Adnan Javed VS The State etc

JUDGMENT SHEET

IN THE ISLAMABAD HIGH COURT, ISLAMABAD

(JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT)

Criminal Appeal No. 27 of 2026 Adnan Javed Vs.

The State and another

Criminal Appeal No. 41 of 2026 Muhammad Raees Vs.

The State and another

Appellants by : M/s Barrister Hasnain, Raja Muhammad Shafat Khan, Hazrat Umar Advocates.

Complainant by : Complainant in person.

State by : Ms. Rabia Imtiaz, ADPP.

Mr. Zafar Iqbal, SI/IO, P.S. Lohi Bher.

Date of Hearing : 16-10-2026.

SHAHRUKH ARJUMAD, J.-

1.The appellants [Adnan Javed and Muhammad Raees] in titled appeals have assailed Judgment, dated 23.12.2025, passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-IV (East), Islamabad (“Trial Court”) whereby the appellants have been convicted/sentenced in case FIR No.306 dated 11.6.2021, registered under Sections 302, 382, 337-J, 34, PPC registered at Police Station Lohi Bher, Islamabad as under:

a) Firstly, appellants Raees and Adnan Javed are convicted under section 302(b), P.P.C. as Tazir and sentence them to undergo R.L. for life imprisonment for each for causing death of Muhammad Junaid by throwing him from fourth floor of flat in a building.

b) Secondly, appellants Rasees and Adnan Javed are convicted under section 337 (J) PPC and sentence them

Criminal Appeal No. 27/2026 and 41/2026.

to undergo, R.I for 5 years imprisonment each for causing the deceased to take intoxicant/liquor with intent to cause hurt to the deceased.

c) In addition, both the convicts are order to pay compensation to the tune of Rs.500,000/-(five lacs) each to the legal heirs of deceased for mental anguish and psychological damage caused to them. In case of default of payment, it shall be recovered as arrears of land revenue and they shall suffer 06 months (S.I). All the sentences shall run concurrently.

d) The convicts are extended benefit of section 382-B, Cr.P.C.

2.Briefly, the prosecution case, as set out in the complaint (Exh.P/5-E) submitted by Nusrat Bibi, mother of the deceased, was that on the night of 10.06.2021 at about 11:00 p.m. night, her son Muhammad Junaid attended a gathering at a flat situated on the fourth floor of plaza No. 163 in Civic Center, Bahria Town Phase-4, Islamabad, in the company of his friend Malik Muhammad Waseem. According to the complainant, Malik Waseem informed her that at the flat/place of occurrence they drunk liquor together and that at about 2:30 a.m. on 11.06.2021 a quarrel had taken place involving Amna Shahnawaz, Adnan Javed, Muhammad Raees, Zohaib, Malik, Waseem and her son, during which search of her son and Malik Waseem was made, their cash, purse and mobiles were snatches and they were also beaten. Malik Waseem was pushed out of the flat. It was further alleged that her son (Muhammad Junaid) was thereafter thrown from the fourth floor of the building through window, who sustained serious injuries and was taken to Benazir Bhutto Hospital, Rawalpindi where he succummed to the injuries. His deadbody was subsequently brought to PIMS Hospital, Islamabad. Upon learning of the occurrence and her son's death on 11.06.2021, the complainant submitted the application on the basis of which the instant FIR was registered.

3.The detailed account of the occurrence was furnished by Malik Muhammad Waseem, who appeared at trial as PW-11. He stated that the deceased received a telephone call from Muhammad Raees inviting him to a

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party. PW-11 accompanied the deceased to the flat, where Adnan Javed, his wife Amna Shahnawaz, their minor child and Muhammad Raees were already present. According to him, other persons, referred to as Bhatti and Sardar, subsequently joined the gathering. He alleged that intoxicants were consumed, a quarrel ensued, and the appellants and their associates assaulted him and the deceased, searched their pockets and took their belongings. PW-11 further alleged that the deceased was taken into the bedroom while he remained in the lounge under restraint. According to his examination-in- chief, Adnan Javed and Muhammad Raees subsequently came to him and stated that they had thrown Junaid, and directed him to leave the flat. He alleged that the accused thereafter escaped, while Bahria Security personnel and the police subsequently arrived. In cross-examination, however, he expressly admitted that he had not seen who pushed the deceased out of the window.

