Behlol Ehsan Vs Mehammad Shahwaid

Judgment Sheet

PESHAWAR HIGH COURT, PESHAWAR

(Judicial Department)

Criminal Appeal No. 781-P/2019

Behlol Ehsan Vs Muhammad Shahwaid

JUDGMENT

Date of hearing: 08.10.2026.

Appellant by: Mr. Kabir Imam, Advocate.

State by: Mr. Irshad Ahmad Khan, AAG.

Respondent by: Mr. Fawad Hussain, Advocate.

SAHIBZADA ASADULLAH, J.- This criminal appeal has been filed by the appellant, Behlol Ehsan, challenging the judgment dated 01.06.2019, passed by the learned Additional District & Sessions Judge-I, Kohat, whereby the respondent was acquitted in case FIR No.

106 dated 16.04.2016 registered under sections 302, 324, 457 PPC, at Police Station Ustarzai, Kohat.

2.Brief facts of the case are that on 16.04.2016, the complainant, Behlol Ahsan, while in injured condition, at the Emergency of KDA Hospital, Kohat, reported to the local police that he, along with his mother, Mst.

Rifat Begum, his sister, Mst. Naima Begum, and his father, Ali Raza, was present in a room of their house when the accused, Shawaid, duly armed, entered their house and started firing at them, as a result of which he, his mother, and his sister sustained firearm injuries, whereas his father remained unhurt.

They were subsequently shifted to the hospital, where Mst. Rifat Begum was referred to a hospital in Peshawar for further treatment. The motive behind the occurrence was stated to be that the accused had pressured the complainant to establish a friendship with him and, on refusal, opened fire on them. It is pertinent to mention that Mst. Rifat Begum subsequently succumbed to her injuries on 25.05.2016, whereupon section 302 PPC was added to the case.

3.On completion of investigation, challan against the accused was submitted before the learned trial Court. Provision of section 265-C Cr.P.C. were duly complied with, whereafter formal charge was framed against the accused, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed trial, and the prosecution

was directed to produce its evidence and the prosecution witnesses were summoned accordingly. In order to substantiate its case, the prosecution produced and examined as many as 13 witnesses. After closure of prosecution evidence, the statement of accused was recorded under section 342 Cr.P.C. where he posed innocence, however, neither he wished to be examined on Oath under section 340(2) Cr.P.C. nor wanted to produce evidence in defense. After hearing the parties, the learned trial Court acquitted the respondent of the charge, hence, the instant appeal.

4.Heard. Record perused.

5.What an incident this was, in which three members of a family initially sustained firearm injuries, but one of them, Mst. Rifat Begum, despite receiving medical treatment, ultimately succumbed to her injuries, whereupon section 302, P.P.C., was added to the case. The injured, namely Behlol Ahsan and Mst. Naima Begum, were the son and daughter of the deceased, respectively, whereas Ali Raza was her husband. Soon

after the occurrence, the injured were shifted to the hospital, where their injury sheets were prepared and they were medically examined.

Mst. Rifat Begum, owing to the seriousness of her condition, was referred to Lady Reading Hospital, Peshawar, for further treatment. She remained under medical care and,

notwithstanding her subsequent discharge from the hospital, could not survive the injuries and ultimately breathed her last. The Investigating Officer, on receiving a copy of the FIR on the very day of occurrence, proceeded to the spot and initially prepared the site plan on the basis of his personal observation. During spot inspection, he collected blood from inside the room and also from point ‘C’, situated outside the room. He further took into possession three empties of .30 bore from inside the room and one empty of the same bore from outside the room.

Subsequently, when the injured complainant was discharged from the hospital, the Investigating Officer again visited the place of occurrence and, at his pointation, incorporated the respective positions of the

deceased, the injured eyewitnesses, the complainant and the accused in the site plan.

The accused was arrested on 18.04.2016, subjected to investigation and subsequently sent to judicial lockup. Ultimately, he was committed to stand trial before the learned trial court, which, upon conclusion of the proceedings and appraisal of the evidence, acquitted him of the charge. The question which, therefore, falls for determination before this Court is whether the learned trial court was justified in recording the acquittal and whether the evidence brought on record was appreciated in its true legal perspective. It is true that the present case involves a single accused and that substitution of an innocent person for the actual offender, particularly where only one person is nominated, may ordinarily be regarded as an uncommon phenomenon. Nevertheless, the mere circumstance that a single accused has been charged cannot, by itself, constitute a determining factor for fastening criminal liability upon him. Criminal responsibility must rest upon evidence which is trustworthy,

confidence-inspiring and sufficient to satisfy the standard of proof prescribed by law.

