Azizullah Chandio VS FOP etc.

JUDGMENT SHEET

ISLAMABAD HIGH COURT, ISLAMABAD

JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

Writ Petition No.1424 of 2026

Aziz Ullah Chandio

Versus

Federation of Pakistan and others

Petitioner by: Barrister Ali Hamza Malik and Raja Tanveer Hussain, Advocates.

Respondents No.1&2 by: Mian Muhammad Faisal Irfan, Deputy Attorney General.

Respondent No.3 by: Mr. Noor Zaman, Advocate.

Date of Hearing: 09.09.2026.

INAAM AMEEN MINHAS, J. Through the instant writ petition, the petitioner seeks declaration of his deferment as illegal and setting aside of the letter dated 19.03.2026 (communication of reasons for deferment) as well as the notification dated 19.03.2026, whereby respondent No.3 was promoted to the post of Director (BS-19).

2.Brief facts are that the petitioner was appointed as Deputy Director (BS-18) in the Ministry of Climate Change through FPSC on 28.04.2011. On 26.08.2013, he was sent on deputation to NAVTTC, where he served until September, 2020 and thereafter rejoined his parent Ministry. On 15.10.2020, his services were again placed at the disposal of NAVTTC under Section 10 of the Civil Servants Act, 1973, and he returned to the Ministry in February 2023. He was again deputed to NAVTTC for three years on 08.05.2023 and finally rejoined the Ministry of Climate Change on 17.02.2026. Being eligible for promotion from Deputy Director (BS-18) to Director (BS-19) under the Civil Servants Promotion (BPS-18 to BPS-21) Rules, 2019 (“Promotion Rules, 2019”), the petitioner was considered by the Departmental Selection Board against the available vacant post along with respondent No. 3, who was about one year junior to him. However, the

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DSB deferred the petitioner’s promotion under Rule 7(d) on the ground that he lacked working experience in his cadre and recommended respondent No. 3 for promotion. Consequently, vide impugned letter dated 19.03.2026, the petitioner was deferred while vide notification dated 19.03.2026 respondent No. 3 was promoted to Director (Environmental Policy), BS-19, hence, this writ petition.

3.The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the petitioner’s deferment under Rule 7(d) of the Promotion Rules, 2019 is unlawful, as the impugned letter merely states that he lacks working experience in his cadre without identifying any deficiency under the specific attributes prescribed in Schedule IV; that the DSB also failed to give proper reasons as required by Rule 23 of the Promotion Rules, 2019 and Section 24-A of the General Clauses Act, 1897; that service of the petitioner in NAVTTC, including performance of duties against a BS-20 position and work on climate resilience, renewable energy and environmental sustainability, constituted relevant and varied experience and could not reasonably be treated as a disqualification; that “Variety and Relevance of Experience” carries only 3 out of 30 marks under Schedule IV and, even if those marks were excluded, even then the petitioner would still fall within Category-A under Rule 18(3); that PERs/ACRs of the petitioner throughout his service, including during deputation, were available and satisfactory; therefore, there was no valid basis to defer his case merely for further observation of his performance; that the competent authority also posted him to NAVTTC under Section 10 of the Civil Servants Act, 1973, and compliance with such official orders could not subsequently be used to prejudice his promotion; that only one BS-19 vacancy was available and has been filled by his junior, respondent No. 3, the deferment has substantially affected the petitioner’s future promotion prospects; that the DSB failed to consider case of the petitioner in accordance with the prescribed criteria and that the impugned action of his deferment is arbitrary, without proper reasoning and contrary to his constitutional and statutory rights.

4.On the other hand, the learned counsel for respondent No.3 contended that the instant writ petition concerns the terms and conditions of the

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petitioner’s service and is therefore barred under Article 212 of the Constitution, as the proper remedy lies before the Federal Service Tribunal. It was further submitted that the petitioner was appointed as Deputy Director (BS-18) on 28.04.2011 but remained mostly on deputation with NAVTTC from 2013 to February, 2026; that despite repeated directions, he failed to rejoin his parent Ministry in a timely manner and, during about 15 years of service, served there for only about two years and seven months, therefore, the DSB found that he lacked sufficient working experience in his own cadre; that promotion of the petitioner was deferred for one year under Rule 7(d) of the Promotion Rules, 2019.