4.Investigation was conducted by Muhammad Naveed Tahir, SI, who appeared as PW-12. During investigation, an empty liquor bottle and four empty glasses were taken into possession from the flat, as was the Suzuki Mehran car in which the deceased had allegedly arrived. Amna Shahnawaz was arrested, and a mobile telephone containing two SIMs was recovered during her personal search. The investigating officer stated that Adnan Javed was arrested from the flat on 14.06.2021 and that, on his disclosure, a pink- coloured pipe was recovered on 19.06.2021 from beneath the stairs on the fourth floor leading towards the flat. Call data records were also collected. The recoveries were effected by police witnesses alone, and, as the investigating officer acknowledged, no independent or public witness from the building or its security staff attested the recovery of the pipe.

5.Upon completion of investigation, a report under Section 173, Cr.P.C. was submitted. The appellants were charged under Sections 302, 382, 337-J and 34, PPC. They pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. The investigating officer acknowledged during cross-examination that Amna Shahnawaz had

Criminal Appeal No. 27/2026 and 41/2026.

been placed in Column No.2 of the report under Section 173, Cr.P.C., as she had not been found involved in the fight.

6.The prosecution examined twelve witnesses. Lady Constable Kiran Farooq (PW-1) testified regarding the personal search of Amna Shahnawaz; Naveed Ahmed, ASI (PW-2), supported the recovery proceedings; Amir Shahzad, draftsman (PW-3), prepared the scaled site plan; and Shamraiz Iqbal, Head Constable (PW-4), testified regarding custody and transmission of the case property. Waris Ali, ASI (PW-5), described the initial hospital proceedings and receipt of the complaint, while Muhammad Farooq, ASI (PW-6), proved registration of the FIR. Dr. Farrukh Kamal (PW-7) furnished the postmortem evidence, and Dr. Zia Ur Rehman (PW-8) testified regarding the deceased's initial examination at Benazir Bhutto Hospital. Nusrat Bibi, complainant, appeared as PW-9; Muhammad Arshad, Constable, as PW-10; Malik Muhammad Waseem as PW-11; and the investigating officer as PW-12. The prosecution also tendered documentary evidence, recovery memoranda, medical documents, call data records and the Forensic Toxicology Analysis Report, Ex.PAA, and closed its evidence on 15.12.2025.

7.In their examinations under Section 342, Cr.P.C., both appellants denied the allegations. Adnan Javed maintained that he had been falsely implicated by Malik Waseem in connivance with the complainant and police. Muhammad Raees denied the alleged assault and robbery and maintained that the deceased had voluntarily consumed alcohol and fallen from the building while intoxicated. Neither appellant elected to testify on oath under Section 340(2), Cr.P.C., or produced defence evidence.

8.The learned Trial Court vide the Impugned Judgment held that the prosecution had established an unbroken chain of circumstantial evidence comprising the appellants' presence at the flat, the alleged assault, recoveries, medical evidence and their subsequent conduct. It also relied upon the absence of an explanation from the appellants regarding the deceased's death

Criminal Appeal No. 27/2026 and 41/2026.

while in their company and treated several matters as established because particular suggestions had not been put during cross-examination. Consequently, the appellants were convicted and sentenced as stated above.

