Muazam Ahmad Vs Sosan Zarif etc

Judgment Sheet

PES HAWARHIGH COURT. BANNU BENCH

(Judicial Department)

WP No.l101-Bl20l9

Muazam Ahmad Vs Sosan Zarif etc.

For petitioner(s): Mr. Muham mad Tariq Oureshi and Sawal ir Khan A cates For respondent(s): r. Hafeez Ul Khan Advoca

Date of hearing: 15.10.20 26

JUDGMENT

AURANGZEB J.- Through this common judgment, I intend to decide Writ Petition No. 1101-8 of 2019, instituted by Dr' Muazzanr Ahmad, and connected Writ Petition No. 1294-B of 2019, instituted by Lady Dr. Sosan Zarif Y'han and the minor Mst.

Guluna, as both petitions arise out of the consolidated judgment and decree dated 08.08.2019, passed by the leamed Additional District Judge-II, Bannu, in Family Appeals No. 17/FCA of 2018 and 03/ICA of2019. Through the impugnedjudgment, the appeal preferred by the husband was dismissed, whereas the appeal preferred by the wife and the minor was partially allowed by modifying the judgment and decree dated 23.11.2018, passed by the leamed Senior Civil Judge/Judge Family Court, Bannu, in Family Suit No. l5lFC of 2016. For the sake of convenience, the petitioner in W.P. No. 1101-8 of 2019 shall hereinafter be referred to as "the husband," while the respondent therein, Lady Dr. Sosan Zarif Y.'han, shall hereinafter be refened to as "the wife." The same designations shall apply to the parties in the connected petition, wherever the context so requires.

2.The facts giving rise to W.P. No' I 101-8 of 2019, flrled by the husband, are that the parties contracted marriage on

27.05.2012 in accordance with Muslim rites. The wife instituted a family suit on 21.04.2016, seeking recovery of 50 tolas of gold omaments as dower, maintenance allowance at the rate of Rs.40,000 per month for herself and Rs.20,000 per month for the minor, with eflect from 01.07 .2012, recovery of 35 tolas of gold omaments allegedly given to her by her parents at the time of rukhsati, and recovery of dowry articles or their value, assessed at Rs.5,943,000.

The wife averred that she belonged to a respectable family of District Bannu, held a BDS degree and was serving in Saudi Arabia. According to her, the dower fixed at 50 tolas of gold omaments remained outstanding against the husband. Her parents had provided dowry articles in accordance with the list appended to the plaint. She further asserted that, at the husband's demand, she incurred marriage-related expenses amounting to Rs.1,000,000 and purchased a diamond ring worth Rs.50,000 and a wristwatch worth Rs.100,000 for him. She also referred to the expenses incurred in completing her medical education while serving in Saudi Arabia.

The wife maintained that she had performed her matrimonial obligations and served the husband and his family, but their conduct towards her remained cruel, threatening and humiliating. According to her, the parties cohabited for only 35 days after rukhsati, whereafter the husband tumed her out of the matrimonial home.. She further alleged that, following the birth of minor Guluna on 03.03.2013, the husband failed to provide for the household and medical expenses. Several local jirgas were convened to resolve the dispute, but their efforts proved unsuccessful, compelling her to institute the family suit.

3.The husband contested the suit through a written statement, denying the material allegations and raising various legal and factual objcctions. His principal defence was that the marriage had already been dissolved through khula on 08.10.2012, allegedly at

the insistence of the wife, and that she was consequently bound to retum the gold ornaments received by her. He asserted that, at the time of engagement and nikah, 24 tolas and 01 mash of gold omaments were given to her, whereas, at the time of rukhsati, 39 tolas, 03 mashas and 06 raties of gold omaments were handed over to her. He further claimed that a ring weighing 01 tola and 06 mashas was given to her on the wedding night, bringing the total quantity allegedly delivered to 64 tolas, 10 mashas and 06 raties.

The husband also disputed the paternity of minor Guluna" asserting that she Was the younger sister of the wife and not his daughter. He maintained that the wife had voluntarily left his house on 09.07.2012 and had taken away the gold omaments. On these grounds, he resisted the wife's claims and sought recovery of the ornaments allegedly remaining in her possession, together with damages amounting to Rs.20,000,000.

4.After framing issues, recording evidence and hearing the parties, the learned Family Court, through judgment and decree dated 23.11.2018, partially decreed the suit. The wife was awarded maintenance at the rate of Rs.15,000 per month from July 2012, with an annual increase of 10%, for the period during which she remained in the nikah of the husband. The Family Court held that the dower was fixed at 50 tolas of gold ornaments and had been paid to, and remained in the possession of, the wife.

