M/s Parco Gunvor Limited VS OGRA etc

Form No: HCJD/C-121

JUDGEMENT SHEET

IN THE ISLAMABAD HIGH COURT, ISLAMABAD

(JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT)

OGRA Application No.08/2026

M/s Parco Gunvor Ltd.

Versus OGRA and another

Petitioner by: Syed Hassan Ali Raza, Advocate.

Respondents by: Syed Faisal Ishtiaq, Advocate.

Date of Hearing: 15.09.2026.

JUDGEMENT

UMAIR MAJEED MALIK, J: Through the instant

application, the applicant has assailed the order dated 08.06.2026, passed by respondent No. 1, whereby the applicant’s application seeking interim relief was rejected.

2.The brief facts as mentioned in the instant application are that the applicant, M/s Parco Gunvor Ltd., engaged in the marketing and sale of petroleum products, was served with a Show Cause Notice dated 25.06.2025 by a delegatee of the respondent No.1, Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority (“OGRA”), alleging non-compliance with the prescribed High-Speed Diesel (“HSD”) stock requirements under Rule 37 of the Pakistan Oil Rules, 2016, as well as short upliftment of Motor Spirit (“MS”). The applicant filed a reply dated 08.07.2025, denying the allegations and vide order dated 27.03.2026, the respondent No.1 imposed an aggregate penalty of Rs.7,000,000/-

upon the applicant for (i) maintaining minimum HSD stocks for April and May 2025 and (ii) short upliftment of MS during April 2025.

3.Aggrieved by the said order, the applicant filed an appeal under section 12 (1) of the Oil and Gas Regulator Authority Ordinance, 2002 (“Ordinance”) read with the OGRA (Procedure for Appeals) Regulations, 2024 (“Appeals Regulations”), with an additional prayer for interim relief against recovery of the impugned penalty. However, without issuing notice and affording an opportunity of hearing or recording any reasons, the respondent No.1, vide impugned letter/order dated 08.06.2026, declined the request for interim relief and directed the applicant to deposit the penalty amount.

Hence, the instant appeal.

4.Learned counsel for the applicant, inter alia, argued that respondent No.1 passed the impugned order on the applicant’s appeal, without assigning any appeal number, without affording the applicant an opportunity of hearing and the prayer for ad interim relief seeking suspension of the operation of the order dated 27.03.2026 was declined. Learned counsel further argued that impugned order is non-speaking, inasmuch as no reason whatsoever has been assigned for declining the prayer for interim relief. Learned counsel contended that the impugned order was passed without affording the applicant an opportunity of hearing, notwithstanding that a statutory appeal under Section 12(1) of the Ordinance read with the Appeals Regulations had already been preferred on 23.04.2026. He added that the respondent No.1, without due application of mind and in disregard of the

principles of natural justice, summarily declined the prayer for interim relief.

5.Conversely, learned counsel for respondent No.1 submitted that the applicant’s statutory appeal is pending before the respondent No.1 which would be decided expeditiously in accordance with law.

Learned counsel further submitted that, at this stage, the applicant’s grievance is confined to the rejection of the prayer for ad interim relief while the main appeal remains pending adjudication. Learned counsel contended that interim relief is interlocutory in nature and does not determine the substantive rights of the parties which are to be adjudicated upon in the main appeal on its own merits.

6.Arguments advanced by learned counsel for the applicant and respondent No.1 have been heard and the record perused with their able assistance.

7.The primary grievance of the applicant is that whilst deciding its stay application filed with the main appeal under section 12 (1) of the Ordinance, respondent No.1 has denied a right of hearing to the applicant and summarily decided the stay application through a non- speaking. In order to resolve the controversy, it is necessary to examine the provisions of section 12(1), ibid and other relevant regulations. Section 12 (1), ibid, reads as under:

“12. Appeal, etc.- (1) Any person aggrieved by any order or decision of the delegatees of a power delegated by the Authority under section 10 may, within thirty days of the receipt of such decision or order, prefer appeal to the Authority and Authority shall hear and decide the appeal within ninety days from the date of its presentation.”

