Navidullah VS FOP though Secretary M/o Finance etc

JUDGMENT SHEET

IN THE ISLAMABAD HIGH COURT, ISLAMABAD

WRIT PETITION NO. 1302 OF 2026

Navidullah Versus Ministry of Finance through its Secretary

PRESENT: Mr. Wahid Iqbal Khattak, Advocates for Petitioner. Raja Amjad Mehmood, learned A.A.G.

Mr. Imran Ali, Section Officer, Ministry of Finance Date of Hearing: 21.09.2026

SHAHRUKH ARJUMAND, J. Through the instant constitutional petition, the petitioner [Navidullah] has sought direction to the Respondents to make payment of pension and pensionary benefits for his 30 years’ service.

2.The brief facts giving rise to the instant petition are that the petitioner was initially appointed as Grading Inspector (BS-13) in the Ministry of Food and Agriculture, Livestock Products Marketing and Grading Department, on 28.05.1995. He was subsequently confirmed as a regular employee against the said post vide Office Order dated 16.08.1997. On 15.11.2007, posts of Marketing Officer (BS-17) were advertised by the Ministry of Food and Agriculture, in the same department, namely, the Agricultural and Livestock Products Marketing and Grading Department. The petitioner, while serving as a regular employee, applied for the advertised post through proper channel. He was thereafter called for interview vide letter dated 10.04.2008, and accordingly appeared before the interview committee on 17.04.2008. The petitioner was subsequently informed, vide letter dated 07.11.2008, of his appointment as Marketing Officer (BPS-17) in the project titled “Crop Scouting and Price Monitoring of Essential Items of Daily Use by Common Man.” He accepted the offer of

appointment. Consequently, vide Office Order dated 01.01.2009, he was relieved from his parent department with immediate effect, while retaining his permanent lien therein. The proposal regarding his relieving and joining the aforesaid project was thereafter placed before the competent authority, which approved the same vide Staff Order dated 03.01.2009. The petitioner accordingly joined the project on the same date. During the course of his service as Marketing Officer, the Eighteenth Constitutional Amendment was enacted, pursuant to which, inter alia, the Ministry of Food and Agriculture was devolved. In consequence thereof, the employees of the devolved ministry were transferred/adjusted in different ministries and departments. Vide Notification dated 18.08.2011, the petitioner, along with his post and budget, was transferred to the Central Directorate of National Savings. Thereafter, vide Notification dated 19.12.2012, issued pursuant to the decision of the Cabinet Sub-Committee, the employees of the Ministry of Food and Agriculture were regularized. The petitioner was also included amongst the employees so regularized. Subsequently, the Ministry of Finance, vide Notification dated 08.04.2015, absorbed the petitioner, along with certain other employees, in the Central Directorate of National Savings. It is further the petitioner’s case that, in the year 2012, he approached the Federal Service Tribunal, Islamabad, by filing Appeal No. 354(R)CS/2012, seeking, inter alia, grant of BPS-17 as personal to him with effect from the date of his appointment. During the pendency of the said proceedings, his grievance was redressed by the department vide Notification dated 17.10.2016, whereupon the appeal was disposed of. The petitioner thereafter filed another appeal, being Appeal No. 1016(R)CS/2023, before the Federal Service Tribunal, Islamabad, seeking encadrement of the post against which he was serving as National Saving Officer (BS-17). The Tribunal, vide order dated 19.03.2024, directed respondent No.2 to encadre the petitioner’s post with effect from 16.05.2017. In compliance with the said order,

respondent No.2 issued Notification dated 09.08.2024, whereby the petitioner’s post was encadred accordingly. The petitioner states that he completed approximately thirty years of service and reached the age of superannuation on 22.04.2025. However, according to him, his retirement notification was issued subsequently on 18.06.2025. He, therefore, approached respondent No.2 through an application dated 25.06.2025, requesting correction of his service record and release of his pensionary benefits. It is his grievance that despite his repeated requests, the matter remained pending and his pensionary benefits were not released. Aggrieved by the continued withholding/non- release of his pensionary benefits, the petitioner has invoked the constitutional jurisdiction of this Court, seeking appropriate directions to the respondents for correction of his service record and release of the pensionary benefits claimed by him.