It rejected the husband's plea for retum of the omaments as consideration for khula, as the alleged dissolution through khula had not been established. The claims for recovery of dowry articles or their value of Rs.5,943,000 and 35 tolas of gold omaments allegedly given by the wife's parents were dismissed' The claim for maintenance of the minor and delivery expenses was not decided on merits because the question of paternity had been disputed; the Family Court left that claim open for reconsideration after determination of patemity by the competent Court.

5.Both sides challenged the judgment and decree before the learned Additional District Judge-II, Bannu. Through the consolidated judgment and decree dated 08.08.2019, the leamed appellate Court dismissed the husband's appeal, finding no misreading, non-reading of evidence or material irregularity warranting interference. However, it partially allowed the appeal filed by the wife, holding that only 24 tolas and 06 mashas of gold omaments had been proved to have been paid towards dower, leaving the remaining quantity outstanding. The remaining hndings of the leamed Family Court were maintained.

6.The husband instituted Writ Petition No. I101-8 of 2019, challenging the dismissal of his appeal and seeking relief in respect of the findings concerning khula, dower and the other claims. The wife and the minor instituted Writ Petition No. 1294- B of 2019, assailing the adverse findings conceming payment of dower and the dismissal or non-determination of their remaining claims. Thus, both sides are aggrieved by different parts of the same judgment and decree, and their petitions are being decided together.

7.I have heard leamed counsel for the parties and examined the available record with their assistance. The controversy may conveniently be determined through the following questions:

(D Whether the impugned findings warrant interference in the constitutional jurisdiction of this Court under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, I 973?

(ii)Whether the husband established that the marriage had already been dissolved through khula on 08.10.2012, and what legal effect is to be given to the subsequent divorce deed dated 09.08.2019?

(iii)Whether the wife is entitled to maintenance for the period claimed, including the period of iddat following a legally effective talaq?

(iv)Whether the husband proved payment of the agreed dower of 50 tolas of gold omaments, and what

evidentiary value may be attached to photographs, video recordings, purchase receipts and the husband's admissions?

(v)What is the effect of the subsequent determination of the patemity of minor Guluna upon her claim for maintenance?

(vi)Whether the wife established her separate claims for 35 tolas of gold omaments allegedly given by her parents and for dowry articles or their value?

(vii)What order should be passed in the two connected writ petitions?

8.Before addressing these questions, it is necessary to delineate the scope of constitutional jurisdiction in family matters. Article 199 of the Constitution does not confer upon the High Court an ordinary appellate jurisdiction to reassess every item of evidence or substifute its own conclusions merely because another view may be possible. Ordinarily, findings of fact concurrently recorded by the Family Court and the appellate Court are not to be disturbed unless the aggrieved party establishes a material legal defect, misreading or non-reading of evidence, perversity, an eroneous assumption of fact or a conclusion unsupported by the record.

In Maqbool Ali and another v. Mst. Raheela and others (2025 SCMR 1275), the august Supreme Court of Pakistan reiterated the limitations goveming interference with findings of fact in constitutional jurisdiction. The Court emphasized that, even where interference is warranted, the appropriate course would ordinarily be to remit the matter for fresh determination rather than substitute the High Court's own findings, subject to the circumstances of the case and the requirements of justice.

9.The principle, however, does not exclude the constitutional jurisdiction of this Court where a Family Court or an appellate Court has acted .in disregard of a binding legal principle, misconstrued a statutory provision or reached a conclusion

through legally unsound reasoning . In Mushtaq and others v. Mst. Fatima and others (PLD 2025 SC 434), the august Supreme Court recognized that an erroneous conclusion founded upon a clear misinterpretation of law, disregard of the applicable legal principles or legally unsound reasoning may be corrected through certiorari under Article 199(l)(a)(ii) of the Constitution. The Court also considered the special evidentiary framework governing family proceedings and the need to determine financial obligations in their proper matrimonial context.

10.The present case must be examined within these parameters. The litigation commenced in 2016 and has remained pending through the trial, appellate and constitutional stages. The record contains material relating to the alleged khula, an admitted subsequent divorce deed, the agreed dower, photographs and video recordings of the marriage ceremonies, and the subsequent judicial determination of the minor's patemity. The principal controversy concerning payment of dower also raises a question of the legal sufficiency of the evidence relied upon by the appellate Court.