Indeed, the circumstance of a solitary nomination neither relieves the prosecution of its obligation to establish the charge beyond reasonable doubt nor diminishes the duty of the Court to examine the evidence with the care and circumspection which a criminal trial demands. The question is not merely whether the accused has been named, but whether his participation in the occurrence has been established through evidence capable of sustaining a finding of guilt. It is in this perspective that this Court considers it necessary to revisit the statements of the prosecution witnesses, examine the medical and circumstantial evidence in conjunction with the ocular account, and reassess the material circumstances emerging from the record. Such an exercise is particularly essential where the occurrence has resulted in the loss of a human life, yet the accused has been acquitted after trial. The gravity of the offence cannot substitute proof, just as the seriousness of the accusation cannot diminish

the protection which the law extends to an accused person. The object of judicial scrutiny is neither to sustain an acquittal merely because it has been recorded nor to disturb it merely because the consequences of the occurrence were tragic, rather, the endeavor must be to ascertain whether the conclusion reached by the learned trial court is the product of a lawful, rational and comprehensive appreciation of the evidence, so that justice is administered according to law and the possibility of a miscarriage of justice is avoided.

6.In order to appreciate the

essential and peculiar circumstances attending the present case, this Court deems it desirable to examine the intrinsic relationship between the parties, the intimacy which had developed over the years, the place and alleged manner of occurrence, and, more importantly, the resentment attributed to Ali Raza, the father of the complainant, concerning the frequent visits of the accused to his house. These circumstances are not merely incidental to the prosecution story,

rather, they constitute the very background against which the unfortunate incident occurred and the competing versions of the prosecution and the defense fall to be examined. There is no denial of the fact that Mst. Rifat Begum, who subsequently succumbed to her injuries, was the mother of the injured complainant, PW-5 Behlol Ahsan, and the injured eyewitness, PW-7 Mst. Naima Begum, whereas PW-6 Ali Raza was her husband. It was on the evening of the occurrence, when the family members were allegedly present together in a room of their house, that the tragic incident took place, resulting in firearm injuries to three persons, one of whom subsequently lost her life. True that the accused stands charged with having entered the room and opened fire on the family, but equally true that the mere accusation, however grave, cannot relieve the prosecution of its obligation to establish that the occurrence took place at the stated time, in the alleged manner and at the hands of the person nominated. The central inquiry, therefore, is not confined to whether the

unfortunate incident occurred, for the injuries sustained by the victims are borne out by the medical evidence; rather, it extends to the more important question whether the accused was responsible for those injuries or whether the incident had its origin in the domestic discord suggested by the defense. It is in this setting that the relationship between the accused and the complainant, the affection extended to the accused by the deceased, the alleged deterioration of friendship, the objection raised to his continued visits and the strained relations between the husband and wife assume significance. These

circumstances must be examined through the testimony of PW-5, PW-6 and PW-7, not merely to ascertain whether their accounts are mutually consistent, but also to determine whether the differences emerging from their cross-examination affect the genesis, manner or authorship of the occurrence. The prosecution case principally rests upon the testimony of three witnesses, PW-5 Behlol Ahsan, the injured complainant; PW-6 Ali Raza, the husband of the deceased and PW-

7 Mst. Naima Begum, the injured daughter of the deceased. The complainant explained that at about 6:30 p.m., he, his mother, his sister and his father were present in a room of their house when the accused entered, armed with a pistol, and immediately opened fire upon them. As a result, he, his mother and his sister sustained firearm injuries, whereas his father fortunately escaped unhurt. He further explained that the accused fled from the spot and that the injured were hurriedly shifted to the hospital, where he reported the matter to the police. His mother, owing to the seriousness of her condition, was referred to Peshawar for further treatment, while he and his sister remained admitted to KDA Hospital.