3.Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that pension is not a gratuitous payment or a concession extended by the State, but a recurring monetary benefit earned by an employee in recognition of the services rendered by him during his tenure in public service. According to learned counsel, the object of pension is to provide financial security to a retired employee during the later stage of his life when, owing to advancing age, his capacity to earn is diminished. It was, therefore, argued that withholding pensionary benefits, despite fulfillment of the requisite conditions of service, cannot be treated as a matter of administrative discretion. Learned counsel further submitted that the petitioner had entered government service on 28.05.1995 and, having served for approximately thirty years, stood entitled to consideration and release of his pensionary benefits in accordance with the applicable rules. Learned counsel placed reliance upon the case of certain similarly situated employees of the Staff Welfare Organization, Karachi, who had initially been appointed as Inspectors on ad hoc basis and whose services were subsequently the subject matter of litigation. It was submitted that, pursuant to the judgments

of the superior courts, the employees concerned were reinstated and their cases were required to be placed before the Federal Public Service Commission for regularization. Learned counsel pointed out that, in the case of one such employee, the proceedings for regularization remained pending when he attained the age of superannuation, whereafter his pensionary benefits were withheld. The matter was subsequently considered by the Federal Service Tribunal, which directed that the employee be extended benefits corresponding to those granted to his similarly placed colleagues. Learned counsel further submitted that the Federal Public Service Commission thereafter recommended processing of the employee’s case in terms of the judgment rendered by the Federal Service Tribunal in Appeal No.170(K)/CS/2019, decided on 04.06.2022, yet the pensionary benefits were not released. According to learned counsel, the said case furnished a relevant analogy for consideration of the petitioner’s claim. It was further argued that pension has a broader social and constitutional significance beyond being merely a reward for past service. Learned counsel submitted that it represents a form of economic security available to an employee after retirement and may appropriately be regarded as a deferred component of the remuneration earned through public service. On this premise, it was contended that a person who has rendered approximately thirty years of service cannot be deprived of the pensionary benefits accrued to him except strictly in accordance with law. Learned counsel also relied upon the settled jurisprudence of the superior Courts [2025 SCMR 168 & 2022 PLC (C.S.) 202] to contend that pension is a legally enforceable entitlement arising under the applicable statutory or regulatory framework and does not constitute a bounty or an act of grace on the part of the State. Lastly, learned counsel submitted that the right to livelihood has been recognized as an integral aspect of the right to life guaranteed by Article 9 of the Constitution contended that

pension, being a regular source of livelihood after retirement, carries a corresponding constitutional dimension.

4.Conversely, learned counsel for the respondents opposed the petition and submitted that the petitioner’s claim was founded upon an erroneous assumption that completion of approximately thirty years of service, by itself, conferred an unconditional entitlement to pensionary benefits. It was contended that pension is governed by the applicable statutory framework and service rules and becomes payable only upon fulfillment of the conditions prescribed thereunder. Thus, according to learned counsel, the mere fact that the petitioner had remained in service for a considerable period could not, by itself, convert every period of service rendered by him into qualifying service for pensionary purposes. He further submitted that the respondents had, in fact, taken steps to process the petitioner’s case before the Federal Public Service Commission (FPSC). In this regard, the matter was referred to the FPSC vide letter dated 03.11.2025, in the light of the instructions issued by the Establishment Division concerning regularization of the petitioner’s service, and recommendations were sought particularly because the petitioner had already attained the age of superannuation with effect from 23.04.2025, while his retirement dues remained to be finalized on account of the unresolved question of regularization of his contractual service. It was submitted that the FPSC, vide its letter dated 22.12.2025, advised that the petitioner’s case may be processed in terms of the judgment rendered by the Federal Service Tribunal in Appeal No.170(K)/CS/2019, decided on 04.06.2022. Learned counsel, however, contended that the judgment relied upon by the FPSC could not be mechanically applied to the petitioner’s case, as the factual and legal circumstances of the two cases were materially different. According to learned counsel, the employees involved in the said case had ultimately been regularized against their substantive post of Instructor (BS-16), against which one of the employees had served for a period of approximately thirty-one

years and nine months. In contrast, the petitioner herein was initially appointed as Grading Inspector (BS-13) and was subsequently selected as Marketing Officer (BS-17), the latter appointment being contractual in nature. He continued to serve in that capacity until the devolution of the Ministry of Food and Agriculture.

5.It was further submitted that, following the devolution of the parent Ministry, the petitioner was subsequently provided a channel for career progression and his post was encadred as National Saving Officer (BS-17) pursuant to the order of the Federal Service Tribunal dated 19.03.2024, with effect from 16.05.2017, vide Notification dated 09.08.2024. Learned counsel emphasized that such encadrement did not, by itself, amount to regularization of the petitioner’s earlier contractual service, nor did it retrospectively alter the legal character of the contractual appointment.

