Akhtar Gul Vs The State & another (Connected: "Inam Ullah Vs Akhtar Gul & another")

JUDGMENT SHEET

PESHAWAR HIGH COURT, PESHAWAR

(Judicial Department)

Cr. A No. 979-P/2025

Akhtar Gul Vs The State & another

JUDGMENT

Date of hearing: 07.10.2026

Appellant by: Barrister Amir Khan Chamkani.

The State by: Mr. Mushtaq Rahim, AAG.

Complainant by: - M/s. Hussain Ali and Maqsood Alam, Advocates,

SAHIBZADA ASADULLAH, J.- Through this single judgment, this court is intending to decide the instant appeal as well as connected Criminal Revision No. 242-P/2025 titled “Inam Ullah vs Akhtar Gul & another” as both the matters are arising out of one and the same judgment dated 27.09.2025 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-XVII, Peshawar delivered in case FIR No. 1293 dated 04.11.2023 under sections 302/34 PPC at police

station Paharipura, Peshawar whereby, the appellant was convicted and sentenced as under:

“Under section 302(b)/34 PPC to imprisonment for life for the murder of Usman Khan and to pay compensation of Rs.5,00,000/- (rupees five lac) to the legal heirs of the deceased within the meaning of section 544-A CrPC and in default whereof, to further undergo simple imprisonment for six months. Benefit of section 382-B Cr.P.C is extended in favour of the appellant.

2.Brief facts, as borne out from the contents of the FIR are that on 04.11.2023, complainant Inam Ullah, narrated the occurrence to the effect that he, alongwith his brother-in-law and brother Usman Khan, was travelling in a motorcar and when reached near his house, they found a motorcar parked in the thoroughfare leading to their residence, obstructing their entry; that his brother Usman Khan went towards the house of the owner of the said vehicle to ask him to remove it; that accused Akhtar Gul and Muhammad Agha, who

were neighbours, came out of their house and, instead of removing the vehicle, entered into an altercation with the deceased, during which Muhammad Agha caught hold of Usman Khan, while Akhtar Gul inflicted a knife blow upon his chest as a result of which he received injuries;

that he was shifted to Lady Reading Hospital, Peshawar however, Usman Khan succumbed to the same at the hospital; that the accused were charged for the commission of offence hence, the present FIR.

3.Complete challan was put in court.

Provisions of section 265-C CrPC were complied with from the appellant and the absconding co-accused to which they pleaded not guilty and claimed trial however, thereafter, the accused Muhammad Agha absented himself and proceedings under section 512 CrPC were initiated against him. In order to prove its claim, the prosecution produced and examined as many as 11 witnesses. After closure of prosecution evidence, statement of the appellant was recorded under section 342 CrPC, wherein he posed innocence, however, neither he wished to

be examined on Oath as required under section 340 (2) CrPC, nor wanted to produce evidence in defence. The learned trial Court, after full- fledged trial, convicted the appellant vide the impugned judgment hence, the instant appeal.

4.Arguments heard and record

scanned through.

5.The unfortunate deceased, after receiving a stab injury, was hurriedly shifted to the hospital in an injured condition, where the complainant reported the matter to the police.

During medical examination, however, he succumbed to his injury, whereafter the injury sheet and inquest report were prepared and the dead body was sent for postmortem examination. The Investigating Officer, after receiving a copy of the FIR, visited the spot and, on the pointation of the complainant, prepared the site plan, besides collecting blood through cotton from the place of the deceased. The investigating officer also took into possession one energy saver which was lit at the time of occurrence. On the same day, PW-3 Qazi Nisar, SI., apprehended the accused in an injured

condition; their injury sheets were prepared and they were subsequently medically examined at Lady Reading Hospital, where their medico- legal certificates were prepared. Thereafter, their physical custody was obtained for investigation and, during interrogation, the appellant allegedly led the police party to his house, from where, on his pointation, the knife stated to have been used in the commission of the offence was recovered and taken into possession. The recovered knife (churi) alongwith the collected blood from the spot, was sent to the office of the Chemical Examiner and the report received therefrom confirmed the presence of human blood upon the knife. The appellant was thereafter sent behind the bars. Upon completion of investigation, the appellant alongwith co- accused was sent up for trial however, co- accused went into hiding and remained at large.

On conclusion of the trial, the learned trial Court convicted and sentenced him to imprisonment for life.

