Buland Iqbal Vs The State

Judgment Sheet

IN THE PESHAWAR HIGH COURT, ABBOTTABAD

BENCH

JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

Cr.Misc. (Q) No. 03-A/2026

JUDGMENT

Date of hearing...................05.10.2026.................................

Petitioner (Buland Iqbal) By Muhammad Riaz, Advocate.

Respondents. (State) By Malik Amjad Inayat, AAG.

ABDUL FAYAZ, J.- Through the instant petition filed under section 561-A Cr.P.C, the petitioner, Buland Iqbal, seeks quashment of paragraph No.20 of the judgment dated 25.02.2026 passed by learned Sessions Judge / Judge Special Court under Khyber Pakhtunkhwa CNSA, Kohistan Lower, in Case No.22/III of 2025, as well as consequential complaint dated 05.03.2026 forwarded against him for his trial under section 32(d) of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 2019.

2.Brief facts necessary for disposal of the petition are that FIR No.90 dated 04.04.2025, under section 9(d) of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa CNSA, was registered at Police Station Pattan, Kohistan Lower, against respondent No.4, Limoo, on the allegation of recovery of 6000 grams chars from his

possession. At the relevant time, the petitioner was serving as SHO Police Station Pattan and was complainant of the case. After completion of investigation, respondent No.4 was sent up to face trial before the learned Special Court. The prosecution examined six

(06)witnesses, whereas the accused, besides, recording his own statement on oath, produced defence evidence.

3.Upon conclusion of the trial, the learned Special Court, vide judgment dated 25.02.2026, acquitted the respondent No.4 of the charge by extending him benefit of doubt.

The learned trial Court noticed, inter alia, discrepancies relating to the circumstances of arrest and recovery, absence of the alleged video recording / memory card from the evidence, and deficiencies concerning safe custody and chain of possession of the recovered substance. However, while acquitting the accused, the learned trial Court proceeded further and, in paragraph No.20 of the judgment, observed that the petitioner had upsettingly arrested the accused and directed that a complaint be sent to the competent Court for his trial under section 32(d) of the KP-CNSA. In consequence thereof, complaint

dated 05.03.2026 was forwarded against the petitioner. Hence, the instant petition.

4.Arguments heard and record gone through.

5.The pivotal question is not whether the acquittal of respondent No.4 was justified, as the same is not under challenge before this Court, but whether the material available before the learned trial Court was sufficient to record a positive conclusion that the petitioner had committed an offence falling within the ambit of section 32(d) of the KP-CNSA and consequently to set the criminal law into motion against him.

6.The distinction between failure of the prosecution to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt and a positive finding that a police officer deliberately or vexatiously fabricated a narcotics case is fundamental.

An accused is entitled to acquittal whenever a reasonable doubt arises regarding the prosecution case; however, such acquittal does not ipso facto establish that the prosecution case was deliberately fabricated or that the arrest or search was vexatious.

The latter is a separate allegation carrying its own penal consequences and, therefore,

must rest upon material capable of satisfying the ingredients of the offence attributed to the concerned officer.

7.Perusal of the judgment dated

25.02.2026 shows that respondent No.4 was acquitted essentially because the learned trial Court found doubts and deficiencies in the prosecution evidence. The Court noticed discrepancies regarding the arrest and recovery proceedings, non-production of the alleged video recording and deficiencies relating to safe custody and chain of custody.

These circumstances were certainly relevant for determining whether the prosecution had discharged its burden against the accused, and the learned trial Court was competent to extend benefit thereof to him. They could not, however, without something further, be treated as conclusive proof that the petitioner had intentionally or vexatiously arrested the accused or planted narcotics upon him.

8.It is also significant that the defence version was that respondent No.4 had been apprehended while proceeding to attend a funeral and had remained in illegal custody for 04 / 05 days before registration of the FIR.

The defence witnesses supported that version

during trial. Nevertheless, acceptance of a defence version for the purpose of creating reasonable doubt in a criminal prosecution stands on a different footing from recording a definite finding of criminal misconduct against the complainant. The burden resting upon the prosecution in the narcotics case could not effectively be reversed, so as to make the petitioner's criminal liability an automatic consequence of the accused's acquittal.

9.The impugned paragraph No.20

does not disclose an independent appraisal of material establishing the requisite element of vexatious conduct on the part of the petitioner. Rather, the conclusion appears to have flowed from the deficiencies which had already persuaded the learned trial Court to grant benefit of doubt to the accused. The deficiencies in investigation, contradictions amongst prosecution witnesses or failure to maintain an unimpeachable chain of custody may weaken or even destroy a prosecution case, but every such lapse cannot, without affirmative material demonstrating deliberate misuse of authority, be transformed into a criminal prosecution against the police officer concerned.

10.There is another important aspect of the case is that the consequences flowing from the impugned direction are penal in nature. Once the learned trial Court intended to proceed beyond adjudication of the charge against respondent No.4 and contemplated criminal proceedings against the present petitioner personally, fairness demanded that such conclusion should not be founded merely upon observations recorded while appreciating evidence for an entirely different purpose. A finding exposing a person to independent criminal prosecution must have a clear factual and legal foundation. The record placed before this Court does not disclose such material sufficient to sustain the impugned direction.

11.The inherent jurisdiction of this Court under section 561-A Cr.P.C is undoubtedly to be exercised sparingly; nevertheless, where continuation of criminal proceedings emanates from an order which does not disclose the essential factual foundation of the alleged offence, intervention becomes necessary to prevent abuse of the process of Court and to secure the ends of justice.

Allowing such proceedings to continue merely

because the prosecution case against respondent No.4 ultimately failed would amount to equating an acquittal based upon reasonable doubt with proof of deliberate fabrication, which proposition cannot legally be sustained.

12.For what has been discussed hereinabove, this petition is allowed and the paragraph No.20 of the impugned judgment dated 25.02.2026, passed by the learned Sessions Judge / Judge Special Court under KP-CNSA, Kohistan Lower, to the extent it directs initiation of proceedings against the petitioner under section 32(d) of the KP- CNSA, 2019, is hereby set aside.

Consequently, complaint dated 05.03.2026, forwarded pursuant thereto against the petitioner, and all proceedings arising therefrom, stand quashed.

Announced:

JUDGE

/*Arshad Iqbal*/