Kashif Farhan & others Vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Cabinet Division & others

JUDGMENT SHEET

PESHAWAR HIGH COURT, PESHAWAR

(Judicial Department)

W.P No. 6081-P/2023

Kashif Farhan & others Vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Cabinet Division & others

JUDGMENT

Date of hearing: 13.07.2026

Date of decision: 29.07.2026 Petitioner: by Mr. Muhammad Farooq Malik, advocate, for the petitioner.

Mr. Sana Ullah, Additional Attorney General, for Federation, alongwith Amir Nawaz, Focal Person, Ministry of Energy (Power Division), Islamabad.

Barrister Asad-ul-Mulk, counsel for respondent No. 03, alongwith Muhammad Shakeel, Chief Law Officer and Malik Muzamil Hussain, Legal Assistant, for

PESCO.

SAHIBZADA ASADULLAH, J.- Through this single judgment, this Court intends to decide the instant writ petition along with the connected W.P No. 6196-P/2026 titled Ali Askar & others vs Government of Pakistan

through Secretary Cabinet Division & others, as common questions of law and fact arise in this batch of constitutional petitions.

2.The relevant facts are that the petitioners either initially entered service under the Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) or were subsequently appointed in the distribution companies established pursuant to the restructuring of the power sector. Under the service regime prevailing in WAPDA, eligible employees were extended the concession of free electricity units subject to prescribed conditions. This concession continued for decades and formed one of the service benefits available to employees of the Authority.

3.Subsequently, the electric power sector underwent extensive restructuring.

WAPDA’s operational functions relating to generation, transmission, and distribution were unbundled, resulting in the establishment of various Generation Companies (GENCOs), Distribution Companies (DISCOs), and other corporate entities. PESCO emerged as one such distribution company. Following its

incorporation, PESCO issued an office order whereby the service rules and regulations applicable under WAPDA were adopted for purposes of regulating the service conditions of its employees until independent regulations were framed. According to the petitioners, by virtue of such adoption, every service benefit previously available under the WAPDA regime, including free electricity units, stood incorporated into their service conditions and consequently assumed the character of enforceable legal rights. The record further reveals that, owing to increasing financial constraints, circular debt, and sectoral reforms proposed by the Federal Government, deliberations commenced at the governmental level regarding the withdrawal of free electricity units and substitution thereof by a monetized allowance. Meetings were convened, inter-ministerial consultations were held, financial implications were examined, and summaries were prepared for consideration by the Federal Cabinet. During the tenure of the caretaker Federal Government, the said summary was placed before the Cabinet and

approval was accorded to the proposal whereby the existing concession of free electricity units stood substituted by payment of a monetized allowance in accordance with the approved mechanism. Consequential notifications were thereafter issued implementing the decision.

4.Feeling aggrieved, the petitioners invoked the constitutional jurisdiction of this Court, contending that the caretaker government lacked authority to approve such a policy, that accrued service rights could not legally be withdrawn, and that the impugned action offended the guarantees of equality and protection of vested rights; hence, these petitions. The respondents were directed to submit their respective para-wise comments to the petition, and in compliance thereof, the respondents have duly submitted their para- wise comments, setting forth their stance on the factual and legal assertions raised in the petition.

5.Arguments heard and available record scanned through.

6.Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and having examined the

pleadings, documents, and statutory framework with their able assistance, the Court is of the considered view that the first question requiring determination is whether the present constitutional petitions are maintainable under Article 199 of the Constitution.

7.Learned Attorney General for

Pakistan and the learned counsel representing PESCO have, at the threshold, objected to the maintainability of the petitions on the ground that the controversy essentially relates to service conditions of employees and, therefore, falls outside the constitutional jurisdiction of this Court. According to the respondents, the petitioners seek enforcement of a service benefit arising out of the terms and conditions of employment, which, in the ordinary course, does not warrant invocation of the extraordinary constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199.

8.The objection undoubtedly

deserves serious consideration, for the jurisdiction conferred upon this Court under Article 199 is extraordinary in nature and is not intended to convert the High Court into a forum

of first instance for every service dispute.

Equally, however, it is well settled that the true character of a constitutional petition is determined not by the form in which the relief is couched, but by the real nature of the controversy involved. Where the grievance transcends an individual service dispute and raises substantial questions regarding the legality of executive action, the interpretation of constitutional or statutory provisions, or the limits of governmental authority, the doors of constitutional jurisdiction cannot be closed merely because the dispute incidentally concerns service conditions. Reference may be made to Chief Collector of Customs v. Iftikhar Ahmed Tabasum, etc (PLD 2019 SC 563); Ali Azhar Khan Baloch v. Province of Sindh (2015 SCMR 456); Pakistan Defence Officer Housing Authority and others v. Lt. Col. Syed Jawaid Ahmed (2013 SCMR 1707); &

Azizullah Memon v. Province of Sindh (2007

SCMR 229).

