Taimoor Amir vs The State

ORDER SHEET

IN THE ISLAMABAD HIGH COURT, ISLAMABAD

JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

Criminal Miscellaneous No. 1174 of 2026 Taimoor Amir Vs.

The State and another

S. No. of Date of Order with signature of Judge and that of order/ order/ parties or counsel where necessary. proceedings Proceedings

19-8-2026 Mr. Tasawar Hussain Abbasi Advocate for the Petitioner.

Dr. Fatima Younas, Complainant, in person. Ch. Tahir Mahmood Advocate, for the Complainant.

Muhammad Wajid Munir, Deputy District Public Prosecutor.

Mukhtar Ahmed, ASI/I.O. with record.

SHAHRUKH ARJUMAND, J.: Through the instant petition, the petitioner, Taimoor Amir, seeks post-arrest bail in FIR No. 920 dated 11.11.2024, registered at Police Station Koral, Islamabad, for offences under Sections 406 and 411 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860 (“PPC”).

2.Briefly stated, the prosecution case, as reflected from the contents of the FIR, is that the complainant, Dr. Fatima Younas, is a doctor and had known the petitioner for some time on account of their association with the medical field. According to her, the petitioner used to visit her

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residence. She alleges that, on one occasion, the petitioner expressed his financial need and requested her to arrange money for him. The complainant states that two iPhone 12 Pro Max mobile phones were sold by her at Saddar, Rawalpindi, for a total consideration of Rs.400,000/-. Out of the said amount, Rs.80,000/- was deposited by the purchaser into the petitioner's Bank Alfalah account, whereas the remaining amount of Rs.320,000/- was received by the petitioner in cash. Thereafter, on another occasion, the petitioner requested further financial assistance. Consequently, an amount of Rs.482,000/- was deposited into the petitioner's Bank Alfalah account through the complainant's cousin. The complainant thus alleges that an aggregate amount of Rs.882,000/- was entrusted/given to the petitioner. The complainant further alleges that approximately one month prior to the lodging of the FIR, she handed over her Scooty bearing registration No. LEK-1222 to the petitioner for use for a few days as “amanat/trust, but, upon demanding its return, she came to know or suspected that the petitioner had disposed of the same. The value of the Scooty was stated to be Rs.300,000/-. The complainant also alleged that when she demanded return of her money and vehicle, the petitioner threatened her with kidnapping and murder and further threatened to circulate manipulated and objectionable photographs of her on social media. On the basis of the application submitted by the complainant, the present FIR was registered.

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3.Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the FIR does not disclose the specific date and time on which the alleged monetary amounts or the Scooty were entrusted to the petitioner; that the petitioner has remained behind bars since 22.04.2026; that investigation has already been completed and challan has been submitted before the learned Trial Court; that charge has also been framed but no prosecution witness has yet been examined; that the offences alleged against the petitioner do not fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497(1), Cr.P.C.; and that, therefore, continued incarceration of the petitioner serves no useful purpose. Learned counsel further contended that the matter, at its core, concerns a monetary dispute and that the essential ingredients of criminal breach of trust are not prima facie established from the allegations contained in the

FIR.

4.Conversely, learned counsel appearing for the complainant opposed the petition and submitted that, apart from the monetary amount, the petitioner was entrusted with the complainant's Scooty, which he allegedly dishonestly disposed of; that the Scooty has subsequently been recovered from the petitioner; and that the mere submission of challan before the Trial Court does not, by itself, confer any right upon the petitioner to be released on bail. Reliance was placed upon an unreported order of the Hon’ble Supreme Court passed in Criminal Petition No.1854 of 2025 and

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an unreported order of this Court passed in Crl. Misc. No.1625 of 2025.

5.Learned Deputy District Public Prosecutor also opposed the petition and submitted that sufficient material is available on the record connecting the petitioner with the commission of the alleged offences; that the Scooty has been recovered from the petitioner; and that the challan has already been submitted before the learned Trial Court.

6.Arguments heard. Record perused.

7.The petitioner has been accused of offences punishable under Sections 406 and 411 PPC, which entail maximum sentences of seven years and three years, respectively. Both offences, therefore, fall outside the prohibitory clause contained in Section 497(1), Cr.P.C. The legal consequence of this classification is well settled: in cases falling outside the prohibitory clause, the grant of bail is the rule and refusal is an exception, although the discretion of the Court remains subject to the facts and circumstances of each case. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Tariq Bashir and others v. The State, PLD 1995 Supreme Court 34, authoritatively held that, in non-bailable offences punishable with imprisonment for less than ten years, bail is ordinarily to be granted and may be refused only in exceptional circumstances, such as likelihood of abscondence, tampering with prosecution evidence, repetition of the offence or where the accused is a previous convict. The

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relevant portion of the Judgment is reproduced herein: -

“----Ss. 496 & 49'7---Bail---Grant of bail in bailable offence is a right while in non- bailable offences the grant of bail is not a right but concession/grace-- Grant of bail in offences punishable with imprisonment for less than ten years is a rule and refusal an exception---Exceptional and extraordinary cases whore bail is declined in oases of offences punishable with imprisonment of loss than ten years enumerated.