PW-6 Ali Raza supported the prosecution account concerning the occurrence, whereas PW-7 Mst. Naima Begum, who herself sustained a firearm injury, also attributed the firing to the accused. Thus, on the essential question of the identity of the person who allegedly entered the room and resorted to firing, the witnesses have furnished substantially consistent accounts.

Nevertheless, their testimony cannot be appreciated merely upon the apparent harmony of their examination-in-chief. The admissions, explanations and differences emerging from their cross-examination must also receive careful consideration, particularly because the defense has attempted to construct an altogether different account of the occurrence upon certain circumstances admitted by the prosecution witnesses themselves. Turning first to the relationship between the accused and the complainant, PW-5 candidly acknowledged that the accused had been his friend since childhood, that their houses were situated opposite each other and that the accused enjoyed considerable intimacy with his deceased mother. He further admitted that, from childhood until the occurrence, no serious difference had existed between them, although he volunteered that he had himself directed the accused to refrain from visiting their house. PW-6 Ali Raza likewise acknowledged that the accused and his son had been cordial friends since childhood, but

explained that their friendship had broken down approximately eight months before the occurrence. He further admitted that, notwithstanding the alleged termination of friendship, the accused continued visiting their house and that his deceased wife treated him with the affection ordinarily extended to a son.

PW-7 Mst. Naima Begum substantially confirmed these circumstances and explained that the accused regarded her mother as his own mother. These admissions establish that the accused was neither a stranger to the family nor a person whose presence in their household had previously been unusual, rather, he had enjoyed a relationship of considerable intimacy which, according to the prosecution, subsequently deteriorated when the complainant objected to his continued visits. The significance of this relationship lies not merely in its existence, but in the circumstances surrounding its deterioration and the competing explanations advanced by the parties concerning the unfortunate incident. It is at this stage that a material difference emerges between the statements

of PW-6 and PW-7. Ali Raza denied the suggestion that he had strained relations with his deceased wife on account of the visits of accused. His daughter, Mst. Naima Begum, however, candidly acknowledged that her parents had strained relations over this very issue and that they frequently quarreled with each other. The admission made by PW-7 cannot be brushed aside merely because it does not accord with the denial furnished by her father. It is a circumstance emerging from the prosecution evidence itself and must be assigned its proper evidentiary value.

Nevertheless, the existence of domestic differences and the commission of the alleged firing are two distinct matters. The former may explain the atmosphere prevailing within the household, but it does not necessarily establish the identity of the person who resorted to firing. A disagreement between husband and wife, however unpleasant or frequent, cannot by itself justify the inference that the husband must have fired upon his wife and children. Such an inference requires a reasonable foundation in the evidence and

cannot be drawn merely from the existence of strained matrimonial relations. The defense further attempted to strengthen its alternative version by drawing attention to the drinking habit of Ali Raza. During cross-examination, PW-6 admitted that he was a habitual drinker, whereas PW-7 also acknowledged the same circumstance. The defense suggested to PW- 5 that his father, being under the influence of liquor, had fired upon his mother during a domestic quarrel and that he and his sister had sustained injuries in the course of the incident. The complainant categorically denied this suggestion. What deserves particular attention is that an admission concerning habitual consumption of liquor is not equivalent to proof of intoxication at the time of occurrence. The defense was required neither to establish its version beyond reasonable doubt nor to produce evidence of the same standard as the prosecution;

nevertheless, the suggested explanation must find some reasonable support in the material on record before it can create doubt concerning the prosecution account. No

medical evidence establishing intoxication at the relevant time has been identified in the material presently under consideration. Nor can the admission of a drinking habit, standing alone, establish that Ali Raza had discharged a firearm. The Court cannot travel from an admitted habit to an assumed state of intoxication and thereafter to the authorship of a fatal shooting without examining whether the intervening conclusions are supported by evidence. The defense version, as disclosed in the statement of the accused under Section 342, Cr.P.C., was that Ali Raza, having returned from abroad shortly before the occurrence, quarreled with his wife over the visits of the accused and, while under the influence of liquor, fired upon her, causing injuries to the other members of the family during the ensuing struggle. This explanation undoubtedly requires consideration, particularly in view of admission of PW-7 concerning the strained relations between her parents. Yet, the accused did not claim to have personally witnessed the alleged firing by Ali Raza, and the account furnished by him

must be examined in the light of the evidence rather than accepted as an established occurrence. The question is not whether the defense has proved its alternative version with certainty, for no such burden rests upon it. The real question is whether the circumstances relied upon by the defense are sufficiently supported by the record to create a reasonable doubt concerning the identity of the assailant. A possibility which reasonably emerges from the evidence cannot be disregarded; equally, an unsupported supposition cannot acquire evidentiary force merely because it offers an alternative explanation for the tragedy. Turning again to the injured witnesses, PW-5 Behlol Ahsan and PW-7 Mst. Naima Begum were not persons whose presence at the occurrence rested exclusively upon their own assertions.