[Emphasis Added]

8.A bare reading of section 12(1) of the Ordinance reveals that it provides a statutory remedy of appeal to any person aggrieved against an order or decision of a delegatee of the Authority. Section 12 (1), ibid, clearly provides a statutory right of hearing to an aggrieved person.

9.Likewise, OGRA has prescribed comprehensive Appeals Regulations under section 42 (2) (g) read with section 6 (2) (n) of the Ordinance. Regulations 3, 13 and 14 of Appeal Regulations are relevant for the purposes of present controversy. Regulation 3, 13 and 14 are reproduced below for ready reference:

“3. Filing of an Appeal.- (1) Any person aggrieved by any order or a decision of the delegatees of a power delegated by the Authority under section 10 of the Ordinance may, within thirty days of the receipt of such order or decision, file an appeal before the Authority and the Authority shall hear and decide the appeal, within ninety days from the date of its presentation, pursuant to Section 12 (1) of the Ordinance.

(2)An order or a decision against which an appeal is filed shall be deemed to be infield till the same is suspended or set aside by the Authority or court of law, as the case may be.

(3)The concerned Designated Officer shall get implemented his/her order or decision unless the said order or decision is suspended by the Authority or the court of law.

(4)No appeal shall lie against any order or decision given with the consent of the parties.”

“13. Date of hearing to be notified.— The Consumer Affairs Department shall notify the date, time and venue of hearing of the appeal to all the parties in such manner as the Chairman may, by general or special order, direct.”

“14. Hearing and Decision of Appeal.— (1) On the day fixed for hearing, or on any other day to which the hearing may be adjourned, the appellant(s) shall be heard personally or through his/her authorized

representative(s) by the Authority, in support of the appeal. The Authority shall then hear the respondent(s) or his/her authorized representative(s) against the appeal and in such a case the appellant(s) shall be entitled to reply.

(2)All parties appearing before the Authority may submit a summary of their arguments in writing at the conclusion of the hearing provided that the Authority shall not be bound to admit such arguments which are included in the summary but not pressed before the Authority during the course of hearing.

(3)The hearing of appeal under these regulations shall not be public proceedings, provided that any person not being a party to the proceeding before the Authority may attend such proceedings with the prior approval of the Authority.

(4)The Authority in an appeal may, inter alia, confirm, amend, remand, set aside or cancel the order appealed against or enhance or reduce the penalty or make such order it may deem just and equitable in the circumstances of a case.

(5)Hearing of the Appeal and decision thereon shall be taken by the Authority.

[Emphasis Added]

10.It is abundantly clear from the provisions of Regulation 3, 13 and 14 of Appeals Regulations that a right of hearing has to be afforded by the Authority to an aggrieved person before passing any order or decision under section 12 (1) of the Ordinance. Further, it is also evident from the provisions of Regulation 3 (2) and (3) of Appeals Regulations that the Authority has a power to suspend the order passed by a delegatee. Even otherwise, it is a settled law that an authority which has a power to grant the final relief can also grant interim relief1.

Pfizer Pakistan (Pvt.) Limited v. Federation of Pakistan, 2019 MLD 1849; Sindh Employees Social Security Institution v. Adamjee Cotton Mills Ltd., PLD 1975 SC 32; Syed Imran Raza Zaidi v. Government of Punjab and 02 others1996 SCMR 645 and Messrs Pak-Saudi Fertilizers Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan and other, 2002 PTD 679.

11.Moreover, Article 10-A of the Constitution guarantees the right to fair trial and due process. It is, therefore, incumbent upon an authority, before passing any adverse order, to afford the affected person a fair and reasonable opportunity of hearing including an opportunity to know, explain and controvert the allegations against him. Where the statute expressly requires observance of natural justice such requirement must be strictly followed, even where it is silent, the principles of natural justice remain applicable unless expressly or necessarily excluded by law. No order prejudicially affecting a person’s rights or interests can lawfully be passed without affording such opportunity.