9.The distinction between an

ordinary service dispute and a challenge to executive action having constitutional

dimensions has long been recognized by the superior courts of Pakistan. In Miss Benazir Bhutto v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1988 SC 416), while considering the width of constitutional jurisdiction, the Hon’ble Supreme Court emphasized that constitutional remedies are designed to protect the supremacy of the Constitution and the enforcement of fundamental rights, and that where the impugned action itself is alleged to offend constitutional guarantees, the Court is not confined by technical objections as to form.

The Court observed that Article 199 empowers the High Court not merely to redress individual grievances, but also to examine the legality of governmental action when constitutional rights are alleged to have been infringed.

10.The jurisprudential foundation of judicial review is equally explained by De Smith’s Judicial Review, where it is observed that the essential function of judicial review is not to determine the merits of governmental decisions, but to ensure that public authorities act within the limits of the powers conferred upon them by law [De Smith, Woolf & Jowell,

Judicial Review 15, para. 1-017 (6th ed.

2007)]. Judicial review, therefore, is concerned with the legality of the decision-making process rather than with the wisdom of the decision itself. Wade and Forsyth express the same principle by observing that every public authority is a creature of law and must remain within the legal boundaries of the authority entrusted to it. Whenever the legality of governmental action itself is questioned, the supervisory jurisdiction of constitutional courts is properly attracted [H.W.R. Wade & C.F.

Forsyth, Administrative Law 4-5 (10th ed.

11.This conclusion also accords with settled principles of constitutional interpretation. As observed in Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, constitutional and statutory provisions conferring remedial jurisdiction deserve a liberal construction so as to advance the remedy rather than defeat it.

[Peter B. Maxwell, On the Interpretation of Statutes 92 (P. St. J. Langan ed., 12th ed.

1969).]. Similarly, Bennion explains that where Parliament creates a remedial

jurisdiction intended to preserve legality, the courts should avoid an interpretation that unnecessarily restricts access to that remedy in the absence of clear statutory language to the contrary. [Francis Bennion, Statutory Interpretation § 312, 313 & 314 (5th ed.

2008).] The Supreme Court of India has consistently held that where executive action is challenged on the ground of constitutional infirmity, the mere fact that the dispute incidentally arises out of service does not denude the constitutional court of jurisdiction.

Reference may be made to Chandra Kumar v.

Union of India (1997) 3 SCC 261; T.K.

Rangarajan v. Government of Tamil Nadu (2003) 6 SCC 581; & State of West Bengal v.

Committee for Protection of Democratic Rights (2010) 3 SCC 571. Likewise, English administrative law has long distinguished between disputes arising purely from contractual rights and challenges directed against the legality of the exercise of public power. The supervisory jurisdiction of the courts extends to the latter because the source of the impugned power is public law rather

than private agreement. Reference may be made to famous English authorities in the cases of R v. Panel on Take-overs and Mergers, ex parte Datafin plc [1987] QB 815; O’Reilly v.

Mackman [1983] 2 AC 237; & R v.

Disciplinary Committee of the Jockey Club, ex parte Aga Khan [1993] 1 W.L.R. 909.

12.Viewed in this constitutional perspective, the objection raised by the respondents cannot be accepted in its absolute form. The petitioners have not merely asserted a claim to continuation of a service benefit.

They have challenged the competence of the caretaker Federal Government to approve the impugned policy under Section 230 of the Elections Act, 2017; they question the legal effect of the subsequent continuation of that policy by the elected Federal Government; they contend that the impugned decision violates Articles 4, 18, and 25 of the Constitution; and they further assert that the executive lacked lawful authority to alter a benefit allegedly protected by the service framework governing their employment. These are not questions confined to the internal administration of

service matters. They involve the interpretation of constitutional provisions, statutory limitations upon executive power, and the permissible limits of governmental action. Such issues plainly fall within the constitutional province of judicial review.

13.It must, however, be emphasized that maintainability and success on merits are conceptually distinct. The existence of constitutional jurisdiction merely entitles the Court to examine the legality of the impugned action; it does not create a presumption that the challenge must ultimately succeed. Whether the petitioners possess an enforceable legal right, whether the impugned policy was lawfully adopted, and whether any constitutional guarantee has in fact been infringed are questions that fall to be determined upon an examination of the merits. The objection to maintainability is, accordingly, overruled and the Court proceeds to examine the substantive issues raised in these petitions.

