6,495,540 11 Jan-21 6,402,300 12 Feb-21 4,825,760 Total 59,991,570

5.On the basis of the aforesaid calculation, a show- cause notice was issued to the respondent on 11.03.2021. The respondent/restaurant seriously contested the calculation and also produced its own record in support of its contention regarding the amount of sales tax payable. In the first round of litigation, an assessment order was passed by the Assessing Officer; however, the Tribunal remanded the matter on certain grounds.

6.During the re-adjudication proceedings, the Assessing Officer furnished a detailed calculation of the tax liability of the respondent on the basis of the record recovered by the department as well as the record subsequently produced by the respondent. The said calculation is reproduced as under:

Sales Value Sales Value as Record Taken Sales Value Per Income Tax Sales Value into Custody as Record (FY 2019-20) Record Per Rule 06 of Submitted by Record Submitted by MONTH KP Delegation RP Submitted by RP of During First RP During Second Enforcement Adjudication During First Adjudication Power Rules, Adjudication

Mar 20 (16

Days) Apr-20 3,404,420 340,115 - 334,279 May-20 3,706,480 330,410 - 327,320 Jun-20 5,039,140 320,962 - 323,370 Jul-20 5,888,860 386,120 - 387,180 Aug-20 4,248,060 376,550 - 377,180 Sep-20 5,529,850 385,540 - 384,649 Oct-20 5,968,290 378,410 - 366,565 Nov-20 6,423,840 368,670 - 364,540 Dec-20 6,495,540 390,190 - 386,232 Jan-21 6,402,300 385,020 - 363,855 Feb-21 4,825,760 368,260 - 319,650 Total 59,991,570 4,390,687 4,775,500 4,279,030 Sales Tax

7.The aforesaid calculation shows that the Revenue determined the tax liability of the respondent on the basis of the record taken into custody at Rs.4,799,326/-, whereas the

maximum amount of sales tax admitted by the respondent for the relevant period was Rs.382,040/-. The Assessing Officer rejected the calculation furnished by the respondent and, vide order dated 19.06.2023, ordered recovery of Rs.4,799,326/-. The first appellate forum, vide order dated 15.11.2023, upheld the said order.

8.The worthy Tribunal, however, vide the impugned judgment dated 30.04.2024, set aside both orders on the legal premise that, since no search warrant had been obtained in terms of Section 74 of the Act of 2013, therefore, the seizure of the record by the Revenue officer under Section 72 was not legally permissible. In reaching this conclusion, the Tribunal relied upon the judgment of the Inland Revenue Appellate Tribunal, Lahore, in Messrs Munir Foundry.1

9.The Revenue has filed the instant reference, questioning the findings of the Tribunal and seeking interpretation of Sections 72 and 74 of the Act of 2013, read with Rules 5 and 6 of the Rules. In order to appreciate the respective contentions of the parties, it would be appropriate to first reproduce the relevant provisions of law upon which the parties have relied.

Section 72 of the Act of 2013

72.Authorized officers to have access to premises, stocks, accounts and records.---(1) Any officer, authorized in this behalf by the Authority by notification in the official Gazette, shall have free and full access to the business premises, registered office or any other place where any business records or documents required under this Act and the rules are kept or maintained by any registered person or a person liable for registration or whose business activities are covered under this Act and the rules or who may be required for any inquiry or investigation in any tax fraud committed by him or his agent or any other person; and such officer may, at any time, inspect the records, data, documents, correspondence, accounts, statements, utility bills, bank statements, information regarding nature and sources of funds or assets with which his business is financed, and any other records or documents, including those which are required under any other law maintained in any form Messrs Munir Foundry v. C.I.R. (Appeals-II), Lahore and others (2016 PTD (Trib.)

or mode and may take into his custody such records, statements, diskettes or documents, in original or copies, in such form as the officer may deem fit against a signed receipt.

(2)The registered person, his agent or any other person specified in sub-section (1), shall answer any question or furnish such information or explanation as may be asked by the authorized officer.

(3)All other Government departments, local bodies, autonomous bodies, corporations or such other institutions shall supply requisite information and render necessary assistance to the authorized officer in the course of inquiry or investigation under this section.

Section 74 of the Act of 2013

74.Searches under warrants.---(1) Where any officer has reason to believe that any documents or things which in his opinion, may be useful for, or relevant to, any proceedings under this Act are kept in any place, he may after obtaining a warrant from the Magistrate or from the Collector, enter that place and cause a search to be made at any time.

