Islamabad High Court

Rizwan Akhtar VS Shakeel Alias Munshi etc.

Outcome The appeal was dismissed and the acquittal of respondent No.1 was maintained.

Case
Criminal Appeal-319-2022
Type
Criminal Appeal
Judge
Mr. Justice Inaam Ameen Minhas
Length
14 pages

Summary

AI-generated · quotes checked against the text

This was an appeal against acquittal in a murder and attempted murder case arising from FIR No. 82/2019. The Islamabad High Court held that the prosecution evidence did not prove the accused’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt and dismissed the appeal.

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Written by AI from the judgment's text and may miss nuance. Rely on the full judgment below and the court's official copy. Court's own note: Appeal against acquittal in FIR No. 82/2019 dated 23.04.2019 U/s 302/324 PPC P.S. Shahzad Town, Islamabad

Full judgment

Official copy

JUDGMENT SHEET

IN THE ISLAMABAD HIGH COURT, ISLAMABAD

(JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT)

Crl. Appeal No.319/2022 Rizwan Akhtar Versus Shakeel Akhtar alias Munshi and another

Appellant by : Raja Rizwan Abbasi, Advocate.

Raja Usman Raza, Advocate.

Respondent No.1 by : Raja Muhammad Shafaat Khan, Advocate State by : Mr. Muhammad Adnan, DDPP.

Mr Zahid Hameed, ASI, P.S. Shahzad Town.

Dates of Hearing : 10.09.2026.

SHAHRUKH ARJUMAND, J.- Through the titled criminal appeal, filed under Section 417(2-A) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (hereinafter referred to as “Cr.P.C.”), the appellant, Rizwan Akhtar, calls in question the judgment dated 30.07.2022, passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-I, Islamabad (East), in FIR No.82 dated 23.04.2019, registered under Sections 302 and 324 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as “PPC”), whereby, after a full- fledged trial, the learned trial Court acquitted respondent No.1-Shakeel Akhtar alias Munshi of the charge.

2.The facts relevant for adjudication of the appeal are that the FIR (Exh.PB) was registered on the written complaint of Rizwan Khizar (PW-7), wherein it was alleged that he, along with his brother Haroon Khizar (deceased), was proceeding towards their house situated in Mouza Tumair from Rawalpindi in vehicle bearing registration No. LZU-4739. They picked up Shakeel alias Munshi (respondent No.1) from Trolley Adda, Shakrial. While they were on their way, Shakeel alias Munshi demanded that his 15-marla plot situated in Mouza Tumair be transferred to him by the complainant's brother. Upon his refusal, a heated exchange ensued between them. In the meantime, at about 10:00 p.m., when they

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reached Government School Panjgran, Shakeel alias Munshi, enraged by the refusal, took out a pistol and fired a shot directly at the complainant's brother, Haroon Khizar, which struck him above his left ear. He then fired a second shot, which struck the complainant, Rizwan Khizar, on his back.

3.Upon receipt of information regarding the commission of the offence, Zafar Ali, ASI (PW-5), reached Polyclinic Hospital along with Liaquat, C/7174 (not examined as a witness). There, they found Rizwan Khizar under treatment in the Emergency Ward, whereas Haroon Khizar had already been referred to PIMS Hospital. Zafar Ali, ASI (PW-5), prepared the injury statements of both the injured persons and submitted an application to the CMO, Polyclinic, for recording their statements. The written complaint (Exh.PA) submitted by the injured Rizwan Khizar was thereafter forwarded through Liaquat, Constable, to Police Station Shahzad Town, whereupon the FIR (Exh.PB) was registered on 23.04.2019 at 01:05 a.m. (midnight).

4.Zafar Ali, ASI (PW-5), prepared the injury statements of both injured persons (Exh.PE and Exh.PF). On the following morning, he visited the place of occurrence and took into possession the vehicle (Exh.P-2) along with two empties of a 30-bore pistol, one recovered from inside the car and the other from the spot near the car. Meanwhile, he received a call from Imran Khizar informing him that injured Haroon Khizar had succumbed to his injuries. Thereafter, investigation was taken over by Munir Ahmed (PW-12), who reached the crime scene and received the articles already collected, including the cotton swab on which the blood sample had been collected. The two empties were taken into possession vide recovery memo (Exh.PH), while the vehicle was taken into possession vide recovery memo (Exh.PJ). On 23.04.2019, Dr. Abid Shah (PW-9) conducted the autopsy on the dead body of the deceased and prepared postmortem report (Exh.PN/1-6). The MLC of injured Rizwan Khizar (Exh.PR), prepared by Dr. Amir Khan Mehsud (PW-11), was subsequently handed over to Momin Khan, ASI (PW-3). On 25.04.2019, Amir Shahzad, Draftsman, visited the place of occurrence and prepared the scaled site plan (Exh.PD), while Munir Ahmed (PW-12) prepared the inquest report

