Mst. Saira Noor Vs Nisar Ahmad & others

PESHAWAR HIGH COURT, PESHAWAR

(JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT)

W.P No. 3028-P/2025

Mst. Saira Noor.

V.

Nisar Ahmad & Others.

For the Petitioner: Mr. Gulsadbar, Advocate For Respondents: Mr. Muhammad Altaf, Advocate Research assistance: Mr. Mazhar Ali Khan, Research & Reference Officer Date of hearing: 12.01.2026

JUDGMENT

MUHAMMAD FAHEEM WALI, J.- The petitioner, Saira Noor, has invoked the constitutional jurisdiction of this Court under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 (Constitution), to call into question the Order dated 28.02.2025 passed by the learned Additional District Judge-III, Charsadda (appellate court), whereby the appeal filed by the petitioner was dismissed and the Order, Judgment and Decree dated 27.05.2023 passed by the learned Senior Civil Judge/Rent Controller, Charssada (Rent Controller) was upheld.

2.Facts of the matter are that the petitioner filed an eviction petition under Section 13 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 (Rent Ordinance) against the

respondents seeking eviction and recovery of arrears of rent since June 2019. The precise case of the petitioner is that she owns a property measuring 12 Kanals 11 Marlas. She leased 4 Kanals of this property to the respondents, Nisar Ahmad and others, under a lease agreement dated 06.01.2005 for the operation of a CNG Pump known as Grace CNG Station. The lease expired on 31.02.2019. After the expiration of the lease, the respondents failed to vacate the premises or pay rent, which led to their classification as willful defaulters. The petitioner also alleged that the respondents occupied an additional 1 Kanal of her land without her permission and tried to deduct 9 Marlas from the leased land based on a mutation No. 4441 dated 07.11.2016.

3.In response to the eviction petition, the respondents asserted that the petitioner had sold the disputed property to Mst.

Salma Begum, who subsequently transferred it to her son, Hamid Mehmood. The said Hamid Mehmood further sold the property to one Faisal Aizaz, who executed a lease deed dated 15.09.2020 in favor of the respondents, thereby denying any legal relationship with the petitioner. During the proceedings before the Rent Controller, after framing of issues, the petitioner produced three witnesses, including her special attorney. Consequently, the Rent Controller dismissed the eviction petition on 27.05.2023, concluding that no landlord-tenant relationship existed. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner filed an appeal, which was also dismissed by the appellate court, affirming the Rent Controller’s decision on the ground that since the petitioner sold out the rented property, and therefore, she lacked a valid interest in the property.

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4.Arguments heard and record perused.

5.The key question that arises for determination in the instant petition is: whether the petitioner, after having sold her interest in the leased property, can still be regarded as a landlord or landlady within the meaning of Section 2(c) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, thereby maintaining the right to file an eviction petition against the respondents?

6.The evolution of rent laws in the region illustrates a progressive response to the complexities of landlord-tenant relationships over time, shaped significantly by socio-economic factors. The first legislative attempt to regulate these relationships was made with the introduction of the Transfer of Property Act in 1882. This Act provided the framework for eviction and the extinction of tenancy, specifying that tenants acquiring immovable property for agricultural or manufacturing purposes could be evicted with six months' notice, while those renting premises for residential or business purposes were subject to a shorter notice period of 15 days. In the aftermath of World War II, the acute housing shortages in major cities prompted the government to enact more targeted legislation to manage rent levels and restrict landlords’ rights to lease properties. This led to the establishment of the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act in 1941, followed by the NWFP House Rent Control Act of 1946. The Punjab Act was later replaced by the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act of 1947, which introduced significant restrictions on landlords' rights to evict tenants at will and to unilaterally increase rents. This Act also established a Page 3 of 10

Special Tribunal to resolve disputes between landlords and tenants.

7.The legislative framework continued to evolve with the enactment of the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act of 1949, which was subsequently amended by the Punjab Act XVI of 1952.

Concurrently, the NWFP received the NWFP Premises (Requisition and Eviction) Act of 1953, while Sindh introduced the Sind Rent Restriction Act of 1952, which applied to select urban areas, excluding Karachi. In response to the need for a unified approach, the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance was introduced in 1956, consolidating rent laws across the newly formed province. This Ordinance was later replaced by the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Act of 1957 and ultimately by the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance of 1959, which remained effective until the dissolution of One Unit in 1970. After this period, the Ordinance was adapted by the provinces of Punjab, Sindh, NWFP, and Balochistan, with Sindh revising its laws in 1979 and Punjab making changes in 2007 and 2009. The Cantonment areas of the country were governed by the Cantonments Rent Restriction Act of 1963. The trajectory of these legislative developments reflects a concerted effort to balance the rights and obligations of landlords and tenants, responding to the evolving needs of society while providing a legal framework for the regulation of rents and tenant relationship.