(2)All searches made under sub-section (1) shall be carried out in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure,1898 (V of 1898).

Rule 5 of the Rules

5.Inspection of business premises --- (1) The Deputy Collector or the Assistant Collector, subject to the prior approval of the Deputy Collector, may, at any time, with or without prior notice to the owner or occupant of the business premises, inspect the business premises whether the conditions laid down in clauses (a) to (h) of sub-rule (2) of rule 7 are fulfilled or otherwise.

(2)The Deputy Collector or the Assistant Collector, as the case may be, while inspecting the business premises, shall disclose to the owner or occupant of the business premises for the purpose of his inspection.

Rule 6 of the Rules

6.Access to records--(1) The Deputy Collector or the Assistant Collector, as the case may be, may take into his possession any record relating to the business, involving rendition of taxable services; provided that an attested copy of such records may be given to the owner or occupant of the business premises in such manner as the Deputy Collector or the Assistant Collector, as the case may be, may deem appropriate.

(2)Where record is maintained in electronic form, the Deputy Collector or the Assistant Collector, as the case may be, may take into possession the computer equipments and allied gadgets etc, in such manner as deem necessary and every person, who has been or is working on such computer equipments for the maintenance of record or carrying out any other electronic documentation activity, shall be under

obligation to disclose access code or password, if any, for retrieval of the information stored therein.

(3)When the official purpose for which any record, including computer equipments, has been served to the satisfaction of the Deputy Collector or the Assistant Collector, as the case may be, such record or equipment shall be returned under proper receipt; provided that nothing shall bar the Deputy Collector or the Assistant Collector, as the case may be, to retain copy of the documents or information contained in such record or equipment.

10.The plain reading of Section 72 ibid demonstrates that an authorized officer of the Revenue has free access to the business premises of a registered person for the purpose of inspecting records, data, documents, etc., and may also take into his custody such records, statements, etc., as may be required for the purposes of inquiry or investigation into a tax fraud allegedly committed by a taxpayer. Rule 6 of the Rules further supplements and gives effect to the power contemplated under Section 72.

11.Nevertheless, such statutory powers cannot be exercised in disregard of the constitutional guarantees relating to the dignity of man and privacy of home. Public functionaries, while exercising statutory powers, are required to act fairly, transparently and strictly in accordance with law while dealing with the person or property of a citizen, even where such citizen is alleged to have committed an offence, much less in a matter relating to tax fraud or tax evasion.

12.The essential question, therefore, is whether Section 72 of the Act of 2013 is to be read in isolation or whether it is required to be read conjointly with Section 74, both provisions forming part of the statutory scheme governing inspection, search and seizure of the business premises of a taxpayer in the course of an inquiry or investigation into tax fraud.

13.We have before us pari materia provisions contained in the Sales Tax Act, 1990 (“the Act of 1990”), dealing with the powers of Revenue officers to have access to the business

premises of a registered person and to obtain a search warrant.2 Section 38 of the Act of 1990 is pari materia with Section 72 of the Act of 2013. The scheme governing search and inspection of business premises under the Act of 1990 was elaborately delineated by the Lahore High Court in Messrs Ihsan Yousaf Textile Mills3. The opinion rendered by Nasim Sikandar, J., as he then was, constitutes a landmark and valuable exposition of . Section 38 of the Act of 1990. Authorised officers to have access to premises, stocks, accounts and records – (1) Any officer authorised in this behalf by the Board or the Commissioner shall have free access including real-time electronic access to business or manufacturing premises, registered office or any other place where any stocks, business records or documents required under this Act are kept or maintained belonging to any registered person or a person liable for registration or whose business activities are covered under this Act or who may be required for any inquiry or investigation in any tax fraud committed by him or his agent or any other person; and such officer may, at any time, inspect the goods, stocks, records, data, documents, correspondence, accounts and statements, utility bills, bank statements, information regarding nature and sources of funds or assets with which his business is financed, and any other records or documents, including those which are required under any of the Federal, Provincial or local laws maintained in any form or mode and may take into his custody such records, statements, diskettes, documents or any part thereof, in original or copies thereof in such form as the authorised officer may deem fit against a signed receipt.