14.The resolution of the present controversy necessarily turns upon the true legal character of the office order whereby,

following the corporatization of the power sector, the service rules and administrative framework previously applicable to the employees of WAPDA were adopted by PESCO. The petitioners contend that such adoption irrevocably incorporated every service facility available under the WAPDA regime, including the concession of free electricity units into the service conditions of PESCO employees, thereby creating enforceable legal rights beyond the reach of subsequent executive modification. The respondents maintain that the office order constituted nothing more than a transitional administrative arrangement intended to preserve continuity in service administration until independent regulations were framed by the successor corporation. The controversy, therefore, raises a question of whether an executive adoption of existing service rules transforms every administrative concession into an immutable statutory entitlement, or whether such adoption merely ensures continuity of administration without altering the legal character of the rights thereby regulated.

15.It is an admitted position that the petitioners or their predecessors initially entered service under WAPDA, a statutory authority established by Parliament to undertake the generation, transmission, and distribution of electricity. Subsequently, as part of the comprehensive reforms introduced in the power sector, the Federal Government undertook an extensive programme of corporatization and unbundling. The integrated structure of WAPDA was dismantled and separate corporate entities were established.

PESCO emerged as one such independent corporate entity, possessing its own juristic personality, separate management, independent finances, and a distinct employer-employee relationship. The law has consistently recognized that a company incorporated under the Companies Act, notwithstanding complete governmental ownership, enjoys a legal existence separate and distinct from the authority or entity from which it may have evolved. Continuity of employment is preserved to protect employees against institutional disruption; it does not, without

more, convert every administrative practice prevailing under the former organization into a permanent legal obligation binding upon the successor.

16.The distinction between statutory rules and executive instructions lies at the very heart of modern administrative law. Every legal system governed by the rule of law recognizes a fundamental difference between rules deriving their authority from legislation and directions issued by the executive for purposes of internal administration. The former constitute law because the Legislature, either directly or through delegated authority, has invested them with binding legal force. The latter regulate the exercise of executive power, guide administrative discretion, and ensure uniformity in governmental functioning, but they do not ordinarily possess the force of subordinate legislation unless the enabling statute expressly or by necessary implication so provides. This distinction is lucidly reflected in Black’s Law Dictionary, wherein a “statutory rule” is understood as a rule made pursuant to authority delegated by statute and possessing

legislative force, whereas an “administrative instruction” or “executive direction” is characterized as an instrument intended to regulate the manner in which executive power is exercised, without itself becoming an independent source of legal rights unless the governing statute so ordains. [Rule, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).] The same principle is echoed in Halsbury’s Laws of England, which explains that departmental circulars, office memoranda, and executive directions are ordinarily intended to secure administrative uniformity and discipline; they facilitate governance but do not assume the character of law unless issued under an enabling statutory provision conferring legislative authority. [Halsbury’s Laws of England, Administrative Law para. 31 (5th ed.

2008).] Craies on Legislation similarly explains that courts should not infer legislative consequences from executive arrangements unless such an intention is clearly manifested by the parent statute [Daniel Greenberg, Craies on Legislation para. 1.1.3 (12th ed.

2020).]. These juristic principles have found

repeated recognition in Pakistani and comparative jurisprudence. In Shafique Ahmed Khan v. NESCOM (PLD 2016 SC 377), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the decisive consideration is the nature, source, and area of operation of the rules. Rules forming an integral part of the statutory scheme, framed under delegated legislative authority, possess statutory force; those issued merely for internal administration or managerial regulation, notwithstanding their importance, remain executive in character. In Muhammad Zaman v. Government of Pakistan (2017 SCMR 571), the Supreme Court reiterated that where the governing instrument merely regulates administrative affairs without deriving force from delegated legislation, it remains subject to modification by the competent authority in accordance with law. In State of Uttar Pradesh v. Babu Ram Upadhya (AIR 1961 SC 751), the Supreme Court of India carefully distinguished between statutory rules framed under legislative authority and executive directions issued in exercise of administrative power. In Sant Ram Sharma v. State of

Rajasthan (AIR 1967 SC 1910), it was authoritatively held that executive instructions may supplement statutory rules where the field remains unoccupied, but where the governing field is occupied only by executive instructions, the competent authority retains the power to modify or withdraw such instructions.