9.Learned counsels for the appellants contended that the Impugned Judgment rests upon misreading and non-reading of material evidence. They submitted that the complainant was admittedly not an eyewitness and that the prosecution case concerning the occurrence depended principally upon PW-11, whose account contained material contradictions regarding his consumption of alcohol, the communication of information to the complainant and the circumstances surrounding the alleged assault. Reliance was placed on Wazir Mohammad v. The State (1992 SCMR 1134), it being settled that the prosecution must prove its case to the hilt and that no such duty rests upon an accused, who need only create a doubt in the prosecution case. It was argued that although PW-11 claimed to have been beaten with considerable force with a PVC pipe on his back, head and hands, no medico-legal examination was conducted or produced. Both the first responding police officer and the investigating officer stated that they observed no injuries upon him. Learned counsel further submitted that the medical evidence, as discussed in the Impugned Judgment, did not disclose corresponding signs of the alleged torture upon the deceased. Reliance was placed on the rule that suppression or non-disclosure of injuries on a prosecution witness, and the absence of medico-legal corroboration of a claimed assault, damages the veracity of that witness and requires corroboration before his account can be acted upon, as held in Muhammad Iqbal v. Abid Hussain (1994 SCMR 1928). Learned counsel emphasized PW-11's admission that he did not see who pushed the deceased from the window. They contended that the learned Trial Court erroneously treated this concession as an admission by the defence that the appellants had thrown the deceased. They further argued that presence at the gathering could not, by itself, establish commission of murder or a common intention to commit it. It was further submitted that the recovery of the pipe did not establish its use in causing the deceased's death, while the empty bottle and glasses

Criminal Appeal No. 27/2026 and 41/2026.

established neither administration of an intoxicant by the appellants nor the intention or knowledge required for an offence under Section 337-J, PPC. Learned counsel maintained that Article 122 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, could not be employed to relieve the prosecution of its primary burden. They accordingly sought acceptance of the appeals and acquittal of both appellants by extending the benefit of doubt.

10.Conversely, learned Assistant District Public Prosecutor controverted the contentions raised by learned counsels for appellants and supported the Impugned Judgment and submitted that PW-11 provided a connected account of the gathering, quarrel, assault and the appellants' subsequent treatment to the deceased. It was contended that the evidence was corroborated by the recovery of the bottle, glasses and pipe, together with the medical evidence concerning fatal injuries resulting from a fall from height. Learned ADPP further maintained that the appellants' presence with the deceased immediately before the occurrence and their subsequent conduct constituted incriminating circumstances. The discrepancies identified by the defence were characterized as minor, while investigative omissions were stated not to be sufficient to discredit otherwise reliable evidence. It was submitted that conviction could lawfully rest upon the testimony of a single trustworthy witness, in terms of Article 17 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, and that the prosecution had proved the charges beyond reasonable doubt.

11.The complainant appeared in person and stated that learned Assistant District Public Prosecutor would argue the case on her behalf.

12.We have heard the arguments advanced by learned counsel for the parties and have also examined the record with their able assistance.

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Appraisal of evidence:

13.The principal question is not whether Muhammad Junaid died from injuries sustained in a fall from height, but whether the prosecution proved, beyond reasonable doubt, that the appellants caused that fall in the manner alleged and thereby committed the offences for which they were convicted?

14.Where the fatal act is not directly witnessed, the circumstances relied upon must form a complete and coherent chain connecting the accused with the offence and excluding a reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence. Suspicion, even when substantial, cannot replace proof. Nor can deficiencies in the defence supply missing links in the prosecution evidence. The distinction between probability and proof is particularly important where several persons were present and the precise fatal act was not observed. It is settled that in a case resting on circumstantial evidence every incriminating circumstance must be proved beyond reasonable doubt, and the circumstances must be so inter-connected as to form a continuous chain, the one end of which touches the dead body of the deceased and the other the neck of the accused, excluding every hypothesis of innocence; if the facts proved can be reconciled with any reasonable hypothesis compatible with the innocence of the accused, the case must be treated as one of insufficient evidence. Reliance is placed upon Muhammad Mansha v. The State (2018 SCMR 772). The rule is not a formality, as held in Khurshid v. The State (PLD 1996 SC 305), no rule of law or practice prevents a conviction on circumstantial evidence alone, but no link in the chain may be missing and every circumstance must point precisely to guilt and to no other inference.

Evidence of the complainant:

15.Nusrat Bibi (PW-9) candidly admitted that she was not an eyewitness. Her evidence regarding the assault and alleged throwing of the deceased was derived from information attributed to Malik Waseem, PW-11. Her testimony remained relevant to the receipt of information, submission of the

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complaint, identification of the body and other acts performed by her, but it could not be treated as an independent eyewitness account corroborating the commission of the fatal act.