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(Exh.PP/1-4). On 21.05.2019, Dr. Muhammad Zaheen Gul (PW-13) conducted a surgical procedure to remove the foreign body, i.e. the bullet, from the back of injured Rizwan Khizar. Anees Akbar, Inspector (PW-14), arrested respondent No.1 from Karachi, whereafter he was shifted to Islamabad through due official process for the purpose of investigation. According to this witness, respondent No.1 was arrested on 05.05.2019, who subsequently led to recovery of crime weapon i.e. 30 bore pistol.

5.Charge against respondent No.1, Shakeel Akhtar, was framed on 05.10.2019 under sections 302 and 324 PPC, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. To prove its case, the prosecution examined fourteen witnesses, namely Nasir Mahmood, ASI (PW-1), Ali Hassan, ASI (PW-2), Momin Khan (PW- 3), Amir Shahzad (PW-4), Zafar, ASI (PW-5), Shahzad Malik (PW-6), Rizwan Khizar (PW-7), Imran Khizar (PW-8), Dr. Abid Shah (PW-9), Dr. Anum (PW-10), Dr. Amir Khan Mehsud (PW-11), Munir Ahmed (PW-12), Dr. Muhammad Zeeshan (PW-13) and Anees Akbar (PW-14). Zaheer Ahmed, HC, was subsequently given up. The prosecution also produced documentary evidence, including the Firearms & Toolmarks Examination Amended Report (Exh.PSS), Forensic DNA and Serology Analysis Report (Exh.PTT), postmortem report (Exh.PN), and other exhibited documents.

6.The statement of respondent No.1 under section 342 Cr.P.C. was recorded on 03.09.2021. He neither opted to produce evidence in defence nor to make a statement under section 340(2) Cr.P.C. Upon conclusion of the trial and after affording an opportunity of hearing to the parties, the learned trial court acquitted respondent No.1 of the charge. Hence, the instant appeal.

7.Learned counsel for the appellant has argued that one of the two injured persons, namely Haroon Khizar, succumbed to the firearm injuries sustained during the occurrence, whereas the other injured person, Rizwan Khizar, survived and appeared before the Court as an injured eye-witness; that the surviving injured witness has, in clear, categorical and unambiguous terms, implicated respondent No.1 and attributed to him the specific role of firing upon the deceased

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as well as upon himself; that the presence of the injured witness at the place of occurrence and the injuries sustained by him stand duly established through the medical evidence, lending inherent assurance to his ocular account; that the motive for the occurrence has also been established by the prosecution and furnishes a clear background for the commission of the offence; that the crime weapon recovered at the instance of respondent No.1 was subjected to forensic examination and was found to have matched with the empties recovered from the place of occurrence; that the medical evidence, recovery of the crime weapon, forensic matching of the weapon with the empties and the testimony of the injured eye-witness form a consistent and mutually corroborative chain of evidence connecting respondent No.1 with the commission of the offence; that there is no element of mistaken identity in the case, as the injured witness had directly seen the assailant and specifically identified respondent No.1 as the person who fired upon him and the deceased; that the prosecution evidence, when appreciated cumulatively, proves the occurrence, identity of the assailant, specific role attributed to respondent No.1, motive and use of the recovered weapon beyond reasonable doubt; that the learned trial Court, therefore, failed to properly appreciate the direct, medical and forensic evidence available on record and erroneously extended the benefit of doubt to respondent No.1 despite the prosecution having discharged its burden of proving the charge beyond reasonable doubt.

