Muhammad Mohsin Javed vs The Learnd Asj East Isb

JUDGMENT SHEET

IN THE ISLAMABAD HIGH COURT, ISLAMABAD

(JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT)

W.P. No. 4117 of 2026

Muhammad Mohsin Javed Vs.

The learned Additional Sessions Judge-V, Ex-Officio Justice of Peace, and 3 others.

Petitioner by : Mr. Majid Ahmed Abbasi Advocate

Respondents by : Ch. Zubair Ahmed Jatria, State Counsel. Mr. Shahzad SI, P.S. Koral.

Date of Hearing : 03-9-2026.

SHAHRUKH ARJUMAND, J.-

1.The petitioner [Muhammad Mohsin Javed] has assailed order dated 28.07.2026 (“Impugned Order”) passed by respondent No.1 [the learned Additional Sessions Judge-V/Ex-Officio Justice of Peace, Islamabad], whereby application under Section 22-A, Cr.P.C. filed by respondent No.4 [Mst. Nazia Rehman] was allowed and respondent No.3 [S.H.O., Police Station Koral, Islamabad] was directed to register an FIR against the petitioner under relevant provisions of law.

2.Brief facts, as narrated in the memorandum of petition, are that respondent No.4 instituted a civil suit for declaration and permanent injunction before the learned Senior Civil Judge, Islamabad-East, in respect of the property in dispute, alleging interference, encroachment and threatened dispossession at the hands of the petitioner. In the said suit, respondent No.4 claims ownership and possession of 05 Marlas of land

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comprised in Khewat No.84, Khatooni No.119 and Khasra No.825, situated in Revenue Estate Tarlai Khurd, Islamabad. The petitioner, in his written statement, has denied any concern with the property claimed by respondent No.4 and has asserted that his ancestral property is comprised in Khewat No.77, Khatooni No.109 and Khasra No.1113/832.

3.The case of the petitioner is that the dispute between the parties essentially involves questions relating to the identity, location, title, possession and revenue particulars of the respective properties, which are already sub judice before the competent Civil Court. Notwithstanding the pendency of the said civil proceedings, respondent No.4 approached learned Ex-Officio Justice of Peace under Sections 22-A and 22-B, Cr.P.C., seeking registration of an FIR, without, according to the petitioner, disclosing the pendency of the civil suit. It is contended that the allegations forming the basis of application under Sections 22-A and 22-B, Cr.P.C. substantially arise out of the same dispute which is already the subject matter of the civil proceedings. The petitioner further contends that the Impugned Order passed by the learned Ex-Officio Justice of Peace is mechanical and non-speaking, as it merely records that the allegations disclose commission of a cognizable offence and directs registration of an FIR, without specifying the offence allegedly committed, its essential ingredients, the particular role attributed to the petitioner, or the material connecting him with the alleged commission of such offence. It is also contended that the learned forum was not apprised of the pendency of the civil suit or the distinction between the revenue particulars of the properties claimed by the respective parties. It is, therefore, the petitioner's case that criminal process is being invoked in relation to a dispute which is already pending adjudication before the Civil Court and that the Impugned Order has been passed without proper consideration of the relevant facts. He apprehends that registration of an FIR pursuant to the Impugned Order may result in coercive proceedings against him and cause prejudice to his case in the pending civil litigation. The petitioner, however, does not contend that the pendency of civil proceedings, by itself, bars criminal proceedings;

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rather, his grievance is that, in the circumstances of the present case, no independent criminal act constituting a cognizable offence has been identified and that the material circumstances relating to the pending civil dispute were not brought to the notice of the learned Ex-Officio Justice of Peace. On these grounds, the petitioner has invoked the constitutional jurisdiction of this Court under Article 199 of the Constitution and seeks setting aside of the Impugned Order.

4.Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that his client has no concern with the land of respondent No.4 and that no offence whatsoever was committed by him. He contends that, in order to convert the civil dispute into a criminal one, the application under Section 22-A, Cr.P.C. was filed before the learned Ex-Officio Justice of Peace. He further submits that demarcation of the land is yet to be carried out and that respondent No.4 has herself instituted a civil suit for declaration and permanent injunction in respect of the suit property, which is still pending before the competent Court.

5.On the other hand, learned counsel for respondent No.4 submits that the Impugned Order passed by the learned Ex-Officio Justice of Peace is well reasoned and does not suffer from any illegality or infirmity. He contends that the police authorities had failed to take action on the complaint of respondent No.4, compelling her to approach learned Ex- Officio Justice of Peace for redressal of her grievance.