17.Applying these principles, this Court finds that the office order issued by PESCO after corporatization neither purports to have been framed in exercise of delegated legislative authority nor bears any indication that it was intended to operate as subordinate legislation. Its language, context, and object unmistakably demonstrate that it was promulgated as a measure of administrative continuity, designed to ensure that the newly constituted corporate entity was not left without a governing service framework during the transitional period. An executive instruction does not acquire statutory force merely because it has regulated service affairs for many years.

Longevity may strengthen administrative practice; it cannot alter constitutional pedigree.

18.The adoption of the WAPDA

Rules ensured continuity of administration; it did not convert administrative practice into statutory law. Consequently, the concession of free electricity units, in the absence of any statutory provision, contractual guarantee, or legislative incorporation conferring permanence upon it, continued to derive its existence from executive policy. Such a concession was capable of modification, substitution, or withdrawal by the competent authority in accordance with law. The Court is, therefore, constrained to hold that the office order adopting the WAPDA Rules did not confer upon the petitioners an immutable statutory right to continue receiving every service benefit in precisely the same form as had prevailed under the former organizational structure.

19.Having held that the office order adopting the WAPDA Rules did not convert every executive concession into a statutory condition of service, the Court must now determine whether the concession of free electricity units, by reason of its uninterrupted

enjoyment over several decades, nevertheless ripened into a vested or accrued right beyond the reach of executive modification, or gave rise to a legitimate expectation. Black’s Law Dictionary defines a vested right as one that is “fixed, accrued, settled, absolute and complete,” explaining that rights become vested when the right to present or future enjoyment has become the property of a particular person; a mere expectancy of future benefits founded upon the anticipated continuance of existing law does not constitute a vested right. [Vested Right, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).] This definition has repeatedly been approved by the Indian Supreme Court in Bibi Sayeeda v. State of Bihar (1996) 9 SCC 516. The Cornell Legal Information Institute (Wex) similarly explains that a vested right is absolute, fixed, and enforceable, protecting rights that have crystallized under law rather than expectations dependent upon future governmental choices.

[Legal Information Institute, ‘Vested’ (Wex) cornell.edu.]

20.Legitimate expectation, on the other hand, is a public law doctrine devised to ensure fairness in administrative decision- making. As explained by Wade and Forsyth, legitimate expectation is intended to secure fairness in the exercise of public power, but it cannot compel a public authority to make an unlawful decision or to perpetuate a policy merely because it has existed for a long period.

Comparative and our national jurisprudence establishes this doctrine very elaborately.

[H.W.R. Wade & C.F. Forsyth, Administrative Law 449-450 (10th ed. 2009).] In Union of India v. Hindustan Development Corporation [(1993) 3 SCC 499], the Supreme Court of India observed that an expectation is not the same as anticipation, desire, or hope, declaring that every legitimate expectation does not, by itself, fructify into a legal right. In Punjab Communications Ltd. v. Union of India [(1999) 4 SCC 727], it was held that the Government remains competent to alter or abandon an existing policy where overriding public interest, financial necessity, or changing circumstances so demand. In Council of Civil

Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service ([1985] AC 374 - the GCHQ Case), the House of Lords recognized legitimate expectation as an important ground of judicial review, while making it equally clear that such expectation may yield where overriding considerations of public interest justify departure. In R v. North and East Devon Health Authority, ex parte Coughlan ([2001] QB 213), the Court of Appeal explained that even where a substantive expectation exists, the Court must balance the expectation against the overriding demands of lawful public administration. Applying these principles, this Court is unable to persuade itself that the concession of free electricity units, merely because it remained available for a considerable length of time, thereby acquired the status of a vested legal right. Continuity of enjoyment, however prolonged, is not the legal test. In the absence of a statutory source or contractual undertaking, the mere continuation of an executive concession cannot ripen into an indefeasible right. Moreover, the record prima facie discloses that the Government has sought

to monetize the concession rather than abolish it altogether. Monetization substitutes one mode of extending a financial benefit for another. At the highest, the petitioners acquired a legitimate expectation that any departure from the existing policy would be undertaken fairly, rationally, and for reasons consistent with public interest. Legitimate expectation protects fairness; it does not freeze administration or prevent the State from reviewing and restructuring executive policy.