In these circumstances, the Court is not undertaking a routine reappraisal of the entire evidence. It is examining whether the findings under challenge are legally sustainable and whether the proper legal principles have been applied. The age of the litigation and the material available on the record are relevant considerations in deciding the controversy without unnecessarily subjecting the parties to another round of proceedings. The findings will, therefore, be disturbed only to the extent that a material legal defect or an unsustainable conclusion is established.

11.The first substantive question concems the alleged dissolution of marriage through khula on 08.10.2012. The husband relied upon this assertion to defeat the wife's claim for maintenance and to contend that she was liable to retum the gold omaments. The wife denied that she had sought or obtained khula

and maintained that the marital relationship had not been dissolved at that time. Both the learned Family Court and the appellate Court rejected the husband's plea.

The distinction between khula and talaq is fundamental. Talaq is a mode of dissolution initiated by the husband, whereas khula is a distinct right available to the wife to seek release from the marital relationship in accordance with the principles of Islamic law. The two modes cannot be treated as interchangeable merely because both result in separation of the spouses. The legal character of dissolution must be determined from the pleadings, the evidence, the intention of the parfy invoking the particular remedy and the applicable legal requirements.

12.The Holy Qur'an recognizes the prescribed limits governing marital relations and provides guidance for both the continuation and dissolution of marriage. Surah Al-Baqarah, verse 229, provides:

LL lrgL ii S ,J+ \jjagr:;r., &r.- -il ,-irji4.:ltil)i gu-.p iXur" Eu> )3 r1r i-j3 r'# ili$ jlr'4, rr:'i u#.ii tq it itt1;; Ar*f e drli rirt ir3'q [:>":ol-lr!:ij )i Jlll 3J:( et!'r.,, osit kJi lit+]a 'jJ"ut}]l

English translation: "Divorce is twice; then, either retain [her] in a fair manner or release [her] with good treatment. And it is not lawful for you to take back anything of what you have given them, unless both fear that they cannot maintain the limits set by Allah. If you fear that they cannot maintain the limits set by Allah, then there is no blame upon either of them conceming that by which the wife ransoms herself. These are the limits set by Allah, so do not transgress them. And whoever transgresses the limits set by Allah, it is they who are the wrongdoers."

The verse establishes the religious foundation of khula as a distinct mode of release from marriage. It also underscores that the financial consequences associated with such dissolution

cannot be imposed without determining whether the wife actually sought release through khula and whether the requisite conditions were fuIfi lled.

13.Surah Al-Baqarah, verse 230, further provides: ji t:g'ia tu+ )G k5u iF"L* Li.!j e$,!-:i .:4 o+ el 3* )1i raiiu iG' ".r *14 6ril L&+ lirt 5rJ.,ail3rrtut ill 14-ij jI tu jl trsrj-r1 English translation: "And if he divorces her [for the third time], she is not lawful to him afterward until she marries another husband. Then, if the latter divorces her, there is no blame upon the two of them if they retum to each other, provided they believe that they can maintain the limits set by Allah. These are the limits of Allah, which He makes clear to a people who know."

The verse explains certain legal consequences of divorce and the circumstances in which remarriage between the former spouses may be permissible. It reinforces the principle that the legal consequences of dissolution depend upon its nature and the applicable rules of Islamic law. The terminology employed by the parties cannot displace the need to determine the actual mode of dissolution.

14.Surah An-Nisa, verse 35, emphasizes reconciliation where discord arises between spouses:

"ljrtF qla 6t3 airt itat-^t-tl-,

English translation: "And if you fear a breach between them, appoint an arbiter from his family and an arbiter from her family. If they both desire reconciliation, Allah will bring about harmony between them. Indeed, Allah is All-Knowing, All- Aware."

The verse directs that, where a breach between the spouses is apprehended, an arbiter from each family may be appointed

and that reconciliation should be pursued where its conditions are present. It does not, however, mean that reconciliation must invariably succeed or that either spouse may be compelled to remain in a relationship in which the prescribed limits cannot be maintained. Rather, it establishes reconciliation, fairness and respect for the rights ofboth spouses as guiding principles.

15.In Mst. Khurshid Bibi v. Baboo Muhammad Amin (PLD 1967 SC 97), the august Supreme Court of Pakistan recognized the right of a Muslim wife to seek dissolution of marriage through khula even where the husband is unwilling to consent, subject to the applicable legal requirements. The right is a means of release available to the wife and cannot be defeated merely by the husband's refusal. At the same time, khula cannot be attributed to a wife solely because the husband alleges that she was unwilling to cdntinue the marital relationship.