5.I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and carefully examined the record with their able assistance.

6.As per the record and contention of the parties, after carefully examining the available record as well as the relevant provisions of the Civil Servants Act, 1973 and the Promotion Rules, 2019, the principal question requiring determination is whether the DSB after considering the petitioner for promotion from BS-18 to BS-19, was justified in deferring his case under Rule 7(d) merely on the ground that he “lacks working experience in his cadre”, particularly when substantial periods of his service outside the parent Ministry were spent pursuant to orders of the competent authority.

7.Before examining the merits, the preliminary objection regarding maintainability raised by the learned counsel for respondent No.3 requires consideration. The learned counsel for respondent No.3 argued that the controversy relates to the terms and conditions of service and, therefore, under Article 212 of the Constitution, the petitioner’s remedy lies before the Federal Service Tribunal. There can be no disagreement with the settled proposition that matters falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of a Service Tribunal cannot ordinarily be examined by this Court in exercise of constitutional jurisdiction. However, the present case does not involve a simple claim by the petitioner that he has an absolute or vested right to promotion. Rather, he has questioned the legality of the process through which his fitness for promotion was considered and deferred by the DSB on

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a ground which, according to him, is not supported by the governing statutory rules. The grievance, therefore, essentially relates to the legality of the determination of his fitness and suitability for promotion. In these circumstances, the objection to maintainability, in the peculiar facts of the present case, does not persuade this Court to non-suit the petitioner without examining whether the statutory authority exercised its discretion within the limits prescribed by law.

8.It is an established principle of service law that a civil servant has no vested right to promotion merely because he is senior or has completed the prescribed length of service. Promotion depends upon eligibility, fitness, suitability, availability of vacancy and fulfilment of the criteria prescribed under the relevant law. Nevertheless, an eligible civil servant undoubtedly possesses a right to be fairly, meaningfully and lawfully considered for promotion. Once his case is placed before the competent DSB, such consideration cannot be an empty formality. The Board must assess his case strictly in accordance with the Civil Servants Act, 1973, the applicable recruitment rules, and the Promotion Rules, 2019.

9.In the present case, it is not disputed that the petitioner was appointed as Deputy Director (BS-18) through FPSC on 28.04.2011 and was within the zone of consideration for promotion to Director (BS-19). His case was accordingly placed before the DSB along with that of respondent No. 3, who was approximately one year junior to him. It is also not disputed that the DSB did not declare the petitioner unfit for promotion on account of an adverse PER/ACR, disciplinary punishment, lack of mandatory training, deficiency in prescribed length of service, or any other clearly identified statutory disqualification. Instead, his case was deferred for one year under Rule 7(d) on the ground that he “lacks working experience in his cadre”.

10.The validity of this reason has to be examined in the context of the petitioner’s service history. The record shows that the petitioner was initially sent to NAVTTC on deputation on 26.08.2013. After returning to his parent Ministry in September 2020, his services were again placed at the disposal of NAVTTC on 15.10.2020 under Section 10 of the Civil Servants Act,

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1973. He returned to the Ministry in February 2023 but was again deputed to NAVTTC for three years on 08.05.2023 and finally rejoined his parent Ministry on 17.02.2026. Thus, there is no dispute that the petitioner spent a substantial part of his service outside his parent Ministry. However, the important question is not simply how much time he spent in the parent Ministry, but whether the law makes such physical service in the parent department an independent condition for promotion to BS-19.

11.The learned Deputy Attorney General as well as the learned counsel for respondent No.3 have not been able to point out any provision of the Civil Servants Act, 1973 or the Promotion Rules, 2019 which provides that an otherwise eligible officer must be deferred merely because he has served for a lesser period in his parent Ministry due to deputation. If a particular recruitment rule governing the post requires a specified period of experience in a particular cadre as an essential qualification, such requirement must undoubtedly be satisfied. However, a general observation that an officer “lacks working experience in his cadre”, without connecting that conclusion with a particular statutory requirement or prescribed assessment criterion, cannot by itself become an additional condition for promotion.