Both sustained firearm injuries and were medically examined shortly after the incident.

PW-1 Dr. Saleem Ullah recorded their respective injuries and stated that all three injured persons were conscious and well- oriented in time and space when brought to

the hospital. The medical evidence, therefore, lends substantial assurance to the presence of PW-5 and PW-7 at the occurrence. Their accounts also agree upon the essential allegation that the accused entered the room and resorted to firing. Despite the cross- examination directed towards their previous relationship with the accused, the disagreements within the family and the suggested involvement of Ali Raza, neither injured witness accepted the allegation that the firing had been committed by the father.

This circumstance is relevant when evaluating their testimony, though the Court must still determine whether their identification of the accused is reliable in the light of the entire record. The fact that a witness has sustained injuries establishes a strong reason to accept his presence; it does not relieve the Court of its obligation to examine the truthfulness of his attribution of criminal responsibility.

Another circumstance which deserves attention is that the complainant did not conceal the previous friendship between himself and the accused, nor did Mst. Naima

Begum attempt to suppress the domestic disagreement concerning the visits of the accused. Indeed, PW-7 acknowledged a circumstance which could lend support to the defense suggestion, notwithstanding that her father had denied it. Such admissions must be appreciated fairly. They cannot automatically establish the truthfulness of the entire prosecution account, but neither should they be overlooked while assessing whether the witnesses were attempting to present an artificially consistent narrative. The Court must distinguish between differences which reveal the natural independence of witnesses and contradictions which strike at the foundation of the prosecution case. Here, the principal divergence concerns the existence of domestic discord, whereas the injured witnesses have maintained their attribution of the firing to the accused. Whether that divergence is sufficient to generate reasonable doubt must ultimately be determined through a cumulative appreciation of the ocular, medical and physical evidence.

It is after considering these circumstances

that the submission concerning the relationship of the witnesses with the deceased falls for examination. Learned counsel for the appellant sought to persuade this Court that PW-5, PW-6 and PW-7, being the son, husband and daughter of the deceased, respectively, were interested witnesses whose testimony should not be relied upon. We are not impressed by the contention in the form in which it has been advanced. Relationship with the deceased is not, by itself, a disqualification, nor does it necessarily establish an interest in falsely implicating an innocent person. The law draws a distinction between a witness who is related to the victim and one who, because of animosity, personal advantage or some other demonstrated circumstance, has a motive to secure the conviction of a person known to be innocent. In the present case, no previous blood feud or longstanding enmity between the accused and the family has been brought on record, rather, the admitted position is that the accused had been a childhood friend of the complainant and had enjoyed

considerable affection from the deceased, who treated him as her own son. The subsequent disagreement concerning his visits certainly deserves consideration, but it cannot, without more, establish a deliberate design on the part of the injured witnesses to substitute him for the actual offender. Equally significant is that PW-5 and PW-7 themselves sustained firearm injuries, thereby furnishing objective support for their presence at the scene. Their relationship with the deceased cannot, therefore, constitute an independent reason for rejecting their testimony, although its credibility must still be tested upon the ordinary principles governing appreciation of criminal evidence. In case of Farmanullah v.

Qadeem Khan and others -2001 SCMR 1474, the Supreme Court held that mere friendship or relationship does not make a witness an interested witness. An interested witness is one who has a motive to falsely implicate the accused, is partisan, or is involved in the matter against the accused. The Court emphasized that the intrinsic value of the evidence must be examined rather than

rejecting it merely because of relationship or enmity. Likewise, in Abdul Sayeed v. State of Madhya Pradesh [(2010) 10 SCC 259], the Supreme Court of India emphasized the special evidentiary significance of an injured eyewitness, whose injuries ordinarily furnish assurance of presence at the occurrence and whose testimony should not be discarded without cogent reasons. Tested upon these principles, the mere relationship of PW-5, PW-6 and PW-7 with the deceased, in the absence of a demonstrated motive for false implication, cannot furnish a lawful basis for discarding their evidence. The decisive consideration remains whether their testimony, particularly that of the two injured eyewitnesses, inspires confidence upon an examination of the record as a whole and whether the circumstances relied upon by the defense create a reasonable doubt concerning the participation of the accused.