16.The learned Trial Court invoked Article 19 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, to treat the narration as part of the same transaction. Such a conclusion required examination of when, where and in what circumstances the relevant statement was made. A later repetition to the complainant of an account furnished by another witness does not become part of the same transaction merely because it concerns the occurrence. The uncertainty in the prosecution evidence regarding who informed the complainant and when was therefore material to that reasoning. In her cross-examination dated 04.03.2024, the complainant stated that a police officer informed her of the occurrence and her son's death. PW-11, in cross-examination dated 19.10.2024, initially asserted that he informed her of both the occurrence and death. In the same cross-examination, he stated that he supplied her telephone number to the police, who contacted her. Subsequently, on 25.11.2025, he expressly denied informing the deceased's mother and stated that he did not know who had informed her.

17.The initial statements might admit of reconciliation if the police conveyed the fact of death and PW-11 subsequently supplied the details. The later categorical denial, however, could not be disregarded. The learned Trial Court's conclusion that the witnesses were entirely consistent on this subject did not address the whole of PW-11's testimony.

18.There was also a discrepancy concerning preparation of the complaint. On 04.03.2024, complaiant/PW-9 described the application as being in her own handwriting, whereas on 15.12.2025 she stated that she had dictated it to police officials. Standing alone, this discrepancy would not determine the appeals. It nevertheless required consideration alongside the uncertainty concerning the source and communication of the initial account. As held in Roshan v. The State (PLD 1977 SC 557), contradictions in cross-

Criminal Appeal No. 27/2026 and 41/2026.

examination do not by themselves require that the whole of a witness's evidence be discarded; but equally, a material contradiction going to the very foundation of the prosecution version cannot be brushed aside as immaterial, and it is the duty of the Court to weigh whether the contradiction concerns a peripheral matter or an essential link. Here, the source of the initial account and its transmission lay at the root of the prosecution story and not at its margins.

Reliability of PW-11:

19.PW-11 was the central witness connecting the appellants with the alleged assault and subsequent declaration. In examination-in-chief, he stated that "we started drinking Alcohol." In cross-examination, he asserted that he did not take intoxicants and had consumed chips and a soft drink. He also described the participants sitting on the floor after consuming alcohol and other intoxicants, while later denying that he had given such a version about himself. Intoxication does not, by itself, render a witness legally incompetent or require rejection of his evidence. Equally, a contradiction concerning whether the principal witness consumed alcohol during the very occurrence is not necessarily immaterial. It bears upon his consistency depending upon the degree of consumption, his opportunity to perceive and accurately recall events. The absence of his medical examination left that aspect unresolved. The alleged injuries to PW-11 presented a further difficulty. He stated that he was beaten with full force with a PVC pipe on his back, head and hands. Although he denied blood-stained wounds and abrasions on his head, he claimed bruising elsewhere. Waris Ali, ASI (PW- 5), stated that PW-11 was not in an injured condition and had no visible signs of injury or scars on his face. More importantly, the investigating officer expressly stated that he observed no marks of bruises or injury on PW-11's face or body and did not have him medically examined. The draftsman also stated that PW-11 showed no marks of violence in his presence, while PW- 2 stated that PW-11 had not told him that any accused had beaten him with a pipe. Absence of visible injury does not conclusively establish that no

Criminal Appeal No. 27/2026 and 41/2026.

assault occurred. Nevertheless, the account of repeated, forceful blows with a pipe required careful scrutiny against the contemporaneous observations of police witnesses and the absence of medical documentation. The principle recognized in Muhammad Iqbal v. Abid Hussain (1994 SCMR 1928), that suppression of injuries and absence of prompt medico-legal examination shake the confidence of the Court and require the testimony of a claimed injured witness to be approached with caution, applies with added force where the witness is the sole connecting link between the accused and the fatal act. The learned Trial Court treated this deficiency as inconsequential without adequately assessing its bearing on the reliability of the principal account.