21.Having concluded that the

concession of free electricity units did not, merely by reason of its long and uninterrupted continuance, crystallize into an immutable vested right, the Court now turns to the principal constitutional question arising in these petitions i.e., whether the caretaker Government possessed the requisite competence under Section 230 of the Elections Act, 2017 to approve the impugned restructuring of the concession and, if not, whether the subsequent assumption of office by the elected Government and its conscious continuation of the same arrangement bears

upon its legal validity. The petitioners contend that the impugned decision is constitutionally unsustainable because it was taken during the tenure of a caretaker Government whose authority is confined to the discharge of routine governmental functions pending the assumption of office by an elected Government. According to the learned counsel, the restructuring of a concession which had remained operative for decades constituted a major policy decision carrying enduring financial and administrative consequences and, therefore, travelled beyond the limits prescribed by Section 230 of the Elections Act, 2017. The submission raises an important constitutional issue requiring the Court to reconcile two equally compelling constitutional imperatives. On the one hand, a caretaker Government, lacking an independent democratic mandate, must maintain complete political neutrality and ordinarily refrain from initiating measures that may bind or materially influence the policy choices of the incoming elected Government. On the other hand, constitutional transition cannot be permitted to

interrupt the ordinary functioning of the State.

Public administration must continue, statutory obligations must be discharged, essential public services must remain uninterrupted, and matters demanding immediate executive attention cannot simply await the formation of a new Government. A caretaker Government is, therefore, neither an extra-constitutional arrangement nor an executive denuded of governmental authority. It is a constitutionally recognized administration constituted for a limited duration and a defined constitutional purpose. Its powers are restricted not because it lacks executive competence, but because that competence must be exercised consistently with the purpose for which the caretaker administration is established. Section 230 reflects this constitutional balance. It neither suspends executive authority nor permits its unrestricted exercise. Rather, it preserves continuity of governance while ensuring that decisions involving major policy choices, particularly those carrying enduring political, financial or institutional consequences, are

ordinarily left to a Government enjoying a fresh electoral mandate.

22.The proper construction of Section 230 must proceed upon settled principles of constitutional and statutory interpretation. As stated by Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, the intention of the Legislature is to be gathered from the language employed, read in its ordinary and natural sense and in the light of the object sought to be achieved. Bennion on Statutory Interpretation similarly explains that statutory provisions must receive a purposive construction that advances the legislative objective while avoiding interpretations producing unreasonable or impracticable consequences. These principles have repeatedly been affirmed by the Supreme Court of Pakistan. In the State v. Zia-ur-Rehman (PLD 1973 SC 49), the Court emphasized that the Constitution must be construed as an integrated whole and that no provision should be interpreted in a manner that disturbs the harmony of the constitutional scheme.

Likewise, in Al-Jehad Trust v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1996 SC 324), it was held that

constitutional interpretation must remain dynamic, purposive and sufficiently broad to meet the requirements of an evolving constitutional order. More recently, in District Bar Association, Rawalpindi v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2015 SC 401), the Supreme Court reiterated that constitutional provisions must be harmoniously construed so as to preserve the salient features and coherence of the Constitution rather than render any constitutional institution incapable of performing its assigned functions. The constitutional philosophy underlying Section 230 must be understood against this interpretative background. The restriction imposed upon a caretaker Government is intended to preserve political neutrality and prevent the assumption of functions involving major policy choices that properly belong to an elected Government. It is not intended to suspend the ordinary machinery of government or to deprive the executive of the authority necessary to ensure continuity of administration. Comparative constitutional jurisprudence proceeds upon the same

principle. In State of Rajasthan v. Union of India, (1977) 3 SCC 592, the Supreme Court of India observed that every constitutional power is confined by the purpose for which it has been conferred and must be exercised consistently with the constitutional scheme.

Likewise, constitutional convention in the United Kingdom recognizes that, although a caretaker administration should ordinarily refrain from entering commitments of enduring significance capable of binding its successor, it must nevertheless continue to discharge the ordinary business of Government.

Constitutional restraint cannot be equated with administrative paralysis. The language of Section 230 itself reinforces this conclusion.

The provision does not prohibit every executive decision involving financial or administrative consequences. Such an interpretation would enlarge the statutory restriction beyond its intended purpose and disable the executive from performing even its ordinary functions during the caretaker period. The decisive inquiry, therefore, is not whether the impugned decision had financial implications, but

whether, viewed in its true nature and effect, it amounted to a fresh policy initiative of enduring significance or merely represented the regulation or rationalization of an existing executive arrangement. It is to that question that the Court now turns. The expression "major policy decision", though not defined in the Elections Act, 2017, must derive its meaning from the constitutional purpose underlying Section 230. The restriction is intended neither to immobilize the caretaker Government nor to deprive it of the authority necessary to ensure continuity of administration. Its object is to prevent a temporary administration, lacking an electoral mandate, from embarking upon new policy initiatives or undertaking commitments of such enduring political, financial or institutional significance that they ought, in constitutional propriety, to be left to the incoming elected Government. The emphasis, therefore, is not upon the existence of financial implications but upon the true nature, character and effect of the impugned decision. Governmental

