Maryam Qazi Vs The State & another

Judgment Sheet

IN THE PESHAWAR HIGH COURT,

PESHAWAR

(Judicial Department)

Criminal Appeal No. 1174-P/2025.

Date of hearing: 29.09.2026 & 30.09.2026.

Barrister Amir Khan Chamkani, for the appellant.

Mr. Javed Khan, Addl. AG for the State.

Mr. Shabbir Hussain Gigyani, advocate, for the respondent/accused.

JUDGMENT

SAHIBZADA ASADULLAH, J.- This appeal calls into question the judgment dated 11.11.2025, passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Child Protection Court, Peshawar, whereby the respondent/accused was acquitted of the charge in case FIR No. 393, dated 14.02.2023, registered under section 376 PPC, read with section 53, CPA, police station Hayat Abad, Peshawar.

2.Briefly stated, the prosecution case, as set forth in the FIR (PA), is that the alleged occurrence took place on 06.02.2023 at about 17:00 hours. According to the complainant, Maryam Qazi, her parents and sister had gone outside for some work, while her brother, Ismail Qazi, was

asleep in the guest room of the house. The respondent/accused, who is her brother-in-law, was also present in the house. It was alleged that, while the complainant was conversing on her cell phone in the lounge, the respondent/accused approached her, caught hold of her, and forcibly kissed and embraced her. He allegedly removed her shalwar and subjected her to sexual intercourse for about 10 to 15 minutes.

Thereafter, on 14.02.2023, the complainant, Maryam Qazi, accompanied by her father, Qazi Khalid, submitted an application setting out the aforesaid allegations. The application was duly endorsed by her father. Upon receipt of the said application, the police registered the instant FIR on the basis thereof.

3.The present case has its own peculiar circumstances and, in our view, cannot be properly decided by applying any single general rule. The natural bond between a father and his daughter is certainly a matter which cannot be ignored. The allegation in the present case, if deliberately set in motion by the father, would not only bring a serious criminal accusation against his own son-in-

law, but would also expose his twelve-year-old daughter to its stigma, trauma and lasting consequences. Ordinarily, a father would be expected to protect the dignity, reputation and future of his daughter. Yet human conduct is not always governed by ordinary expectations, and no family relationship can, by itself, give rise to an absolute presumption. The question, therefore, is not what a father would ordinarily be expected to do, but whether the circumstances of this particular case disclose any strong and convincing reason which could have led this father to take such an extraordinary step, despite knowing what it might mean for his own daughter. The position of the accused, however, must be considered with the same fairness. He was the husband of the victim’s elder sister and was thus a close member of the family. The marriage had produced children, and another child was expected at the relevant time.

This close relationship cannot, by itself, make the alleged occurrence impossible or even necessarily improbable. Equally, the seriousness of the allegation cannot, by itself, place the accused under a burden to explain away a case which the prosecution must otherwise establish through

reliable evidence. The two circumstances, therefore, have to be viewed together, as parts of the same family setting, without permitting either of them to determine the case in advance. The Court must keep the scales even. The alleged motive of the father has to be examined in the light of the consequences which such an allegation would inevitably bring upon his own daughter. At the same time, the close relationship of the accused with the victim and her family has to be examined to see whether, and to what extent, it bears upon the probability of the alleged occurrence. Neither parental affection nor family trust can, by itself, answer these questions. Nor can the gravity of the allegation substitute for proof. The truth, if it can be found, must emerge from the circumstances in which the allegation came to be made, the conduct of the parties, the nature of their relationships, the manner in which the case unfolded and, above all, the evidence brought on record.

It is for this reason that we consider it necessary to examine the factual and legal background of the case in some detail and to assess the evidence in its proper perspective, keeping the alleged motive of the father at the centre of the

inquiry. Only through such an examination can the Court determine whether the circumstances disclose any convincing reason for the course attributed to the father and what weight, if any, the surrounding family circumstances carry in assessing the probability of the occurrence. We, therefore, turn to the factual background of the case.

