Dr. Shabana Ayub Vs Zeeshan Khan & others

JUDGMENT SHEET

PESHAWAR HIGH COURT, PESHAWAR

(Judicial Department)

Writ Petition No. 2634-P/2025

Dr. Shabana Ayub Vs Zeeshan Khan & Others

Mr. Muhammad Asif, Advocate, for the petitioner.

Mr. Waqas Ur Rehman, Advocate, for the respondents.

Date of hearing: 14.09.2026

JUDGMENT

BABAR SATTAR, J. The petitioner has impugned a Revisional Order dated 12.04.2025 passed by the learned Additional District Court, whereby the Order of the learned Civil Court dated 20.02.2025, dismissing the application filed by the petitioner under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (“CPC”), was upheld.

2.The respondents filed a suit for recovery of damages in the amount of Rs.25 million to compensate for the injury and mental torment inflicted upon them by virtue of the medical treatment administered to respondent No.2. The Civil Court framed issues and invited the parties to produce their evidence. The respondents produced several witnesses and their testimonies were recorded. When the petitioner was

invited to produce her evidence, she filed an application under Order VII, Rule 11 of the CPC for rejection of the plaint. The Civil Court dismissed the application on the basis that the respondents were not required by law to first file an application before the Pakistan Medical and Dental Council (“PMDC”) as a prerequisite to pursuing a tortious claim for damages before the Civil Court. The Civil Court noted that the suit was filed in 2016 and entailed a factual controversy that required recording of evidence for determination of the respondents’ entitlement to the damages being claimed. The order dismissing the petitioner’s application was impugned before the learned Additional District Court. In such proceedings, learned counsel for the petitioner raised the additional ground that in terms of Section 13 of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Health Care Commission Act, 2015 (“Health Care Act”), the respondent had a remedy of filing a complaint before the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Health Care Commission (“Commission”), which was a mandatory requirement, and without availing such remedy, the respondents could not bring a claim for damages before the Civil Court. The said contention was rejected by the learned Additional District Court.

3.Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner was a doctor and fell within the definition of “health care service provider” in terms of Section 2(k) of

the Health Care Act. It was an admitted fact that the respondents, who had brought a suit for damages against the petitioner for medical malpractice and negligence, had not availed the remedy of filing a complaint in terms of Section 13 of the Health Care Act. That the Health Care Commission was vested with the power under Section 6 of the Health Care Act to investigate any maladministration or failures on the part of health care service providers and pass consequential orders. Section 6(3) of the Health Care Act vested certain powers of a Civil Court in the Health Care Commission.

Section 18 of the Health Care Act vested the Commission with the authority to impose fine. Section 19 of the Health Care Act provided that no suit or other legal proceedings related to provision of health care services would lie except under provisions of the said law. Section 20 excluded the jurisdiction of civil courts in relation to matters falling within the domain of the Health Care Act. Section 33 of the Health Care Act granted overriding effect to the provisions of the said law over any other law for the time being enforced. In view of the scheme of the law as well as the law laid down by the Peshawar High Court in Dr. Naim Ullah vs. Izaz Khan (FAO No.208-P/2021), Lady Doctor Getman Alla Alias Aliya Wahab vs. The State & Others (PLD 2026 Peshawar 23), Lady Doctor Nargas vs. The State (2025 PHC 5369/ WP No. 994-A/2023), it had been held that no other court or

authority had no jurisdiction in relation to matters falling within the domain of the Commission, and even an FIR could not be registered prior to the question of malpractice by a health care service provider being investigated by the Commission. It was submitted that the impugned order was liable to be set aside.

4.Learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the respondents had suffered tremendously at the hands of the petitioner and consequently filed a suit for damages on 11.06.2026. The question of jurisdiction of the Commission was never raised before the Civil Court and was raised for the first time before the Additional District Court almost 9 years after the filing of the suit. The jurisdictional challenge was therefore an afterthought and a tactical maneuver to delay adjudication of the matter being tried competently by the Civil Court. It was submitted that PMDC could regulate the license of a doctor, but could not grant damages. Similarly, under Section 18 of the Health Care Act, the Commission could impose fine of up to Rupees 1 million on a health care establishment, but could not grant damages to a person injured due to medical malpractice by a doctor. Section 1(2) of the Health Care Act limited the regulatory scope of the Commission to health care establishments, the definition of which did not include an individual health care service provider. He submitted that plenary jurisdiction of the Civil

Court in terms of Section 9 of the CPC could not be ousted by implication. The question of grant of damages due to the malpractice of a doctor did not fall within the scope of the Health Care Act and the doctrine of implied ouster of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was therefore not attracted, as held by the Civil Court and the Additional District Court.

