PTCL VS Fida Hussain and others

JUDGMENT SHEET

ISLAMABAD HIGH COURT, ISLAMABAD

JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

(1)I.C.A. NO.150 of 2026

Pakistan Telecommunication Company Ltd.

VERSUS

Fida Hssain and others

ed

(2)I.C.A. NO.159 of 2026

Pakistan Telecommunication Company Lt.

i

VERSUS

if Muhammad Anwar Shahid and others

(3)I.C.A. NO.161 of 2026

Pakistan Telecommunication Company Lt. rt

VERSUS

Fazli Malik and others ce

(4)I.C.A. NO.260 of 2026

Pakistan Telecommunication Employees Trust

VERSUS

Un

Muhammad Anwar Shahid and others

(5)I.C.A. NO.292 of 2026

Pakistan Telecommunication Employee Trust

VERSUS

Fazli Malik and others

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AND

(6)I.C.A. NO.304 of 2025

Pakistan Telecommunication Employee Trust

VERSUS

Federation of Pakistan and others

ed Appellants by: Mr. Shahid Anwar Bajwa, M. Habib Kazi, and Muhammad Daniyal, Advocates, along

iwith Salman Zafar, EVP, Raheel Zafar, G.M, Nauman if Ahmad Manager, for PTCL, Mateen-Ur-Rehman, A.D.

Legal, PTET

Respondents by: M/s. Ch. Mushtaq Hussain, rt

Imran, Haider Shah, Zulqurnain Tariq and Humbale Murad Siddiqui.

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Date of Hearing: 07.10.2026 & 12.10.2026 INAAM AMEEN MINHAS, J.- This single judgment is aimed at Un

deciding the fate of the above captioned appeals since they emanate from one and the same consolidated judgment dated 26.05.2025 passed by the learned Judge-in-Chambers, whereby the applications filed the appellants under Section 12(2) C.P.C.

(i.e. C.M. Ind. Nos.1767/2024, 1768/2024, 1773/2024, 1774/2024, 1775/2024, and 1824/2024) were dismissed.

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2.The abridgment of facts giving rise to the filing of the captioned appeals are that the respondents filed separate writ petitions before this Court, claiming to be retired employees of Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited (“PTCL”), seeking grant of increases in their pension on the same basis and at the same rate as those granted by the Federal Government to civil ed servants. It was further the case of PTCL that the Voluntary Separation Scheme (VSS) had been offered to the employees and i that substantial amounts had been paid to those who opted for the same. However, the respondents allegedly concealed their if status as VSS optees and did not disclose the material facts in this regard before this Court.

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3.This Court allowed the writ petitions vide judgment dated 21.12.2011. Aggrieved by the said judgment, PTCL preferred ce

Intra-Court Appeals (ICAs), wherein the issue relating to employees who had opted for the VSS was again raised. The ICAs were, however, dismissed vide order dated 17.03.2014. The said Un

order was subsequently challenged before the Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan through Civil Petition(s) for Leave to Appeal (CPLA), which were dismissed through judgment reported as 2015 SCMR 1472.

4.Following dismissal of the CPLA(s), and for the purpose of complying with the directions of the Honourable Supreme Court, PTCL sought particulars of the respondents, including their

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employee details, as identification based merely on their names was not possible in several cases. Upon receipt of the requisite information from the respondents’ counsel, PTCL ascertained their respective employment status and determined whether they had opted for the VSS.

5.The issue concerning employees who had opted for the VSS ed was specifically noticed by the Honourable Supreme Court in paragraph 6 of its order dated 12.06.2015. However, in i paragraph 18 of the same order, the Honourable Supreme Court observed that it was not appropriate to determine the said if question at that stage. PTCL thereafter filed a Civil Review Petition against the order dated 12.06.2015, which was disposed rt

of vide order dated 17.05.2017. During the review proceedings, PTCL contended that it intended to approach this Court by filing ce

applications under section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC), in respect of employees who had opted for the VSS.

The Honourable Supreme Court considered the said contention Un

fair and reasonable and observed that the ends of justice would be met by disposing of the review petition accordingly.

