SNGPL through its GM at Peshawar Vs M/S Fuel Zone through its Authorized officer, Peshawar

u Sheet v (Judicial Department)

SNGPL through its GM at Peshawar

V.

lWs Fuel Zone through its Authorized Officer, Peshawar

JADGMENT

For aooellarrt: Mr. Yasir Saleem Advocate

For respondent:

Babar. Advocates

,I

Date ofhearing: 26.01.2026 ,k{.rk**

MUHAMMAD TARIO AFRIDI. J.- This appeal under Section 13 of the Gas (Theft Control and Recovery) Act,2016, 4 is directed against the judgment and decree dated 23.11.2022, passed by the learned Additional District JudgeJ / Judge, Gas Utility Court, Peshawar ("Trial Court"), whereby the suit of the respondent / plaintiff seeking declaration, perpetual prohibitory injunction, and mandatory injunction was decreed under the provisions of Order XV-A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Through the said decree, the gas bill for the month of November, 2021, originally generated for a total amount of Rs.13,859,3871-, was revised due to an atleged uncorrected fault in volume, reflectirlg a current bilt of Rs.5,819,800/-, a fault volume of Rs.114,5681- and alleged under-billing of Rs.1,854,6621-. The said bill was declared illegal and the appellant was restrained from taking coercive measures against the respondent.

2.Briefly stated, facts of the case are that the plaintiff IWs Fuel Zone, through its authorized officer (hereinafter referred to as the respondent), a registered consumer operating a CNG

station atPajaggi Road, Peshawar, instituted a suit alleging that in November 2021 the defendant, Sui Northern Gas Pipelines Limited through its Managing Director (hereinafter referred to as the appellant), issued a bill oontaining handwritten additions of Rs.l14,5681- under the head "Fault ' Volume" and Rs.1,854,6821- under the head "IJnder Billing" aggregating to Rs.1,969,2501-.It was averred that the respondent had regularly paid all bills from October 2O2O to Novemb er 202I, and under coercion deposited Rs.710,000/- as a measure taken for survival. It was further averred that the explanation advanced by the appellant, that gas supplied at 0.5 PSI did not register on the meter, was frivolous and the result of mala fide. The respondent, therefore, sought declaration that the impugned bill was iltegal, mandatory injunction against recovery of the 4 disputed amounts, and perpetual injunction against disconnection of gas supply.

3.On 17.01 .2022, the appellant was issued the prescribed summons, along with a copy of the plaint, directing the appellant to appear on 17.02.2022 and to seek leave of the Court to appear and defend the suit. On that date, a representative of the appellant appeared before the Trial Court, but no application for leave to defend was filed, leading to adjournment of the case to 28.03.2022. On that date as well, application for leave to defend was not fited. The matter was thereafter adjoumed on several occasions, but ultimately on 12.09.2022, counsel for the respondent moved an application seeking decree of the suit on account of the appellant's failure to submit apptication for leave to defend within the statutory period. On the fotlowing date, i.e. 28.09 .2022, the appellant filed its application for leave to defend, to which the respondent submitted rejoinder. The case was then fixed for hearing arguments on the application for leave to defend on23.11.2022.

4.After hearing arguments and examining the material on record, the Trial Court held that no substantial defence was available and that the respondent was entitled to decree. Accordingly, it proceeded to decree the suit vide judgment and decree dated 23.1L.2022, declaring the disputed bill:illegal and restraining the appellant from taking any adverse action against the respondent.

5.Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree dated 23.t1.2022, the appellant filed the present appeal on

6.Arguments heard. Record perused.

7.Learned counsel for the appellant submits that summons were not properly served and that the Bailiff of the Court was () not examined to confirm due service upon the appellant. He further submits that the application for leave to defend was not considered in accordance with law and that the impugned decree was passed in a perfunctory manner without affording the appellant a fair opportunity of being heard. He lastly contends that the Trial Court favoured adjudication of the case on mere technicality rather than deciding it on merits and, therefore, it is a fit case for remand.

8.Perusal of the record reveals that the impugned judgment was passe d on23.11.2022. Section 13 of the Gas (Theft Control and Recovery) Act, 2016 prescribes a period of thirty days for filing an appeal against any judgment, decree, sentence, or final order passed by a Gas Utility Court. Accordingly, the limitation period commenced on 24.11.2022 and expired on 23.12.2022. The record further reflects that the appellant applied for an attested copy of the impugned judgment on 2,6.0L.2023, i.e., after the expiry of the prescribed period of limitation for filing the appeal. The said copy was prepared and delivered to the appellant on 22.02.2023, whereas the present appeal was

preferred on 21.03.2023, thereby occasioning a delay of approximately eighty-nine days beyond the statutory period.

9.It is a settled principle of law that once the period of limitation has commenced and expired, the time subsequently consumed in obtaining certified copies of the impugned judgment neither suspends nor extends the limitation period, nor can such time be excluded for the purpose of computing limitation. Moreover, no application for condonation of delay has been filed, nor has any sufficient cause been shown during the course of arguments. In view of the foregoing, the appeal is liable to be dismissed as hopelessly time-barred.