12.Perusal of record and the impugned order reveal that the applicant preferred a statutory appeal under Section 12 (1) of the Ordinance, before respondent No.1 against the order of the Designated Officer (SED-OSC), wherein a prayer for ad interim relief seeking suspension of the operation of the impugned order was also made. The prayer for granted of interim relief was, however, declined by respondent No.1 with a direction to the applicant to deposit the penalty amount while the main appeal was stated to be scheduled for hearing in due course in accordance with the Appeals Regulations.

Thus, the prayer for interim relief, incorporated in the appeal, was declined without affording the applicant an opportunity of hearing while the main appeal was scheduled for hearing at a subsequent stage. Consequently, the applicant was subjected to the immediate adverse effect of the impugned order despite its appeal remaining pending adjudication. The impugned order has been passed in

violation of section 12 (1) of the Ordinance and Regulation 3, 13 and 14 of the Appeals Regulations, which clearly provide a right of hearing. The dismissal of prayer for interim relief by respondent No.1, without an opportunity of hearing, cannot be countenanced.

13.Even though the provisions of section 12 (1) of the Ordinance and Regulations 3, 13 and 14 of the Appeals Regulations do not specifically provide a right of hearing to the applicant in relation to his application or prayer for interim relief but it is settled law that in every judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings, the rule of natural justice audi alteram partem (no one should be condemned unheard) should be read into every statute even if the right of hearing has not been expressly provided therein2. The impugned order has, therefore, been passed in violation of principles of natural justice, particularly the rule of audi alteram partem, which requires that a person likely to be adversely affected by an order be afforded a reasonable and meaningful opportunity of being heard before an adverse decision is rendered.

14.It further transpires that no reasons have been recorded in the impugned order for declining the prayer for interim relief. The impugned order is a non-speaking order. An order having adverse consequences must disclose the reasons forming its basis, reflecting due application of mind and enabling the affected party to avail its legal remedy effectively. Section 24-A (2) of General Clauses Act, 1897, specifically imposes a statutory obligation on every authority or person, who has a power to make any order under any enactment, to act reasonable, fairly, justly and for advancement of the purposes of Mrs. Anisa Rehman v. P.I.A.C and other, 1994 SCMR 2232.

the enactment, and such person or authority should give reasons for making the order3. Section 24A, ibid, reads as follows:

“24A. Exercise of power under enactments.— (1) Where, by or under any enactment, a power to make any order or give any direction is conferred on any authority, office or person such power shall be exercised reasonably, fairly, justly and for the advancement of the purposes of the enactment.

(2)The authority, office or person making any order or issuing any direction under the powers conferred by or under any enactment shall, so far as necessary or appropriate, give reasons for making the order or, as the case may be, for issuing the direction and shall provide a copy of the order or as the case may be, the direction to the person affected prejudicially.”

[Emphasis added]

15.The legislative intent behind section 24A, ibid, is that the public functionary must decide the matters after due application of mind and pass speaking order containing reasons so that the persons adversely affected by it should know its basis. The impugned order has been arbitrarily passed by respondent No.1 in a mechanical manner without adhering to the statutory requirements of section 24-A, ibid, and therefore the same is liable to be struck down4. The mere observation that the main appeal would be scheduled in due course does not constitute a reasoned determination of the prayer for interim relief.

16.Yet, there is another aspect of this case. The Authority performs different kinds of functions and powers under the Ordinance. It performs regulatory functions and powers, when it fixes Messrs Airport Support Services v. The Airport Manager, Quaid-e-Azam International Airport, Karachi, 1998 SCMR 2268, Government of Pakistan through Director-General, Ministry of Interior, Islamabad and others v. Farheen Rashid, 2011 SCMR 1; Muhammad Amin Muhammad Bashir Limited v. Government of Pakistan and others, 2015 SCMR 630.

Khalid Humayun v. NAB through D.G. Quetta, PLD 2017 SC 194; Muhammad Amin Muhammad Bashir Limited v. Government of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Finance, Central Secretariat, Islamabad.

and regulate oil and gas tariffs under section 6 and 7 of the Ordinance or regulate the businesses of oil, gas and LPG marketing companies in accordance with applicable regulatory regime. It acts as a licensing authority, when it grants licences for different regulated activities under section 23 of the Ordinance. It performs adjudicatory functions and powers, when it decides appeals and review applications, under section 12 (1) and 13 of the Ordinance. It also performs adjudicatory functions in respect of disputes between licencees. Each function requires exercise of different powers and discretion. However, for the purposes of present controversy, the Authority was acting as an appellate forum under section 12 (1), ibid, which provides a remedy of appeal to an aggrieved person against an order or decision of a delegatee of the Authority, and the Authority, itself has been vested with a jurisdiction by law to hear and decide such appeal. In essence, the Authority has to perform this function as a quasi-judicial forum.