6.In pursuance of the aforesaid proceedings, PTCL filed applications under section 12(2) CPC before this Court, challenging the judgments obtained by the respondents on the ground, inter alia, that material facts relating to their status as VSS optees had not been disclosed. The said applications were

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dismissed by this Court. PTCL challenged the said dismissal orders before the Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan, which accepted the appeal(s) and set aside the orders passed by this Court. The Honourable Supreme Court, vide order dated 29.04.2024, further permitted PTCL to file the applications under section 12(2) CPC within one month. Accordingly, PTCL filed ed applications under section 12(2) CPC before this Court in compliance with the directions of the Honourable Supreme i Court. However, the said applications were dismissed vide impugned judgment dated 26.05.2025, giving rise to the present if proceedings.

7.Learned counsel for the appellants contended that the rt

learned Judge-in-Chambers had erroneously proceeded on the premise that the applicability of pension increases announced by ce

the Government to PTCL retirees was an admitted position, although neither PTCL nor PTET had made any such admission.

He submitted that the judgment in Muhammad Arif’s case (2015 Un

SCMR 1472) had been subjected to review proceedings, wherein PTCL/PTET had been permitted to agitate all legal questions, and that the Supreme Court had reserved its judgment on 10.02.2025. He further argued that the respondents had concealed the material distinction between employees who retired upon attaining the age of superannuation and those who opted for the Voluntary Separation Scheme (“VSS”), and had failed to

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satisfy the requirements of Order VI, Rule 9, CPC. According to learned counsel, the findings concerning the calculation of pension and the Pakistan Telecommunication Employees Trust Fund (Pension) Rules, 2012, were also contrary to law. He maintained that the entitlement of VSS optees had not been conclusively determined in Muhammad Arif’s case, ed notwithstanding that PTCL had specifically raised the issue.

Elaborating upon this contention, he submitted that the VSS i constituted a contractual, non-statutory arrangement under which its optees stood separated from service, rather than retired if under the applicable retirement rules; consequently, their claims could not be enforced through constitutional proceedings, and rt

the writ petition was not maintainable.

8.Conversely, learned counsel for the respondents opposed ce

the appeals and supported the impugned judgment, contending that the allegation of concealment of the respondents’ status as optees of the Voluntary Separation Scheme (“VSS”) was belied by Un

the record of the original proceedings. He submitted that PTCL itself had expressly raised the issue of VSS, including the acceptance of lump-sum payments by its employees, in its written reply and preliminary objections, and that the submissions concerning the Scheme were also recorded in the judgment dated 21.12.2011. He further maintained that the respondents had furnished particulars of their appointments and

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retirement, together with pension documents and Pension Payment Orders (“PPOs”), which disclosed their status and enabled their identification. The omission of employee numbers, therefore, did not establish concealment, particularly when pensioners were identified through their pension numbers and the relevant employment and pension records were maintained ed by PTCL/PTET themselves. Learned counsel argued that the appellants had neither identified any specific deception practised i upon the Court nor produced material substantiating the allegation that the earlier judgment had been procured through if fraud or misrepresentation. He maintained that disagreement with the conclusions reached regarding pensionary entitlement, rt

the effect of VSS, or the applicable pension rules could not, by itself, furnish a ground for setting aside the judgment under ce

Section 12(2), CPC. He further submitted that the liberty granted by the Supreme Court to invoke that provision required the appellants to establish its plea in accordance with law and did Un

not constitute a finding that fraud had occurred. Accordingly, they contended that the applications had rightly been dismissed and prayed for dismissal of the appeals.

9.Heard. Record Perused.

10.At first instance, this court would address the question of maintainability. Before examining the rival submissions concerning pensionary entitlement, the effect of the Voluntary

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Separation Scheme (“VSS”), and the alleged concealment of the respondents’ status, we must first determine whether the present Intra-Court Appeals are competent. These appeals are directed against the judgment dated 26.05.2025, whereby the learned Judge-in-Chambers dismissed the appellants’ independent applications under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, ed 1908 (“CPC”), registered as C.M. No.1774 of 2024 and connected. The immediate subject of challenge is, therefore, the i decision rendered on that application, rather than the original judgment granting relief in constitutional jurisdiction. This if distinction is material because the jurisdiction to entertain an appeal depends upon the legal character of the order challenged rt

and the provision under which an appeal against it is authorized.