6.The learned trial Court, upon

appraisal of the evidence and application of its

judicial mind, concluded that the appellant was responsible for the commission of the offence.

This Court is, therefore, required to examine whether such conclusion was legally sustainable and whether the evidence on the record, read in the light of the surrounding circumstances, was properly appreciated. True that the fatal stab injury is specifically attributed to the appellant and that, in a case involving a single principal assailant, substitution ordinarily becomes a comparatively remote possibility. Yet, nomination of a single accused cannot relieve the prosecution of its obligation to establish the charge through reliable and confidence-inspiring evidence, nor can it absolve the Court from carefully examining the entire evidentiary setting in which the occurrence took place. It is equally true that the complainant and the eyewitness are closely related to the deceased;

however, mere relationship with the deceased is no lawful ground for discarding their testimony.

The real test is whether their evidence, when examined against the attending circumstances, inherent probabilities, medical evidence,

investigative material and other circumstances appearing from the record, rings true and inspires confidence. In order to guard against miscarriage of justice, this Court considers it necessary to reappraise the evidence, particularly the statements of the material witnesses, so as to determine not merely who inflicted the fatal injury, but also the circumstances in which it came to be inflicted and the degree of criminal intention accompanying the act.

7.The peculiar circumstances in

which the unfortunate incident occurred assume considerable importance. This Court is inclined to consider not only the statements of the witnesses, but also the manner in which the occurrence unfolded, the inter-se relationship between the parties, the existence or otherwise of any previous grudge or animosity, and whether the parties were, in fact, known to each other. Learned counsel for the appellant argued that the accused were not residents of the immediate locality and, therefore, their identification by the complainant party was

doubtful. It was further highlighted that, according to the prosecution itself, the deceased, the complainant (PW-5) and PW-6 were running their shop at Shuba Bazaar and, consequently, remained away from the residential locality during much of the day; hence, according to the learned counsel, there was little opportunity for the complainant party to become acquainted with the accused. The complainant, however, while appearing as PW-5, stated that deceased Usman Khan was his brother, whereas PW-6 Jawad was his cousin as well as his brother-in- law, and categorically maintained that accused Akhtar Gul and Muhammad Agha were their neighbours and were well known to them. He explained that on the relevant evening he, the deceased and PW-6 returned from their shop at Shuba Bazaar and, upon reaching the street leading to their house, found the motorcar of the accused obstructing their passage. The deceased got out of their vehicle, went to the house of accused Akhtar Gul and knocked at the door for removal of the obstruction. According to the complainant, both accused came out, an

altercation ensued, one of them caught hold of the deceased and the appellant inflicted the stab injury. PW-6 Jawad Ali supported the complainant regarding the occurrence, and both witnesses were subjected to extensive cross- examination without any glaring inconsistency being elicited between them regarding its broad features. Such consistency undoubtedly lends assurance to their account, but does not bring the judicial inquiry to an end, for consistency alone is not synonymous with truth. The spoken word must still be tested against the objective circumstances, inherent probabilities, conduct of the parties before, during and immediately after the occurrence, and the physical and circumstantial material available on the record.

The question, therefore, is not merely whether PW-5 and PW-6 have contradicted one another, but whether their narration represents the occurrence in its entirety or leaves undisclosed some material part of its genesis. The judicial search for truth does not authorize the Court to import evidence from outside the record, but it equally does not require it to shut its eyes to

circumstances proved by the prosecution itself merely because its eyewitnesses have spoken with verbal consistency. Criminal jurisprudence requires a holistic appraisal. Evidence cannot be placed in watertight compartments, with ocular testimony examined independently of the medical, physical and circumstantial evidence.

The circumstances preceding the occurrence, the immediate cause of the quarrel, the conduct of its participants, the manner in which the confrontation developed, the injuries sustained on either side, the condition in which the accused were apprehended and their subsequent conduct are all parts of one continuous transaction. Their cumulative effect, tested against ordinary human conduct and probabilities, must guide the judicial conclusion.

Viewed from this perspective, an important circumstance emerges from the evidence of the prosecution. PW-3 Qazi Nisar SI., who apprehended the accused shortly after the occurrence, categorically stated that both were found in an injured condition. He prepared their injury sheets and referred them to Lady Reading

Hospital for medical examination and treatment.