administration is not conducted in watertight

compartments. Decisions relating to salaries, pensions, service conditions, procurement, public utilities, contracts and institutional management invariably involve financial consequences. If financial impact alone were treated as the decisive criterion, a caretaker Government would be disabled from performing even the ordinary functions of governance, thereby frustrating the very object of Section 230. The Legislature cannot be presumed to have intended an interpretation that produces administrative paralysis during every electoral transition. The proper inquiry is whether the impugned measure introduced a new governmental direction involving an enduring policy commitment or whether it merely regulated, rationalized or restructured an existing executive arrangement. While a caretaker Government must ordinarily refrain from initiating irreversible policy measures, creating substantial long-term financial obligations or fundamentally altering the policy framework of the State, it is not precluded from maintaining continuity of administration, removing operational anomalies or improving

the implementation of existing executive arrangements where such measures are reasonably incidental to effective governance.

The limits of judicial review in matters of executive policy are equally well settled. The Supreme Court of Pakistan has consistently held that the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Courts is concerned with the legality of executive action and not with the comparative wisdom or desirability of governmental policy.

Courts do not sit in appeal over executive decisions merely because another course of action may appear preferable. Interference is warranted only where the impugned action is shown to be unconstitutional, without lawful authority, mala fide, arbitrary or in violation of a mandatory statutory provision. More recently, in Federal Government Employees Housing Authority through Director General, Islamabad v. Ednan Syed and others (PLD 2025 SC 11), the Supreme Court reiterated that judicial review is not an unbridled authority and that constitutional courts must remain within the limits prescribed by the Constitution, lest they transgress into the executive domain

in disregard of the doctrine of separation of powers. The same approach finds persuasive support in Common Cause v. Union of India, (2003) 8 SCC 250, wherein the Supreme Court of India emphasized that constitutional authorities must exercise their powers consistently with the purpose for which those powers have been conferred and avoid decisions producing irreversible consequences beyond their legitimate sphere of authority.

Although rendered in a different constitutional setting, the underlying principle, that constitutional restraint depends upon the substance rather than the form of executive action, provides useful comparative guidance.

Applying these principles to the present case, it becomes evident that the concession of free electricity units neither originated with nor was introduced by the caretaker Government. It had existed for decades as an executive concession available to the employees concerned. The impugned decision neither created a new benefit nor withdrew the existing concession. It merely substituted the facility of free electricity units with its monetary equivalent, thereby

altering the mode through which the concession was extended. This distinction is legally significant. The law recognizes a clear difference between the existence of a benefit and the mechanism adopted for its implementation. A modification in the mode of extending an existing concession does not, without more, amount to the formulation of a new governmental policy. The substance of the concession remains unchanged; only its modality undergoes alteration. Whether the substituted mechanism ultimately proves more or less advantageous to individual employees is essentially a matter of executive judgment and administrative policy. Such considerations may furnish grounds for policy debate, but they do not, by themselves, determine the constitutional validity of the decision or convert an administrative restructuring into a prohibited policy initiative. The Court is, therefore, unable to accept the proposition that every alteration in the mode of extending an existing executive concession necessarily constitutes a "major policy decision" within the contemplation of Section 230. To adopt such an interpretation

would blur the distinction between policy formulation and administrative implementation and enlarge the statutory restriction beyond its intended purpose. Properly construed, the impugned measure bears the attributes of an administrative rationalization of an existing executive arrangement rather than the formulation of a new governmental policy.

Even if that conclusion were assumed to be debatable, the matter does not end there. The Court must still examine whether the subsequent assumption of office by the elected Government and its conscious decision to continue and implement the impugned arrangement has any legal consequence upon the validity of the petitioners' challenge. It is to that question that the Court now turns. The subsequent assumption of office by the elected Government introduces a further constitutional dimension to the controversy. Even if it were assumed, arguendo, that the caretaker Government exceeded the limits contemplated by Section 230 of the Elections Act, 2017, the Court must still determine the legal effect of the elected Government's conscious decision to

continue and implement the impugned arrangement. The answer depends not merely upon the existence of an alleged irregularity but upon its legal character and legal consequence.

Administrative law has long recognized a distinction between an act performed in complete absence of jurisdiction and one undertaken by a competent authority in the irregular exercise of an existing power. The former is void ab initio because the authority itself lacks legal competence to act; the latter does not necessarily suffer from incurable invalidity. Whether such an act may subsequently be affirmed or lawfully continued depends upon the statutory framework, the nature of the defect and the competence of the authority thereafter dealing with the matter.