Unless the present appeals falls within the statutory grant of ce

appellate jurisdiction, the questions raised on the merits cannot be examined.

11.The relevant statutory framework is contained in Section 3 Un

of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972 (“the Ordinance”), which provides two distinct bases for an Intra-Court Appeal. Subsection

(1)concerns a decree passed or final order made by a Single Judge in the exercise of the High Court’s original civil jurisdiction. Subsection (2), subject to its stated exception and proviso, concerns an order made by a Single Judge under Article 199(1) of the Constitution. The two provisions must be examined

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separately, for neither creates an unrestricted right of appeal against every determination made by a Single Judge. Likewise, the requirement of finality in subsection (3) does not independently confer a right of appeal; it limits the appeals otherwise falling within subsections (1) and (2). Consequently, the fact that the impugned judgment finally disposed of the ed application under Section 12(2), CPC, does not, by itself, establish the competence of these appeals. We first consider i subsection (1), which reads as follows:-

“An appeal shall lie to a Bench of two or more Judges of a if High Court from a decree passed or final order made by a single Judge of that Court in the exercise of its original civil jurisdiction.”

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12.For this provision to apply, the impugned determination must answer the description of a decree or final order, and it must have been rendered in the exercise of original civil ce

jurisdiction. These requirements operate together. The expression “final order” cannot be detached from the jurisdictional Un

qualification that follows it, nor can the civil nature of the underlying dispute substitute for that qualification. The relevant portion of the definition of “decree” in Section 2(2), CPC, is reproduced below:

“the formal expression of an adjudication which, so far as regards the Court expressing it, conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit....”

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13.The definition identifies several essential features: there must be an adjudication in a suit; that adjudication must concern the rights of the parties in relation to matters in controversy in the suit; it must conclusively determine those rights, so far as the Court expressing it is concerned; and it must receive formal expression. Conclusiveness is thus an essential ed feature of a decree, but it is not the only one. A determination does not become a decree merely because it finally disposes of a i contested proceedings. An application under Section 12(2), CPC, although civil in character, does not thereby become a suit. It if invokes a specific remedy against an existing judgment, decree or order on the grounds recognized by that provision. In the present rt

case, the appellants did not institute a suit through a plaint seeking an original adjudication of civil rights. It sought to ce

displace a judgment already rendered in constitutional proceedings by alleging fraud, misrepresentation and the consequences said to follow from the respondents’ participation Un

in the VSS. The dismissal of that application determined whether the earlier judgment could be reopened on those grounds. It did not constitute an adjudication in a suit within the meaning of Section 2(2), CPC. Accordingly, the impugned judgment cannot be treated as a decree merely because it conclusively rejected the appellants’ applications.

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14.The next question is whether the impugned judgment may nevertheless qualify as a final order made in the exercise of original civil jurisdiction. The fact that an application is presented directly before the High Court does not necessarily establish that the Court is exercising such jurisdiction. The source and nature of the jurisdiction invoked must be identified ed from the proceedings itself. Here, the original controversy was brought before the Court under Article 199 of the Constitution.

i The subsequent invocation of Section 12(2), CPC, did not convert that constitutional proceedings into an original civil suit or if transform the jurisdiction exercised in it into original civil jurisdiction for the purposes of Section 3(1) of the Ordinance. The rt

nature of the relief sought reinforces this conclusion. A proceedings under Section 12(2), CPC, necessarily presupposes ce

an existing judicial determination whose validity is challenged.

Its purpose is to examine whether that determination is liable to be displaced on account of fraud, misrepresentation or want of Un

jurisdiction. Although this remedy is distinct from an ordinary review, it concerns the reopening of a decided matter on specified grounds. In the present proceedings, the appellants sought such reopening of a judgment delivered in constitutional jurisdiction.

Describing its application as “independent,” assigning it a separate C.M. number, or deciding it through a separately titled judgment does not alter the source or legal character of the

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jurisdiction exercised. Procedural form cannot supply the jurisdictional requirement imposed by Section 3(1). The present appeals, therefore, does not fall within that subsection.