7.Now turning to the place of

occurrence, when the Investigating Officer visited the spot, he initially prepared the site plan on the basis of his personal observation,

without the pointation of the complainant, who, by then, had been hospitalized on account of the firearm injuries sustained during the occurrence. Admittedly, upon his discharge from the hospital, the complainant verified the site plan already prepared, and at his instance, the respective positions of the deceased, the complainant, the eyewitnesses and the accused were subsequently incorporated therein. When questioned on this aspect during cross-examination, the complainant satisfactorily explained his inability to accompany the Investigating Officer at the initial stage, an explanation independently supported by the medical record. Nothing could be elicited to suggest that he had deliberately avoided pointing out the place of occurrence, or that despite being available at his residence, he had failed or refused to associate himself with the preparation of the site plan. In these circumstances, its initial preparation in his absence, followed by subsequent verification, cannot reasonably be regarded as a circumstance sufficient to discredit the

prosecution version. Apart from the above, the presence of the witnesses at the place of occurrence deserves consideration in the light of their relationship with the parties, the residential character of the premises and the time at which the incident occurred. Ali Raza, though not the complainant, was cited as an eyewitness, and his presence inside the house during the evening hours was neither unusual nor unnatural, particularly when he had returned from abroad approximately ten days before the occurrence. Equally significant is the presence of Mst. Naima, who herself sustained firearm injuries inside the same house, thereby furnishing physical support to her presence at the scene.

Likewise, the presence of the complainant stands corroborated by his injuries, hospitalization and the medical evidence brought on record. When these circumstances are examined collectively, the presence of the witnesses emerges as a natural feature of the occurrence rather than an artificial arrangement subsequently introduced to support the prosecution case. The testimony

of the Investigating Officer assumes particular importance, for it enables this Court to examine whether the physical circumstances discovered at the spot correspond with the account furnished by the eyewitnesses.

During cross-examination, he was specifically questioned regarding his visit to the place of occurrence, the respective positions of the parties and the inter se distances between them. He explained these circumstances and confirmed the recovery of blood from inside the room as well as from a place outside it, marked as point C in the site plan. He further confirmed the recovery of three spent cartridge cases from inside the room and one from outside. True that the prosecution evidence does not furnish a precise explanation as to which particular shot resulted in the recovery of each cartridge case, or to which injured person the blood discovered at the respective points belonged.

Nevertheless, these omissions must be appreciated in the context of the occurrence as a whole. The possibility that a further shot was fired in the courtyard to discourage

pursuit, or that an injured person moved outside the room, cannot altogether be excluded, though neither circumstance can be treated as affirmatively established. The essential consideration remains whether these unexplained details materially contradict the eyewitness account or merely leave certain incidental movements during the occurrence unaccounted for. In the circumstances of the present case, they do not appear sufficient to overshadow the otherwise consistent ocular evidence, particularly when the witnesses were closely related not only to the deceased but also to the accused, and no previous grudge or blood feud has been established which might reasonably explain their deliberate false implication of the latter. The evidence of PW- 09, the scribe of the report, provides another important link in the prosecution narrative.

According to his statement, when he reached the hospital, he found the injured persons already present there, whereupon the complainant narrated the occurrence and caused the matter to be reported. His

testimony finds support from the medical evidence, particularly the statement of the Medical Officer who examined the injured persons and prepared their medico-legal certificates. The Medical Officer confirmed their injuries and described their condition as conscious and oriented as to time and place.

Nothing material was elicited during cross- examination to establish that the complainant, on account of the nature or severity of his injuries, was incapable of speaking or communicating the circumstances of the incident. Nor could anything be brought on record to demonstrate that the injured eyewitness, Mst. Naima, was absent from the hospital at the relevant time. The medical record, read alongside the testimony of PW-9, thus provides independent corroboration regarding the presence and condition of the injured persons when the matter was reported. What lends further significance to this evidence is the correspondence between the testimony of the scribe and that of the Medical Officer, for the former confirms the circumstances in which the report was

recorded, while the latter furnishes medical assurance regarding the injuries, consciousness and orientation of the complainant and the injured eyewitnesses.

