M/s National Telecommunication Corporation VS M/s Catalyst Communication Pvt Ltd

ORDER SHEET

IN THE ISLAMABAD HIGH COURT, ISLAMABAD

JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

F.A.O.No.51 of 2013 M/s National Telecommunication Corporation Versus M/s Catalyst Communication (Private) Limited and another S. No. of order Date of order/ Order with signature of Judge and that of parties or counsel / proceedings Proceedings where necessary. 04.02.2021 M/s Syed Hasnain Ibrahim Kazmi and Feroze Jamal Shah, Advocates for the appellant, Mr. Kamran Masood, C.E.O., Catalyst Communication / respondent No.1.

Through the instant appeal under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 (“the 1940 Act”), the appellant, M/s National Telecommunication Corporation, impugns the order dated 20.05.2013 passsed by this Court, whereby the objections filed by the appellant to the arbitration award dated 15.08.2006, were rejected and the said award was made a Rule of Court by passing a judgment and decree in terms of the said award.

2.At the very outset, learned counsel for respondent No.1 raised an objection to the maintainability of this appeal on the ground that the same was time barred. We deem it appropriate to first decide the said objection taken by the learned counsel for respondent No.1.

3.The admitted position is that the impugned judgment and decree was passed on 20.05.2013. Certified copy of the said judgment and decree was applied for on 20.05.2013. Certified copy of the said judgment and decree was prepared on 25.05.2013 and delivered on 27.05.2013. Since an application for the certified copy was filed on the very same day on which the impugned judgment and decree was passed, the limitation period for filing an appeal is to be computed from 25.05.2013 when the certified copy of the judgment and decree was prepared. The instant appeal was filed on

17.06.2013 i.e., twenty two days after the certified copy of the impugned judgment and decree was prepared. In the case of Fateh Muhammad Vs. Malik Qadir Bakhsh (1975 SCMR 157), it has been held as follows:- “The time requisite for obtaining copy of order within the meaning of section 12 of the Limitation Act 1908 means only the interval between the date of application for supply of copy and the date when it is ready for delivery. Even during, this interval, clue diligence on the part of the litigant is required by law, and no delay, unless such as was caused by circumstances over which he had no control and which could not by due diligence be avoided, can form part of time `requisite' for obtaining the copy. The time between the date on which the copy is ready for delivery and the date on which the applicant chooses to take delivery thereof is not a portion of the time `requisite' for obtaining a copy.”

4.Article 151 of the First Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1908 (“the 1908 Act”) provides a limitation period of twenty days for filing an appeal from a decree or order of the High Court in exercise of its original jurisdiction. This limitation period is to start from the date of the decree or order. However, the time consumed in the preparation of the certified copy of the decree under challenge is to be excluded from the limitation period. The period between 20.05.2013 (when the appellant applied for the certified copy of the judgment and decree) and 25.05.2013 (when certified copy of the judgment and decree was prepared) is to be excluded from the limitation period. After the exclusion of this period, the appeal is barred by two days.

5.The appellant had filed an application for condonation of delay wherein it is admitted that the limitation period for filing this appeal is twenty days under Article 151 of the First Schedule to the 1908 Act. It is also pleaded that the limitation was to expire on 16.06.2013 which was a Sunday and

therefore, the appeal was filed on the next working day i.e., 17.06.2013. The pleadings show that the appellant is computing the limitation period to have commenced on 27.05.2013, when the certified copy of the judgment and decree was obtained by the appellant. Since the limitation period is to be computed from the date when the certified copy of the judgment and decree is prepared, therefore, it is safe to hold that the instant appeal was barred by two days. Even though this period is short, the fact remains that no plausible or sufficient reason has been given by the appellant to this Court to condone the delay with which this appeal has been filed.

6.In view of the above, the application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal is dismissed. Since the application for condonation of delay has been dismissed, it would not be appropriate for this Court to delve into the merits of this case. Consequently, the instant appeal is dismissed as time barred.

(LUBNA SALEEM PERVEZ) (MIANGUL HASSAN AURANGZEB)

JUDGE JUDGE

Sultan*