In bailable offences the grant of bail is a right and not favour, whereas in non- bailable offences the grant of bail is not a right but concession/grace. Section 497, Cr.F.C. divided non-bailable offences into two categories i.e. (i) offences punishable with death, imprisonment of life or imprisonment for tee years; and (ii) offences punishable with imprisonment for loss than ten years. In non-bailable offences falling in the second category (punishable with imprisonment for less than ten years) the grant of bail is a rule and refusal an exception. So the bail will be declined only in extraordinary and exceptional cases for example: -

(a)Where there is likelihood of the abscondence of the accused;

(b)Where there is apprehension of the accused tampering with the prosecution evidence;

(c)Where there is danger of the, offence being repeated if the accused is released on bail; and

(d)Where the accused is a previous convict.”

8.The said principle has consistently been reaffirmed in subsequent jurisprudence, including

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Muhammad Tanvir v. The State, PLD 2017 Supreme Court 733, whereby the Hon’ble Hon’ble Apex Court held that: -

“Once this court has held in categorical terms that grant of bail in offences not falling within the prohibitory limb of section 497 Cr.P.C shall be a rule and refusal shall be an exception then the courts of the country shall follow this principle in its’ letter and spirit because principles of law enunciated by this court are constitutionally binding on all courts throughout the country including the Special Tribunals and Special Courts.”

9.Further the said principle has been affirmed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Muhammad Amjad Naeem vs. The State, 2025 SCMR 1130, some relevant portions of the same are reproduced hereunder:

“13. This principle was authoritatively affirmed by this Court in a landmark judgment reported as Tariq Bashir v. The State (PLD 1995 SC 34). This Court analyzed the legal implications of the classification of non-bailable offences under Section 497(1) Cr.P.C. and was pleased to observe the following:

"6....... It is crystal clear that in bailable offences the grant of bail is a right and not favour, whereas in non-bailable offences the grant of bail is not a right but concession/grace. Section 497, Cr.P.C. divided non-bailable offences into two categories i.e. (i) offences punishable with death, imprisonment of life or imprisonment for ten years; and (ii) offences punishable

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with imprisonment for less than ten years. The principle to be deduced from this provision of law is that in non-bailable offences falling in the second category (punishable with imprisonment for less than ten years) the grant of bail is 'a rule and refusal an exception. So, the bail will be declined only in extraordinary and exceptional cases, for example-

(a)where there is likelihood of abscondence of the accused;

(b)where there is apprehension of the accused tampering with the prosecution evidence;

(c)where there is danger of the offence being repeated if the accused is released on bail; and

(d)where the accused is a previous convict.

Section 497 Cr.P.C. bifurcates non-bailable offences into two distinct categories: those that fall within the prohibitory clause and those that do not. As per the dictum of the Tariq Bashir case (supra), in the latter category of cases, the grant of bail is a rule, whereas refusal is an exception. Such refusal can only be justified in extraordinary and exceptional circumstances, such as where the accused is likely to abscond, tamper with the prosecution evidence, repeat the offence, or is a previous convict. Since the decision in Tariq Bashir (supra), this Court has consistently reaffirmed the principles established therein through a series of subsequent judgments. Reference in this regard can be made to cases reported as Subhan Khan v. The State (2002 SCMR 1797), Zafar Iqbal v. Muhammad Anwar (2009 SCMR 1488), Muhammad Tanveer v. The State and another (PLD 2017 SC 733), Arsalan Masih v. State (2019 SCMR 1152), Muhammad Ramzan v. State (2020 SCMR 717), Dr. Abdur Rauf v. The State (2020 SCMR 1258), Muhammad Nasir Shafique v.