Their statements, when examined in conjunction with the medico-legal certificates and the time of arrival of the injured persons at the hospital, disclose a consistent sequence of events, beginning with their removal from the place of occurrence, followed by medical examination and the recording of the report. The circumstances thus brought on record lend substantial assurance to the prosecution assertion that the injured persons were shifted to the hospital without unnecessary loss of time and that the complainant, being conscious and capable of communication, narrated the occurrence without any unexplained interval affording an opportunity for deliberation, consultation or fabrication. In this regard, reference may usefully be made to Abdul Wahid v. The State (2023 SCMR 1278), wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan considered the evidentiary

significance of prompt reporting following the removal of an injured person to the hospital and recognized that the time reasonably consumed in securing medical assistance does not, by itself, constitute an unexplained delay. Such prompt reporting, when supported by the attending circumstances, materially diminishes the possibility of deliberation or consultation. Applying this principle to the present case, the mutually corroborative testimony of PW-9, the Medical Officer and the injured witnesses, read alongside the contemporaneous medical record, provides substantial assurance regarding their presence at the hospital, the condition in which they were examined and the circumstances in which the occurrence was reported. Thus, when the testimony of the complainant, the injured eyewitnesses, PW-9, the Investigating Officer and the Medical Officer is examined in its proper perspective, a coherent chain of circumstances emerges. The occurrence took place inside a residential house; firearm injuries were sustained; the injured were

removed to the hospital; the complainant reported the matter and the subsequent investigation disclosed blood and spent cartridge cases at the place of occurrence.

The initial absence of the complainant during preparation of the site plan stands explained by his hospitalization, while its subsequent verification supplied the particulars which could not earlier be obtained from him. The physical evidence, though not accounting for every movement or every shot fired during the incident, does not disclose any fundamental inconsistency with the ocular account. The law does not demand mathematical precision in the narration of a violent occurrence, but requires the Court to distinguish between discrepancies affecting its essential features and omissions relating merely to incidental details. Viewed cumulatively, the ocular, medical and investigative evidence lends support to the material circumstances of the prosecution case, and the omissions noticed above do not, by themselves, furnish a sufficient basis for discarding the testimony of

witnesses whose presence is otherwise supported by the record.

8.The medical evidence, when

examined in conjunction with the ocular account, lends substantial support to the prosecution case. The unfortunate deceased, Mst. Rifat, initially sustained firearm injuries and, although she survived for a considerable period thereafter, ultimately succumbed to their consequences. The complainant, who happened to be her son, also sustained a firearm injury, as did his sister, Mst. Naima.

The injuries suffered by these witnesses assume particular significance, for they furnish independent assurance of their presence at the place of occurrence at the relevant time. The Medical Officer who initially examined the injured persons appeared before the learned trial court and explained the circumstances in which they were brought to the hospital, the nature of their injuries and their medical condition at the time of examination. Likewise, the Medical Officer who conducted the postmortem examination of Mst. Rifat confirmed that her injuries were

caused by a firearm. It is true that medical evidence is essentially corroborative in character and cannot, by itself, identify the person responsible for inflicting the injuries.

Nevertheless, where the prosecution succeeds in producing trustworthy and confidence-inspiring ocular testimony, the medical evidence, if consistent therewith, provides valuable corroboration. In the present case, the nature of the injuries, their medical confirmation and the presence of the injured witnesses at the hospital constitute circumstances which reinforce the account furnished by the prosecution witnesses. At this juncture, it is equally necessary to examine the explanation offered by the accused when confronted with the incriminating circumstances during his examination under section 342, Cr.P.C. In response to a question, he attributed the death of Mst. Rifat to her own husband, alleging that her husband was under the influence of liquor on the night of occurrence, that an altercation had taken place between the spouses, and that the husband thereafter

drew a pistol and fired at the deceased. This explanation, however, must be appreciated in the light of the evidence available on record.