6.Learned counsel also referred to the opinion rendered by the Establishment Division on the question of counting the petitioner’s contractual service for pensionary purposes. According to the said opinion, the grant of BS-17 on a personal basis with effect from 28.05.1995 did not, by itself, convert the petitioner’s contractual service into regular service. It was therefore contended that the service rendered by the petitioner in BS-17 could not be treated as regular qualifying service for the purpose of fixation of pension unless his service was regularized strictly in accordance with the applicable recruitment rules and upon the requisite recommendation of the FPSC. As regards the petitioner’s reliance upon Article 9 of the Constitution, learned counsel submitted that, although the superior Courts have, in appropriate cases, recognized the right to livelihood as falling within the ambit of the right to life, such constitutional protection could not be invoked to create an entitlement contrary to the statutory scheme governing pension. It was therefore contended that the right to livelihood could not be construed as authorizing the grant of

pensionary benefits in respect of service which did not otherwise qualify under the applicable rules. In support of his submissions, learned counsel for the respondents placed reliance upon the judgment dated 25.03.2021 passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in C.P. No.2210-L of 2020, Province of Punjab v. Dr. Javed Iqbal, as well as the judgment dated 17.04.2019 rendered in Civil Appeals Nos.323- 325 of 2018, Director General, National Savings Central Directorate v. Muhammad Sultan.

7.I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner as well as the learned counsel for the respondents and have perused the available record with their able assistance. The submissions advanced by learned counsel for the parties have been considered in the light of the relevant documents placed on record, the applicable legal framework governing pensionary benefits and qualifying service, and the judgments relied upon by them. The principal question that requires determination is whether, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the petitioner’s service, particularly the period during which he served as Marketing Officer (BS-17), is liable to be treated as qualifying service for the purposes of pension and pensionary benefits.

8.At the first instance, this Court would examine the submission advanced by the learned A.A.G. with reference to the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Province of Punjab v. Dr. Javed Iqbal (C.P. No.2210-L of 2020, decided on 25.03.2021). Learned A.A.G., while placing reliance upon the said judgment, submitted that the Hon’ble Supreme Court has clearly delineated the legal distinction between a regular civil servant and a contractual employee, observing that the mechanism of regularization is intended to induct contractual employees into the stream of regular service and that regularization constitutes a fresh appointment into such service. It was further observed that a contractual employee does not possess a vested right

to regularization, much less a right to claim regularization from the date of his initial contractual appointment, and that the benefit of regularization ordinarily operates prospectively. The learned A.A.G. accordingly sought to invoke the said principle to contend that the petitioner’s contractual service could not, merely by reason of its duration or his subsequent placement in BS-17, be treated as regular qualifying service for pensionary purposes.

9.However, the reliance placed upon the aforesaid judgment requires examination in the context of the materially different factual circumstances obtaining in the present case. In Province of Punjab v. Dr. Javed Iqbal, the respondents had been appointed on contract basis in BS-17 in the Livestock & Dairy Development Department, Government of Punjab, during the period from 2004 to 2009. Their services were subsequently regularized by the competent authority with immediate effect vide order dated 15.02.2011. Their grievance before the Court was not that they had never been regularized, but that their regularization ought to have been given retrospective effect from the respective dates of their initial contractual appointments instead of operating from 15.02.2011. The controversy, therefore, essentially concerned the date from which an already contractual employee, subsequently regularized, could claim the status and benefits of regular service. The factual position in the present case stands on a materially different footing. The petitioner had entered government service on 28.05.1995 as Grading Inspector (BS-13) and was thereafter confirmed as a regular employee against that post vide Office Order dated 16.08.1997. Thus, prior to his subsequent appointment as Marketing Officer (BS-17), the petitioner had already acquired the status of a regular government servant. It was while holding such regular status that he applied, through proper channel, against the post of Marketing Officer advertised on 15.11.2007 and was subsequently selected and appointed to the said post in 2008. He was relieved from his parent department while retaining his

permanent lien therein and joined the project on 03.01.2009. The present case, therefore, does not concern an individual who entered government service for the first time on a contractual basis and subsequently sought retrospective regularization from the date of such contractual appointment. Rather, it concerns an employee who had already been inducted into regular government service, had acquired a confirmed status therein, and thereafter moved to another post in the course of his government service.

10.This distinction assumes particular significance while determining the legal character of the petitioner’s subsequent service. The ratio of Province of Punjab v. Dr. Javed Iqbal cannot be understood as laying down an absolute proposition that every period of service rendered by a person under a contractual appointment, irrespective of his antecedent status as a regular government servant and the circumstances in which he came to occupy the subsequent post, must necessarily be excluded from consideration for all purposes. The precise legal effect of the petitioner’s subsequent appointment as Marketing Officer (BS-17), his retention of permanent lien in the parent department, the subsequent regularization of employees pursuant to the decision of the Cabinet Sub-Committee dated 19.12.2012, his absorption in the Central Directorate of National Savings vide Notification dated 08.04.2015, and, thereafter, the encadrement of his post as National Saving Officer (BS-17) with effect from 16.05.2017, therefore, requires independent examination in the light of the relevant orders, notifications and applicable pension rules. Consequently, while the principle enunciated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court regarding the prospective nature of regularization of a purely contractual employee is well settled, its application to the petitioner’s case cannot be determined merely by characterizing his service in BS-17 as contractual. The Court must first ascertain the legal effect of the petitioner’s pre-existing regular status, the circumstances in which he was selected and transferred to the post of

Marketing Officer, the nature and effect of the subsequent regularization and absorption orders, and the legal consequences, if any, flowing from the encadrement of his post. Only thereafter can it be determined whether the disputed period is liable to be excluded from qualifying service for pensionary purposes.