(2)The registered person, his agent or any other person specified in sub-section (1) shall be bound to answer any question or furnish such information or explanation as may be asked by the authorised officer. (3) The department of' direct and indirect taxes or any other Government department, local bodies, autonomous bodies, corporations or such other institutions shall supply requisite information and render necessary assistance to the authorised officer in the course of inquiry or investigation under this section. (4) For the purpose of sub- section (1), the Board may make rules relating to electronic real-time access for audit or a survey of persons liable to tax.

Section 40 of the Act of 1990. Searches under warrant.– (1) Where any officer of Inland Revenue has reason to believe that any documents or things which in his opinion, may be useful for, or relevant to, any proceedings under this Act are kept in any place, he may after obtaining a warrant from the magistrate, enter that place and cause a search to be made at any time.

(2)The search made in his presence under sub-section (1) shall be carried out in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (V of 1898).

Section 40A of the Act of 1990 before omission by Finance Act, 2006. Search without warrant.---(1) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 40, where any officer of Sales Tax not below the rank of an Assistant Collector of Sales Tax has reason to believe that any documents or things which, in his opinion, may be useful for, or relevant to, any proceeding under this Act are concealed or kept in any place and that there is a danger that they be removed before a search can be effected under section 40, he may, after preparing a statement in writing of the grounds of his belief for which search is to be made, search or cause search to be made for such documents or things in that place.

(2)Any officer or person who makes a search or causes a search to be made under subsection (1) shall leave a signed copy of the statement referred to in that section in or about the place searched and shall, at the time the search is made or as soon as is practicable thereafter, deliver a signed copy of such statement to the occupier of the place at his last known address.

Messrs Ihsan Yousaf Textile Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. Faisalabad vs. Federation of Pakistan through Ministry of Finance, Islamabad and 4 others (2003 PTD 2037).

the jurisprudence governing the collection of records from the business premises of a taxpayer by a Revenue officer where there are reasons to believe that the taxpayer is involved in tax fraud. His Lordship aptly observed that Section 38 of the Act of 1990 cannot be construed in isolation so as to confer an unfettered power upon an officer of the Revenue to conduct a search and seize documents or records of a taxpayer. Section 38 is essentially an enabling provision authorizing access to the premises, accounts and records of a registered person and, where necessary, taking into custody relevant material found during such routine visit; whereas a planned or regular search and seizure undertaken for the purpose of collecting evidence is governed by the specific safeguards and procedure prescribed under Sections 40 and 40-A of the Act of 1990. Thus, where the Revenue seeks to conduct an actual search and seizure rather than merely exercise its right of access under Section 38, it must resort to the procedure prescribed by the specific provisions of Sections 40 and 40-A and cannot circumvent those statutory safeguards by taking shelter under the general expression “free access” contained in Section 38. The judgment further emphasizes that general provisions cannot be invoked so as to defeat or render redundant specific statutory provisions prescribing conditions for search and seizure, particularly where constitutional guarantees relating to the person and property of a citizen are involved. Crucially, the Court held at para 18:

Mr. Tariq Kamal Qazi, Advocate, also appearing for the first petitioner is right in pointing out that an illegal search and seizure must be set at naught right from its inception otherwise the purpose of Constitutional guarantees with regard to person and. property of an individual shall be completely defeated. He has pointed out that the learned Division Bench of the Karachi High Court while accepting the petition also made a direction that all material, books of accounts etc. be returned to the registered person. According to Mr. Tariq Kamal Qazi, Advocate, fruit of a poisonous tree cannot be allowed to be enjoyed. A tree not grown by dint of labour or acquired by lawful means is a poisonous tree and its fruit cannot be allowed to be enjoyed by

the offender. Every evidence collected through an illegal means, howsoever incriminating, partakes the colour of a confession extracted through torture. It is not admissible in evidence in any legal tradition jurisdiction of the world. It needs to be discarded through and through.