Admittedly, the accused did not claim to have personally witnessed the alleged firing by the husband. His assertion, therefore, rests upon an inference rather than upon any occurrence personally perceived by him. It is true that the witnesses acknowledged the complainant's habit of consuming liquor, but such acknowledgment, standing alone, cannot establish that he was intoxicated at the relevant time, much less that he was responsible for firing at his wife. The existence of a particular habit and the commission of a specific criminal act are two entirely different matters, and the former cannot, without supporting evidence, be treated as proof of the latter. The explanation furnished by the accused was undoubtedly entitled to consideration, but its evidentiary worth had to be tested against the ocular account, the injuries sustained by the complainant and his sister, the medical evidence and the surrounding circumstances.

When so examined, it does not disclose any circumstance of sufficient probative force to displace the prosecution evidence or create a reasonable doubt regarding the identity of the assailant. To attribute responsibility to the husband merely upon the suggested possibility of an altercation arising from intoxication would amount to substituting conjecture for evidence, a course which judicial appreciation does not permit. The question of motive, however, assumes considerable importance in the peculiar circumstances of the present case and, in our considered view, did not receive its due appreciation at the hands of the learned trial court. The motive was not merely alleged by the prosecution witnesses; rather, the circumstances giving rise to the bitterness between the parties also find

acknowledgment in the explanation furnished by the accused himself and support in the evidence of the Investigating Officer. The controversy essentially revolved around the accused's visits to the house and his close relationship with the deceased, which had

disturbed the inter-se relationship between the parties and become a source of resentment and annoyance. The accused sought to attribute the fatal occurrence to the husband on account of that very resentment, whereas the prosecution maintained that the accused himself was responsible for the firing.

Thus, although the parties differed fundamentally as to the identity of the person who resorted to violence, the underlying cause of discord was substantially common to both versions. This distinction is of considerable significance. The

acknowledgment of the circumstances giving rise to the dispute does not amount to an admission of the offence, but it does lend support to the existence of the motive alleged by the prosecution. Indeed, if the accused's visits and his relationship with the deceased were capable of generating resentment in the mind of her husband, the restriction or objection placed upon those visits could equally furnish a cause of annoyance to the accused. The latter inference, however, derives its significance not from speculation

alone, but from its correspondence with the surrounding circumstances and the evidence otherwise brought on record. It is a settled principle of criminal jurisprudence that motive, however strong, cannot substitute proof of the commission of an offence, nor can it independently establish the identity of the offender. Its significance, however, becomes pronounced when the prosecution has otherwise succeeded in establishing the charge through trustworthy and confidence- inspiring evidence. In such circumstances, motive not only lends assurance to the prosecution narrative but also assumes relevance in determining the nature and quantum of punishment. In this regard, reference may usefully be made to Iftikhar Mehmood and another v. Qaiser Iftikhar and others (2011 SCMR 1165), wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan considered the significance of motive in determining the appropriate sentence in a case of murder. The principle relevant to the present controversy is that, once guilt has been established, the nature of the motive

and the circumstances in which it operated are material considerations in the exercise of sentencing discretion. Applying this principle to the present case, the learned trial court ought to have examined the motive not merely as an allegation advanced by the injured witnesses, but in the broader context of the relationship between the parties, the cause of their mutual resentment, the explanation furnished by the accused and the circumstances established during investigation. The cause of discord was not merely asserted by the prosecution witnesses but also found substantial acknowledgment in the explanation furnished by the accused himself. Such acknowledgment, though not amounting to an admission of guilt, was relevant to the existence and nature of the motive. Once the ocular and medical evidence is found sufficient to establish the criminal responsibility of the accused, the proved motive acquires additional significance, both as a corroborative circumstance and as a factor requiring independent judicial consideration while

determining the appropriate sentence. The learned trial court's failure to appreciate this aspect in its proper perspective, therefore, calls for examination, for the discretion to award the lesser punishment must rest upon a reasoned evaluation of the entire circumstances, including the nature of the motive, rather than upon an incomplete appreciation of the evidence.