4.Following registration of the FIR, the Investigating Officer visited the place of occurrence, inspected the scene and, on the pointation of the complainant, prepared the site plan. During the course of investigation, however, the investigation was subsequently entrusted to another officer. Upon taking over the investigation and visiting the place of occurrence, the succeeding Investigating Officer was handed over the panty and leggings of the victim, which he took into possession. A hoodie stated to belong to the accused was also taken into possession. In the meantime, the victim was medically examined by the lady doctor, during which vaginal swabs, including low and high vaginal swabs, were collected for forensic examination. Buccal swabs of the accused were likewise obtained, while blood samples of both the

victim and the accused were collected for the purpose of DNA profiling. The relevant exhibits, including the garments, biological samples and other articles, were thereafter transmitted to the forensic laboratory for chemical and DNA analysis.

The forensic examination produced results of varying nature. While a number of the exhibits did not yield incriminating findings, the examination of the leggings revealed the presence of spermatozoa in the relevant biological material recovered therefrom. Subsequent DNA profiling showed that the male DNA profile obtained from that material corresponded with the blood sample of the accused.

Likewise, four short hairs recovered from the pink sweater of the victim upon forensic comparison were found, to be consistent with the accused. Thus, notwithstanding that the forensic examination did not produce positive results from every article submitted for analysis, certain material exhibits yielded findings connecting the accused with biological material recovered from the articles in question.

Upon completion of the investigation, the accused was sent to judicial lock-up, and the challan

was submitted before the competent Court. The accused faced trial and, upon conclusion thereof, was acquitted of the charge. Hence, the present criminal appeal. The question before us is not merely whether another view of the evidence was possible, but whether the conclusion reached by the learned trial Court was justified upon a proper and holistic appreciation of the material available on record.

5.Heard. Record perused.

6.It is apparent from the impugned

judgment that considerable significance was attached to the delay in reporting the occurrence, the circumstances in which the victim’s panty and leggings came to be collected and taken into possession, and the subsequent transmission of those articles, together with the biological samples of the victim and the accused, to the forensic laboratory. These circumstances undoubtedly require careful scrutiny, particularly where the prosecution relies upon scientific evidence, and the integrity and continuity of the material examined assume importance. At the same time, the record discloses that forensic examination was in fact

undertaken and that the biological material recovered from the leggings yielded a DNA profile corresponding with that of the accused. The question, therefore, is whether the deficiencies noticed by the learned trial Court were sufficient, in law and on the facts, to neutralize otherwise positive scientific evidence, or whether the Court was required to examine that evidence in conjunction with the testimony of the witnesses, the medical evidence and the surrounding circumstances. The further question is whether the material witnesses remained consistent on the essential features of the occurrence and whether their evidence, when read together with the medical and forensic material, furnished a coherent evidentiary chain. We shall, therefore, examine the statements of the material witnesses, the circumstances attending the collection and transmission of the forensic exhibits, the medical findings, and the results of the DNA analysis, so as to determine whether the learned trial Court appreciated the evidence in its proper perspective and whether the conclusion of acquittal is reasonably sustainable on the record.

7.We shall now examine the evidence in the light of the considerations which weighed with the learned trial Court, commencing with the delay in reporting the occurrence and the conduct of the victim and her father, followed by the medical evidence and the testimony of the doctors. This will lead us to the circumstances attending the collection, custody and transmission of the relevant garments and biological samples to the forensic laboratories, and the evidentiary worth of the resulting scientific analysis, particularly the detection of spermatozoa in the material recovered from the leggings and its DNA correspondence with the accused. We shall also examine the consistency of the material witnesses on the essential features of the occurrence, so that each circumstance may be assessed in its proper context and the evidence, viewed cumulatively, may reveal whether the conclusion of acquittal represents a reasonable appreciation of the record. We accordingly take up, in the first instance, the question of delay in reporting the occurrence.