5.The petitioner has raised the question of whether or not jurisdiction is vested in the Civil Court in terms of Section 9 of the CPC to entertain a suit for grant of damages for medical negligence and/or malpractice by a doctor, in view of the provisions of the Health Care Act, which is a special law granted overriding effect in terms of Section 33 of the Health Care Act, while ousting the jurisdiction of civil courts in relation to matters that fall within the scope of the Health Care Act. It is settled law that the question of whether or not an adjudicatory authority is vested with jurisdiction over a matter can be raised at any stage in the proceedings. The submission of the respondents that the objection ought to have been raised in the first instance before the Civil Court is therefore without force. The question before this Court is whether, in view of the provisions and the scheme of the Health Care Act, jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain a suit for damages filed by a person alleging medical malpractice and negligence on the part of a doctor and

bringing a claim against such doctor is ousted either explicitly or by necessary implication.

6.Let us reproduce below for convenience the relevant provisions of the Health Care Act that would require interpretation for purposes of addressing the question before us:

1.Short title, application and commencement.--(1) This Act may be called the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Health Care Commission Act, 2015.

(2)It shall apply to all the health care establishments in public and private sectors,- a) owned, managed or administered by Government or non-profit organizations, charities, trusts, corporate sector or by any person, or group of persons incorporated or not; and b) operated and managed under allopathic system, complementary and alternative medical treatment system recognized in Pakistan.

2.Definitions.---In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires, the following expressions shall have the meanings hereby respectively assigned to them, that is to say, a) "Commission" means the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Health Care Commission, established under section 3 of this Act;

i)"healthcare establishment" means a hospital, diagnostic centre, blood banks, medical clinics, nursing home, maternity home, dental clinic, homeopathy clinic, Tibb clinic, acupuncture, physiotherapy clinic or any other premises or conveyance- j) "health care services" mean services provided in public and private sectors for diagnosis, treatment or care of

persons suffering from any physical or mental disease, injury or disability including procedures that are similar to forms of medical, dental or surgical care but are not provided in connection with a medical condition and includes any other service notified by Government;

k) "health care service provider" means an owner, manager or in charge of a healthcare establishment and includes a person registered by the Medical and Dental Council, Council for Tibb, Council for Homeopathy or Nursing Council;

6.Powers and functions of the Commission.---(1) The Commission shall perform such functions and exercise such powers as may be required to ensure the safety of patient and health staff and to improve quality of public and private healthcare services.

(2)Without prejudice to the generality of the provisions of sub-section (1), the Commission shall,-

g) enquire and investigate into mal- administration, malpractice and failures in the provision of private healthcare services and issue consequential advice and orders; o) devise mechanism to deal with quackery;

p) to monitor service performance against prescribed standards;

(3). The Commission may exercise the same powers as are vested in a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), in respect of the following matters:

a) summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath;

b) compelling the production of documents;

c) receiving evidence on affidavits; and d) issuing Commission for the examination of witnesses.

19.Immunity.---No suit, prosecution or other legal proceedings related to provision of private health care services shall lie against a health care establishment except under this Act.

20.Bar of jurisdiction.---Save as provided in this Act, no Court other than the Court of the District and Sessions Judge shall have jurisdiction,- a) to question the validity of any action taken, or intended to be taken, or order made, or anything done or purporting to have been taken, made or done under this Act; or

b) to grant an injunction or stay or to make any interim order in relation to any proceeding before, or anything done or intended to be done or purporting to have been done by, or under the orders or at the instance of the Commission.

31.Regulations.---(1) The Commission may make regulations, not inconsistent with the provision of this Act and the rules, for carrying out the purposes of this Act.