8.The Rent Ordinance as applicable in the Province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa establishes a comprehensive framework to regulate the landlord-tenant relationship within urban areas of the Page 4 of 10

Province. The Ordinance aims to restrict the increase of rent and provide protections against arbitrary eviction of tenants. Key provisions include the determination of fair rent (Section 4), the prohibition of landlords charging excess rent (Section 6), and the conditions under which eviction may occur (Section 13).

Additionally, the Ordinance mandates that landlords must maintain essential amenities (Section 10) and outlines the procedures for appeals against decisions made by the Controller (Section 15). The statutory scheme reflects a balance between the rights of landlords and the protections afforded to tenants, ensuring stability in rental agreements within the urban context.

9.To fully comprehend the legal position germane to the present petition, it is essential to evaluate the true scope and meaning of the phraseology “landlord” as provided under section 2(c) of the Rent Ordinance, which is reproduced below for ready reference:

(c)“landlord” means any person for the time being entitled to receive rent in respect of any building or rented land whether on his own account or on behalf or for the benefit of any other person, or as a trustee, guardian, receiver executor or administrator for any other person, and includes a tenant who sublets any building or rented land in the manner hereinafter authorized and every person from time to time deriving title under a landlord;

The above provisions of Section 2(c) reveal a broad and inclusive definition of “landlord” within the context of the Rent Ordinance. Firstly, it encompasses any individual who is “entitled to receive rent” for a building or rented land, regardless of whether they hold ownership directly or manage the property on behalf of another. This provision recognizes the rights of agents and representatives who collect rent for the benefit of property Page 5 of 10

owners. Furthermore, it extends to “trustees, guardians, receivers, executors, and administrators,” making it clear that those in fiduciary roles concerning the property are classified as landlords and are subject to the same legal obligations in managing the property. Notably, the definition also includes “tenants who sublet” the premises in accordance with the Ordinance, which designates them as landlords to their subtenants. Lastly, it encompasses all individuals who “derive title from a landlord,” thus recognizing subsequent owners or assignees of the property as landlords as well. This comprehensive framework is essential for determining the rights and responsibilities of all parties engaged in rental agreements under the Ordinance, promoting clarity and fairness in landlord-tenant relationships.

10.The term “landlord” as defined in Section 2(c) is not synonymous with “owner,” yet the two concepts are inextricably linked when the entitlement to receive rent flows from title. The statutory definition pivots on the phrase “for the time being entitled to receive rent.” This implies a present and subsisting right. When a landlord transfers the ownership of a rented building to a third party, the right to receive rent generally passes to the vendee by operation of law, specifically under Section 8 and Section 109 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. Consequently, the vendor, having divested himself/herself of the title, ordinarily ceases to be a “landlord” within the meaning of the Rent Ordinance, as he/she is no longer entitled to receive rent or capable of conferring possession upon the tenant. However, this general proposition is subject to a significant exception recognized by the superior courts. The relationship of landlord Page 6 of 10

and tenant may survive the sale of property if there exists a specific stipulation or “contract to the contrary” between the vendor and the vendee. In the landmark judgment of Muhammad Amin v. Ghulam Murtaza (PLD 1967 Lahore (W.P.) 1020), the Lahore High Court held that:

9.The question is whether the right to give the property on lease passed with the transfer of ownership in the present case or not. All the rights and liabilities `attached' to a property pass to the person to whom the property passes. The rela-tionship between the landlord and tenant is, however, based on contract and would not create a privity of contract between the vendee of the property and the lessee under the vendor. It was with a view to getting over this difficulty that section 109 of the Transfer of Property Act provides for the transfer of all the rights of the lessor to the transferee‐ “If the lessor transfers the property leased, . . . . . the transferee, in the absence of a contract to the contrary, shall possess all the rights . . . . . .” It, however, restricted the transfer to two qualifications‐

(a)that the liabilities of the lessor shall be deemed to have been transferred to the transferee only if the lessee so elects, and (b) that even the transfer of all the rights may be subject to restriction by a contract between the lessor and the trans-feree.