14.Subsequently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Messrs Mega Tech (Pvt.) Ltd.4 substantially upheld the ratio of Messrs Ihsan Yousaf. In Messrs Mega Tech, the Apex Court authoritatively clarified the interrelationship between Sections 38, 40 and 40-A of the Act of 1990. Although Section 38 empowers an authorized officer to have free access to the business or manufacturing premises, stocks, records and documents of a registered person and to inspect the same, such power cannot be construed in isolation or as conferring an unlimited authority to search and impound documents. The Supreme Court held that Sections 40 and 40-A are to be read harmoniously with Section 38 and that, where the Revenue intends to conduct an actual search and seize or impound documents relevant to proceedings under the Act of 1990, the specific statutory procedure governing search must be followed. Ordinarily, under Section 40, the officer is required to obtain a search warrant from the Magistrate and the search is to be conducted in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. Only in an emergent situation falling within the strict requirements of Section 40-A— namely, where there exists a genuine and reasonable belief, founded upon credible and material circumstances, that the documents or things are in danger of being removed before a search can be effected under Section 40 may a search be conducted without a warrant, subject to the safeguards prescribed therein. The Supreme Court expressly rejected the notion that Section 38 could be invoked as a device to bypass Section 40 and confer unlimited or unbridled powers upon the Revenue, holding that “reasonable belief” must have a direct Collector of Sales Tax and Central Excise (Enforcement) and another vs. Messrs Mega Tech (Pvt.) Ltd. (2005 SCMR 1166).

nexus with strong and material circumstances and cannot rest upon mere suspicion or an anonymous complaint. Thus, Section 38 merely facilitates access and inspection, whereas the power of coercive search and seizure is controlled by Sections 40 and 40-A, and the former cannot be employed to circumvent the mandatory safeguards prescribed by the latter provisions.

15.In Messrs Haq Cotton Mills (Pvt.) Ltd.5, the Apex Court reaffirmed the ratio of Messrs Mega Tech and made it abundantly clear that Section 38 of the Act of 1990 cannot be construed or invoked in isolation from Sections 40 and 40-A thereof. The Supreme Court, while examining the scope of the powers of the Sales Tax authorities to enter the premises of a taxpayer and take into possession its books, documents and records, held that the statutory scheme contained in Sections 38, 40 and 40-A was required to be read harmoniously. Ordinarily, where an officer has reason to believe that documents or things relevant to proceedings under the Act are kept at a particular place, Section 40 mandates obtaining a search warrant from the Magistrate before entering the premises and conducting a search. The exception carved out by Section 40-A, permitting a search without a warrant, was conditional and could be resorted to only where the officer, not below the prescribed rank, had reason to believe that the documents or things were concealed or kept at the place and that there was a danger of their removal before a search under Section 40 could be effected. Moreover, the officer was required to record in writing the grounds of such belief and comply with the other statutory safeguards. Thus, Section 38 did not confer an independent, unfettered or unlimited power upon the officer of Inland Revenue to enter the business premises and seize or impound documents without recourse to the safeguards prescribed under Sections 40 and 40-A. Any action involving search and seizure was, therefore, required to Chairman, Central Board of Revenue and others vs. Messrs Haq Cotton Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. Burewala (2007 PTD 1351).

conform to the statutory procedure, and a search conducted without a warrant, in the absence of the exceptional circumstances and mandatory requirements contemplated by Section 40-A, was without lawful authority and rendered the consequential seizure unsustainable in law.

16.The statutory landscape was further clarified by the Division Bench of the Sindh High Court in the recent decision Team A-Ventures6. The Court observed that following the deletion of Section 40-A by the Finance Act, 2006, tax authorities possess zero power to search business premises without obtaining a prior warrant from a Magistrate under Section 40 of the Act of 1990. The Court reiterated that discretionary statutory powers under tax laws can only be exercised for legitimate statutory objects and cannot be converted into unbridled “fishing inquiries” to hunt for potential tax evasion.7

17.In examining the merits of the instant Sales Tax Reference, an essential question of law arises as to whether, under Article 18 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, relevancy serves as the sole test for the admissibility of evidence, and whether material obtained through an irregular or illegal search can be relied upon in civil tax proceedings. It is necessary to consider the classic legal proposition, historically advanced in decisions such as Bisvil Spinners8, Kuruma9, Pooran Mal10, Malkani11, and Kharak Singh,12 that if evidence is relevant and probative, the court is unconcerned with the method by which it was obtained. Upon a meticulous analysis of the statutory framework governing sales tax on Commissioner Inland Revenue / Directorate of I&I v. Team A-Ventures (Pvt) Ltd. et al. (2026 PTCL 320 Sindh).

Commissioner Inland Revenue v Pakistan Beverages Ltd. (2018 SCMR 1544); Assistant Director, Intelligence and Investigation, Karachi v. B. R. Herman PLD (1992

SC 485).

Bisvil Spinners (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Pakistan (PLD 1992 SC 96).