The distinction between khula and dissolution on statutory grounds was further explained in Ibrahim Khan v. Mst. Saima Khan and others (PLD 2024 SC 645). The august Supreme Court held that khula is a distinct and exclusive right of the wife and that her express and unequivocal intention to exercise that right is essential. A Court cannot, of its own motion, convert a claim for dissolution on statutory grounds into khula, thereby compelling the wife to relinquish her dower without her consent. The judgment also emphasi zes that dissolution under the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939, and dissolution through khula operate in distinct legal domains and carry different financial consequences.

16.The same principle was reiterated in Dr. Faryal Maosood and another v. Khu rram Shehzad Durrani and others (PLD 2025 SC 262) and Dr. Seema IIan if Khan v. Waq as Khan and others (PLD 2026 SC 91). These authorities emphasize that a Court must determine the actual relief sought by the wife and cannot presume her consent to khula merely because the marital

relationship has broken down or because she has expressed unwillingness to live with the husband. The distinction is material because dissolution through khula may entail consequences for dower which do not necessarily follow where a marriage is dissolved on a statutory ground or through the husband's pronouncement of talaq.

17.Applying these principles to the present case, the husband asserted that the wife had demanded and insisted upon khula on 08.10.2012. The wife denied the assertion. The leamed Family Court and the appellate Court did not accept the husband's plea, and no sufficient gtound has been demonstrated to disturb their concurrent finding. The husband's assertion, without reliable proof of the wife's request and the alleged dissolution, cannot establish that the marriage stood dissolved through khula on the stated date. The finding that khula dated 08.10.2012 was not proved is, therefore, maintained.

18, The controversy, however, does not end there' During the proceedings before this Court, leamed counsel drew attention to a written divorce deed produced by the respondents. Although the deed does not expressly mention the date of execution in its body, the date 09.08.2019 appears in its margin. Upon being asked to clarify the date, leamed counsel for both parties agreed that the deed was executed on 09.08.2019. It is thus established for puryoses of these proceedings that, on the day following the decision of the appeals, the husband executed a written instrument recording his pronouncement of talaq.

This subsequent event must be considered independently of the disputed allegation of khula. The alleged earlier khula was athibuted to the wife, whereas the later written pronouncement was made by the husband. Their legal character cannot be conflated, and the subsequent act cannot retrospectively prove that the marriage had already been dissolved through khula in20l2.

19.Section 7 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, govems the procedure and legal consequences of talaq pronounced by the husband. Under subsection (1), the husband is required, as soon as possible after pronouncing talaq in any form whatsoever, to give written notice to the Chairman of the relevant Union Council and supply a copy to the wife. Under subsection (3), talaq does not become effective until the expiration ofninety days from the date on which the notice is delivered to the Chairman, unless revoked earlier in accordance with law. Subsection (4) provides for the constitution of an Arbitration Council for the purpose of bringing about reconciliation between the parties.

The distinction between pronouncement and legal effectiveness is consequently material. The deed dated 09.08.2019 establishes the husband's recorded pronouncement, but the date on which the marriage legally stood dissolved cannot automatically be equated with the date of execution of the deed. That date must be determined with reference to the delivery of the statutory notice, expiry of the prescribed period, any revocation and the other relevant material available on the record.

20.In Muhammad Hassan Sultan v, C hairman. Union Counc il. Cantonment Board Office. Karachi and another (2026 SCMR 1759), the august Supreme Court considered the operation of Section 7 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, and the statutory period goveming the legal effectiveness and revocation of a pronouncement of divorce. The judgment reinforces the necessity of applying the statutory scheme to the relevant form of dissolution rather than treating the pronouncement alone as invariably conclusive of the date on which the marriage legally ends.

Section 8 of the Ordinance extends the relevant procedure, with necessary modihcations, to the exercise of a delegated right of divorce and to other forms of dissolution, so far as applicable.

Section 2l of the Family Courts Act, 1964, separately provides for the transmission of a certified copy of a decree for dissolution of marriage to the appropriate Chairman. These provisions must be applied according to the nature ofthe dissolution in question. A husband's pronouncement of talaq, the exercise of a delegated right of divorce and a decree of judicial dissolution are distinct legal events.

21.The Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Acr, 1939, operates in a separate sphere by providing statutory grounds upon which a Muslim wife may seek a decree for dissolution of marriage. Where such grounds are invoked, the Family Court must determine the claim on the pleadings and evidence and cannot substitute khula merely because the marital relationship has broken down. The distinction is important because Section 5 of the Act protects the wife's rights to dower upon dissolution under the Act.