In the present case, the stipulation contained in the conveyance and referred to above is "a contract to the contrary" so far as the right to possession is concerned because by it the delivery of possession has been made dependent upon the decision of the peti-tion for eviction filed by the lessor.

Conversely, where no such reservation of rights exists, the vendor loses the locus standi to seek eviction. The cause of action regarding default or other grounds attached to the property enures to the benefit of the new owner, who steps into the shoes of the previous landlord. The Sindh High Court in Mst. Sher Bang Dad v. Kasim (1987 MLD 2352) expounded this position as below:

“4. Mr. Aziz Urfi, on the other hand, submitted that the Lahore case is distinguishable because in that case previous landlord had retained the right of securing Page 7 of 10

the rent from the tenant and therefore the relationship was held to continue. While in the present case no right of recovery of rent had been retained by appellant No. 1 and hence according to the definition of landlord as contained in section 2 of West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, the relationship of the appellant No. 1 with the respondent had come to an end. It appears to me that the position adopted by Mr. Urfi is weightier in view of the definition of ‘landlord’ where the basic qualification is the entitlement to recover the rent.”

Similarly, in Mst. Haseena Begum v. Mst. Nazma Begum (1991 MLD 2329), the Lahore High Court in somehow similar facts of the present petition held:

“7. The main burden of argument presented by the learned counsel for the petitioners in support of this petition was that the respondents 1 to 3 became owners of the property on 30-6-1982 when sale-deeds in their favour were executed by Agha Safdar Jang etc. and since the default in the payment of monthly rent regarding the said two months of November and December, 1980 relates to the period prior thereto therefore, they could not avail of the said default for seeking an order for striking off the defence of the petitioners. The argument in my opinion is not tenable. The application of the respondents 1 to 3 for substitution of their names as petitioners for Agha Safdar Jang etc. was accepted through order, dated 31- 1-1983 and the petitioners did not challenge that order on the ground that the entire period of default alleged in the ejectment petition on the basis of which eviction of the petitioners was sought related to the period prior to the date of the purchase of the property by them as such they could not be substituted as petitioners. If the petitioners' case was that the said default did not enure for the benefit of the purchaser they should have challenged the said order. Even otherwise, the payment of rent of premises is a right and liability attached to the property and its non- payment the consequence of which is the default on the basis of which eviction of the premises could be claimed subsists for the benefit of the new landlord in the like manner as is available in respect of ground of subletting and the damage to the property. Agha Safdar Jang etc. did not seek the ejectment of the petitioners on the ground of their personal need. Had it been so an argument could be raised that their personal need could not be availed of by the new landlord for seeking tenant's eviction. This view finds support from judgment reported as Abdul Rauf v. Nawab Ali and 3 others (P L D 1986 Kar.117).”

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11.Applying these legal principles to the factual matrix of the instant case, it is evident that the petitioner, Saira Noor, alienated her proprietary rights without any apparent reservation of the right to possession or rent collection post-sale and this fact has never been brought on record. More crucially, the record demonstrates that the ultimate vendee, Faisal Aizaz, has already exercised his rights as the new landlord by executing a fresh lease deed dated 15.09.2020 with the respondents. This act unequivocally signifies that the entitlement to receive rent and the power to regulate the tenancy have effectively passed to the new owner. The existence of a direct tenancy agreement between the new owner and the respondents severs any residual nexus the petitioner might have claimed under the shadow of the Muhammad Amin case (supra).

12.Once the petitioner lost the title and the corresponding right to receive rent, she ceased to be a “landlord” under Section 2(c) of the Rent Ordinance. An eviction petition is a mechanism for the recovery of possession; a person who has no right to possession cannot maintain a petition for it. While the petitioner may have a claim for the recovery of arrears of rent accrued up to the date of sale, such a claim essentially transforms into a actionable debt recoverable through a civil suit, rather than a ground for eviction in a rent petition she no longer has the standing to prosecute. The learned courts below, therefore, rightly appreciated that with the sale of the property and the attornment of the tenants to the new owner, the petitioner’s locus standi to seek eviction evaporated.

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13.For the reasons recorded above, this Court finds no illegality or jurisdictional defect in the impugned orders passed by the learned Rent Controller and the learned Appellate Court. The petitioner, having sold the property and failing to demonstrate any contractual reservation of landlordship, could not maintain the eviction petition. The petition is, accordingly, dismissed.

Parties are left to bear their own costs.

Sd/-

JUDGE

Date of hearing & announcement

D.B (SB) Mr. Justice Muhammad Faheem Wali

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