12.This aspect is more important because the petitioner’s postings outside the Ministry were not wholly independent acts undertaken outside the service structure. His services were repeatedly placed at the disposal of NAVTTC through orders issued or approved by the competent authorities, including his placement under Section 10 of the Civil Servants Act, 1973. A civil servant is ordinarily required to comply with lawful posting and transfer orders issued by the competent authority. Once the State exercises its statutory power and places an officer at the disposal of another department or organization, the mere fact that the officer consequently spent less time in his parent department cannot subsequently be converted into a disadvantage in promotion unless the applicable law specifically attaches such consequence to it.

13.In other words, an officer cannot be sent or permitted to serve elsewhere by the competent authority and thereafter be told, at the stage of

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promotion, that the very service rendered pursuant to those arrangements has deprived him of sufficient experience merely because it was not performed within his parent Ministry. Such an approach would be unreasonable unless the applicable recruitment or promotion rules expressly require it. The Government cannot create a service situation through its own administrative orders and thereafter use the natural consequence of those orders as an independent disqualification against the civil servant.

14.The learned counsel for respondent No.3 strongly relied upon the fact that during approximately fifteen years of service, the petitioner served in the parent Ministry for only about two years and seven months. This fact may form part of his overall service profile and may be examined to the extent permitted by the relevant rules, but the length of his stay outside the Ministry cannot, by itself, substitute the statutory criteria governing promotion. The DSB was required to examine what experience the petitioner actually acquired during his service, its variety and relevance, his performance record, professional competence, training and all other factors prescribed under the Rules. The question before the DSB was not merely where the petitioner served, but whether the service rendered by him demonstrated the requisite fitness and suitability for promotion to BS-19.

15.This Court does not intend to determine the comparative value of these achievements or to substitute its own assessment for that of the DSB. That function belongs exclusively to the competent departmental forum. However, these aspects formed part of the petitioner’s service profile and had to be considered under the prescribed criteria, rather than treating the mere fact of deputation as a negative factor.

16.Schedule IV of the Promotion Rules, 2019 assumes significance in this regard. The learned counsel for the petitioner has correctly pointed out that the prescribed objective assessment includes “Variety and Relevance of Experience”. Thus, the Rules contemplate an assessment of the nature and relevance of the officer’s experience, not merely the department or office in which that experience was acquired. If the DSB considered the petitioner’s experience deficient, it was required to assess that deficiency against the

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prescribed attributes and assign it the consequence provided by the Rules. A general statement that the petitioner lacked cadre experience, without explaining which prescribed attribute remained unsatisfied and why his extensive service record was insufficient for assessment, does not demonstrate meaningful application of mind.

17.There is another important aspect. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, “Variety and Relevance of Experience” carries only three marks out of the total thirty marks prescribed under Schedule IV and that even if the petitioner was denied the entire three marks under this head, even then he would still fall within Category-A under Rule 18(3). This contention cannot be ignored. If the Rules prescribe marks for different attributes, the DSB must apply that framework. An attribute to which the Rules assign a limited weight cannot ordinarily be transformed into an absolute disqualification unless some other provision of law expressly permits such consequence. Doing so would effectively alter the statutory scheme through an administrative decision.

18.Rule 7(d), under which the petitioner was deferred, also requires careful application. Deferment under the said provision is connected with the need to further watch the performance of an officer for a reason to be recorded in writing. Therefore, the reason must rationally connect to the need to further observe the officer’s performance. In the present case, the petitioner’s PERs/ACRs were admittedly maintained by the Ministry and were available for consideration. The learned counsel for the petitioner also contended that the petitioner continued earning PERs during his deputation and that his reports were satisfactory. The learned Deputy Attorney General and the learned counsel for respondent No.3 have not demonstrated that his PERs were unavailable or that his performance could not be assessed from the existing service record. In such circumstances, merely stating that he lacked working experience in his cadre does not adequately explain why his performance needed to be further watched for another year.

19.Rule 23 of the Promotion Rules, 2019, which requires communication of the reason for deferment, cannot be understood as permitting the authority

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merely to reproduce a general conclusion. A reason must disclose why the particular statutory power has been exercised against the officer. Likewise, the requirement of a reasoned administrative decision embodied in Section 24-A of the General Clauses Act, 1897 is intended to ensure that statutory discretion is exercised upon relevant material and for reasons having a nexus with the law governing the matter. The expression “lacks working experience in his cadre”, without identifying the relevant statutory deficiency or explaining its effect upon the prescribed promotion criteria, falls short of this requirement in the peculiar circumstances of the present case.