The learned trial Court, while acquitting the accused, appears to have attached predominant significance to the delay in reporting the occurrence and thereafter examined the remaining evidence,

including the recoveries and the transmission of the recovered articles to the forensic laboratory, with particular emphasis on the alleged missing link in the chain of custody, as to how the articles were recovered, who handed them over, and through whom they were ultimately received by the laboratory. In our understanding, however, the learned trial Court failed to appreciate the essential aspects of the case in their proper perspective and, more importantly, failed to consider the attending circumstances in which the matter came to be reported. The first and foremost question, therefore, is whether the delay of approximately eight days was, in the peculiar circumstances of the present case, so abnormal as to justify the inference that it resulted from consultation and deliberation, with a view to falsely implicating the accused for some ulterior benefit known to the complainant or the victim's father. Measured against the circumstances appearing on the record, such an inference does not appear justified. The victim's father was admittedly abroad at the relevant time; the victim remained within the family environment; the accused was closely related to her in different capacities; and, upon his return to the country, the father furnished

his passport and boarding pass to the Investigating Officer, thereby providing contemporaneous material supporting his absence and subsequent arrival. The record, therefore, does not present a case of unexplained or suspicious silence. Rather, it reflects a short interval arising in the context of an allegation of an exceptionally grave and sensitive nature, involving a closely connected family member, in circumstances where the victim and her family were confronted with the immediate consequences of the occurrence and were required to decide how and when to set the criminal law in motion. The mere passage of eight days cannot, in such circumstances, be treated as conclusive proof of consultation, deliberation or fabrication. Delay may undoubtedly furnish a circumstance requiring careful scrutiny, but its evidentiary significance must necessarily be assessed in the light of the explanation offered and the surrounding circumstances. Where the delay is plausibly explained, it cannot be converted into a decisive ground for rejecting the prosecution case, particularly without first examining whether the explanation is consistent with the objective material available on the record. The learned trial Court,

therefore, fell into error in allowing the interval in reporting the occurrence to assume a determinative character and, on that basis, permitting its effect to overshadow the remaining evidence. The proper approach was to examine the delay in its factual setting and thereafter assess the recoveries, their transmission to the forensic laboratory, the chain of custody, and the other evidence independently, rather than allowing the initial circumstance of delayed reporting to predetermine the assessment of the entire prosecution case.

8.The approach adopted by the learned trial Court is also inconsistent with the settled judicial understanding of human behaviour in cases involving sexual offences. Delay in reporting such an occurrence cannot be assessed through an inflexible or stereotypical standard of conduct, divorced from the social, familial and psychological circumstances in which the allegation arises. The Supreme Court of Pakistan has repeatedly recognized that the victim and her family may require time to recover from the shock of the occurrence and to overcome the stigma, shame and apprehension associated with reporting a sexual

offence. In The State and others v. Abdul Khaliq and others (PLD 2011 SC 554), while examining delay, the Supreme Court expressly observed that there are no hard and fast rules for determining the effect of delay and that each case must be examined in the light of its own facts and the nature of the offence.

The Court recognized that a victim and her family may take time to recover from the shock of the occurrence and to decide whether the matter should be reported, particularly in view of the social taboos and stigma attached to allegations of sexual assault.

The Court also relied, inter alia, upon Mehboob Ahmad v. The State (1999 SCMR 1102), wherein it was observed that prevailing social taboos may result in cases of rape remaining unreported and that a victim cannot be disbelieved merely on account of an ostensible delay in reporting the occurrence.

The same principle was reaffirmed in Irfan Ali Sher v. The State (PLD 2020 SC 295), where the Supreme Court specifically recognized that victims of rape and their families may be reluctant to report the crime promptly because of the trauma suffered and the perception of shame or dishonour associated with the offence and the invasive medical examination to which the victim may thereafter be

subjected. The Court consequently held that delay in reporting a sexual assault, by itself, is not a material circumstance against the prosecution. Likewise, in Zahid and another v. The State (2020 SCMR 590), the Supreme Court explained that the violation of a woman's modesty may understandably give rise to apprehension on the part of the victim and her family in approaching the police immediately, particularly where the allegation implicates the family's honour and reputation and may expose them to an unsympathetic social response. The same judicial approach finds support in Indian jurisprudence. In State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh and others [(1996) 2 SCC 384; AIR 1996 SC 1393], the Supreme Court of India cautioned that delay in reporting a sexual offence may arise from the reluctance of the victim or her family to approach the police where the allegation concerns the reputation of the victim and the honour of the family. The Court recognized that a victim may be reluctant to disclose such a traumatic experience, conscious of the attendant shame, ostracization and other social consequences, and emphasized that her conduct must be assessed in the light of normal human behaviour rather than against an artificial

expectation of immediate disclosure. The Court further observed that sexual assault may cause serious psychological as well as physical harm and that the evidence of the victim must consequently be appreciated with sensitivity and against the broader probabilities of the case.