In the present proceedings, the Court is not deciding a suit for dissolution of marriage under the 1939 Act' The relevant question is whether the husband established his plea of earlier khula and what legal effect is to be given to his subsequent pronouncement of talaq. For the reasons stated above, the earlier khula remains unproved, whereas the subsequent divorce deed must be considered subject to compliance with Section 7 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961.

22.The second substantive question concems the wife's entitlement to maintenance. In Ambreen Akram v. Asad Ullah Kha n and others (2026 SCMR 1), the august Supreme Court held that the right of a wife to maintenance flows from the solemnization of a valid marriage and is not, as a general rule, contingent upon consummation or rukhsati. The husband may be excused from that obligation only where he establishes, through clear, cogent and compelling evidence, that the wife wholly and unjustifiably withdrew from the marital relationship- The burden

rests upon the husband, and the exception must be construed narrowly.

The principle applies to the present case. The marriage between the parties was validly solemnized, and the husband cannot avoid his obligation merely by asserting that the wife left the matrimonial home or that cohabitation continued for a short period. Nor do the wife's professional qualifications or her employment in Saudi Arabia, by themselves, extinguish the husband's legal obligation. The decisive questions are whether the marriage subsisted during the period claimed, whether maintenance was paid and whether the husband established a legally sufficient ground for denying it.

23.The leamed Family Court awarded maintenance to the wife at the rate of Rs.15,000 per month from July 2012,with an annual increase of l0%o, fur the period during which she remained in the nikah of the husband. The appellate Court maintained that award' Since the alleged khula dated 08.10.2012 was not proved, the husband cannot rely upon that allegation to defeat the wife's claim for the subsequent period.

The subsequent divorce deed dated 09.08.2019 must, however, be given effect according to law. The marital relationship is found to have been brought to an end through the husband's divorce deed dated 09.08.2019, rather than through the alleged khula of'08.10.2012. The legally effective date of dissolution and its consequences must nevertheless be determined in accordance with Section 7 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 , on the basis of the relevant statutory record. The wife is entitled to maintenance for the period during which the marriage legally subsisted and, subject to the applicable law, for the legally admissible period of iddat following dissolution.

24.Consequently, the wife's entitlement to maintenance at the rate of Rs.15,000 per month, with an annual increase of 10%, as

determined by the leamed Family Court and maintained by the appellate Court, is upheld, subject to adjustment of any amount already paid. The husband shall remain liable for the legally admissible period of iddat following the effective dissolution of marriage. The exact terminal date shall be determined by reference to the statutory record relating to the divorce deed dated 09.08.2019 and the applicable provisions of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961. The award of maintenance is modified only to the extent necessary to clariff the legally admissible period.

25.The next question concems the minor's patemity and her claim for maintenance. The leamed Family Court did not decide the minor's claim on merits because the husband disputed her patemity and asserted that she was the wife's younger sister rather than his daughter. The Family Court left the claim open for determination after the issue of patemity had been resolved by the competent Court.

During the proceedings before this Court, leamed counsel for the respondents produced an attested copy of the judgment dated 27.11.2019, passed by the leamed Civil Judge-IV, Bannu, whereby the husband's challenge to the paternity of the minor was declined. It was further stated that the said judgment was upheld in appeal by the leamed Additional District Judge-V, Bannu, through judgment dated 30.06.2021. The Court was also informed that the parties had arranged DNA testing outside the judicial proceedings, which established that the minor was born out of their wedlock. Learned counsel for the husband could not identifr any material d emonstrating otherwise.

26.The judicial determination of paternity removes the factual impediment that had prevented adjudication of the minor's claim for maintenance. Nevertheless, the amount of maintenance, the period for which it is payable, the minor's requirements and the husband's financial capacity were not determined by the Courts

below. It would not be appropriate to fix those matters for the first time in these constitutional proceedings without the necessary pleadings and evidentiary determination.

Accordingly, the minor's right to pursue her claim for maintenance is preserved, and she may seek its determination before the competent Family Court in accordance with law, placing on record the judgments concerning paternity and the relevant material. The observations made herein shall not prejudice the determination of the amount and period of maintenance by the competent Court.