8.Conversely, learned counsel for the respondents have argued that the prosecution evidence suffers from material and irreconcilable contradictions regarding the manner in which the injured persons were taken to the hospital, which created serious doubt about sequence of events relied upon by the prosecution; that according to the inquest report, the deceased had died at 12:00 noon, whereas he had allegedly remained admitted at PIMS for about twelve hours, yet no corresponding medical record or other medical evidence was produced by the prosecution to establish such admission and treatment; that the injury statement of the deceased was prepared by the Investigating Officer in his absence; that the medical evidence suggests that the injury statement was prepared by the Investigating Officer in the presence of the concerned doctor is thus rendered

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doubtful and stands contradicted by the prosecution's own evidence; that Zafar Ali, ASI (PW-5), stated that he visited the place of occurrence in the morning and received information there through a telephone call that the deceased had expired, whereas the inquest report records the time of death as 12:00 noon, which renders his version regarding the time and circumstances of receiving such information wholly inconsistent with the documentary record; that these contradictions are not minor discrepancies but relate to material circumstances concerning the treatment, death and preparation of the relevant documents; that the prosecution was required to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt, but the material contradictions and unexplained gaps in its evidence rendered the prosecution version unsafe for sustaining a conviction; that after the acquittal recorded by the learned trial Court, respondent No.1 enjoys a double presumption of innocence and such presumption carries greater weight at the appellate stage; that an order of acquittal cannot be interfered with merely because another view of the evidence is possible, rather strong, cogent and convincing material is required to demonstrate that the conclusion reached by the learned trial Court was perverse, arbitrary or wholly unsustainable; that in the presence of material contradictions and doubtful circumstances appearing from the prosecution's own evidence, no compelling ground exists for disturbing the acquittal and the appeal is, therefore, liable to be dismissed.

9.Learned counsel for the parties as well as the learned Deputy District Public Prosecutor have been heard at length and the record perused with their able assistance.

10.Before examining the ocular account, it is necessary to bear in mind the settled principles governing determination of criminal liability as well as the scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal. The prosecution is required to establish not merely the factum of the crime but, with equal certainty, the identity and active participation of the accused in its commission. Proof of the occurrence, howsoever clear, cannot by itself justify conviction unless the evidence further establishes a direct and credible nexus between the accused and the offence. The

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burden throughout rests upon the prosecution, and the accused cannot be saddled with criminal liability on the basis of suspicion, conjecture, presumption or an uncorroborated assertion of involvement; rather, his participation must emerge from reliable and confidence-inspiring evidence which proves his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. At the same time, since the present proceedings arise out of an order of acquittal, the respondent No.1 enjoys the protection of the presumption of innocence flowing from such acquittal. Interference would only be warranted where the appreciation of evidence by the learned trial Court is found to be perverse, arbitrary or otherwise unsustainable on the record. It is in this backdrop that the evidence on record, particularly the ocular account, is required to be examined to determine whether the prosecution has succeeded in establishing a direct and credible nexus between respondent No.1 and the occurrence in question.

11.Rizwan Khizar (PW-07) is the injured witness in the instant case; therefore, the quality of his testimony assumes considerable significance. He set the process of law into motion by narrating a version in which he did not mention the time of their departure from Rawalpindi. He only mentioned the time of their arrival at Pungran School Stop as 10:00 p.m. Significantly, in his entire statement, he did not disclose the seating arrangement in the car, which was a relevant circumstance for determining the direction from which the firing was allegedly made. During cross-examination, this witness admitted that, after sustaining the bullet injury, he remained admitted in Polyclinic Hospital for about 6/7 days; whereas, the Discharge Certificate (Exh.PQ) records his date of discharge as 24.04.2019, i.e. the following day. He also failed to establish the alleged motive for the occurrence, as nothing was brought on record to show that any transaction concerning the plot had taken place between the deceased and respondent No.1. Munir Ahmed, Inspector (PW-12), during cross-examination, admitted that “it is also not mentioned in the case diaries of the instant case that who shifted the injured from the place of occurrence to the Polyclinic Hospital”. Rizwan Khizar (PW-07), who admittedly remained in his full senses, did not disclose the identity of persons who allegedly shifted the injured from the place of occurrence to the Polyclinic Hospital. Furthermore, he did not disclose how they had coordinated their journey with

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respondent No.1 and travelled together, while the prosecution also failed to produce the CDRs of respondent No.1, the deceased or the injured witness to support version of the complainant.