Kuruma v. R. (1955) 1 All ER 236 (PC).

Pooran Mal v. Director of Inspection (AIR 1974 SC 348).

R.M. Malkani Vs. State of Maharashtra [1972 INSC 234/ 1973 (1) SCC 471].

Kharak Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1964) 1 SCR 332.

services in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and binding constitutional precedents, we find that this proposition cannot be accepted to validate warrantless searches and illegal seizures under fiscal statutes for the following reasons:

i. Article 18 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, embodies the general law of evidence governing the test of relevancy. However, where a special fiscal statute, such as the Act of 2013 (Section 74) or the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Sales Tax on Services Act, 2022 (Section 62) expressly prescribes a mandatory procedural prerequisite requiring executive officers to obtain a judicial warrant from a Magistrate prior to executing a coercive search, that specific statutory command operates as a legal barrier against warrantless intrusions. Invoking general principles of evidentiary relevancy to sanitize records seized in direct violation of a statutory prohibition would completely nullify the legislative mandate of Section 74. Under the well- established maxim generalia specialibus non derogant, the specific statutory protection enacted by the Legislature to govern searches and seizures overrides general evidentiary rules. The executive cannot be permitted to defeat a clear statutory prohibition by relying upon general rules of evidence.

ii. The traditional common law doctrine that ‘relevancy is all that matters’ originated in era prior to the constitutionalization of fundamental human rights. Modern constitutional jurisprudence has established a firm distinction between mere technical procedural irregularities and fundamental constitutional violations. Article 14(1) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan guarantees the inviolability of dignity of man and the privacy of home. A warrantless raid on business premises is not a mere formal flaw; it constitutes an unconstitutional invasion of private property. As

demonstrated by the 9-Judge Bench decision of the Supreme Court of India in K.S. Puttaswamy13, which departed from Kharak Singh and Pooran Mal (supra), the evidence gathered through executive lawlessness in violation of fundamental privacy rights is constitutionally tainted. Executive zeal for revenue collection cannot be prioritized over fundamental constitutional guarantees.

iii. Under the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa sales tax framework, Section 74 of the Act of 2013 (Section 62 of the Act of 2022) does not draw any distinction between civil assessment proceedings and criminal prosecutions. The statutory requirement of a judicial warrant attaches directly to the power of search and seizure itself. Where the initial search and seizure is legally void for want of a warrant, the state cannot utilize the fruits of that unlawful act to create a tax demand against the citizen in adjudication proceedings

18.Applying these reasons to the present case, the departmental raid conducted on 01.03.2021 at the premises of M/S Al-Maida Café under Rule 6 of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Delegation of Enforcement Powers Rules, 2017 without obtaining a search warrant from a Judicial Magistrate under Section 74 of the Act of 2013 was void ab initio. The opinion rendered by the worthy Tribunal regarding the legality of the collection of documents by the Assessing Officer, in the manner and mode explained above, is in consonance with the law laid down in Messrs Ihsan Yousaf Textile Mills, Messrs Mega Tech (Pvt.) Ltd. and Messrs Haq Cotton Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. Under the doctrine of the ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’, evidence obtained through an unlawful search is poisoned at its origin and cannot be received in evidence. Consequently, the tax demand of Rs. 4,799,326/- calculated by the Assessing Officer exclusively on the basis of the illegally seized records is legally unsustainable K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1.

and is hereby set aside.

19.However, a clear distinction must be maintained regarding the ‘independent source’ exception to the exclusionary rule. Facts and admissions derived from an independent, untainted source remain admissible. During adjudication, respondent M/S Al-Maida Café voluntarily submitted its financial records and explicitly admitted a sales tax liability of Rs. 342,322/- for the periods from 16.03.2020 to February 2021. Because this admission and supporting record were provided voluntarily by the taxpayer independent of the unlawful search of 01.03.2021, the tax liability of Rs. 342,322/- is untainted and legally recoverable.

20.Therefore, the instant tax reference is answered in the above terms. The impugned judgment of the worthy Tribunal dated 30.04.2024 shall stand modified to the extent indicated above. A copy of this judgment be sent to the worthy Tribunal in terms of section 71(5) of the Act of 2022.

JUDGE

JUDGE

Date of hearing: Date of Signing:

DB: Honorable Mr. Justice Syed Arshad Ali & Hon’ble Mr. Justice Muhammad Faheem Wali

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