6.Arguments heard and record perused with the able assistance of learned counsel for the parties.

7.Report of the Superintendent of Police (Complaint), Islamabad, dated 25.07.2026, explains the factual position and records that, for the purpose of demarcation of land, an application has been submitted before the Tehsildar, Islamabad, and the demarcation is yet to be carried out. The report submitted by respondent No.3/SHO, Police Station Koral, before this Court also refers to the said application having been submitted to the Tehsildar, Islamabad. Thus, the exact identity, location and status of the

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respective piece of land have yet to be determined through the competent revenue process.

8.It is further evident from the record that respondent No.4 herself has instituted a civil suit for declaration and permanent injunction in respect of the property in question. The said suit is still pending and the questions raised therein remain to be adjudicated by the competent Civil Court after recording of evidence. The petitioner, on the other hand, has specifically denied any concern with the property claimed by respondent No.4 and has relied upon different revenue particulars in respect of his alleged ancestral property. Therefore, the controversy between parties is not confined merely to an allegation of interference with an undisputed parcel of land; rather, it involves disputed questions regarding the identity, location, demarcation and possession of the property.

9.At this stage, it would be appropriate to examine the scope of jurisdiction exercised by an Ex-Officio Justice of Peace under Section 22- A(6), Cr.P.C. The Honourable Supreme Court, in Younas Abbas and others v. Additional Sessions Judge, Chakwal and others (PLD 2016 SC 581), has authoritatively held that the functions performed by an Ex-Officio Justice of Peace under Section 22-A(6), Cr.P.C. are quasi-judicial in nature. The Court entertains applications, examines the record, hears the parties and passes orders and directions with due application of mind; every lis before it demands discretion and judgment. The jurisdiction, therefore, cannot be exercised as a mere ministerial or mechanical formality.

10.The aforesaid principle has subsequently been reiterated by the Honourable Supreme Court in Munawar Alam Khan v. Qurban Ali Mallano and others (2024 SCMR 985). While considering an application under Sections 22-A and 22-B, Cr.P.C., the Honourable Supreme Court observed that there are numerous precedents concerning misuse of these provisions and that it is the prime duty of the Court to take care of such misuse. It was specifically emphasized that an application should not be lightly entertained and decided in a mechanical manner merely for issuing a direction to the police to lodge an FIR, conduct investigation and

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prosecute the accused. The Honourable Supreme Court further reiterated that each case has to be considered in the light of its own peculiar facts and circumstances.

11.The principle enunciated in Munawar Alam Khan (supra) is of particular relevance to the present controversy. The Honourable Supreme Court, while examining the circumstances attending the invocation of criminal process, emphasized the necessity of considering the surrounding circumstances and guarding against misuse of the process of law. The ratio does not mean that a civil dispute can never give rise to criminal liability; rather, it requires the Court exercising jurisdiction under Section 22-A, Cr.P.C. to remain vigilant against the misuse of criminal process and to examine the application in the context of the entire material placed before it.

12.The same approach is also consistent with the law laid down in Rai Ashraf and others v. Muhammad Saleem Bhatti and others (PLD 2010 SC 691), which has also been noticed by the Honourable Supreme Court in Munawar Alam Khan (supra) in the context of circumstances in which jurisdiction under Sections 22-A and 22-B, Cr.P.C. may be misused. The Court exercising such jurisdiction is, therefore, required to guard against the criminal process being employed for purposes other than the legitimate prosecution of a cognizable offence.

13.Likewise, in Jamal Khan v. Secretary, Home Department and others (2021 SCMR 468), the Honourable Supreme Court dealt with a matter arising from a civil dispute and declined to interfere with the refusal to direct registration of a criminal case. The said authority does not lay down that the existence of civil proceedings constitutes an absolute bar to criminal proceedings. The relevant principle is that the nature of the underlying controversy and the availability of an appropriate civil remedy are material circumstances which cannot be ignored while examining whether the criminal process ought to be set in motion.

14.It is equally necessary, however, to keep in view the other side of the legal position. In Badar-ud-Din and another v. Senior Superintendent of

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Police, Shikarpur and others (2025 MLD 165), the learned Sindh High Court observed that the Justice of Peace, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 22-A, Cr.P.C., is not required to conduct a detailed fact- finding inquiry or to meticulously determine the truthfulness of competing versions. The relevant consideration is whether the facts placed before the forum prima facie disclose commission of a cognizable offence.