The factum of their injuries, therefore, is not a defence plea subsequently devised at the trial; it emerges from the testimony of a prosecution witness and from an official act performed contemporaneously with their arrest. The medico-legal certificates were neither formally exhibited nor was the concerned doctor examined. We would, therefore, refrain from treating the contents of those unproved certificates as substantive evidence regarding the exact nature, dimensions or probable cause of the injuries. That, however, is materially different from altogether ignoring the proved circumstance that the accused were found injured and were referred by the police for medical examination. To notice that circumstance is neither to read an unproved document in evidence nor to construct an abandoned defence; it is merely to appreciate a fact affirmatively brought upon the record by the prosecution itself. Its significance becomes apparent when the genesis of the occurrence is examined. This was not, even according to the

prosecution, a case generated by an old blood feud or a pre-existing design to eliminate the deceased. The parties were known to each other and there is no allegation of previous enmity of such magnitude as might suggest that either side was waiting for an opportunity to settle an old score. The prosecution itself supplies the origin of the quarrel: a motorcar was parked in the street; the complainant party, while returning home, found its passage obstructed; the deceased got out of the vehicle and knocked at the door of the appellant for removal of the car;

the accused came out; words were exchanged;

an altercation developed; and ultimately the deceased received a fatal stab injury. This sequence has to be examined as one continuous transaction. Before the knock at the door, the accused, being inside the house, could not ordinarily have known the purpose for which the deceased had approached them. There is nothing in the prosecution case suggesting that they had advance knowledge that the complainant party was approaching, that a confrontation was anticipated, or that the knock at their door would

lead to a physical encounter. In the absence of previous hostility or advance knowledge of an impending confrontation, this Court must, therefore, examine whether the occurrence was the product of a preconceived homicidal design or the unfortunate culmination of a quarrel which developed unexpectedly after the accused came outside. Absence of previous enmity does not by itself exonerate the appellant. Intention can arise even at the spot and may form within a short span of time. The decisive inquiry is, therefore, not merely whether there was an antecedent motive, but at what stage the requisite intention, if any, came into existence and what the appellant actually did thereafter.

The circumstances immediately preceding the fatal blow consequently become crucial: the obstruction in the street; the request for removal of the vehicle; the knocking at the door; the emergence of the accused; the exchange of words; the development of the altercation; the possibility of physical grappling; the injuries found upon the accused; the production and use of the knife; the nature and number of blows;

the part of the body upon which the injury landed; and the conduct of the participants immediately thereafter. It is from the cumulative force of these circumstances, rather than from any single circumstance detached from the rest, that the state of mind of the appellant is to be determined. The allegation that the absconding co-accused caught hold of the deceased while the appellant inflicted the stab injury also requires appraisal against this background. Such an allegation cannot be accepted merely because PW-5 and PW-6 repeated it consistently. This Court must determine whether, in the midst of a sudden quarrel arising out of an obstruction in the street, the asserted act of catching hold forms a natural and convincing component of a concerted attack, or whether the physical circumstances are more compatible with a spontaneous scuffle in which the rapidly changing movements of the participants were subsequently assigned distinct and deliberate roles. At the same time, the Court cannot travel from an evidentiary gap to a factual conclusion resting upon speculation. The injuries upon the

accused may justify closer scrutiny of the prosecution version and may bear materially upon whether the whole genesis has been disclosed, but they do not, by themselves, authorize the Court to invent a counter-version or conclusively declare that the deceased was the aggressor. Equally, the possibility of grappling must remain a possibility unless supported by circumstances appearing from the record. The proper judicial course lies between these two extremes: neither mechanically accepting an internally consistent ocular account nor filling its gaps through conjecture.

8.The question which, therefore, assumes central importance is: what happened between the knocking at the door and the infliction of the fatal stab injury? The answer cannot be found by looking only at the final blow. Both accused were apprehended shortly after the occurrence in an injured condition;

their injuries were noticed by the police officer who arrested them, injury sheets were prepared and they were thereafter referred for medical examination. Those injuries were thus not

introduced at some later stage through a manufactured defence version. At the same time, neither accused appears to have set up a detailed counter-version founded upon them.