Judicial review is, therefore, directed not merely towards identifying an irregularity but towards determining whether the alleged defect strikes at the very root of jurisdiction or merely concerns the manner in which an otherwise existing power has been exercised. The jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of Pakistan consistently draws this distinction.

Constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 is concerned with the legality of executive action and not with correcting every procedural imperfection or substituting judicial opinion for executive discretion. The Court intervenes where the action is shown to be without lawful authority, tainted by mala fides, arbitrary, violative of mandatory statutory provisions or otherwise constitutionally infirm. As recently reaffirmed in Federal Government Employees Housing Authority through Director General, Islamabad v. Ednan Syed and others (PLD 2025 SC 11), judicial review is neither unlimited nor unbridled; it is circumscribed by the Constitution and the law, and constitutional courts must refrain from entering the executive domain in a manner that offends the doctrine of separation of powers. Likewise, the Supreme Court has reiterated that, while governmental policy is amenable to judicial review, the Court examines only its lawfulness and not its wisdom, expediency or desirability unless the decision-maker has acted without jurisdiction, contrary to law or in a manner that no reasonable authority could have adopted.

23.The same principle finds

persuasive support in State of Punjab v.

Gurdial Singh, (1980) 2 SCC 471, wherein the Supreme Court of India observed that executive action must remain within the limits of the authority conferred by law and for the purpose for which such authority exists. At the same time, the Court recognized that the legal consequence of an irregularity depends upon its nature and effect rather than upon the mere existence of a procedural defect. The emphasis throughout administrative law remains upon substantive legality rather than technical imperfection. Viewed against these settled principles, the present controversy assumes a different complexion. The caretaker Government was neither an unconstitutional body nor an executive devoid of lawful authority. It was a constitutionally recognized Government entrusted with the administration of the affairs of the State until the elected Government assumed office. The controversy, therefore, concerns the permissible extent of the exercise of an existing constitutional power rather than the existence of that power itself.

This distinction is fundamental because it directly bears upon the legal significance of the elected Government's subsequent conduct. The record reveals that, upon assuming office, the elected Government neither rescinded nor suspended the impugned arrangement. On the contrary, it consciously permitted the arrangement to continue and implemented it in the ordinary course of administration. Such conduct is of considerable constitutional significance. The object underlying Section 230 is to ensure that a caretaker Government, lacking an electoral mandate, does not commit the State to policy choices that properly belong to an elected Government. Once the Government possessing that democratic mandate independently elects to continue the same arrangement, the constitutional concern underlying the original objection is materially diminished. The continued operation of the arrangement thereafter derives its legitimacy from the independent exercise of executive authority by the elected Government itself.

This conclusion is further reinforced by the constitutional doctrine of continuity of

governance. The State is a continuing juristic entity; Governments change through constitutional processes, but the administration of the State does not recommence with every political transition. Subject to constitutional and statutory limitations, executive decisions relating to public administration, service conditions and financial management ordinarily continue unless withdrawn, modified or declared unlawful by a court of competent jurisdiction. Continuity of administration is itself an important constitutional value and cannot be sacrificed in favour of an unduly technical construction of Section 230. It is equally important to bear in mind that, as already held, the impugned measure did not extinguish the concession itself but merely altered the mode through which it was extended. The essential financial benefit remained available to the employees, albeit in a different form. The modification related to implementation rather than entitlement.

Monetary substitution represented only an alternative mechanism for extending the same concession. Whether that mechanism

ultimately proved more or less beneficial to individual employees is a matter of executive judgment and administrative policy. It does not, by itself, establish the infringement of a vested legal right or convert an administrative restructuring into a constitutionally prohibited policy decision. Judicial review must remain directed towards the legality of the decision- making process and the constitutional competence of the authority concerned rather than the comparative merits of the administrative choice adopted. Viewed cumulatively, the petitioners' challenge cannot be sustained. The impugned measure neither introduced a new executive policy nor created a fresh class of beneficiaries or imposed an altogether new financial obligation upon the State. Properly appreciated, it merely rationalized the manner in which an existing executive concession was administered by substituting the facility of free electricity units with its monetary equivalent. The concession itself remained intact; only the mechanism through which it was extended underwent modification. Judged by its true legal character

and practical effect, the impugned measure falls within the sphere of administrative regulation rather than the formulation of a major policy decision contemplated by Section 230 of the Act. For all the foregoing reasons, this Court is of the considered view that the impugned decision did not transgress the limitations embodied in Section 230 of the Elections Act, 2017. The challenge founded upon the alleged lack of competence of the caretaker Government is, therefore, misconceived, devoid of legal substance and is accordingly repelled.