12.Upon receipt of information regarding the occurrence, Zafar ASI (PW-05) reached the hospital along with Liaqat Ali Constable. The outdoor tickets (Exh.PS and Exh.PT) record the time of arrival of both injured persons as 10:50 p.m. According to Zafar ASI (PW-05), when he reached the hospital, Rizwan Khizar (PW-07) handed over to him a written application, which was thereafter transmitted through Liaqat Ali Constable at 12:30 a.m. for registration of the FIR. Admittedly, however, Zafar ASI prepared the injury statement of the deceased without personally examining him, as he admitted in cross-examination that “It is correct that I prepared the injury statement of Haroon Khizar (since deceased) without personally examining him”. Liaqat Ali Constable, through whom the application was allegedly transmitted for registration of the FIR, was neither cited as a witness in the calendar of witnesses nor was any application moved before the trial Court seeking permission to examine him as a prosecution witness. Furthermore, the deceased had already been shifted to PIMS before Zafar ASI's arrival at Polyclinic Hospital, and he made no attempt to see the deceased. In cross- examination, this witness stated that, on the morning following the occurrence, he visited the crime scene, where he received a telephone call informing him that the deceased had passed away. However, according to the inquest report (Exh.PP), the time of death of the deceased is recorded as 12:00 noon. Thus, the account furnished by this witness regarding the time when he received information about the death is at variance with the time of death recorded in the inquest report.

13.During the trial, the defence had consistently suggested that the deceased was not fired upon with a pistol but with a shotgun. In this regard, the statement of Dr. Abid Shah (PW-09) assumes significance. He stated that, “As per radiologist report, multiple metallic density focci were seen representing below out fracture seen through the bones comprising left orbit and frontal bone.” During

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cross-examination, the witness further stated:

“The three metallic pieces taken out from the brain of deceased were sealed in the bottle. It is correct that as per report of the radiologist multiple metallic density focci were seen representing pallets. I had seen/examined the X-Ray of the head of deceased. In routine X-Ray film is also handed over to the Police by the radiology department however in the instant case such X-ray film was not handed over to me at the time of postmortem examination of the deceased”.

14.The above medical evidence, particularly the radiologist's observation of multiple metallic densities representing pellets, raises a material question as to the nature of the weapon used in causing the fatal injuries. The medical evidence, therefore, does not conclusively establish that the fatal injury was caused by the alleged 30-bore pistol, particularly when the defence had consistently maintained that the deceased had been fired upon with a shotgun. Not only this, the admission made by PW-9 during his cross-examination, reproduced hereinabove, assumes considerable significance. It reveals that the metallic pieces recovered from the brain of the deceased were sent for forensic analysis; however, other prosecution witnesses did not depose about the existence of the said fact nor were such documents exhibited during trial. Furthermore, neither the forensic analysis report nor the relevant X-rays and reports were produced before the Court. In the circumstances, the withholding of such material evidence assumes significance, and an adverse inference is liable to be drawn that, had the same been produced before the Court, it would not have supported the prosecution case.

15.The manner in which the injured witness was brought to the hospital also does not find consistent support from the prosecution evidence. Dr. Anum (PW-10) had attended the injured Rizwan Khizar. According to the OPD ticket (Exh.PT), the injured witness was brought to Polyclinic Hospital at about 10:52 p.m. on 22.04.2019. Significantly, the said ticket mentions the name of “Zafar Ali ASI”. Furthermore, in the column relating to Tashkhees, “P.S. Shahzad Town” is

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mentioned. Dr. Amir Khan Mehsud (PW-11), during cross-examination, admitted that “In the column of OPD ticket where the word (tashkhees) is printed, we mention the name of the person, who brings the patient to hospital. In that column it is mentioned as P.S. Shahzad Town”. The medical record, therefore, does not accord with the statement of injured Rizwan Khizar (PW-07), who stated that they were shifted to the hospital by unknown persons. It is also at variance with the statement of Zafar Ali ASI (PW-05), who stated that, when the police party reached the hospital, the deceased had already been shifted to PIMS Hospital. The discrepancy is thus not confined to a mere omission in the ocular account; rather, the consistent hospital record furnishes a different account regarding the person or agency responsible for bringing the injured to the hospital, which remains unexplained by the prosecution.