11.It is an undisputed position emerging from the record that the petitioner initially entered government service on 28.05.1995 as Grading Inspector (BS-13) in the Ministry of Food and Agriculture, Livestock Products Marketing and Grading Department. His status as a regular employee was subsequently affirmed by the competent authority vide Office Order dated 16.08.1997, whereby he was confirmed against the said post with effect from the date of his initial appointment, i.e. 28.05.1995. Thus, the petitioner’s entry into government service cannot be characterized as contractual or irregular; rather, his service from 28.05.1995 stood acknowledged and protected as regular service by the department itself. Subsequently, the petitioner, while holding the status of a regular employee, applied through proper channel against the post of Marketing Officer (BS-17), which had been advertised on 15.11.2007 in the same administrative set-up. He was interviewed and was thereafter appointed as Marketing Officer (BS-17) in the project titled “Crop Scouting and Price Monitoring of Essential Items of Daily Use by Common Man”. It is true that this subsequent appointment was made on contractual basis. However, the legal character of the petitioner’s service cannot be examined by isolating this appointment from the undisputed fact that, immediately prior thereto, he was already a confirmed regular government employee. The distinction is of considerable significance because the petitioner did not enter public service for the first time through the contractual appointment in BS-17; rather, he moved from an established regular position to another position within the governmental structure while retaining his permanent lien in his parent department.

12.The subsequent course of events further assumes significance. Following the enactment of the Eighteenth Constitutional Amendment and the consequent devolution of the Ministry of Food and Agriculture, the employees and functions of the devolved Ministry were required to be adjusted in other Ministries and departments of the Federal Government. In that process, the petitioner, along with his post and budget, was transferred to the Central Directorate of National Savings vide Notification dated 18.08.2011. Thereafter, pursuant to the decision of the Cabinet Sub-Committee, a Notification dated 19.12.2012 was issued whereby the employees of the Ministry of Food and Agriculture were regularized, and the petitioner was expressly included amongst the employees so regularized. The Ministry of Finance subsequently issued Notification dated 08.04.2015, whereby the petitioner, along with other similarly placed employees, was absorbed/inducted into the Central Directorate of National Savings. It is of particular importance that none of these successive administrative actions—namely, the petitioner’s confirmation as a regular employee with effect from 28.05.1995, his inclusion in the regularization process pursuant to the Cabinet Sub- Committee’s decision dated 19.12.2012, and his subsequent absorption/induction in the Central Directorate of National Savings vide Notification dated 08.04.2015—was ever challenged by the department before any competent forum. Nor has any material been brought before this Court demonstrating that any of these orders was subsequently rescinded, recalled, set aside or declared to be without lawful authority. The petitioner was thus permitted to remain in service for years under the legal status flowing from these orders and was dealt with by the department on that basis.

13.The matter does not end there. The record further shows that, pursuant to the judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal in Appeal No.354(R)CS/2012, the petitioner was granted BS-17 on personal basis with effect from 28.05.1995 vide Notification dated 17.10.2016.

The language of the said notification is not without significance. It expressly records that the President of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan had sanctioned the grant of BS-17, as personal, to the petitioner from the date of his initial appointment as Grading Inspector, i.e. 28.05.1995, pursuant to the Finance Division’s concurrence and in compliance with the orders of the Federal Service Tribunal. The notification was therefore not an informal administrative concession or an arrangement of an ad hoc nature; it was an act undertaken pursuant to the decision of the competent constitutional and executive authorities and expressly carried retrospective effect from the petitioner’s initial date of appointment. This notification, too, was never challenged or withdrawn. The operative part of the notification is as under:- “In pursuance of Finance Division's OM. No.9(12)R- /2013-295/2016 dated 05-05-2016, I am directed to convey sanction of the President of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan to the grant of BS-17 (As personal) to M/S Naveed Ullah & Muhammad Ayub, Grading Inspectors (BS-13) working in this Directorate, holding BSC (Hons.) Agriculture from the date of their initial appointment as Grading Inspectors i.e. 28-05-1995 & 01-01-1995 respectively, and obtaining degree of BSC (Hons.) in Agriculture after six years post Matric Study, without arrears, in compliance with orders of Federal Service Tribunal (FST) dated 29.05.2012 in appeal No. 354 & 356(R )CS/2012 Misc. No.204 & 205/2016.

2- The expenditure involved will be debitable to the head of accounts A-01-Employees Related Expenses for the financial year 2016-17 under Demand No.032(FC21NO1) National Savings,

3- This issues under the delegated power to the ministries/Division/Attached Department vide Finance Division's O.M. No.F.3(2)Exp.IIl/2006 dated 13-09-2006 and with the concurrence of Finance Division's O.M. No.9(12)R-112013-295/2016 dated 05-05-2016.”