(2)The power to make regulations conferred by this section shall be subject to the condition of previous publication and, before making any regulations, the draft thereof shall be published, in the official Gazette, two newspapers of wide circulation and on the website of the Commission, for eliciting public opinion thereon within a period of not less than fifteen days from the date of publication.

33.Overriding effect.---Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any

other law, the provisions of this Act shall have an overriding effect and the provisions of any such law to the extent of inconsistency to this Act shall cease to have effect.

7.While the petitioner did not cite or rely upon the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Health Care Commission (Complaints Management) Regulations, 2022 (“Regulations”), consideration of the same is essential for purposes of adjudication of the instant claim. The provision of relevance for our purposes is Regulation 13, part of which is reproduced below:

13.Complaints.---(1) An aggrieved person may, within sixty days from the date of knowledge of the cause of action, file a complaint against a healthcare service provider or healthcare establishment by submitting an application in writing supported by an affidavit, national identity card number and address of the aggrieved person.

(2)The Commission shall not entertain an anonymous or pseudonymous complaint against a private health care service provider or healthcare establishment.

8.Let us first consider the scheme of the Health Care Act and the legislative intent manifested by its provisions. The objects clause reflects that the Health Care Act was promulgated for purposes of regulating health care establishments as defined in Section 2(i) of the Health Care Act, and to ban quackery in all its forms. Consequently, Section 1(2), which states the scope of application of the law, provides that it applies to “all the health care establishments

in public and private sector”. This is relevant as the definition of “health care establishment” does not specifically include individual “health care service providers”, which is a term separately defined by Section 2(k) of the statute. Chapter II of the Health Care Act deals with the establishment of the Health Care Commission and its management etc. Section 6 prescribes its powers and functions.

9.A perusal of the sub-clauses under Section 6(2) reiterates the legislative purpose by focusing on the regulation of health care establishments. The tool provided by the legislature to regulate health care establishments is the grant, renewal, suspension and cancellation of licences to be granted to health care establishments by the Commission. Section 6(2)(g) vests the Commission with the power to “inquire and investigate into maladministration, malpractice and failures in the provision of private health care services and issue consequential advice and orders.” It is important to note that while provision of health care services by individual health care service providers would implicitly fall within the definition of “health care services” as defined by clause 2(j) of the statute, the provisions of the Health Care Act do not vest in the Commission the authority to regulate or license health care service providers, as such authority is vested in the PMDC under a federal law. Sub-clause 6(2)(i) then vests in the Commission the power to “impose and collect fines on

violation, breach or non-compliance of the provisions of this Act, rules, regulations and standards.” This power is correlated to Section 18 of the Health Care Act, reproduced above, which confers jurisdiction on the Commission to impose fines “for contravention of a provision of this Act, rules or regulations” and then impose a fine of up to Rupees 1 million. Section 18(2) obliges the Commission to consider granting opportunity and time to a health care establishment to improve itself prior to imposition of fine. Section 19 similarly grants immunity to health care establishments against legal proceedings in relation to provision of health care services except as provided under the Health Care Act. Likewise, the bar of jurisdiction under Section 20 of the Health Care Act prohibits courts other than the Court of District and Sessions Judge to question the validity of proceedings being undertaken under provisions of the Health Care Act.

10.The only provision that grants the Commission some measure of oversight over health care service providers is Section 13 of the Health Care Act, pursuant to which the Commission can receive, from an aggrieved person, a complaint against a health care establishment or a health care service provider. Whether or not the Commission has authority to impose a fine on a health care service provider, if found liable for maladministration or malpractice, is not a question directly before the Court. However, given the scope

of the Health Care Act and its object of regulating health care establishments, as opposed to individual health care service providers, as discussed above, the question of whether or not Section 18(1) envisages imposition of fines on individual health care service providers (except when such service providers are providing medical services as part of a health care establishment) would need interpretation in an appropriate case. For our purposes, what is relevant is the scheme of the Health Care Act vesting in the Commission the power to issue, suspend and cancel licenses, as the effective tool of regulation, and to impose and collect fines from health care establishments as the relevant disciplinary and accountability measure. What the Health Care Act does not empower the Commission to do is to adjudicate claims for damages brought by aggrieved persons against health care service providers, or impose compensatory damages on health care establishments or health care service providers. This is evident from a combined reading of Section 6(2)(e), (f), (g),