Absence of direct evidence of the fatal act:

20.PW-11 expressly admitted that "I had not seen who had pushed the deceased Junaid and thrown him out of the window." This admission did not establish that the appellants pushed the deceased. It established the limitation of the witness's direct knowledge. The learned Trial Court therefore erred in treating the answer elicited in cross-examination as an admission by the defence of the appellants' participation in the fatal act. Cross-examination testing whether a witness observed an alleged act does not amount to acceptance that a particular accused committed it. Likewise, omission to put a particular negative suggestion cannot transform a witness who did not see the fatal act into one who did. The prosecution remained required to establish the identity and participation of the offenders through admissible and reliable evidence. The omission to put a suggestion in cross- examination may bear upon the weight of a defence plea, but it cannot supply proof of an act that no witness deposed to; a fact must be established by evidence and not by the silence of the defence. PW-11's account of the appellants subsequently telling him that they had thrown Junaid was undoubtedly incriminating and required independent consideration. The absence of an eyewitness to the throwing would not necessarily defeat a case supported by a reliable admission and a complete chain of circumstances.

Criminal Appeal No. 27/2026 and 41/2026.

Here, however, proof of that alleged oral declaration depended upon the same witness whose testimony contained the discrepancies already discussed. The recoveries and medical evidence did not independently establish the making or truth of that declaration. It is settled that evidence of a single witness may suffice for conviction under Article 17 of the Qanun-e- Shahadat Order, 1984, but only where that witness is shown to be wholly reliable and free from blemish; where the witness's account suffers from material infirmities and the prosecution relies upon him alone to prove both the act and the confession, the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt is not satisfied.

Medical evidence:

21.The postmortem opinion reproduced in the Impugned Judgment attributed death to serious chest trauma and associated internal injuries, which were ante-mortem and sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. That evidence established the fatal nature of the injuries. It did not, by itself, identify who caused the deceased to fall or distinguish conclusively between a deliberate push and an accidental fall. Medical evidence, however clear as to the cause of death, cannot supply the identity of the person who caused it, nor can it establish the mental state of an unknown assailant: it proves the act, not the actor.

22.The learned Trial Court also noticed medical evidence concerning the absence of visible signs of torture, but reasoned that the deceased had nevertheless been assaulted and thrown from height. That reasoning assumed the very act which required proof. The existence of fatal injuries from a fall could not, without sufficient connecting evidence, establish that the appellants deliberately caused the fall. Where the medical evidence does not accord with the ocular account as to the manner in which the injuries were caused, the conflict goes to the root of the prosecution case and the benefit of the resulting doubt accrues to the accused. Reliance is placed upon Mangio v. The State (1976 P Cr. LJ 234).

Criminal Appeal No. 27/2026 and 41/2026.

23.Conversely, the defence suggestion that the deceased fell because of intoxication cannot be treated as an established medical finding merely because such a possibility was put to a medical witness. The appellants were not required to prove conclusively how the fall occurred. The relevant inquiry was whether the prosecution evidence excluded a reasonable alternative explanation. On the evidence discussed above, that exclusion was not satisfactorily demonstrated. As held in Wazir Mohammad v. The State (1992 SCMR 1134), the prosecution must prove its case to the hilt; the accused bears no corresponding duty and need only create a doubt.

Recoveries and scientific evidence:

24.Recovery of an empty liquor bottle and four empty glasses supported the occurrence of a gathering at which alcohol was available. It did not establish which participant consumed a particular quantity, whether consumption was voluntary, or whether either appellant administered an intoxicant to the deceased with a prohibited intention.

25.The pipe was allegedly recovered on 19.06.2021 at Adnan Javed's instance from beneath the stairs leading towards the flat. The investigating officer attributed to him a disclosure that it had been used to beat the deceased. Even if the discovery is accepted, its evidentiary significance must be confined to what the recovery and any admissible connected information actually establish. Where the place of discovery was a common area of the building, accessible to all, and no independent witness attested the recovery, the discovery carries little probative weight as against the maker. As held in Fateh Sher v. Crown (PLD 1966 Lahore 157), recovery of an incriminating article at the instance of an accused may raise a burden upon him to explain how he came by knowledge of the place of concealment; but that principle presupposes that the place was one peculiarly within his knowledge, and it does not dispense with proof that the article was connected with the offence.