14.The cumulative effect of these undisputed orders and notifications cannot be ignored while determining the petitioner’s claim for pensionary benefits. The respondents, over a period extending for several decades, successively recognized the petitioner’s service, first as regular from 28.05.1995, thereafter included him in

the regularization undertaken pursuant to the decision of the Cabinet Sub-Committee, subsequently absorbed him into the Central Directorate of National Savings, and finally granted him BS-17 on personal basis with retrospective effect from 28.05.1995. Having permitted the petitioner to continue in service under this legal and administrative framework until his superannuation, the respondents cannot, at the stage of settlement of his retirement dues, simply disregard the legal consequences of their own orders and revert to an earlier characterization of his service without first demonstrating the lawful rescission, invalidation or supersession of those orders.

15.This aspect assumes even greater significance in view of the fact that the petitioner has already attained the age of superannuation and has rendered approximately thirty years of service. The question before the Court, therefore, is not whether a purely contractual employee can, as a matter of right, demand retrospective regularization from the date of his initial contractual appointment. That proposition, as discussed above, may be well settled. The question here is materially different: whether an employee who was initially a confirmed regular government servant, whose service was subsequently dealt with under a Government-wide process arising out of devolution under the Eighteenth Constitutional Amendment, who was thereafter expressly included in the regularization process, subsequently absorbed into another Federal Government department, and whose BS-17 status was retrospectively sanctioned from the date of his initial appointment, can, after retirement, be denied pensionary benefits merely by resurrecting the characterization of one intervening appointment as contractual, without addressing the legal effect of the subsequent orders of the competent authorities. The respondents’ own reliance upon the judgment dated 17.04.2019 rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Director General, National Savings Central Directorate v. Muhammad Sultan and others makes this aspect particularly relevant. It is correct that the controversy in that case

principally concerned the claim of the respondents therein for up- gradation of their posts from Marketing Officer (BS-17) to BS-18 and, therefore, the precise relief sought therein was different from the pensionary relief claimed in the present petition. The factual distinction, however, does not render the judgment irrelevant. The judgment directly considered the legal effect of the Notification dated 08.04.2015 whereby employees affected by the devolution of Ministries pursuant to the Eighteenth Constitutional Amendment were absorbed/inducted into Government service. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, after examining the contention that the absorption was inconsistent with the legal requirements governing regular induction into government service, expressly declined to permit the departmental authorities to reverse the effect of the Notification dated 08.04.2015. In paragraph 8 of the judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that the said notification could not be reversed by the appellant-department merely by referring to the legal requisites for absorption into regular government service identified in Ali Azhar Khan Baloch case. The Hon’ble Supreme Court further distinguished the circumstances considered in that earlier case and noted that the case before it involved employees rendered surplus as a consequence of the Eighteenth Constitutional Amendment, whose absorption had been granted by the highest executive authority pursuant to the recommendations of the Cabinet Sub-Committee. Significantly, the Court also did not observe that the vires of the Cabinet Sub- Committee’s recommendation was under challenge nor was it appropriate to reopen a question which could expose the affected employees to discriminatory treatment vis-à-vis hundreds of similarly placed employees of the Federal Government. The relevant para of the Judgment ibid is reproduced as under:-

“7. Learned counsel for the respondents submits that the letter dated 08.04.2015 permanently absorbing the respondents into Government service is issued under the recommendations of the Cabinet sub-Committee which enjoys sanctity. By that letter the respondents

have been conferred the status of a civil servant which, under section 9 of the Act, includes the entitlement to be considered for promotion and therefore, the right to have a promotion channel available. Accordingly, the direction given by the learned Tribunal is perfectly in order. He has opposed the appellant's submissions based upon section 11-B of the Act on the ground that under a consistent policy the Federal Government has in hundreds of cases given the status and rights of a Civil Servant, to officers who were previously employed in devolved Ministries.

8.We agree with the learned counsel for the respondents that the letter dated 08.04.2015 cannot be reversed by the appellant-department by referring to the legal requisites for absorption into regular government service identified in our judgment given in the Ali Azhar Khan Baloch case (supra). That judgment considers the question in a different scenario. It does not adjudicate the vires of absorption in government service of persons whose services were rendered surplus on account of the 18th Constitutional Amendment. Such relief was granted by the highest executive authority to hundreds of government employees affected by the new Constitutional dispensation. Neither the vires of the recommendation made by the Cabinet sub-Committee were under challenge before the learned FST nor should this Court enter a controversy that may potentially expose the respondents to discriminatory treatment vis-à-vis hundreds of other similarly placed employees of the Federal Government.”