Recently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court5 has eloquently expounded the term ‘quasi-judicial’ in following terms:

“The term "quasi-judicial" is employed to expound and spell out the persons or authorities, though not part of judiciary but under the bounds of given powers, exercising the functions and tasks of judicial nature. Further, this term is used to describe functions of governmental officers, boards and agencies which perform functions of a judicial character, although they are not part of the judiciary. Adolph v. Elastic Stop Nut Corp. of America, 87 A.2d 736, 737, 18 N.J Super, 543. It is applied to action, discretion, etc., of public administrative officers required to investigate or ascertain existence of facts and draw conclusions therefrom as basis for official action and to exercise judicial discretion. U.S. Steel Corp. v.. Stokes, 76 S.E.2d ,474, 477, 478, 138 Government of Punjab through Secretary Schools Education Department, Lahore and others v. Abdur Rehman and others, 2022 SCMR 25

W.Va. 506. It is generally used to describe acts of public boards and municipal officers as the result of investigation and rational judgment, based upon evidentiary facts in a matter within the discretionary power of the board or officers. A "quasijudicial power" is one involving judgment and discretion and which may be conferred upon an executive or administrative board as an incident to its duties. Hoyt v. Hughes County, 142 N.W.471, 473. 32 S.D.117. Ref: Words and Phrases (Permanent edition), Volume 35A. (West Pub. Co.) In the case of Dr. Zahid Javed.Vs. Dr. Tahir Riaz Chaudhary and others. (PLD 2016 SC 637), this Court held that the word "Quasi" is defined 'as if', as though, as it were, in a manner, in a certain sense or degree, seeming, seemingly, analogous to and it may mean resemblance. The quasi-judicial power is a duty conferred by words or by implication on an officer to look into facts and to act on them in the exercise of discretion and it lies in the judgment and discretion of an officer other than a judicial officer. A quasi-judicial power is not necessarily judicial, but one in the discharge of which there is an element of judgment and discretion; more specifically, a power conferred or imposed on an officer or an authority involving the exercise of discretion, and as incidental to the administration of matters assigned or entrusted to such officer or authority.”

17.The Authority is, therefore, required to act independently and impartially with due application as a quasi-judicial appellate forum and not as a regulator. The Authority has to act reasonably, justly and fairly. The fairness and reasonableness could only be demonstrated by the Authority by providing fair opportunity of hearing to the aggrieved person, and by passing a speaking order or decision containing cogent reasons, after due application of independent mind.

Otherwise, this remedy of appeal would become illusory and defeat the purpose of enactment. This Court is of the view that the Authority has failed to perform its quasi-judicial functions and powers under section 12 (1) of the Ordinance, when it passed the impugned order

without providing any opportunity of hearing to the applicant and passed a non-speaking order.

18.For the reasons stated above, the impugned order dated 08.06.2026 is set aside. The matter is remanded to respondent No.1 to decide the applicant’s prayer for interim relief afresh, strictly in accordance with law, after affording the applicant an opportunity of hearing through a speaking and reasoned order, preferably within thirty (30) days of receipt of a certified copy of this order. Till such decision, no coercive action shall be taken against the applicant for recovery of the penalty amount pursuant to the order dated 27.03.2026. Needless to mention that respondent No.1 should strictly adhere to the provisions of section 12 (1) of the OGRA Ordinance 2002 and follow the procedure laid down in OGRA (Procedure for Appeals) Regulations, 2024.

19.This appeal is, accordingly, allowed in the above terms.

(UMAIR MAJEED MALIK)

JUDGE

Announced in open Court on /10/2026

JUDGE

APPROVED FOR REPORTING

Shafqat*/