(h)and (i) read with Sections 13 and 18 of the Health Care Act. Sections 31 and 32 empower the Commission and the Government to frame regulations and rules, respectively, to give effect to the provisions of the Health Care Act. Section 33 then provides that provisions of the Health Care Act would be given overriding effect over the provisions of any other law inconsistent with provisions of the Health Care Act. It is in

view of such provision that the petitioner seeks a finding from this Court that the jurisdiction of civil courts in terms of Section 9 of the CPC stands ousted impliedly for being in breach with provisions of the Health Care Act. In the context of such argument, there are a few points to be flagged before we proceed to consider the relevant principles of statutory interpretation.

11.The first matter to take note of is that Section 6(3) vests in the Commission the powers vested in a Civil Court under the CPC, but only for purposes of summoning persons, compelling production of documents, receiving evidence on affidavits and issuing commission for examination of witnesses which is a standard legislative device to empower executive authorities to perform and discharge investigatory duties. Such powers required for purposes of enquiry and investigation give effect to the mandate of the Commission under Section 6(2)(g) of the Health Care Act, but do not include the power to adjudicate claims of damages in adversarial proceedings, which is a quintessential judicial function. It is also essential to note that the Commission, as conceived and constituted, is not a judicial tribunal. The second matter to note, as has already been flagged above, is that Section 18(1) conceives of imposition of fines by the Commission as a corrective measure to improve healthcare establishments, and the text of

such provision cannot be read so as to confer on the Commission the power to impose damages on healthcare service providers. The scope of the immunity clause under Section 19 of the Health Care Act is in consonance with the overall scheme of the statute, which requires that any suit, prosecution or other proceedings against “healthcare establishment, not be taken, except in accordance with the provisions of the Healthcare Commission Act.” Thus, the immunity clause is also designed to limit its scope to proceedings against health care establishments.

12.These matters are of relevance in appreciating the scope of Regulation 13 of the Regulations, that has been reproduced above. While Section 31 of the Health Care Act vests in the Commission the power to make regulations for carrying out the purposes of the Act, Regulations 13(1) and

(2)seem to extend beyond the four corners of the parent law, by creating a power to impose penalties on healthcare service providers, and also grant damages to persons aggrieved by medical negligence practiced by healthcare establishments or healthcare service providers. The Regulations have not been collaterally challenged before this Court for being ultra vires the Health Care Act. Consequently, this Court need not render an opinion on their legality. The Regulations are being considered here only to consider a possible argument that the jurisdiction of Civil Courts in terms of Section 9 of the CPC

ought to be ousted by implication in view of provisions of the Health Care Act, when read with Regulation 13 of the Regulations, as such holistic reading empowers the Commission to afford a remedy that an aggrieved party could seek from the Civil Court in a suit for damages.

13.It is in this context that this Court has considered and found that Regulation 13 cannot be read into provisions of the Health Care Act, as the penalties provided in terms of the said regulation does not flow from the provisions of the Health Care Act. Regulation 13 creates a penalty not provided for by Section 18 or any other provision of the Health Care Act. It cannot be read into the Health Care Act in breach of the doctrine of casus omissus, for purposes of applying the doctrine of implied ouster. Let us now restate some of the certain principles of statutory interpretation relevant for our purposes.

14.It is a settled principle of jurisprudence re Section 9 of the CPC that exclusion of the plenary jurisdiction of Civil Courts is not to be readily inferred and any provision ousting such jurisdiction is to be strictly construed. It was held by the Supreme Court in Abbasia Cooperative Bank vs.

Hakeem Hafiz Muhammad Ghaus and Others, (PLD 1997, Supreme Court 3), “The Civil Courts under section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure are competent to try all suits of civil nature except those in which their jurisdiction is barred either

expressly or by necessary implication. It is a well-settled principle of interpretation that the provision contained in a statute ousting the jurisdiction of Courts of general jurisdiction is to be construed very strictly and unless the case falls within the letter and spirit of the barring provision, it should not be given effect to.”