The same understanding is reflected in comparative common-law jurisprudence. In R. v.

D.D., 2000 SCC 43, [2000] 2 SCR 275, the Supreme Court of Canada rejected stereotypical assumptions as to how a victim of sexual trauma is expected to behave. The Court recognized that there is no single or inviolable pattern of disclosure: some victims may disclose immediately, some may delay disclosure, and others may not disclose at all.

Feelings of embarrassment, fear, guilt and uncertainty may affect the timing and manner of disclosure. The Court therefore held that delay, standing alone, cannot justify an adverse inference against the credibility of the complainant. Its discussion, informed by expert evidence concerning the behaviour of children subjected to sexual abuse, reinforces the broader proposition that the response of a victim to sexual trauma cannot be measured against a predetermined model of conduct. These

authorities are significant not merely for the proposition that delay may be explained, but for the more fundamental principle underlying them: a Court must not approach the conduct of a victim or her family on the assumption that a genuine victim will necessarily react with immediacy, uniformity or conformity to an externally conceived pattern of behaviour. The assessment must instead be made in the actual social, familial and psychological setting in which the occurrence is alleged to have taken place. Thus, the mere fact that the present occurrence was reported after approximately eight days could not, divorced from its surrounding circumstances, furnish a sound basis for drawing an adverse inference against the prosecution. The determinative question was whether the delay, viewed in the context of the circumstances appearing on the record, was satisfactorily explained and whether it legitimately affected the credibility of the remaining evidence. It is this contextual assessment which, in our view, the learned trial Court failed to undertake.

9.The victim's father appeared as PW- 10, while the victim herself was examined as PW-9.

In his examination-in-chief, PW-10 explained that, upon receiving information regarding the occurrence, he returned to Pakistan from the United States of America, reached his home, spoke to his daughter and thereafter took her to the local police station, where the matter was reported. His account finds material corroboration from the testimony of the victim, who stated that she herself informed her father and accompanied him to the police station.

When specifically questioned about his presence abroad at the relevant time, PW-10 consistently maintained that he was in the United States when the occurrence took place and that, upon his return, he brought the matter to the notice of the police. He further stated that he produced his boarding pass and other travel documents before the Investigating Officer, although those documents were not ultimately exhibited at trial. Their non-exhibition, however, cannot by itself render his explanation inherently false, particularly when his presence abroad was not materially discredited in cross- examination, and nothing substantial was elicited to establish that he was, in fact, present in the village on the date of occurrence. The learned counsel for the respondent nevertheless sought to attribute the

prosecution case to a conspiracy, contending that the complainant's other daughter, who was married to the respondent, desired dissolution of the marriage and that, to facilitate such separation, the complainant and the victim fabricated the present allegation and falsely implicated the respondent.

Reliance was placed upon the subsequent institution of proceedings for dissolution of the marriage. We find no sufficient evidentiary foundation for such an inference. The mere fact that a matrimonial dispute subsequently arose between the respondent and his wife does not establish that the present criminal allegation was conceived or engineered for the purpose of facilitating dissolution of that marriage.

The two matters must remain analytically distinct unless some connecting material is brought on record demonstrating that the matrimonial dispute furnished the motivating cause for the criminal allegation. No such material has been identified.

Indeed, the defence theory requires the Court to accept, without supporting evidence, that the complainant and her minor daughter deliberately concocted a grave allegation against a close relative and subjected the child to the attendant social, familial and personal consequences merely to

advance the matrimonial interest of her elder sister.