This may prevent the Court from reconstructing an affirmative alternative narrative in their favour, but it does not make the injuries themselves disappear from the evidentiary landscape. When those injuries are read together with the absence of previous enmity, the trivial and sudden cause of the quarrel, the age of the parties and the rapid development of the confrontation, the possibility that the occurrence involved an active physical encounter between the two sides cannot safely be excluded. This does not mean that the prosecution case is to be discarded in toto; it means only that the prosecution version concerning the ultimate act may remain credible while its narration concerning the entire genesis and intermediate stages of the occurrence may still be incomplete.

It is here that the distinction between authorship of the fatal act and the degree of criminal intention becomes material. Criminal law does

not measure culpability merely by the consequence which ultimately follows. Death may result in more than one category of homicide, yet the law distinguishes between them because the state of mind accompanying the act may materially differ. Thus, after determining who caused the fatal injury, the Court must still determine the circumstances in which it was caused and the degree of intention which accompanied it. Intention, being a condition of the human mind, ordinarily admits of no direct proof and has to be inferred from the surrounding circumstances. The weapon employed and the part of the body upon which the injury lands are undoubtedly important considerations, but neither can be elevated into an inflexible rule. The Court must also consider whether the weapon was carried in readiness or became available during the occurrence;

whether it was displayed before the confrontation or surfaced only after the struggle had commenced; whether there was previous enmity or preparation; whether the assault was repeated; whether the parties were stationary or

grappling with one another; whether the accused themselves sustained injuries in the same transaction; whether there was sufficient time for reflection; and, above all, whether the fatal act represented the execution of an antecedent design or an instantaneous reaction generated by a suddenly developing encounter. We are conscious that the fatal injury landed upon the chest, a vital part of the body, and that circumstance cannot be minimized. Yet it would be unsafe to convert the seat of a solitary injury, standing alone, into conclusive proof of a predetermined intention to kill when the surrounding evidence indicates a sudden and moving physical confrontation. The seat of injury must be weighed with, rather than divorced from, the remaining circumstances, the suddenness of the quarrel, the injuries upon the accused, the absence of previous preparation, the manner in which the knife came into use, and the fact that the occurrence happened to develop within a short span of time. The character and emergence of the weapon are relevant for the same reason. We are conscious

that an ordinary knife is capable of causing death and that describing it as a conventional knife does not diminish the consequences of its use. The significance lies elsewhere. A weapon deliberately procured, carried in readiness and displayed at the commencement of an encounter may furnish evidence of preparation and antecedent design. A knife which is not shown to have been brandished at the inception of the confrontation and which comes into use only after the physical altercation has developed stands on a materially different evidentiary footing. The distinction is not between a lethal and a non-lethal object; it concerns the inference to be drawn as to the state of mind with which the occurrence commenced. We are, therefore, not persuaded to place the entire moral and legal complexion of the tragic occurrence solely upon the final act of the appellant, detached from the atmosphere in which it unfolded. The parties were young; tempers flared; the dispute arose suddenly over the obstruction caused by a vehicle; there was no antecedent blood feud or settled hostility; the accused themselves were

apprehended in an injured condition; and the prosecution has not satisfactorily explained how those injuries were sustained. The possibility that the confrontation developed into an active physical struggle before the knife came into use cannot, in the circumstances, be ruled out. This, however, does not amount to recognition of a complete right of private defence. The material may fall short of establishing every ingredient necessary for complete exoneration on that ground. The distinction is narrower but important: circumstances which do not establish a complete defence may nevertheless remain highly relevant to the anterior question of mens rea, whether the fatal act proceeded from a settled intention to kill or arose instantaneously in the heat, confusion and pressure of a sudden encounter. Nor we are persuaded that the prosecution case must either be accepted in every detail or rejected altogether. Evidence may establish the core of an occurrence while leaving its genesis or intermediate stages incompletely disclosed. The prosecution may, therefore, prove beyond reasonable doubt that

the appellant inflicted the fatal knife injury and yet fail to establish with the same certainty that he had arrived with a pre-existing homicidal design, that the deceased remained wholly passive throughout, or that the fatal injury was detached from the physical struggle which immediately preceded it. Thus there is an important distinction between an intention to use the knife during the course of an encounter and a preconceived intention to kill. The former may arise instantaneously when tempers have already erupted and the parties are physically engaged; the latter imports a homicidal design whose existence has to be gathered from the totality of the circumstances. We do not suggest that an impulsive knife blow is legally innocuous. The appellant must answer for the fatal consequence of the act proved against him.