Criminal Appeal No. 27/2026 and 41/2026.

26.A general confession to police does not become admissible merely because the witness recounting it was not specifically challenged on that point. Under Article 38 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, no confession made to a police officer shall be proved against an accused, and Article 39 excludes confessions made while in police custody except those recorded in the immediate presence of a Magistrate. Article 40 operates as a narrow exception; it admits only so much of the information as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, and it is only that information, and not the whole confession, that becomes admissible. The discovery-related exception cannot be used to admit an entire assertion of guilt. Moreover, the pipe was not the alleged instrument of the fatal fall, and the evidence identified in the Impugned Judgment did not demonstrate a scientific connection between that article and the deceased's injuries. No weapon was recovered from Muhammad Raees, appellant.

27.The investigating officer collected call data records, but collection of those records is distinct from proof that their contents establish a murderous design or participation in the fatal act. Likewise, the appellants' acknowledgment that records were collected did not amount to an admission of every incriminating inference sought to be drawn from them.

Amna Shahnawaz and the surrounding circumstances:

28.PW-11 attributed participation in the alleged beating to Amna Shahnawaz during cross-examination. The investigating officer, however, acknowledged that she had been placed in Column No.2 because she was not found involved in the fight. The investigating officer's opinion was not binding upon the Court and did not automatically exonerate the appellants. Nevertheless, the differing treatment of an allegation arising from the same witness's account required a reasoned examination. Further, the investigating officer stated that Amna Shahnawaz and a minor child were found at the flat when police arrived and that Adnan Javed was subsequently arrested from that flat on 14.06.2021. These circumstances required a more discriminating

Criminal Appeal No. 27/2026 and 41/2026.

assessment than a general conclusion that all accused had fled and thereby confirmed their guilt. Conduct subsequent to an occurrence is a circumstance of limited weight, and it cannot be used to convert an unproved fact into a proved one.

Burden of proof and common intention:

29.The learned Trial Court repeatedly relied upon the appellants' failure to explain how the deceased died while in their company and invoked Article 122 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984. That provision does not displace the prosecution's primary obligation to establish the foundational facts constituting the offence. Before an adverse inference can materially assist the prosecution, the circumstances giving rise to it must themselves be reliably proved. Article 122 is not a substitute for proof and operates only where a fact is shown to be especially within the knowledge of the accused and the foundational facts are first established by the prosecution.

30.The gathering involved several persons, including PW-11 himself. The appellants' presence, even if accepted, was not equivalent to proof of exclusive custody of the deceased or participation in the fatal act. Nor did the appellants' failure to establish an accidental fall affirmatively complete an otherwise deficient prosecution case.

31.Their election not to testify on oath or produce defence evidence likewise could not cure the prosecution's deficiencies. The case had to stand upon its own evidentiary strength. It is the duty of the prosecution to prove its case to the hilt and no such duty is cast upon an accused, whose failure to explain cannot be treated as proof of guilt. Reliance is placed upon Wazir Mohammad (Supra). Absence of a proved motive for false implication could assist assessment of a reliable witness but could not make an otherwise doubtful account conclusive.

Criminal Appeal No. 27/2026 and 41/2026.

32.Similarly, Section 34, PPC, did not relieve the prosecution of proving participation in a criminal act committed in furtherance of a common intention. A separate overt act by each accused was not indispensable, but mere presence at the gathering was insufficient. Section 34 embodies the principle of constructive liability and is not an independent offence; it applies only where the criminal act is done by several persons in furtherance of a common intention, and that intention must be proved, or be inferable from proved circumstances, showing a prior meeting of minds or a pre-arranged plan. Mere presence at the place of occurrence, without proof of participation or of a shared intention, cannot attract Section 34, and the prosecution cannot invoke it as a doctrine of guilt by association. In the present case, uncertainty concerning the fatal act and the reliability of its principal evidentiary link prevented a safe finding of joint liability for murder. Conviction under Section 337-J, PPC.