16.The aforesaid pronouncement carries considerable weight in the present controversy. Although the Supreme Court was not determining the petitioner’s pensionary entitlement in Muhammad Sultan, it nevertheless examined and upheld the legal efficacy of the very Notification dated 08.04.2015 which forms part of the petitioner’s service history. The respondents cannot, therefore, rely upon one aspect of the petitioner’s history to characterize his service as contractual while, at the same time, disregarding the subsequent governmental acts by which his status was recognized and his service was absorbed within the Federal Government structure. Once the competent authority, pursuant to the policy and recommendations applicable to employees affected by devolution, issued an order of absorption/induction and the same was thereafter judicially examined by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, its legal effect cannot be brushed

aside at the stage of determination of retirement benefits without addressing the binding consequences of that order.

17.On the other hand, the august Supreme Court in Judgment reported as 2025 SCMR 168, particularly paragraphs 13 and 14 thereof, while interpreting Article 371-A of the Civil Service Regulations, reiterated the principles enunciated in Chairman, Pakistan Railway, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad and others v. Shah Jehan Shah (PLD 2016 SC 534) and Ministry of Finance through Secretary and others v. Syed Afroz Akhtar Rizvi and others (2021 SCMR 1546). There can be no cavil with the proposition that contractual or temporary service cannot, by itself, be aggregated with regular service for the purpose of satisfying the minimum qualifying period prescribed for pension, and that Article 371-A does not dispense with the requirement of qualifying service.

“13. In the case of Chairman, Pakistan Railway, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad and others v. Shah Jehan Shah (PLD 2016 Supreme Court 534) this court has interpreted Article 371-A of the CSR and observed as follows:-

“6......However, it is important to note that Article 371-A presupposes that such a government servant, whether falling under clause (i) or (ii), is otherwise entitled to pension (or gratuity, as the case may be). In other words, Article 371-A cannot be used as a tool to bypass the conditions for qualifying service of pensionary benefits, and such government servant has to fulfill the minimum number of years for grant of pension. This is due to the use of the word "count" as opposed to "qualify" or "eligible", as rightly argued by the learned counsel for the appellant. As per the settled rules of interpretation, when a word has not been defined in the statute, the ordinary dictionary meaning is to be looked at. Chambers 21st Dictionary defines "count" as "to find the total amount of (items), by adding up item by item; to include". Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Current English (7th Ed.) defines "count" as "to calculate the total number, of people, things, etc. in a particular group; in include sb/sth when you calculate a total; to consider sb/sth in a particular way; to be considered in a particular way". Thus in light of the above, service rendered for more than five years as contemplated by Article 371-A would only be added, included, or taken into account for the purposes of pensionary benefits, and not make such government servant

qualify for pension per se. This interpretation is bolstered by logic, reason and common sense. ..."

14.This decision was affirmed in the case of Ministry of Finance through Secretary and others v. Syed Afroz Akhtar Rizvi and others (2021 SCMR 1546) wherein it has been observed that:-

“6. .... An analysis of the said provisions and judgments of this Court more specifically a relatively recent judgment of this Court in Shah Jahan Shah's case shows that the following general principles apply to employees who have worked against contractual posts which were subsequently converted into regular posts for the purpose of grant and calculation of pension:

I, an employee who was employed on contractual basis and is subsequently regularized may be entitled to pensionary benefits provided;

i)he is eligible for pension having served for the qualifying period (10 years) as a regular employee.

ii)for the purpose of calculating pensionary benefits his service as a contractual employee can be factored in to provide him any financial benefit that may be due to him.

iii)the period spent in employment as a contractual employee and as a regular employee cannot be aggregated in order to determine his eligibility for entitlement to pension.

iv)eligibility to receive pension is directly related to rendering qualifying service as a regular employee. Unless an employee has performed services in a regular appointment for the duration of the qualifying period (10 years), he is not entitled to receive pension".

Thus, the law is clear that the contractual period, being temporary service, is recognized by Article 371-A of the CSR for inclusion in the calculation of pension provided that the contractual period is followed by regularization or confirmation without any gap or interruption, in accordance with clause (ii) of Article 371-A of the CSR. Therefore, Federal Service Tribunal has rightly allowed the appeal of the respondent.”

18.It is also noteworthy that the respondents have not asserted that the petitioner obtained any of the aforesaid benefits through fraud, misrepresentation, concealment or any other unlawful means. Nor has any competent authority, so far as the record before this Court

discloses, annulled the orders whereby his service was confirmed, regularized, absorbed or his BS-17 status was recognized. In such circumstances, an administrative authority cannot, at the point of retirement, selectively disregard its own concluded orders merely because their implementation has subsequently become financially consequential in the form of pensionary benefits. Administrative consistency, finality of governmental decisions and fairness in the treatment of an employee who has structured his entire career upon the basis of such official determinations assume particular importance in a matter concerning retirement benefits.