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The State (2021 SCMR 2092), Iftikhar Ahmad v. The State (PLD 2021 SC 799), Muhammad Daniyal Farrukh Ansari v. The State (2021 SCMR 557), Ahmad Khalid Butt v. State (2021 SCMR 1016), Abdul Saboor v. State (2022 SCMR 592), Nazir Ahmad v. State (2022 SCMR 1467), Hilal Khattak v. The State (2023 SCMR 1182), Muhammad Nawaz v. State (2023 SCMR 734), Munawar Bibi v. The State (2023 SCMR 1729), Muhammad Aziz v. State (2023 SCMR 1773), Zafar Nawaz v. State (2023 SCMR 1997), Noman Khaliq v. State (2023 SCMR 2122) and Ali Anwar Paracha v. The State

(2024 SCMR 1596).

16.We have also observed that none of the vehicles in question here, have been recovered from the petitioner and that the complainant lodged the FIR after a considerable delay of 5 months, without any explanation. Due to above reasons, case of petitioner also calls for further inquiry, falling under subsection (2) of Section 497 Cr.P.C. The petitioner is also entitled for bail after-arrest on this ground.

17.Before parting with this judgment, we deem it necessary to record our deep concern over two unfortunate matters that have come to our notice in the proceedings of this case, Firstly, we have noticed that there is a disturbing pattern of misconstruction and misapplication of section 405 P.P.C. The offence of criminal breach of trust is increasingly being invoked in circumstances that are purely civil in nature, such as, business disputes. Instead of resorting to appropriate civil remedies, litigants seek to initiate criminal proceedings merely to expedite the recovery of lost money or to exert undue pressure on the opposing party. This practice is wholly against the established scheme of criminal and civil law. Matters that are inherently civil in nature, such as those involving contractual disputes or monetary claims cannot be misinterpreted

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or deliberately converted into criminal cases for the purpose of gaining revenge, coercing settlements, or recovering financial losses. Such abuse of criminal law not only undermines the sanctity of civil remedies but also clogs the criminal justice system by diverting precious judicial resources, and exposing individuals to unwarranted criminal proceedings, which often culminate in grave miscarriages of justice. It is the duty of Courts to remain vigilant to prevent any misuse or misapplication of law. While dealing with cases of criminal breach of trust, Courts must carefully scrutinize the case to determine if the two requisite elements of the offence are fulfilled, and where such elements are not present, Courts must judicially and liberally exercise their discretion in grant of bail. This, however, does not imply that courts should indiscriminately grant bail in every matter where a civil element is apparent. Rather, it underscores the obligation of courts to carefully examine whether the statutory ingredients of the alleged offence are duly satisfied and established on the record before allowing the criminal process to proceed. This duty assumes greater significance at the bail stage, as the fundamental right of liberty of citizens is directly under question at that stage. It would be a grave miscarriage of justice to confine a person to jail for an offence that is not prima facie made out in the first place. It is imperative that this duty is to be discharged at the very first forum of bail, namely, by magisterial courts.”

10.Thus, the fact that the offences alleged against the petitioner are non-bailable does not, by itself, furnish a justification for his continued incarceration; rather, the Court is required to examine whether the case presents any exceptional circumstance warranting departure from the ordinary rule of bail and, at the same time, whether

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the material available on record calls for further inquiry within the contemplation of Section 497(2), Cr.P.C.

11.The accusation against the petitioner requires examination not merely with reference to the nomenclature employed in the First Information Report, but against the constituent elements of the offences with which he has been charged. Keeping in view the settled position in the above mentioned judgment, this court would understand it appropriate to analyze the Sections applied in the FIR. Section 405 PPC defines the offence of criminal breach of trust and postulates, as its foundational requirement, that the accused must have been entrusted in some manner with property, or with dominion over property, and that, after such entrustment or acquisition of dominion, he must have dishonestly misappropriated or converted that property to his own use, or dishonestly used or disposed of the same in violation of any direction of law prescribing the manner in which such trust is to be discharged, or in violation of any express or implied legal contract touching the discharge of such trust. Section 406 PPC merely prescribes the punishment for the commission of such criminal breach of trust. The statutory structure, therefore, makes it clear that every failure to return property, every non-payment of money, every breach of promise, or every failure to honour a financial commitment does not, by itself, constitute criminal breach of trust. The prosecution must first cross the threshold of establishing, at least prima facie, that the

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property in question was placed in the possession or dominion of the accused in the character of an entrustment and that such entrustment created an obligation governing the manner in which the property was to be dealt with; only thereafter does the question arise whether the accused dishonestly misappropriated, converted, used or disposed of the entrusted property contrary to that obligation. The distinction is not merely semantic or technical; it goes to the very root of the offence, because in the absence of entrustment or dominion, there can be no breach of the trust contemplated by Section 405 PPC. The illustrations appended to the provision itself demonstrate the nature of the relationship contemplated by the legislature: where property is delivered to another for a defined purpose, such as safe custody, carriage, investment or discharge of a specified legal obligation, and the person receiving such property subsequently appropriates or disposes of it contrary to the terms upon which possession was entrusted, the criminal element may arise. Conversely, where property or money is transferred to another as an outright advance, loan, consideration or pursuant to an ordinary financial transaction, the subsequent failure to repay or discharge the monetary obligation cannot automatically be elevated into criminal breach of trust merely because the complainant subsequently describes the amount as an “amanat”. The statutory enquiry must remain directed to the legal character of the original transfer and not merely to the grievance arising from its subsequent non-return.