27.The principal controversy in W.P. No. 1294-8 of 2019 concems the payment of dower. The parties do not dispute that the dower was fixed at 50 tolas of gold omaments. The husband asserted that 24 tolas and 0l mash of gold omaments were given to the wife at the time of engagement and nikah, held on 17.01.2012 at PUTA Hall, University of Peshawar. He further asserted that his mother gave the wife a diamond ring worth Rs.130,000 on that occasion. According to him, at the time of rukhsati, which took place on 25.05.2012 at Casaloma Wedding Hall, University Road, Peshawar, 39 tolas, 03 mashas and 06 raties of gold omaments were handed over to her, followed by an additional gold ring weighing 01 tola and 06 mashas on the wedding night. On this basis, he claimed to have delivered a total of 64 tolas, l0 mashas and 06 raties of gold omaments to the wife'

28.The leamed Family Court considered the photographs exhibited as Ex.PW-1/DX-I to Ex.PW-1/DX-6, the video recording exhibited as Ex.PW-1/2, the testimony of DW-l and DW-10 and the receipts exhibited as Ex'DW-1/1 and Ex'DW- 10/1. It observed that the Nikah Nama and the witnesses to the nikah had not been produced, but treated the husband's admission conceming the stipulated dower and the video recording as sufficient proof of the agreed amount. It further relied upon the photographs, whose genuineness was admitted by the wife when

she was confronted with them during cross-examination, and concluded that the entire dower of 50 tolas had been paid and remained in her possession.

29.The appellate Court, while examining the same material, did not agree that the entire dower had been paid. It observed that the receipts relied upon by the husband were in the name of his mother, Mst. Yasmin, and did not establish that the ornaments purchased against those receipts had actually been handed over to the wife towards dower. It also found no convincing evidence of delivery of the ornaments allegedly given at rukhsati or of the additional ring said to have been given on the wedding night. The appellate Court, however, accepted that 24 tolas and 06 mashas of gold ornaments had been paid towards dower and held the remaining quantrty outstanding.

30.The question, therefore, is not whether the dower was fixed at 50 tolas, which is admitted, but whether the husband proved payment of the quantity accepted by the appellate Court. The distinction between proof of the contractual obligation and proof of its discharge is fundamental. Once the agreed dower is admitted, the husband who asserts that the liability has been discharged must establish the alleged payment through evidence sufficient to support that assertion.

31.The evidentiary framework applicable to family proceedings must, however, be correctly understood. Section 17 of the Family Courts Act, 1964, excludes the strict application of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, and the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, to family proceedings to the extent prescribed by that provision. The exclusion does not mean that the Court may disregard the reliability of evidence or accept an unproved assertion. It requires a practical and context-sensitive assessment of the material, consistent with the nature of family disputes and the objective of reaching a just determination.

In Mushtaq and others v. Mst. Fatima and others (PLD 2025 SC 434), the august Supreme Court held that, in a dispute conceming a dower deed, the rigid requirement under Article 79 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, for the production of two attesting witnesses did not apply in the ordinary manner to family proceedings govemed by Section 17 of the Family Courts Act, 1964. The Court recognized that production of the original document, one attesting witness and other persons who were present at execution could, in the circumstances of that case, sufficiently establish the document. Once execution of the dower deed had been proved, the agreed financial obligation recorded therein attracted the legal presumption discussed by the Court.

32.The principle in Mushtaq (supra) is significant for two reasons. First, it confirms that family Courts must not import technical evidentiary requirements in a manner inconsistent with Section 17 of the Family Courts Act,7964. Secondly, it does not dispense with the requirement to prove the fact in issue. The judgment concemed proof of the execution of a dower deed and the legal effect of the obligation recorded in it. The present controversy concems an admitted dower obligation and the husband's assertion that it has been discharged by delivery ofgold omaments. The legal question is, therefore, whether the evidence establishes actual payment, rather than whether the dower agreement itself was validly executed.

33.The significance of dower as an enforceable matrimonial right was further explained in Mst. Fakh ra Jabeen and others v. Wasif Ali an d others (PLD 2026 SC 20). The august Supreme Court held that dower is an obligatory right of the wife and may consist of cash, movable property, immovable property or a combination thereof, provided the agreed subject matter has marketable value. The terms of the Nikah Nama must be interpreted according to the actual intention of the parties, and the headings of its prescribed columns cannot override the substance

of the matrimonial contract. The Court also recognized the evidentiary significance of a registered Nikah Nama and the presumption attached to its entries.

The decision underscores that dower is the exclusive propefty of the wife and a form of financial security arising from the marriage contract. It must be enforced according to the terms agreed upon, unless a legally sustainable basis for denying or reducing the entitlement is established.

34, The principle in Mst. Fakhra Jabeen (supra) supports enforcement of the admitted dower in the present case. It does not, however, prevent the husband from proving payment. The obligation may be discharged ifreliable evidence establishes that the agreed omaments were actually delivered to the wife towards dower. The question must consequently be decided by examining the photographs, video recording, purchase receipts, oral evidence and the husband's admissions collectively, rather than treating any one item as automatically conclusive.