9.The cumulative effect of the

foregoing discussion leads this Court to the irresistible conclusion that the prosecution has succeeded in establishing its case against the accused through convincing, reliable and confidence-inspiring evidence, but the learned trial court failed to appreciate the material circumstances in their true perspective. The testimony of the injured eyewitnesses, their natural presence at the place of occurrence, the injuries sustained by them, the medical evidence confirming those injuries, the prompt reporting of the matter, and the motive emerging from the relationship and discord between the parties, when examined collectively, form a coherent and mutually

corroborative chain of circumstances pointing towards the criminal responsibility of the accused. Unfortunately, the learned trial court, instead of evaluating the evidence in its entirety, appears to have approached the material circumstances in isolation, thereby overlooking their cumulative evidentiary effect. True that an appeal against acquittal stands on a different footing, for the presumption of innocence, already available to an accused, acquires additional strength upon his acquittal, and an appellate Court is ordinarily reluctant to disturb such a finding merely because another view of the evidence may also be possible. Equally true, however, is that this salutary principle of judicial restraint cannot be permitted to become a shield for a judgment which, on its very face, suffers from manifest perversity, misreading or non-reading of material evidence, or conclusions which no reasonable judicial mind could sustain. The distinction is between a possible and reasonably supported view of the evidence, which deserves judicial deference, and a conclusion resting upon an

erroneous appreciation of material circumstances, which may occasion a miscarriage of justice. In this regard, reference may usefully be made to Khadija Siddiqui and another v. Shah Hussain and another (PLD 2019 SC 261), wherein the Supreme Court of Pakistan interfered with an acquittal upon finding that the material evidence, particularly the testimony of the injured witness and its medical corroboration, had not received proper judicial appreciation.

The principle was also elaborated by the Supreme Court of India in Chandrappa and others v. State of Karnataka [(2007) 4 SCC 415], wherein it was held that although an appellate Court possesses full power to review and reconsider the evidence upon which an acquittal is founded, such jurisdiction must be exercised with due regard to the reinforced presumption of innocence, and an acquittal should not be disturbed where two reasonable conclusions are possible. These pronouncements, read together, establish that the sanctity attached to an acquittal protects a lawful and

reasonably supported judicial determination, but does not confer immunity upon findings demonstrably contrary to the evidence or founded upon substantial errors of appreciation. Applying these principles to the present case, the infirmities noticed in the impugned judgment are neither superficial nor confined to matters of insignificant detail;

rather, they go to the very foundation of the conclusion reached by the learned trial court.

The failure to appreciate the consistent ocular account of the injured witnesses in conjunction with the medical evidence, the physical circumstances discovered during investigation and the established motive has resulted in an acquittal which cannot reasonably be sustained. This Court is, therefore, satisfied that the present case discloses circumstances sufficiently compelling to justify interference in appellate jurisdiction, notwithstanding the enhanced presumption of innocence ordinarily attaching to an acquitted person. Consequently, for the reasons recorded above, the instant appeal against acquittal is allowed and the impugned

judgment of the learned trial court is set aside.

The accused/respondent is convicted under section 302(b), PPC, for committing the Qatl-i- amd of Mst. Rifat Begum and sentenced to imprisonment for life as Ta’zir, together with a fine of Rs. 500,000/-, as compensation to be paid to the legal heirs of the deceased within the meaning of section 544-A Cr.P.C., recoverable as arrears of land revenue and in default whereof to further undergo simple imprisonment for six months. He is further convicted under section 324, PPC, on two separate counts in respect of the firearm injuries sustained by the complainant and Mst. Naima, and sentenced to seven years' rigorous imprisonment on each count, together with a fine of Rs. 200,000/- on each count. In default of payment of fine, to further suffer three months’ simple imprisonment, on each count. Under section 337-F(iii) PPC, to three years imprisonment, on two counts, and to pay Daman to the injured/complainant and injured Mst. Naima, amounting to Rs. 50,000/- each in lump sum. Till payment of Daman, his sentences shall be considered as simple

imprisonment. Under section 457 PPC, to suffer two year’s rigorous imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs. 100,000/- and in default whereof, to suffer simple imprisonment for two months. All the sentences shall run concurrently. Benefit of section 382-B Cr.P.C is extended to the convicts. The accused/respondent, being present before this Court, is taken into custody forthwith and shall be committed to prison for undergoing the sentences awarded to him.

Above are the detailed reasons

of the short order of even date.

Announced

Naqqash Haider

JUDGE

JUDGE

Division Bench.

Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sahibzada Asadullah, J. Hon’ble Ms. Justice Farah Jamshed, J.