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12.This distinction assumes particular importance in the present matter because the complainant has used the expression “amaanat (trust/safekeeping)” while narrating transactions which, on their own description in the FIR, comprise materially different factual arrangements. The Court is conscious that at the stage of bail the allegations are not to be subjected to the rigorous standard applicable at trial; nevertheless, where the very foundation of the alleged offence is the existence of entrustment, the Court is required to make a tentative assessment whether the facts narrated in the FIR, taken at their face value, disclose such entrustment. The use of a particular legal expression by a complainant cannot substitute for the factual ingredients required by the statute.

13.The offence created by Section 411 is conceptually distinct from criminal breach of trust. Section 410 PPC defines “stolen property” to include property whose possession has been transferred by theft, extortion or robbery, as well as property which has been criminally misappropriated or in respect of which criminal breach of trust has been committed, subject to the statutory qualification concerning subsequent possession by a person legally entitled thereto. Section 411 then penalizes a person who dishonestly receives or retains such stolen property while knowing or having reason to believe that it is stolen. The architecture of the provision consequently requires more than mere possession of another person's property: there must first be

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property answering the statutory description of “stolen property”, followed by dishonest receipt or retention by the accused, coupled with the requisite knowledge or reason to believe that the property is stolen. Thus, Section 411 is not a general provision dealing with every case in which an accused is alleged to have wrongfully retained property belonging to another. Its essential premise is that the property has acquired the legal character of stolen property and that the accused is a receiver or retainer possessing the requisite guilty knowledge. In the instant matter, the factual foundation for Section 411 PPC, at least from the allegations contained in the FIR, requires closer scrutiny. The complainant does not allege that the petitioner received the Scooty from some third person after it had been stolen from her, nor does she allege that the petitioner purchased or otherwise received the vehicle from a person whom he knew or had reason to believe to be in possession of stolen property. Rather, her allegation is that she herself handed over the Scooty to the petitioner for use and that he subsequently failed to return it and allegedly disposed of it. Such an allegation, if proved, may principally raise the question of criminal breach of trust arising from the alleged misuse or disposal of entrusted property. It does not, without further factual and legal material, automatically satisfy the distinct requirements of Section 411 PPC. The prosecution would therefore have to demonstrate how the property came within the statutory category of “stolen property” and, thereafter, how the petitioner dishonestly received

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or retained it with knowledge or reason to believe that it was stolen. In the absence of such a factual chain, the mere fact that the petitioner was allegedly found in possession of the Scooty cannot, by itself, be treated as sufficient to establish the offence under Section 411.

14.It is, however, clarified that the foregoing discussion is confined to the tentative assessment required for deciding the present bail petition. The learned Trial Court, while considering the matter at the stage of framing of charge, shall independently examine the applicability of Section 411 PPC in the light of the allegations contained in the FIR, the investigation material and the other documents forming part of the police report, and shall determine whether the essential ingredients of the said offence are prima facie attracted to the facts of the case. In particular, the learned Trial Court shall examine whether the property alleged to have been recovered from the petitioner answers the statutory description of “stolen property” within the meaning of Section 410 PPC and, if so, whether there is prima facie material showing that the petitioner dishonestly received or retained the same with knowledge or reason to believe that it was stolen. The learned Trial Court shall record a reasoned and speaking order on this aspect, independently applying its judicial mind to the statutory ingredients of Section 411 PPC, rather than proceeding merely on the basis of its recital in the FIR or challan. Nothing contained in this judgment shall be construed as a final determination either for or against the applicability

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of Section 411 PPC, and the learned Trial Court shall remain at liberty to arrive at its own conclusion in accordance with law.