20.The learned counsel for respondent No.3 has also referred to various occasions when the petitioner allegedly failed to immediately rejoin his parent Ministry despite directions issued by the competent authority. Such allegations cannot improve the legal basis of the impugned deferment. If the petitioner disobeyed any lawful order or overstayed his deputation without lawful authority, the department was competent to take appropriate action against him under the applicable disciplinary law. However, unless such conduct resulted in a legally recognized adverse consequence relevant to promotion, it could not simply be converted into an undefined deficiency of “cadre experience”. Promotion proceedings cannot substitute for disciplinary proceedings.

21.It is equally important to keep within the limits of constitutional judicial review. This Court does not sit as a Departmental Selection Board and cannot itself determine whether the petitioner is more suitable for promotion than respondent No. 3. Nor does seniority by itself confer an automatic right to promotion. The assessment of comparative merit, fitness and suitability remains within the lawful domain of the DSB. Nevertheless, where the Board bases deferment on a consideration that does not constitute an independent statutory ground and fails to assess the officer as prescribed by the Rules, constitutional review is attracted to correct the defect in the decision-making process.

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22.In the present case, the material before this Court shows that the petitioner was eligible and was actually considered for promotion. However, instead of assessing his complete service profile according to the criteria prescribed under the Promotion Rules, 2019, the authorities deferred his case essentially because he had remained on deputation for substantial periods and consequently spent comparatively less time in the parent Ministry. Such a ground, standing alone, is alien to the statutory criteria unless it is shown to correspond with a specific requirement of the applicable recruitment rules. No such statutory requirement has been satisfactorily demonstrated before this Court.

23.The position which emerges from the above discussion is that the petitioner’s repeated deputations and the comparatively shorter period spent by him in his parent Ministry could not, by themselves, constitute a lawful ground for deferment under Rule 7(d). Once the petitioner became eligible and his case was placed before the DSB, the Board had to consider his fitness and suitability under the Civil Servants Act, 1973, the Promotion Rules, 2019, Schedule IV, and the applicable recruitment rules. The DSB could not substitute those prescribed criteria with a general requirement of prolonged physical service in the parent cadre, which the governing law does not show exists.

24.It is also pertinent to observe that a similar matter has already been decided by this Court vide judgment dated 13.07.2021 in a reported matter (Yet not published) i.e. Writ Petition No.1702 of 2021, titled “Abdul Majid Yousafani vs. Establishment Division through its Secretary, etc.” In that case, this Court examined the scope of the statutory framework governing the consideration of civil servants for promotion and the legality of deferment by the competent Departmental Selection Board. The principle emerging therefrom is that once a civil servant becomes eligible and falls within the zone of consideration for promotion, his case must be considered strictly in accordance with the criteria prescribed under the applicable Civil Servants Promotion Rules. The DSB cannot defer an officer on the basis of a general or extraneous consideration, which does not correspond with the statutory criteria governing assessment of fitness and suitability. The

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reasoning adopted therein applies with equal force to the present case, where the petitioner has been deferred merely because he remained on deputation for substantial periods and consequently spent less time in his parent Ministry. Unless such circumstance is shown to constitute a specific disqualification or deficiency under the applicable Rules, it cannot independently furnish a lawful basis for deferment. Thus, the impugned deferment is also inconsistent with the principle already recognized by this Court in the aforesaid judgment.

25.For the foregoing reasons, the instant constitutional petition is partially allowed. The impugned deferment letter dated 19.03.2026 is hereby set aside. The competent authority/Departmental Selection Board is directed to reconsider the petitioner’s case for promotion afresh, strictly in accordance with the Civil Servants Act, 1973, the Civil Servants Promotion (BPS-18 to BPS-21) Rules, 2019, Schedule IV and the applicable recruitment rules, after taking into consideration his complete service record, PERs/ACRs, training and the variety and relevance of the experience gained by him, including during his service on deputation.

(INAAM AMEEN MINHAS)

JUDGE

Announced in open Court on 16.09.2026.

JUDGE

APPROVED FOR REPORTING.

R. Anjam.