Such an inference cannot rest on conjecture. A subsequent matrimonial proceeding may constitute part of the surrounding background, but, in the absence of evidence establishing a causal nexus, it does not furnish a sufficient basis for inferring fabrication or conspiracy. The more immediate and natural sequence emerging from the record is otherwise clear: the victim informed her father; her father, who was then abroad, returned to the country; he spoke to his daughter, took her to the police station, and the matter was reported, whereafter the victim was sent for medical examination. This sequence finds support in the testimony of both PW-9 and PW-10 and has not been materially shaken in cross-examination. The delay, therefore, cannot reasonably be transformed into an indication of fabrication merely because a matrimonial dispute subsequently developed between the respondent and his wife. The inter se relationship of the parties has also been relied upon by learned counsel for the respondent as a circumstance creating doubt. It was argued that the respondent was closely connected with the family through marriage; that his wife was the victim's

sister; and that, being an American national residing in the United States in connection with the birth of their child, he would naturally have been interested in preserving his matrimonial and familial relationships and would not ordinarily expose himself to consequences capable of destroying those relationships. This submission, however, proceeds upon an assumed pattern of human behaviour rather than upon evidence. Criminal liability cannot be determined on the premise that an accused would necessarily have acted in a particular manner because of his social or matrimonial circumstances;

the Court is required to assess the evidence actually brought on record. Moreover, the very relationship relied upon by the defence as an exculpatory circumstance also establishes the respondent's familiarity with the household and his access to the victim. A close familial relationship is, therefore, not inherently inconsistent with the prosecution case. Nor does the subsequent matrimonial dispute, absent independent material connecting it with the present allegation, furnish a sufficient basis for inferring fabrication or conspiracy. Having found the alleged theory of conspiracy unsupported by substantive evidence, the further submission of

learned counsel for the respondent regarding the manner, mode and place of occurrence also requires consideration. It was contended that the house was small; that the victim was not alone at the relevant time, as one of her brothers was sleeping in the adjoining drawing room while another was present nearby; and that it was consequently improbable for the respondent to have subjected the victim to sexual intercourse without attracting their attention.

Emphasis was also placed upon the fact that the victim did not raise an alarm, that no blood was detected on the sofa where the occurrence was alleged to have taken place, and that no other incriminating article was recovered from the house.

According to learned counsel, these

circumstances rendered the prosecution version inherently doubtful. The submission, however, proceeds upon an artificial reconstruction of the occurrence and seeks to elevate individual circumstances, considered in isolation, into conclusions which the evidence as a whole does not warrant. The victim was approximately twelve years of age at the relevant time, as determined through ossification examination, while the respondent was not a stranger to the household but, according to the

prosecution evidence, was a frequent visitor and had repeated interaction with the minor victim. In such circumstances, the mere presence of other family members elsewhere in the house does not render the occurrence physically impossible, nor can the absence of an alarm, visible external injury or blood on the sofa, viewed in isolation, be treated as conclusive evidence that the occurrence did not take place. The Supreme Court of India, in State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh and others [(1996) 2 SCC 384; AIR 1996 SC 1393], cautioned against assessing the conduct of a victim of sexual assault through stereotypical assumptions and emphasized that her evidence must be appreciated in the light of the traumatic and socially sensitive nature of the offence rather than against an assumed uniform pattern of conduct. The same contextual approach is reflected in the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of Pakistan in The State and others v. Abdul Khaliq and others (PLD 2011 SC 554), where the Court emphasized that cases involving sexual offences must be assessed in their own factual and social setting and that rigid standards of human behaviour should not be applied to the conduct of the victim.

More importantly, the defence suggestion that the

victim may have submitted to, or been persuaded or induced into, the sexual act cannot be examined independently of her established age. At approximately twelve years of age, the concept of valid consent cannot be invoked as a defence to the offence alleged. The absence of physical resistance, therefore, cannot, by itself, furnish an exculpatory circumstance. The real inquiry is whether the prosecution evidence, considered cumulatively and in its proper factual setting, establishes the occurrence and the respondent's involvement, and whether the contrary conclusion reached by the learned trial Court was reasonably sustainable on the material available before it.

10.The above evidence does not stand in isolation; rather, it forms a continuous evidentiary chain, each link of which must be examined in its proper place and in its relation to the next. The first link is the medico-legal examination of Maryam and the collection and identification of the biological material; the second is the sealing and preservation of the articles so collected; the third concerns their custody and transmission through the intervening stages; the fourth is their receipt and examination at

Khyber Medical College; and the final link is the DNA comparison between the questioned material and the reference samples of the victim and accused Dr. Qaiser Mehmood. The real question, therefore, is not merely whether the DNA report records a match, but whether the prosecution has satisfactorily connected the material examined by the forensic laboratory with the very articles collected during the medico-legal examination.