19.There is yet another aspect of the matter which cannot be lost sight of. Throughout the petitioner’s service career, the benefits and status conferred upon him by the competent authorities were never questioned, withdrawn or challenged by the department before any competent forum. His initial appointment as Grading Inspector (BS-

13)was not only accepted but his service was confirmed with effect from 28.05.1995. Thereafter, when he was selected as Marketing Officer (BS-17), the process was undertaken by the department itself. The post was advertised by the competent governmental authority; the petitioner applied through proper channel; he was called for interview by the departmental authorities; he appeared before the interview committee; and, upon completion of the process, he was offered appointment, which he accepted. He was thereafter formally relieved from his parent department while retaining his permanent lien and was permitted to join the project. At no stage during the ensuing years did the department raise an objection that the petitioner had secured the appointment through misrepresentation, that he was ineligible for consideration, that the post was required to be filled exclusively through the Federal Public Service Commission, or that his appointment was void for want of any prescribed procedure attributable to the petitioner.

20.The circumstances raise a fundamental question: if, according to the respondents, the post of Marketing Officer (BS-17) was required to be advertised and filled through the Federal Public Service Commission, who was responsible for initiating and completing that recruitment process? Was it the petitioner, an employee seeking consideration for a post advertised by the Government, or was it the department which created, sanctioned and advertised the vacancy and thereafter conducted the selection process? The answer is self-evident. The petitioner neither possessed the authority to prescribe the method of recruitment nor could he himself refer his candidature to the Federal Public Service Commission. He could only respond to a vacancy advertised by the competent authority in accordance with the procedure prescribed by that authority. Having applied through proper channel, appeared before the departmental interview committee and accepted the appointment offered to him by the competent authority, the petitioner cannot, after nearly two decades, be made to bear the consequences of an alleged procedural omission in the recruitment process which was entirely within the domain and control of the appointing department. The Court is particularly concerned with the timing at which this objection has been raised. The petitioner’s appointment as Marketing Officer was made in 2008. He continued to serve under the authority and supervision of the Government for many years thereafter. During this entire period, the department had full knowledge of the manner in which his appointment had been made. Yet no objection on the ground presently being advanced was raised against his appointment, nor was any action taken to annul, recall or otherwise question the appointment on that basis. On the contrary, the petitioner was successively granted benefits and a status which necessarily proceeded on the premise that his service was recognized by the competent authorities. It is only when the petitioner reached the age of superannuation and sought the consequential fruits of his long service in the form of pensionary benefits that the department has

sought to reopen the matter by contending that his appointment to BS- 17 in 2008 had not been made through the FPSC. Such an approach calls for careful judicial scrutiny. The Court is not dealing here with a case where an employee concealed his qualifications, procured appointment through fraud or misrepresentation, or entered government service without any lawful process whatsoever. The petitioner’s case, as borne out by the record, is that a vacancy was advertised by the Government; he applied through proper channel, was subjected to an interview by the departmental authorities, was selected and was thereafter formally offered appointment by the competent authority. If any question existed as to whether the vacancy was required to be routed through the FPSC, that was a matter concerning the legality and regularity of the recruitment process to be ensured by the appointing authority at the time of making the appointment. It was not a statutory function of the petitioner to determine whether the Government had selected the correct recruiting agency or to compel the department to refer the vacancy to the FPSC.

21.There is also a temporal dimension which cannot be overlooked. The appointment in question was made in 2008, whereas the legal pronouncement upon which the department now seeks to rely, or the subsequent interpretation on which it has founded its objection, came much later. A legal principle subsequently articulated by a superior Court may, of course, have retrospective operation where the law so requires; however, such subsequent pronouncement cannot mechanically be employed to place the entire burden of an alleged historical recruitment defect upon an employee who acted in accordance with the procedure prescribed and controlled by the Government at the relevant time. More importantly, the respondents must first demonstrate that the subsequent judgment actually renders the petitioner’s appointment void or disentitles him from pensionary benefits notwithstanding the subsequent regularization, absorption and other orders passed by the competent authorities. Mere reliance upon

a later judgment, without examining its factual and legal context and its effect upon the petitioner’s already settled service status, is insufficient. The Court is therefore unable to accept, at this stage, the proposition that the respondents can withhold the petitioner’s pensionary benefits simply by pointing out that his appointment as Marketing Officer (BS-17) in 2008 was not routed through the FPSC. If the FPSC was the competent recruiting agency for the post, the responsibility to advertise the vacancy through that forum and to complete the prescribed recruitment process rested upon the competent governmental authority. The petitioner neither created the vacancy nor determined its recruitment channel. He merely responded to the advertisement issued by the Government, applied through the prescribed departmental channel, appeared before the interview committee and accepted the appointment offered to him. Thereafter, the Government itself repeatedly acted upon and recognized his service for years.