35.Article 164 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, recognizes the Court's power to receive evidence made available through modem devices or techniques. Photographs and video recordings may, therefore, be relevant to the circumstances in which marriage ceremonies took place and to the appearance of the persons and objects depicted therein. Their admissibility' however, is distinct from their probative value. A photograph showing a bride wearing jewellery does not, without sufficient supporting evidence, establish the precise material, weight' ownership or legal purpose ofthe ornaments.

In the present case, the photographs, Ex.PW-1/DX-1 to Ex.PW-1/DX-6, and video recording, Ex.PW-1/2, may establish that the wife wore omaments during the engagement and marriage ceremonies. Her admission regarding the genuineness of the photographs establishes that the images shown to her were

genuine in the sense admitted during cross-examination. It does not, by itself, amount to an admission that the omaments depicted therein were made of gold, weighed 24 tolas and 06 mashas, were delivered by the husband towards dower, or remained in her possession as payment of that obligation.

36.Similarly, the receipts, Ex.DW-l/l and Ex.DW-lOll, may support the assertion that omaments were purchased. However, receipts in the name of the husband's mother do not, without further supporting evidence, establish that the omaments purchased were subsequently handed over to the wife towards dower. The purchase ofjewellery and its delivery in discharge of a contractual obligation are distinct facts. The latter must be established by evidence connecting the purchased omaments with the alleged payment.

37.The appellate Court itselffound that the alleged delivery of the omaments at rukhsati and the additional ring on the wedding night had not been proved. Having rejected that part of the husband's assertion, the remaining question was whether the material independently established payment of 24 tolas and 06 mashas at the engagement or nikah ceremony. The impugned judgment relies upon the photographs and video recording but does not identifu sufficient evidence establishing the weight and nature of the ornaments or their delivery specifically in satisfaction of dower.

The fact that the wife wore jewellery at the relevant ceremonies cannot, without more, be equated with proof that the husband discharged his admitted dower obligation by delivering the particular quantify of gold accepted by the appellate Court. The frnding that 24 tolas and 06 mashas had been paid towards dower is, therefore, not supported by sufficiently reliable evidence of actual delivery in satisfaction of dower.

38.Guidance may also be drawn from the judgment rendered by this Court on20.02.2023 in Writ Petition No. 215-8 of 2022 wherein the evidentiary value of photographs produced to establish payment of gold omaments towards dower was examined. The Court observed that photographs depicting a bride wearing omtrments do not, by themselves, establish the nature of the omaments, their exact weight or their delivery towards dower, particularly where the relevant supporting evidence is absent.

The principle is not that photographs or video recordings are inherently unreliable or inadmissible. Rather, their evidentiary value depends upon the fact sought to be established and the existence of corroborating material. In the present case, the photographs and video recording, considered with the purchase receipts and the other evidence discussed above, do not suff,rciently establish the payment of 24 tolas and 06 mashas towards dower.

39.A similar evidentiary principle was discussed in Yasir Mumtaz Ali v. Mst. Huma Rafiq and 2 others (202s cLC 9s3 Sindh), where photographs, in the absence of a Nikah Nama or evidence from a witness to the nikah, were considered insufficient to establish the alleged second marriage. Although the factual controversy in that case differed from the present dispute, it illustrates that photographs must be assessed in conjunction with the remaining evidence and cannot automatically be treated as conclusive proof ofthe fact asserted.

The above authorities do not impose a technical requirement that every photograph or video recording must be corroborated by a particular category of witness. They require the Court to determine whether the evidence, considered as a whole, sufficiently proves the disputed fact. In the present case, the necessary connection between the omaments depicted, their alleged weight and their delivery towards dower has not been established.

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40.The husband's own pleadings are also material. He admitted that the dower had been fixed at 50 tolas of gold omaments and asserted that ornaments had been delivered to the wife at different stages of the matrimonial proceedings. His admission establishes the agreed dower obligation; his assertion of payment, however, remains a disputed fact requiring proof. The two parts of his pleading must be considered separately. The admission concerning the amount of dower cannot be treated as proof of payment, while the assertion of payment cannot prevail merely because the wife admitted the genuineness of the photographs.

The record, as described in the impugned judgments, does not disclose a clear admission by the wife that the particular quantity of 24 tolas and 06 mashas had been received by her in satisfaction of dower. Her admission regarding the photographs cannot be enlarged beyond its actual scope. Consequently, the husband has failed to establish that the admitted dower liability was discharged to the extent accepted by the appellate Court.