15.We now turn to Section 3(2) of the Ordinance, which provides:

“An appeal shall also lie to a Bench of two or more Judges ed of a High Court from an order made by a single Judge of that Court under clause (1) of Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan not being an order made under sub-paragraph (i) of paragraph (b) of that clause:

i Provided that the appeal referred to in this sub-section shall if not be available or competent if the application brought before the High Court under Article 199 arises out of any proceedings in which the law applicable provided for at least one appeal or one revision or one review to any court, rt

tribunal or authority against the original order.”

16.The opening requirement of this subsection is that the order appealed against must have been made under Article ce

199(1) of the Constitution. The exception and proviso operate upon appeals meeting that requirement. They do not enlarge the Un

category of appealable orders to include every subsequent determination connected with a constitutional petition.

17.In the present case, the original judgment and the judgment now challenged have distinct legal foundations. The former adjudicated the pensioners’ claims in the exercise of constitutional jurisdiction. The latter determined the appellants’ statutory application seeking to invalidate that adjudication

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under Section 12(2), CPC. The connection between the two proceedings does not make their respective orders interchangeable. An order deciding whether an earlier constitutional judgment was procured through fraud or misrepresentation cannot, merely because of that connection, be equated with the original order granting or refusing relief under ed Article 199(1). To hold otherwise would extend Section 3(2) beyond its stated scope and make the availability of an appeal i depend upon the history of the litigation rather than the legal character of the order actually challenged. Nor does the if appellants’ allegation of want of jurisdiction alter this position.

That allegation is one of the grounds upon which relief may be rt

sought under Section 12(2), CPC; it does not change the provision under which the applications were decided. Similarly, ce

the importance of the pension dispute, the financial implications of the earlier judgment, or the assertion that a material distinction between superannuated employees and VSS optees Un

remained unresolved cannot confer appellate jurisdiction. Those matters may bear upon the substantive controversy, but they cannot dispense with the statutory requirement that the impugned order belong to an appealable category. Since that threshold requirement under Section 3(2) is not met, it is unnecessary to determine whether its proviso would otherwise exclude an appeal in the underlying pension proceedings.

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18.The permission granted by the Supreme Court to pursue the remedy under Section 12(2), CPC, does not lead to a different conclusion. As recorded in the impugned judgment, the appellants was permitted to avail that remedy, with the matter to be decided by the competent Court in accordance with law.

Permission to invoke a remedy and entitlement to appeal against ed the decision rendered upon it are separate questions. The former enables consideration of the application; the latter requires an i independent statutory foundation. The liberty so granted cannot, in the absence of an express direction to that effect, be construed if as enlarging Section 3 of the Ordinance or creating an appellate remedy which that provision does not otherwise confer. The CPC rt

also supplies no basis for treating the present challenge as an appeal from an order under Section 104 read with Order XLIII, ce

Rule 1. An order dismissing an application under Section 12(2) is not included among the orders made appealable by those provisions. This does not mean that every such order is beyond Un

judicial scrutiny through any remedy available under law. It means that the particular appellate jurisdiction invoked before us must be established by reference to an enabling provision.

Neither the final disposal of the application nor the appellants’s continued grievance against the original judgment can substitute for that requirement.

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19.Upon consideration of the nature of the proceedings and the scope of Section 3 of the Ordinance, we conclude that the judgment dated 26.05.2025, passed by the learned Judge-in- Chambers is neither a decree nor a final order made in the exercise of original civil jurisdiction within the contemplation of subsection (1). It is also not an order made under Article 199(1) ed of the Constitution so as to attract subsection (2). The present Intra-Court Appeals are, therefore, not maintainable.

i Consequently, they are DISMISSED as incompetent, without entering upon the merits of the parties’ submissions concerning if pensionary entitlement, the legal effect of the VSS, or the allegations of fraud and misrepresentation.

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(SHAHRUKH ARJUMAND) (INAAM AMEEN MINHAS)

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JUDGE JUDGE

Announced in open Court on 20.10.2026 Un

JUDGE JUDGE

APPROVED FOR REPORTING.

Basit Ali(S)