16.Upon a careful appraisal of the evidence available on record, we are of the considered view that the prosecution evidence does not attain the standard of certainty required for recording a conviction or for interfering with the order of acquittal. Although Rizwan Khizar (PW-07) is an injured witness and his presence at the place of occurrence is supported to some extent by the medical record, the reliability of his account is materially affected by circumstances emerging from the prosecution evidence itself. The witness did not disclose the seating arrangement in the vehicle, which was a relevant circumstance for appreciating the manner and direction of firing; his assertion regarding the period of his hospitalization is contradicted by the discharge certificate; and the alleged motive arising out of the dispute concerning the plot remained unsupported by any independent material. More significantly, the prosecution has failed to furnish a consistent and satisfactory account regarding the removal of the injured persons to the hospital. While the injured witness remained unable to disclose the identity of the persons who shifted them, the Investigating Officer admitted that no such detail was recorded in the case diaries, whereas the hospital record mentions Zafar Ali, ASI (PW-5), and Police Station Shahzad Town in the relevant columns which suggest that the injured were brought to hospital by the police. Likewise, Zafar Ali, ASI, admittedly prepared the injury statement of the deceased without personally

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examining him, and his account regarding the time when he received information about the death of the deceased is at variance with the time recorded in the inquest report. These circumstances assume significance as they relate to material links in the prosecution narrative and cannot, therefore, be brushed aside as mere discrepancies of form or detail. The medical evidence, too, does not provide an unequivocal corroboration to the prosecution case, particularly when the postmortem report records multiple metallic densities representing pellets, whereas the corresponding X-ray film was not made available to the doctor who conducted the autopsy, which leaves the nature of the crime weapon in a state of material uncertainty, more so when the defence had consistently suggested that the deceased had been fired upon with a shotgun.

17.It is true that the testimony of an injured witness ordinarily carries considerable evidentiary weight, as his presence at the place of occurrence is generally established through the injury sustained by him. Nevertheless, the mere fact that a witness has sustained injuries does not, by itself, render his testimony immune from judicial scrutiny or stamp him as a witness of truth. The august Supreme Court in the case of Amin Ali and another v. The State (2011 SCMR 323) has authoritatively held that “Certainly, the presence of the injured witnesses cannot be doubted at the place of incident, but the question is as to whether they are truthful witnesses or otherwise, because merely the injuries on the persons of P.Ws. would not stamp them truthful witnesses.” In the referred judgment the Hon’ble Supreme Court has quoted its earlier judgments on the subject, relevant portions whereof are also reproduced below.-

Said Ahmad v. Zammured Hussain (1981 SCMR 795)

"It is correct that the two eye-witnesses are injured and the injuries on their persons do indicate that they were not self-suffered. But that by itself would not s h o w that they had, in view of the aforenoted circumstances, told the truth in the Court about the occurrence;

particularly, also the role of the deceased and the eye- witnesses. It cannot be ignored that these two witnesses are closely related to the deceased, while the two other

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eye-witnesses mentioned in the F.I.R. namely, Abdur Rashid and Riasat were not examined at the trial. This further shows that the injured eyewitnesses wanted to withhold the material aspects of the case from the Court and the prosecution was apprehensive that if independent witnesses are examined, their depositions might support the plea of the accused."

Muhammad Hayat v. State (1996 SCMR 1411) " There is no cavil with the proposition laid down in the case of Zaab Din and another v. The State (PLD 1986 Peshawar 188) that merely because the P.Ws. had stamp of firearm injuries on their person was not per se tantamount to a stamp of credence on their testimony."

Mehmood Ahmad v. State (1995 SCMR 127)

"For an injured witness whose presence at the occurrence is not disputed it can safely be concluded that he had witnessed the incident. But the facts he narrates are not to be implicitly accepted merely because he is an injured witness. His testimony is to be tested and appraised on the principles applied for appreciation of any other prosecution witness."

18.The recovery of the 30-bore pistol and its forensic comparison with the empties, notwithstanding its evidentiary significance, cannot by itself displace the material doubts arising from the ocular, medical and documentary evidence. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case titled “Naveed Asghar and two others v. State” (PLD 2021 SC 600) has highlighted the significance and evidentiary value of recovery of weapon and empties as under.- “Even otherwise, recovery of weapon of offence is only a corroborative piece of evidence; and in absence of substantive evidence, it is not considered sufficient to hold the accused person guilty of the offence charged. When substantive evidence fails to connect the accused person with the commission of offence or is disbelieved, corroborative evidence is of no help to the prosecution as the corroborative evidence cannot by itself prove the prosecution case. That two out of three circumstances had not been proved while the third, namely, recovery of the blood stained handle of hatchet, that had been

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alleged to be weapon of offence, was insufficient to form the basis of a conviction.”