Despite our anxious consideration of the entire record, we have not been able to identify any discrepancy or infirmity of such a nature as may persuade us that this chain was broken or that any material irregularity occurred in the handling and transmission of the relevant articles. It is true that the recovery memo relating to the collection of the leggings and panties has not been brought on record;

nevertheless, the absence of that particular document, by itself, cannot render the subsequent chain doubtful when the record contains contemporaneous material which independently identifies the articles and traces their movement through the successive stages of the investigation.

The Investigating Officer took the said articles before the doctor who had initially examined the

victim, and the medico-legal certificate prepared by that doctor specifically records, in the relevant column, the receipt of the leggings and panties, with the signature of the Investigating Officer appearing thereon. The documentary trail thereafter proceeds to Khyber Medical College, where the same articles were received for forensic examination, and the prescribed DNA form contains the particulars of the material received. The record further shows that both the victim and accused were produced before the concerned serologist and, while preparing the requisite DNA documentation, the consent of both was recorded; their buccal swabs and other requisite reference samples were accordingly obtained and the necessary particulars entered in the relevant form. Upon completion of the forensic proceedings, the material was received by the Investigating Officer, whose name also finds mention in the record. The chain receives further support from the pink-coloured sweater of the victim, which was likewise taken into possession and whose particulars, including the long and short hairs found thereon, are specifically reflected in the relevant DNA documentation. We are conscious, at the same time, of the apparent variation in the record

concerning the intervening handling and transmission of the sealed forensic material. At one stage, the articles are shown as having been collected and sealed in connection with the medico- legal examination; at another, the evidence- return/deposition record reflects the involvement of Inspector Nasrullah Khan; whereas the subsequent forwarding record shows the sealed forensic parcel being submitted to Khyber Medical College by Constable Taj Muhammad No.6154 on 22 February 2023. If these references are detached from the record as a whole, they may appear to disclose some variation in the sequence of physical custody. But the Court must distinguish between a discrepancy as to the particular person who handled or carried an already identified parcel at an intermediate stage and an actual break in the identity or integrity of the exhibit. The former may constitute a documentary imperfection; the latter would strike at the foundation of the scientific evidence. Here, the medico-legal certificate identifies the articles received from the victim; the subsequent forensic documentation identifies the articles received at Khyber Medical College; the DNA report identifies the material examined therefrom; and the reference

profiles of the victim and accused provide the basis for the comparative analysis. The witnesses too have remained substantially consistent on the material aspects of the manner in which the articles were received and dealt with, and their testimony finds support from the contemporaneous documentary record and, ultimately, from the scientific report generated upon examination of the material so documented.

It is no doubt true that the integrity of forensic evidence rests upon the assurance that the material examined by the laboratory is the same material which was collected during the investigation, and the Court must therefore examine the chain of custody with due care. At the same time, the law cannot reasonably require every witness who handled an exhibit at an intermediate stage to reproduce every movement or detail with photographic precision. What is material is whether the identity and continuity of the articles remain reasonably established and whether the record discloses any real possibility of substitution, contamination, tampering, manipulation or unauthorized interference. In the present case, no such circumstance has been brought to our notice.

Even if certain minor discrepancies are found in the statements of the doctor and the serologist, they relate to peripheral matters and do not touch the identity, integrity or continuity of the material subjected to forensic examination. More importantly, there is neither any allegation supported by material nor any circumstance emerging from the record which may reasonably suggest mala fide, substitution, tampering or manipulation on the part of the Investigating Officer or the forensic personnel.

When the evidence is considered as a whole, rather than dissected into isolated fragments, the documentary and oral evidence sufficiently preserves the identity and continuity of the exhibits from the stage of their medical examination to their forensic analysis. The apparent variation concerning the intervening handling of the sealed parcel, including the references to Inspector Nasrullah Khan and Constable Taj Muhammad No.6154, does not, in the circumstances of the present case, create a reasonable possibility of substitution or tampering.

The absence of the separate recovery memo and the minor variations in the statements of the concerned witnesses likewise do not, by themselves, displace

the contemporaneous documentary record identifying the articles and their subsequent forensic examination. We are, therefore, satisfied that the chain of custody has sufficiently been established and that the DNA examination cannot be discarded on the basis of the discrepancies so pointed out. The medical findings, serological examination, documented continuity of the exhibits and DNA profiling consequently remain relevant links of the same evidentiary chain.