33.The conviction under Section 337-J, PPC, required separate examination. The provision concerns administering or causing a person to take poison, an intoxicant or another specified substance with the intention of causing hurt, committing or facilitating an offence, or with knowledge of the likelihood of causing hurt. The presence of alcohol at a gathering does not, by itself, establish those elements. The offence requires proof of an act of administration by the accused, or of causing the deceased to take the substance, coupled with the requisite intention or knowledge; none of these elements can be presumed from mere availability or consumption of liquor.

34.PW-11 stated in cross-examination that the deceased obtained a bottle of liquor from somebody on the way to the party. The prosecution evidence discussed in the impugned judgment did not identify a proved act by either appellant of administering or causing the deceased to take the intoxicant with the requisite intention or knowledge. Even proof of consumption would not, without more, establish the appellants' liability under this provision. Consequently, the conviction under Section 337-J, PPC, was also unsafe.

Criminal Appeal No. 27/2026 and 41/2026.

Cumulative assessment and benefit of doubt:

35.Investigative shortcomings do not invariably warrant acquittal, nor does every discrepancy destroy a prosecution case. The question is whether the deficiencies concern peripheral matters or affect the essential links connecting the accused with the offence. Here, the difficulties concerned the reliability of the principal witness, corroboration of the alleged forceful assault, proof of the fatal act, the scope of the medical evidence and the impermissible use of gaps in the defence to supplement the prosecution case.

36.These matters could not be resolved merely by repeatedly describing the evidence as unshaken. Even an unchallenged formal recovery may establish only the fact of recovery, not every inference the prosecution seeks to attach to it. The learned Trial Court was required to assess the legal relevance and probative value of each circumstance before determining whether the circumstances collectively established guilt. Finding of guilt cannot rest upon high probabilities; it must rest surely and firmly upon evidence produced, and mere conjecture and probability cannot take the place of proof. Reliance is placed upon Muhammad Mansha v. The State

(2018 SCMR 772).

37.This Court does not hold that the deceased necessarily fell accidentally, nor is a positive finding of suicide required for disposal of these appeals. The conclusion is narrower: the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that these appellants caused the deceased's fall in the manner alleged or committed the offence under Section 337-J, PPC.

38.The principle of benefit of doubt does not require a multitude of circumstances. A single reasonable doubt arising from the evidence entitles the accused to its benefit as a matter of right, not concession. As held in Tariq Pervez v. The State (1995 SCMR 1345), the concept of benefit of doubt is deep-rooted; for giving it, it is not necessary that there should be many circumstances creating doubt, and if there is a circumstance which creates

Criminal Appeal No. 27/2026 and 41/2026.

reasonable doubt in a prudent mind about the guilt of the accused, he is entitled to the benefit of that doubt as a matter of right and not of grace or concession; the rule is based on the maxim that it is better that ten guilty persons be acquitted than that one innocent person be convicted. The same principle was reiterated in Muhammad Mansha v. The State (2018 SCMR 772) and, in the context of circumstantial evidence, in Muhammad Zaman v. The State (2014 SCMR 749). The principle applies with greater force where several material deficiencies operate cumulatively.

39.Upon an independent appraisal of the evidence, this Court finds that the circumstances relied upon do not form the complete and reliable chain necessary to sustain the convictions. The learned Trial Court's conclusions proceeded, in material respects, from assumptions concerning the fatal act and an incorrect allocation of the burden of proof. The resulting convictions cannot safely be maintained.

40.In view of above, Criminal Appeal Nos. 27/2026 and 41/2026 are ALLOWED. The Impugned Judgment dated 23.12.2025 passed by the Trial Court is set aside. Appellants Adnan Javed and Muhammad Raees are acquitted of the charges by extending them the benefit of doubt. The appellants shall be released forthwith, unless required to be detained in any other case. A copy of this judgment shall be transmitted to the learned Trial Court and the Superintendent of the concerned jail for information and compliance.

(SHAHRUKH ARJUMAND)

JUDGE

Announced in the open Court on 21st day of October, 2026.

JUDGE

Approved for reporting.

Tanveer Ahmed/*