What cannot safely be attributed to him, however, is a greater degree of criminal design than the evidence itself establishes. The jurisprudence developed by the Supreme Court of Pakistan provides useful guidance in this regard. In “Azmat Ullah v. The State” (2014

SCMR 1178), the deceased had received a churi blow on his chest, besides another injury which, according to the medical evidence, could have resulted from the same blow. Yet, the Supreme Court did not permit the vital location of the injury, by itself, to determine the character of the homicide. The larger circumstances prevailed: there was no previous ill-will; the occurrence had erupted suddenly and without premeditation; it was the product of a sudden fight and heat of passion; and the accused had neither taken undue advantage nor acted in a brutal or unusual manner. Referring to “Ali Muhammad v. Ali Muhammad” (PLD 1996 SC 274), the Supreme Court held that circumstances formerly comprehended by the exceptions to section 300 PPC may attract section 302(c) PPC. The principle was carried forward in “Muhammad Abbas and another v.

The State” (2023 SCMR 487), where, despite the authorship of the injuries having been established, the Court took into consideration that something had occurred immediately before the incident which provoked the accused, that

the occurrence took place at the spur of the moment, that there was no premeditation or deep-rooted enmity and, importantly, that the accused had not repeated their acts. Comparable judicial wisdom is reflected in “Surinder Kumar v. Union Territory, Chandigarh, (1989) 2 SCC 217, where the Supreme Court of India, while dealing with a fatal knife injury arising during a sudden quarrel and scuffle, emphasized the suddenness of the fight, absence of premeditation, heat of passion and absence of undue advantage or cruel conduct. Seen in the light of these principles, the circumstances before us assume a coherent form. The parties were young; the confrontation developed suddenly; there was no previous enmity or established preparation; the accused were themselves found injured in close temporal proximity to the occurrence and those injuries remained substantially unexplained; the dispute arose over an obstruction in the street; the knife was not shown to have been displayed at the commencement of the encounter; and the fatal act was not shown to have been repeated in a

manner suggestive of a determined execution of a preconceived homicidal design. The prosecution has, therefore, succeeded in establishing the participation of the appellant and his responsibility for the fatal injury. To that extent, its case remains intact. What it has not established with equal assurance is that the tragic consequence was the culmination of a preconceived design to commit murder in the aggravated sense attributed by the learned trial Court. The incompletely disclosed genesis of the occurrence, the injuries upon the accused, the suddenness of the confrontation, the absence of antecedent preparation and the instantaneous character of the fatal act cumulatively place the occurrence in a materially different complexion of culpability. The law cannot restore the precious life unfortunately lost, but neither can the gravity of that consequence relieve a Court of its duty to measure criminal liability according to the intention which the evidence proves, rather than an intention which the consequence alone might invite one to presume.

Criminal law differentiates between degrees of

homicide precisely because every fatal act does not originate from the same mental state or arise in the same human circumstances.

9.In our considered view the

prosecution has proved that the appellant caused the fatal injury, the attending circumstances do not justify maintaining the character of culpability attributed to him by the learned trial Court. The occurrence, viewed cumulatively and in its true setting, falls within the jurisprudential field contemplated by section 302(c) PPC, rather than the aggravated form contemplated by section 302(b) PPC. Consequently, the appeal is partly allowed while the finding regarding the responsibility of the appellant for causing the fatal injury is maintained, his conviction is altered to one under section 302(c) PPC, and he is sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for ten years. The remaining portion of the judgment of the learned trial Court shall remain intact and operative. Likewise, the appellant shall continue to be entitled to the benefit of Section 382-B, CrPC already directed by the learned trial Court.

10.Now, we turn to Criminal

Revision No. 242-P/2025, titled “Inam Ullah v.

Akhtar Gul & another,” filed by the complainant seeking enhancement of the sentence awarded to the appellant. Since this Court has already partially allowed the appeal by altering the conviction to one under section 302(c) PPC, so the circumstances of the case, as discussed hereinabove, do not warrant enhancement of the sentence. Consequently, the prayer for enhancement is found to be without merit and the instant criminal revision petition is accordingly dismissed.

Announced

JUDGE

JUDGE

*Muhammad Fiaz* *D.B* Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sahibzada Asadullah, J Hon’ble Ms. Justice Farah Jamshed, J