15.The correct approach to construing non-obstante provisions is that such provisions operate as an ouster only in case of a conflict or inconsistency with other statutory provisions. It was held by the Supreme Court in Packages Limited vs. Muhammad Maqbool and Others, (PLD 1991, Supreme Court 258), that, “a non obstante' clause operates as an ouster of the earlier provisions only where there is a conflict and inconsistency between the earlier provisions and those contained in the later provision and, therefore, must be read in the context in which it is operating. Accordingly, a non obstante clause will operate as ouster only if an inconsistency between the two is found to exist."

16.In Muhammad Mohsin Ghuman vs.

Government of Punjab (2013 SCMR 85), the Supreme Court cited with approval the following text from Interpretation of Statutes by N. S. Bindra:

“It has to be read in the context of what the legislature conveys in the enacting part of the provision. It should first be ascertained what the enacting part of the section provides on a fair construction of words used according to

their natural and ordinary meaning and the non obstante clause is to be understood as operating to set aside as no longer valid anything contained in relevant existing law which is inconsistent with the new enactment. The enacting part of a statute must, where it is clear, be taken to control the non obstante clause where both cannot be read harmoniously, for even apart from such clause a later law abrogates earlier laws clearly inconsistent with it.

The proper way to construe a non obstante clause is first to ascertain the meaning of the enacting part on a fair construction of its words. The meaning of the enacting part which is so ascertained is then to be taken as overriding anything inconsistent to that meaning in the provisions mentioned in the non obstante clause. A non obstante clause is usually used in a provision to indicate that that provision should prevail despite anything to the contrary in the provision mentioned in such non obstante clause. In case there is any inconsistency between the non obstante clause and another provision one of the objects of such a clause is to indicate that it is the non obstante clause which would prevail over the other clauses. It does not, however, necessarily mean that there must be repugnancy between the two provisions in all such cases. The principle underlying non obstante clause may be invoked only in the case of 'irreconcilable conflict”

17.The third principle relevant for our purposes is that if there are two possible interpretations of seemingly conflicting statutory texts, the construction that resolves the conflict is to be preferred, to uphold the presumption of legality that attaches to the statutes, which presumption is founded on the basis that the legislature would not intentionally leave conflicting statutes in the field at the same time. This principle was articulated in Bhoruka Steel Ltd. vs.

Fairgrowth Financial Services Limited [5 (1997) 89 Comp Cas 547 (Special Court)] quoted with approval by the Supreme Court in Mushahid Shah vs. Federal Investigation Agency (2017 SCMR 1218). It was noted that “It is the second rule of interpretation that if one construction leads to conflict, whereas on another construction two acts can be harmoniously construed, then the latter must be adopted”.

This principle was also articulated by the Lahore High Court in State vs. Syed Mir Ahmed Shah (PLD 1970 Quetta 49), wherein it was held that:

“When the words are clear and capable of proper operation, the revocation or alteration of a statute by construction is not permissible. The legislature is normally not presumed to have intended to keep two contradictory enactments on the statute book with the intention of redeeming the one with the other, without expressing an intention to do so. Such an intention cannot be imputed to the legislature without some strong reasons and unless it is inevitable. Before adopting the last mentioned course, it is necessary for the courts to exhaust all possible and reasonable constructions which offer an escape from repeal by implication.”

18.In view of the fact that the ouster of the jurisdiction of Civil Courts is not to be eagerly inferred, any ouster provisions are to be given strict construction. And further, any conflict between two seemingly contrasting provisions of different statutes is also not to be assumed unless the text of such provisions is capable of being given no interpretation that resolves such conflict. The jurisdiction

vested in the Civil Court to grant damages for tortious claims cannot be deemed to have been impliedly ousted by provisions of the Health Care Act. Neither the Health Care Act vests in the Commission the power and jurisdiction to adjudicate claims of damages and grant them to aggrieved parties against health care service providers, nor can the adjudicatory jurisdiction vested in Civil Courts in relation to a quintessential judicial function be read in conflict with jurisdiction vested in the Commission under provisions of the Health Care Act.

19.As has been discussed above, the legislative intent behind the Health Care Act as well as the substantive machinery to give effect to its provisions appears to be designed to impose regulatory fines for claims of negligence and/or malpractice brought against health care establishments.