15.It is also necessary to distinguish between the concepts of misappropriation, criminal breach of trust and receiving stolen property, because their factual and legal foundations are not interchangeable. A person who is entrusted with property and thereafter dishonestly converts that property may fall within Section 405 PPC. A person who, without being the original offender, dishonestly receives or retains property which has already acquired the character of stolen property, with the requisite knowledge or reason to believe, may fall within Section 411 PPC. The latter offence cannot simply be appended to the former allegation without establishing its own constituent elements. The prosecution must therefore be able to demonstrate, independently and through legally admissible material, the factual basis upon which each statutory provision is invoked. At the stage of bail, where such distinction assumes direct relevance to the liberty of the accused, the Court cannot overlook an apparent deficiency in the factual foundation merely because both provisions have been mentioned in the FIR or charge.

16.There is yet another relevant aspect of the matter. The FIR does not specify the exact date and time on which the alleged monetary amounts were handed over to the petitioner, nor does it provide a precise date and time of the alleged entrustment of the Scooty. While absence of a

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specific date, by itself, may not be sufficient to discard a prosecution case, in the present circumstances it assumes relevance when considered cumulatively with the nature of the transactions, the question of entrustment and the stage at which the petitioner is seeking bail. The petitioner has remained incarcerated since 22.04.2026. The investigation has already been completed and the challan has been submitted before the learned Trial Court. It has further been stated before this Court, and is reflected from the proceedings, that charge has been framed against the petitioner; nevertheless, no prosecution witness has yet been examined. The petitioner is, therefore, no longer required for the purposes of investigation. The material collected during investigation has already been placed before the Trial Court, and the prosecution is now required to substantiate its allegations through evidence.

17.It is settled that the object of bail is neither punitive nor preventive. An accused who has not yet been convicted is presumed to be innocent until his guilt is established in accordance with law. Pre- trial detention cannot be permitted to operate as a substitute for punishment. At the same time, the liberty of an accused has to be balanced against the legitimate requirements of the administration of criminal justice. In the present case, however, the prosecution has not been able to identify any specific circumstance demonstrating that the petitioner's release would frustrate the trial or that he is likely to abscond, tamper with prosecution

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evidence, influence witnesses or repeat the alleged offence.

18.The mere fact that the challan has been submitted cannot, by itself, be treated as an independent ground for grant of bail. The contention of learned counsel for the complainant in this regard is correct to that limited extent. However, completion of investigation and submission of challan are relevant circumstances when considered alongside the other factors of the case, particularly where the accused is no longer required for investigation and the prosecution has not demonstrated any exceptional circumstance justifying continued pre-trial detention. Further, the unreported order of the Hon’ble Supreme Court passed in Criminal Petition No.1854 of 2025 and the unreported order of this Court passed in Crl. Misc. No.1625 of 2025, relied upon by learned counsel for the complainant, have been considered. The principle that mere submission of challan does not automatically entitle an accused to bail is not in dispute. Each bail matter, however, has to be determined on the basis of its own facts, the statutory punishment, the material available on record, the stage of proceedings and the circumstances relevant to the exercise of discretion under Section 497, Cr.P.C. The present case has to be examined on its own factual and legal footing, particularly in view of the questions arising regarding the essential ingredients of the offences alleged. Another important circumstance is that no previous conviction of the petitioner has been

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brought on record. The prosecution has also not pointed out any material demonstrating that, if released on bail, the petitioner is likely to abscond, tamper with evidence, influence prosecution witnesses or repeat the alleged offence. The evidence relating to the alleged transactions, bank entries, sale of the mobile phones, ownership and possession of the Scooty and its alleged recovery is substantially documentary or otherwise capable of being produced before the Trial Court. The apprehension of interference with such evidence, in the absence of any specific material, cannot be presumed merely because the allegations are serious.

19.For what has been discussed above, the instant petition is ALLOWED. The petitioner, Taimoor Amir, is admitted to post-arrest bail in FIR No.920 dated 11.11.2024, registered under Sections 406 and 411 PPC at Police Station Koral, Islamabad, subject to his furnishing bail bonds in the sum of Rs.100,000/- (Rupees one hundred thousand only) with one surety in the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court. The petitioner shall also be at liberty to furnish the surety amount in cash, subject to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court.

20.Before parting, it is clarified that the observations made hereinabove are tentative in nature, confined solely to the adjudication of the present post-arrest bail petition, and shall not prejudice either the prosecution or the defence at trial. The learned Trial Court shall independently

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examine the applicability and ingredients of Sections 406 at the appropriate stage, particularly in the light of the evidence and material brought before it, and shall determine the guilt or innocence of the petitioner strictly in accordance with law. Nothing observed herein shall be construed as an expression of opinion on the ultimate merits of the prosecution case, and the learned Trial Court shall remain uninfluenced by any observation made in this judgment.

(SHAHRUKH ARJUMAND)

JUDGE

APPROVED FOR REPORTING.

Tanveer Ahmed/*