11.The evidentiary value of the DNA report cannot be diminished by a mere general objection to the forensic examination where the biological material has been duly collected, preserved and transmitted, a competent forensic laboratory has conducted the examination, and the report has been duly proved through the concerned expert without any material defect having been brought on record to cast doubt upon its authenticity or scientific reliability. In Santosh Kumar Singh v.

State through CBI, (2010) 9 SCC 747, the Supreme Court of India, while considering DNA evidence in a case of rape and murder, found that nothing adverse had been brought on record against the

experts who had prepared the DNA report and accepted the report as scientifically accurate.

Likewise, in Veerendra v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2022) 4 SCC 225, the Supreme Court, referring to its earlier judgment in Sunil v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2017) 4 SCC 393, recognized that a positive DNA test constitutes clinching evidence against the accused. The principle that emerges is not that every DNA report is infallible, but that where the forensic process is shown to be authentic and reliable, and the positive DNA finding remains unimpeached, the Court cannot discard such scientific evidence on the basis of conjecture or a speculative objection. In the present case, the DNA profiling was conducted by the duly constituted forensic laboratory; the samples and their examination have been established through the prosecution evidence; and no substantive circumstance has been brought on record to impeach the integrity, authenticity or scientific methodology of the laboratory examination. The positive DNA finding, therefore, assumes considerable evidentiary significance and constitutes a strong and reliable circumstance connecting the accused with the biological material recovered during the

investigation, which, when read with the remaining evidence on record, materially reinforces the prosecution case.

12.Learned counsel for the respondent invited the attention of this Court to the fact that the leggings and panty of the victim were taken into possession after eight days of the occurrence. It was contended that, after such a considerable lapse of time, there was hardly any possibility of the spermatozoa retaining their original condition, particularly when the biological material would, in the ordinary course, have dried up by then. Learned counsel, therefore, submitted that the report of the laboratory, to the extent that it records the presence of spermatozoa in a condition capable of detection after eight days, does not appear convincing and that it was next to impossible for the laboratory, after such a passage of time, to find the material in a sufficiently preserved condition so as to yield the reported result. The objection, however, requires examination in light of the scientific material available on the subject and the established forensic understanding regarding the persistence and detection of spermatozoa on the victim's leggings.

Learned counsel, however, appears to have overlooked the fact that scientific advancement and the continuing revolution in forensic science have considerably changed our understanding of what may remain capable of detection after the passage of time. Modern research has established that biological material, including spermatozoa, may in appropriate conditions remain detectable for considerably longer than the period suggested by learned counsel. Indeed, research has reported that such material may remain capable of detection not merely for eight days, but for a minimum period extending up to twelve months, depending upon the nature of the material, the surface upon which it is deposited, and the conditions in which it is preserved. In this respect, we find it useful to draw upon the research and scientific material published by the National Institute of Justice (NIJ), which may assist the Court in appreciating the forensic issue in its proper scientific perspective. The National Institute of Justice (NIJ) recognizes that the persistence of spermatozoa in stains deposited outside the body depends upon a variety of environmental factors and that dried seminal stains may preserve spermatozoal material for prolonged

periods. E. Lachica and R. García-Ferrer, in their peer-reviewed study, Study of Semen Stains by Scanning Electron Microscopy: Influence of their Ageing, 91 Forensic Science International 35–40 (1998), experimentally examined semen stains deposited on cotton and reported substantial preservation of spermatozoal integrity over a period extending to twelve months.