24.The petitioners’ final contention is that the impugned policy offends Articles 4 and 25 of the Constitution by unfairly depriving them of a longstanding service benefit. Article 4 guarantees that every citizen shall be dealt with strictly in accordance with law, while Article 25 secures equality before the law.

However, equality under the Constitution is not a command of absolute uniformity; it permits reasonable classification founded upon an intelligible differentia bearing a rational nexus to a legitimate governmental objective.

Equality is infringed only where persons similarly circumstanced are treated unequally without lawful justification. In E. P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu (1974) 4 SCC 3, the Supreme Court of India held that arbitrariness is the very antithesis of equality, while in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978) 1 SCC 248, it emphasized that every exercise of public power must conform to the

constitutional standards of fairness, reasonableness and non-arbitrariness. These decisions reflect a broader common-law conception of the rule of law: governmental discretion must be exercised rationally and for legitimate purposes, although the wisdom of policy choices ordinarily remains within the exclusive province of the Executive unless constitutional limitations are transgressed.

25.The material on record indicates that the impugned arrangement constitutes a measure of general application adopted as part of a broader sectoral restructuring. The petitioners have not demonstrated that the policy singles them out for hostile discrimination or accords preferential treatment

to another similarly situated class. Under the doctrine of proportionality, modern constitutional jurisprudence requires that the means adopted bear a reasonable relationship to the legitimate objective sought to be achieved.

In Federation of Pakistan v. Aitzaz Ahsan (PLD 1989 SC 61), the Supreme Court underscored that public power must conform to standards of fairness and reasonableness. In R (Daly) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department ([2001] UKHL 26), the House of Lords explained that proportionality requires examining the relationship between the objective pursued and the means employed. In Kasinka Trading v. Union of India [(1995) 1 SCC 274] and Shrijee Sales Corporation v.

Union of India [(1997) 3 SCC 398], it was reaffirmed that executive concessions may be modified or withdrawn where overriding public interest or changed circumstances so require.

26.The Government has justified the measure on grounds of rationalization, transparency, and administrative convenience by substituting the facility with its monetary equivalent. The petitioners have failed to

demonstrate that the substituted benefit is illusory, wholly disproportionate, or arbitrary.

The mere conversion of a facility-based concession into a monetary benefit does not constitute unconstitutional deprivation under Articles 4 or 25. The Court must also remain mindful that questions relating to public expenditure and allocation of fiscal resources lie primarily within the institutional competence of the Executive. Courts exercise restraint in reviewing economic and financial policy because such matters involve balancing competing public interests and budgetary priorities. Judicial review is therefore directed to legality rather than policy preference.

Applying these principles, the Court is unable to conclude that the mere conversion of a facility-based concession into a monetary benefit constitutes unconstitutional deprivation.

The impugned arrangement is supported by legitimate administrative objectives, operates as a measure of general application, and has not been shown to be arbitrary, discriminatory or manifestly disproportionate. The Constitution protects citizens against arbitrary State action;

it does not render every executive concession immutable or prevent the State from reforming administrative policy through lawful means.

Accordingly, the petitioners have failed to establish that the impugned restructuring offends Articles 4 or 25 of the Constitution.

27.Having examined the controversy in its entirety, this Court is of the considered view that the benefit enjoyed by the petitioners remained an administrative concession and did not acquire the status of an indefeasible legal right immune from alteration. The passage of time cannot convert an executive arrangement into a perpetual guarantee against legitimate policy reform. The petitioners have failed to demonstrate that the impugned decision was beyond the authority of the competent forum, was tainted with mala fide, suffered from arbitrariness, or resulted in discriminatory treatment. The constitutional jurisdiction of this Court under Article 199 is meant to preserve the supremacy of law and the limits of public power; it does not extend to substituting judicial assessment for an administrative choice made within lawful bounds. Nevertheless, the

respondents shall ensure that its application remains fair, transparent, and uniform.

28.For the foregoing reasons, the instant as well as the connected W.P No. 6196- P/2026 titled “Ali Askar & others vs Government of Pakistan & others” having no substance stand dismissed.

Announced.

JUDGE

JUDGE

(Muhammad Fiaz) *D.B* Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sahibzada Asadullah, J Hon’ble Ms. Justice Farah Jamshed, J