Thus, neither conceptually nor textually does there exist any overlap between the scope of authority of the Commission and the scope of authority of Civil Courts requiring this Court to employ the doctrine of implied ouster to resolve the issue.

There exists no need to choose between two competing regimes, as it is only in exercise of Civil Court’s jurisdiction under Section 9 of the CPC that compensatory liability can be affixed against an individual doctor. Thus, the question of the Health Care Act being a special law overriding the CPC as

general law does not really arise as there exists no explicit or implicit contradiction that requires a resolution.

20.This is even more so in view of our

constitutional scheme. Quantification and award of damages is an exercise of quintessential judicial power. It is a settled proposition in our constitutional jurisprudence that judicial power is to be exercised by courts and not by executive functionaries, as vesting judicial power in the executive falls afoul the doctrine of trichotomy and separation of powers that underlies our constitutional scheme. (See for example Mehram Ali vs. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1988 SC 1445), Liaqat Hussain vs. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1999 SC 504), Khan Asfandayar Wali vs. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2001 SC 607). The Commission as conceived and constituted under the provisions of the Health Care Act is not vested with judicial power for adjudicatory purposes. In view of Article 175 of the Constitution, judicial power cannot be exercised by a body not properly constituted as a court or tribunal. The Health Care Act does provide an appeal before a District Court against the decision of the Health Care Commission. But Section 6 of the Health Care Act does not conceive of the Commission as exercising judicial power for purposes of quantification of damages in adversarial situations. Even when Section 13 is read along with Section 18, no interpretation of such texts leads to the conclusion that

the legislature either intended for the Commission to award damages to a complainant, in addition to imposition of fines as part of a regulatory sanction, or that such remedy for quantifying and awarding damages could be granted against health care service providers. Reading such power into the provisions of the Health Care Act would be against the rule of casus omissus. Courts are loath to fill any presumed gap in statutory text by implication where the legislature chooses not to do so. This rule applies with even more severity where making such presumption would take away the right of an aggrieved party to seek justice from a court, otherwise competent to receive and adjudicate all civil claims.

21.The contrary argument is that projecting the Health Care Commission as a one-stop forum for all civil and criminal complaints of medical negligence would be a preferred policy and statutory design choice. That may well be so, but it is not for constitutional courts to make policy choices for the legislature under the garb of interpreting statutes. It is the business of the court system to give effect to the legislative intent that manifests itself in the clear words used by the legislature while promulgating laws. It can therefore not be implied by this Court that while enacting the Health Care Act, the legislature intended the Commission to function as a special forum for the adjudication of civil claims in tort brought by patients. Leaving the constitutional

difficulties flagged above apart, such forum may be preferable to some as a specialized body capable of itself determining all claims of medical negligence etc. However, such scheme would also create an additional problem by transforming the Commission into judge, jury and executioner. Section 6 of the Health Care Act vests in the Commission the authority to inquire into and investigate complaints of medical negligence.

If the Commission were also to be given the judicial power to affix tortious liability on the basis of its own investigation, the Commission would arguably become a judge in its own cause.

It cannot be assumed that such would be the intent of the legislature when the text of the Health Care Act clearly does not support such assumption. The question of imposing regulatory penalties in terms of Section 18 of the Health Care Act as a means to ensure compliance with the regulatory regime being overseen by the Commission is distinguishable in this context.

22.For the aforementioned reasons, this Court finds that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain a suit for damages filed by the respondents against the petitioner is not barred by law. The precedents cited by the petitioner hold that a consumer court is not vested with jurisdiction to entertain complaints that fall within the scope of the Commission, and that where the Commission has not undertaken an inquiry/investigation in terms of Section 6(2)(g) of the Health

Care Act the prosecution or initiation of other legal proceedings by virtue of registering an FIR would fall afoul Section 19 of the Health Care Act. Without engaging with the reasons that prevailed with the Court in such cases, suffice it to note that the ratio of the said precedents does not address the controversy before this Court with regard to implied ouster of Section 9 of CPC and such precedents are therefore distinguishable.

23.The Court finds that the petition is devoid of merit and is accordingly dismissed.

Announced on

JUDGE

(Approved for reporting)

Abdul Saeed SB Hon’ble Mr. Justice Babar Sattar, J.