1.0. In Rifat Bibi v. Abid Shah and another Q022 PCrLJ 52), it was held that delay for each day must be satisfactorily explained. Once the prescribed period expires, a vested right is created in favour of the other pafi, which cannot be lightly Q,t disregarded, as the law favours the vigilant and not the indolent.

Likewise, in Lt. Col. Nasir Malik v. Additional District Judge. Lahore and others (2016 SCMR 1821), the august Supreme Court of Pakistan observed that each day of delay in the limitation period must be explained. The law of limitation, being lexfori, creates rights in favour of the parties and cannot be ignored as a mere technicality. This principle was reiterated in The State v. Muhammad Imran Q024 PCrLJ 1111 Lahore).

11.Moreover, in Government of Pakistan through Ministry of Works and another v. Messrs Malbrow Builders Contractor. Sialkot Q006 SCMR 1248), the Supreme Court observed that the question of limitation is not a mere technicality and should not be taken lightly. The right accrued to the other pffiy due to lapse of limitation cannot be taken away without sufficient cause and lawful justification. It was further held that "sufficient cause" is not capable of exact definition and would differ from case to case, but laxity, carelessness, and cursory approach of govemment functionaries do not constitute

sufficient cause, and indulgence in such circumstances does not arlse.

12.Even otherwise, the record demonstrates that the appellant was issued the prescribed summons on 17.01 .2022, pursuant to which its representative appeared before the Trial Court on 17.02.2022. The relevant provision applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case is Section 7 of the Gas (Theft Control and Recovery) Act,20l6, which reads as under:

7.Leave to defend.-{l) In any case in which the summons has been served on the defendant, the defendant shall not be entitled to defend the suit unless he obtains leave from the Gas Utility Court as hereinafter provided to defend the same and in default of his doing so, the allegations of fact in the plaint shall be deemed to be admitted and the Gas Ufility Court may pass a decree in favour of the plaintiffon the basis thereof or such other material as the Gas Utility Court may 4 require in the interests ofjustice.

(2)The defendant shall file the application for leave to defend within twenty-one days of the date of first service, provided that where service has been validly effected only through publication in the newspapers, the Gas Utility Court may extend the time for filing an application for leave to defend if satisfied that the defendant did not have knowledge thereof.

I l

13.The above quoted provision is explicit and leaves no ambiguity. It clearly provides that once summons have been served, the defendant is not entitled to defend the suit unless leave to defend is obtained within the prescribed period. Despite appearance on 17.02.2022, no application for leave to defend was filed within the statutory 2l days. Most significantly, the authenticity of the attendance of the appellant's representative before the Trial Court on 17.02.2022 has neither been disputed nor controverted. The application for leave to defend was eventually filed on 28.09.2022, more than seven months after first appearance. Section 7 of the Act of 2016 clearly provides that in default of filing leave to defend

within the prescribed period, the allegations in the plaint shall v be deemed admitted and decree may follow. Reliance is placed on National Tiles Ceramics Ltd. thrqugh Authorized Officer v. Sui Southern Gas Company Ltd. (2024 MLD 1386), wherein the High Court upheld dismissal of a belated application for leave to defend, reiterating that strict compliance with Section 7(2) is mandatory and that failure to file within 2l days renders the defence incompetent.

!4. The contention of learned counsel for the appellant that the appellant was not duly served is squarely contradicted by the record. As noted hereinabove, the order sheets of the Trial Court dated 17.02.2022 and 19.05.2022 categorically reflect the attendance of the appellant's authorized representative and learned counsel, respectively. Even if, for the sake of argument, /? it is presumed that no formal service had been effected upon the appellant, the burden lay upon the appellant to establish the date on which he acquired knowledge of the pendency of the suit for the purposes of computing limitation for filing the application for leave to defend.

15.The record further reveals material contradictions in the appellant's own stance. In the first instance, the application for leave to defend was admittedly filed before the Trial Court on 28.09.2022. However, in paragraph-6 of the appeal, it is asserted that the appellant acquired knowledge of the decree only after issuance of notice in execution. These pleas regarding acquisition of knowledge of the proceedings axe mutually inconsistent, inherently absurd, false, and wholly unconvincing.

16.Moreover, once appearance was entered and an application for leave to defend was filed, albeit belatedly, the plea of non-service loses all relevance and becomes untenable. The peculiar facts and circumstances of the case clearly demonstrate that the appellant was fully aware of the proceedings before the Trial Court. Since the statutory scheme

(Muhammad Sher Vs The State etc), the tnstarfi bail cancellation application, 1,€, No.10-

does not contemplate or permit indefinite delay in filing an 8,12025 is hereby dismissed nlbninie.

application for leave to defend, the appellant cannot be allowed 07.01.202s. 17. For the foregoing reasons, this appeal lacks merit and is 'Inrdnulldh PS' accordingly dismissed.

Mi lastlcc Abdal Fayaz Announced (S,B) Hon'ble 26.0t.2026 (Ghafoor 7,amtn) -Sd-

JUDGE

Judge

q o

(S.B.) Hon'ble Mr. Justice Muhammad Tariq Afridi