19.The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of “Muhammad Mansha v. The State” (2018 SCMR 772), has held that “Needless to mention that while giving the benefit of doubt to an accused it is not necessary that there should be many circumstances creating doubt. If there is a circumstance which creates reasonable doubt in a prudent mind about the guilt of the accused, then the accused would be entitled to the benefit of such doubt, not as a matter of grace and concession, but as a matter of right. It is based on the maxim, “it is better that ten guilty persons be acquitted rather than one innocent person be convicted”. Reliance in this behalf can be made upon the cases of Tarique Parvez v. The State (1995 SCMR 1345), Ghulam Qadir and 2 others v. The State (2008 SCMR 1221), Muhammad Akram v. The State (2009 SCMR 230) and Muhammad Zaman v. The State (2014 SCMR

20.It is important to note that according to the established principle of the criminal administration of justice once an acquittal is recorded in favour of accused facing criminal charge he enjoys double presumption of innocence, therefore, the courts competent to interfere in the acquittal order should be slow in converting the same into conviction, unless and until the said order is patently illegal, shocking, based on misreading and non-reading of the record or perverse. The said principle has been enunciated by the august Supreme Court of Pakistan in the judgment reported as “Ghulam Sikandar and another Versus Mamaraz Khan and Others” (P L D 1985 Supreme Court 11) wherein it has been held as under:

“The Court would not interfere with acquittal merely because on reappraisal of the evidence it comes to the conclusion different from that of the Court acquitting the accused provided both the conclusions are reasonably possible. If however. the conclusion reached by that Court was such that no reasonable person would conceivably reach the same and was impossible then this Court would interfere in exceptional cases on overwhelming proof resulting in conclusion and irresistible conclusion; and that too with a view only to

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avoid grave miscarriage of justice and for no other purpose. The important test visualised in these cases, in this behalf was that the finding sought to be interfered with, after scrutiny under the foregoing searching light, should be found wholly as artificial, shocking and ridiculous.”

Reliance is also placed upon the cases of Jehangir v. Aminullah (2010 SCMR 491), Mst. Anwar Begum v. Akhtar Hussain alias Kaka (2017 SCMR 1710), Zaheer Sadiq v. Muhammad Ijaz (2017 SCMR 2007), Muhammad Azam v. State (2009 SCMR 1232) and Muhammad Shafi alias Kuddoo v. State (2019 SCMR 1045).

21.The maxim “Falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus”, literally means “false in one thing, false in everything,” embodies the rule that a witness who deliberately speaks falsely with regard to a material fact is liable to be disbelieved as to the entirety of his testimony. The rationale underlying the rule is that the “presumption that the witness will declare the truth ceases as soon as it manifestly appears that he is capable of perjury” and that “faith in a witness's testimony cannot be partial or fractional.” The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the matter titled “Notice in pursuance of the order passed by this Court on 13.02.2019 in Criminal Appeal No.238-L of 2013 to Police Constable Khizar Hayat son of Hadait Ullah on account of his false statement made before the trial court in a criminal case”, (PLD 2019 SC 527), after examining the precedents from municipal as well as foreign jurisdictions concerning the applicability of the aforesaid principle in criminal cases in Pakistan, authoritatively held as under:—

“Therefore, in light of the discussion made above, we declare that the rule falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus shall henceforth be an integral part of our jurisprudence in criminal cases and the same shall be given effect to, followed and applied by all the courts in the country in its letter and spirit.”

22.Viewed cumulatively, the aforesaid circumstances are sufficient to demonstrate that the prosecution had failed to establish an unbroken and confidence-inspiring evidentiary nexus between respondent No.1 and the

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commission of the offence beyond reasonable doubt. The learned trial Court, having considered the evidence in its entirety, extended the benefit of doubt to respondent No.1. Such conclusion cannot be termed as perverse, arbitrary or contrary to the evidence on record so as to justify interference in an appeal against acquittal.

23.In view of the foregoing discussion, we are of the considered view that the learned trial Court, upon proper appreciation of the material available on record, has rightly acquitted respondent No.1 of the charge. No perversity, misreading or non-reading of evidence, or any other illegality has been pointed out which may warrant interference with the impugned judgment. The instant appeal, being devoid of merit, is accordingly DISMISSED.

(INAAM AMEEN MINHAS) (SHAHRUKH ARJUMAND)

JUDGE JUDGE

Announced in the open Court on 16th day of September, 2026.

JUDGE JUDGE

Approved for reporting.

Tanveer Ahmed/*

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