These scientific materials are not invoked as legal authorities determining the evidentiary worth of the exhibits in the present case; they are referred to only for the limited and relevant scientific proposition that the mere passage of time does not, in itself, render dried seminal material incapable of subsequent forensic detection or DNA analysis. Nor is there any suggestion that spermatozoa remain biologically viable outside the body for such periods. The relevant distinction is between viability and forensic persistence: while viability may be lost, cellular structures and DNA may nevertheless remain sufficiently preserved to permit scientific identification. Consequently, the lapse of approximately ten days cannot, on scientific grounds alone, be regarded as sufficient to render the detection of spermatozoa on the leggings

improbable or inherently unreliable. The real question, therefore, is not the passage of ten days in isolation, but whether the particular garments examined by the forensic laboratory have been satisfactorily connected with the victim and whether their identity and integrity remained sufficiently preserved during collection, custody and transmission so as to exclude a reasonable possibility of contamination, substitution or material alteration. Any deficiency in the chain of custody must accordingly be assessed on the evidence relating to the provenance, custody and transmission of the exhibits; it cannot, merely by reference to the passage of time, be transformed into a scientific presumption that the forensic findings were impossible or inherently unreliable.

Viewed in this evidentiary setting, the positive detection of spermatozoa on the leggings, considered alongside the medical evidence and, more significantly, the DNA analysis connecting the biological material recovered from those leggings with the accused, assumes substantial corroborative significance. The forensic evidence, therefore, cannot legitimately be discarded merely because the garments were examined approximately ten days

after the occurrence, particularly where no substantive material has been brought on record demonstrating that the passage of that period resulted in contamination, substitution or destruction of the evidentiary integrity of the exhibits.

13.Upon a cumulative appraisal of the entire record, the prosecution case emerges as a coherent and mutually corroborative whole. The testimony of the victim is materially supported by the medical evidence, the recovery and forensic examination of the relevant garments, the detection of spermatozoa thereon and, most significantly, the DNA evidence connecting the biological material recovered from the leggings with the accused. The circumstances relied upon by the defence, considered in the light of the entire evidentiary record, do not furnish a reasonable basis for displacing this body of evidence. Nor has any substantive material been brought on record demonstrating contamination, substitution or tampering with the exhibits examined by the forensic expert. The case, therefore, does not rest upon the uncorroborated assertion of the victim;

rather, the ocular, medical and scientific evidence

converge upon the identity and involvement of the accused and, taken together, establish the charge beyond reasonable doubt.

14.We are conscious that an appeal

against acquittal stands on a different footing from an appeal against conviction. An acquittal reinforces the presumption of innocence, and the appellate Court does not interfere merely because another view of the evidence may also be possible. In Ghulam Sikandar and another v. Mamaraz Khan and others (PLD 1985 SC 11), the Supreme Court laid down the principle that an acquittal should not be disturbed unless the conclusion of the Court below is not reasonably sustainable on the evidence; the same principle was reiterated in The State and others v. Abdul Khaliq and others (PLD 2011 SC 554), wherein the Supreme Court recognized that interference is warranted where the judgment suffers from grave misreading or non-reading of material evidence or the conclusion is otherwise such as cannot reasonably be sustained on the record. The rule, therefore, is one of restraint, not abstention. In the present case, the learned trial Court did not merely adopt another possible view of the evidence;

rather, its conclusion resulted from a fragmented appreciation of the record and a material failure to accord due significance to evidence bearing directly upon the occurrence and the identity of the offender.

Material evidence was either overlooked or its significance materially misconstrued, with the result that circumstances of limited probative value were permitted to outweigh substantive medical and scientific evidence. The conclusion so reached cannot, therefore, be regarded as a reasonably sustainable view of the record. The impugned judgment of acquittal consequently calls for interference and is hereby set aside.

15.For the foregoing reasons, the appeal is allowed. The accused is convicted under Section 376-B of the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC) and sentenced to imprisonment for life with a fine of Rs.

5,00,000/-. (rupees five hundred thousand). In default whereof, to further suffer six months SI. He is further convicted under Section 53 of the Child Protection Act and sentenced to seven years’ rigorous imprisonment, along with a fine of Rs.

100,000/- (Rupees one hundred thousand only), and, in default of payment thereof, to undergo simple

imprisonment for three months. The sentences shall run concurrently, and the respondent shall be entitled to the benefit of section 382-B, Cr.P.C. The accused shall be taken into custody forthwith to serve the sentence in accordance with law. The record of the learned trial Court, along with a copy of this judgment, be transmitted for information and compliance.

JUDGE

JUDGE

Announced.

Tariq Jan (DB) Mr. Justice Sahibzada Asadullah, HJ & Mr. Justice Inam Ullah Khan, HJ.