41.In view of the foregoing discussion, the finding that 24 tolas and 06 mashas of gold omaments had been paid towards dower cannot be sustained. The husband's plea that the entire dower had been paid is likewise unsupported by sufficient evidence. The agreed dower of 50 tolas remains enforceable, and the wife is entitled to recover the entire stipulated quantity of gold omaments, subject to the lawful mode of execution of the decree.

42.The separate claim for 35 tolas of gold omaments allegedly given to the wife by her parents at the time of rukhsati must be distinguished from the contractual claim for dower. Dower arises from the marriage contract and constitutes the wife's enforceable right against the husband. Parental gifts, by contrast, depend upon proof of their delivery, ownership and identity. The failure of the husband to prove payment of dower does not automatically

establish that the wife's parents gave her the separate quantity of 35 tolas claimed.

The leamed Courts below examined that claim and declined to grant the relief sought. No sufhcient ground has been demonstrated to disturb their findings in constitutional jurisdiction. The dismissal of the claim for 35 tolas of gold omaments allegedly given by the wife's parents is, therefore, maintained.

43.The claim for dowry articles or their value of Rs.5,943,000 is similarly distinct from the claim for dower. The former concems articles allegedly provided to the wife by her parents at the time of marriage, whereas the latter arises from the agreed matrimonial obligation of the husband. The two claims cannot be treated as interchangeable, and failure to prove payment of dower does not automatically establish delivery of every item included in the dowry list or the value athibuted to it.

The leamed. Courts below declined to grant the claim for dowry articles or their value after examining the material placed before them. No specific misreading, non-reading of material evidence or other legal defect has been demonstrated in respect of those findings. They are, accordingly, maintained.

44.In Matloob llussain v. Mst. Shahida and others @LD 2006 SC 489), the august Supreme Court considered the principles goveming judicial interference in family matters. The authorify must be applied according to its ratio and does not relieve the Court of the obligation to examine the particular legal defect alleged in the case before it. The governing principle remains that constitutional jurisdiction is not an ordinary appellate forum for routine reassessment of evidence, but a legally unsustainable finding may be corrected where the requisite grounds for interference are established.

Applying that approach, the findings conceming the alleged khula dated 08.10.2012, the claim for parental gifts and the claim for dowry articles do not warrant interference. The finding regarding payment of 24 tolas and 06 mashas of gold omaments towards dower, however, suffers from a material evidentiary defect because the evidence relied upon does not establish actual delivery in satisfaction of dower. The finding is, therefore, modified to that extent.

45.For the reasons recorded above, Writ Petition No. 1101-8 of20l9, filed by the husband, fails to the extent that it challenges the rejection of his plea of khula and seeks to disturb the wife's entitlement to maintenance and recovery of dower. His assertion that the marriage had already been dissolved through khula on 08.10.2012 has not been established. His plea regarding payment of dower is also not supported by sufficient evidence. The petition is, therefore, dismissed, subject to the clarification concerning the effective date of talaq and the legally admissible period of maintenance.

46.Writ Petition No. 1294-B of 2019, filed by the wife and the minor, is allowed tn part. The finding of the appellate Court that 24 tolas and 06 mashas of gold omaments had been paid towards dower is set aside. The wife is held entitled to recovery of the entire stipulated dower of 50 tolas of gold omaments. Her entitlement to maintenance at the rate of Rs.15,000 per month, with an annual increas e of 10%o, is maintained for the legally admissible period, including the period of iddat following the effective dissolution of marriage in accordance with Section 7 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, subject to adjustment of amounts already paid.

The marriage is held to have been dissolved through the husband's divorce deed dated 09.08.2019, and not through the alleged khula dated 08.10.2012. The legally effective date of dissolution and the corresponding period of maintenance,

including iddat, shall be determined in accordance with Section 7 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, on the basis of the relevant statutory record. The date of execution of the deed shall not, by itself, be treated as conclusive of the date on which the divorce became legally effective.

47 . The minor's claim for maintenance is preserved for determination by the competent Family Court in accordance with law, in light of the judicial determination of paternity referred to above. The dismissal of the wife's separate claims for 35 tolas of gold ornaments allegedly given by her parents and for dowry articles or their value is maintained. The remaining findings of the leamed appellate Court, except to the extent expressly modified herein, are also maintained.

48 Both writ petitions are disposed of in the above terms. The parties shall bear their own costs.

? v Announced ,d 15.t0.2026 (Ghafoor zamsn) ?

JUDGE

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(S.8.) Hon'blc Mr. Justice Aurangzeb