22.In these circumstances, the objection regarding non-routing of the petitioner’s appointment through the FPSC, raised for the first time at the stage of settlement of his post-retirement benefits, cannot be treated as self-executing. Before denying the petitioner pensionary benefits on that ground, the respondents were required to identify the precise statutory provision which rendered his appointment void or otherwise incapable of counting for pension, explain the legal effect of the subsequent regularization and absorption orders, and demonstrate how those orders could lawfully be ignored notwithstanding their continued validity. In the absence of such determination, the department cannot simply rely upon the passage of time to its advantage while placing the entire consequence of an alleged recruitment irregularity upon the employee who, throughout, acted upon the official process devised and administered by the Government itself.

23.Pensionary benefits, in the context of public service, cannot be regarded as a mere gratuitous concession or an ex gratia payment dependent upon the continuing discretion of the employer. They constitute a post-retirement consequence of qualifying service and are intended to provide financial security to a government servant after he ceases to draw salary upon superannuation. The significance of such benefit becomes particularly evident at the stage of life when an employee, after having devoted several decades to public service, ordinarily possesses diminished capacity to undertake further regular employment and has correspondingly limited opportunities to establish an alternative source of livelihood. Advancing age may also bring with it increased medical and other unavoidable expenses, while the ordinary familial responsibilities of the employee do not necessarily come to an end with retirement. The pensionary benefit thus serves the legitimate purpose of ensuring continuity of financial support after cessation of salary and enabling the retired employee to maintain himself and discharge his continuing responsibilities with dignity. The State, having prescribed a pensionary regime for its employees, is required to administer that regime in accordance with law and with due regard to the service actually rendered by the employee. Pension is, therefore, not properly viewed as a bounty bestowed upon a retired employee out of governmental grace; rather, once the statutory and regulatory conditions governing its accrual are satisfied, it becomes a legally regulated benefit arising from the employee’s qualifying service. The underlying rationale is that the employee, during his active service, renders his services to the State on the legitimate understanding that the incidents and benefits attached to such service, including those accruing upon retirement, will be determined and extended in accordance with the governing law. Consequently, while the entitlement to pension must necessarily remain subject to the applicable statutory conditions and the requirement of qualifying service, the determination and release of

such benefit cannot be postponed or withheld arbitrarily, particularly after the employee has attained superannuation and ceased to have the regular salary which constituted his principal source of livelihood during active service. The nature and legal character of pensionary benefits have also been authoritatively explained by the august Supreme Court in 2025 SCMR 168 wherein it is observed that pension is a deferred part of the pay of an employee, earned through the service rendered during his active years and deferred for payment during his old age to meet his post-retirement needs. The Court further reiterated that pensionary benefits are neither a bounty nor a concession, and that where such benefits are payable periodically, a grievance relating thereto gives rise to a recurring cause of action. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in 2025 SCMR 168 clearly held that:- “10. Though it has been repeatedly held by this Court that pension is in fact a deferred part of the pay of an employee while he was putting his best efforts in rendering service to his employer during his hay days and this part is deferred to be paid to him periodically or otherwise to meet his old age needs as such pensionary benefits were neither a bounty nor a concession from any one and in the latter case are paid month wise and therefore, grievance in respect thereof provides a recurring cause, consequently, the limitation could not come in the way of such relief. Reference can readily be made to the case of Chief Executive Progressive Paper Ltd./The Chairman National Press Trust, Islamabad v. Sh. Abdul Majeed (2005 PLC (C.S.) 1439). However, in our opinion, where such pensionary benefit is altered or interpreted to the disadvantage of a civil servant or his pension is reduced or his maximum pension is withheld including an additional pension admissible to him under the rules then his grievance to that extent has to be regulated in terms of Rule 4(1) of the Civil Servant (Appeal) Rules, 1977.”

11.Moreover, in the case of Umar Baz Khan v.

Jehanzeb (PLD 2013 SC 268) it has been observed that the bar of laches cannot be overemphasized in the cases where the relief claimed is based on a recurring cause of action and that no court could dismiss a lis on account of laches if such a decision would perpetuate injustice.”

24.In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court is of the considered view that the respondents have failed to establish any lawful basis for withholding the petitioner’s pensionary benefits.

Accordingly, the instant constitutional petition is ALLOWED. The respondents are directed to finalize the petitioner’s pension case and release all pensionary and retirement benefits to which he is entitled under the applicable pension rules, after taking into consideration the petitioner’s entire service record, including the orders of confirmation, regularization, absorption/induction, grant of BS-17 with effect from 28.05.1995 and subsequent encadrement. The entire exercise shall be completed within thirty days from receipt of a certified copy of this judgment, and the pensionary benefits found payable shall thereafter be released to the petitioner without further avoidable delay. Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of accordingly.

(SHAHRUKH ARJUMAND)

JUDGE

Approved For Reporting.

Farid ur Rehman.