15.The aforesaid proposition does not militate against the conclusion reached herein. The petitioner is not inviting this Court to conduct a mini- trial, determine title or finally adjudicate the question of possession. Nor is this Court, at this stage, required to determine the truth or falsity of the allegations levelled by respondent No.4. The limited question before this Court is whether the learned Ex-Officio Justice of Peace, while exercising his quasi-judicial jurisdiction, considered the material circumstances appearing from the record before directing registration of an FIR. The fact that the Justice of Peace is not required to conduct a detailed fact-finding inquiry does not mean that he may disregard material circumstances directly bearing upon the request for registration of a criminal case.

16.In the present case, such circumstances are significant. Respondent No.4 has herself instituted a civil suit seeking declaration and permanent injunction concerning the property. The petitioner disputes that the property allegedly encroached upon or interfered with is the property in his possession and relies upon different Khewat, Khatooni and Khasra numbers. Furthermore, the demarcation proceedings before the Tehsildar, Islamabad, are admittedly pending. Thus, the very factual foundation of the allegation of encroachment or interference, namely, whether the land allegedly interfered with is in fact the same land which is in the possession of the petitioner, remains unresolved.

17.This distinction assumes significance. If the allegation of criminal trespass, encroachment or interference is founded upon the assertion that the petitioner has entered upon or interfered with a particular parcel of land, the identity and location of that parcel are foundational facts. In the present case, those facts have not yet been objectively determined. The

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pending demarcation proceedings may clarify the position, while the question of title and other civil rights remains before the competent Civil Court. This Court is not determining those questions in the present proceedings; it is merely taking note of their unresolved nature while examining the legality of the Impugned Order.

18.The reports of the police authorities are also not without significance. The report of the Superintendent of Police (Complaint), Islamabad, dated 25.07.2026, specifically refers to the pending application before the Tehsildar, Islamabad, for demarcation. The report submitted by respondent No.3 before this Court also confirms the same factual position. The material before the learned Ex-Officio Justice of Peace, therefore, was not confined to the bare allegations of respondent No.4; there existed circumstances requiring judicial consideration before a direction having serious criminal consequences was issued.

19.In Younas Abbas (supra), the Honourable Supreme Court made it clear that the functions of the Ex-Officio Justice of Peace are quasi-judicial and that the forum is required to examine the record, hear the parties and exercise discretion and judgment. Similarly, Munawar Alam Khan (supra) underscores that applications under Sections 22-A and 22-B should not be entertained and decided mechanically. Consequently, although the learned Ex-Officio Justice of Peace is not required to determine the ultimate truth of the allegations, he is nevertheless required to consider the material circumstances which are directly relevant to the request for registration of an FIR.

20.Examined in this context, the Impugned Order does not reflect adequate consideration of the material circumstances brought before the learned forum. In particular, the order does not demonstrate consideration of the pending civil suit instituted by respondent No.4 herself, the petitioner's specific assertion that his property is comprised in different revenue particulars, the pending demarcation proceedings before the Tehsildar, Islamabad, or the reports of the police authorities referring to such proceedings.

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21.It is also noteworthy that the Impugned Order, as available on record, proceeds substantially on the premise that the allegations contained in the application disclose a cognizable offence and, on that basis, directs registration of an FIR. However, where the foundational factual controversy concerns the very identity and location of the property allegedly encroached upon, a mere recital that the allegations disclose a cognizable offence, without addressing the relevant circumstances appearing from the record, does not adequately demonstrate the judicial application of mind required by law.

22.The contention of learned counsel for respondent No.4 that the police authorities had not taken action on her complaint does not alter the above position. The jurisdiction under Section 22-A(6)(i), Cr.P.C. undoubtedly provides a remedy against non-registration of a criminal case; however, the availability of that remedy does not dispense with the requirement that the Ex-Officio Justice of Peace exercise the jurisdiction judicially and upon consideration of the relevant material.

23.The Court is conscious of the settled principle that the pendency of civil proceedings, by itself, does not bar criminal proceedings. Where the allegations independently disclose commission of a cognizable offence, the mere availability of a civil remedy cannot prevent the criminal law from taking its course. The present case, however, is not being decided on the broad proposition that a civil dispute can never have a criminal dimension. Rather, the conclusion rests upon the particular circumstances of the case, namely, the pending civil suit concerning the same property, the petitioner's categorical denial of any connection with the property claimed by respondent No.4, the different revenue particulars relied upon by the parties, the pending demarcation proceedings and the failure of the Impugned Order to demonstrate consideration of these material circumstances.

24.The authority reported as Badar-ud-Din and another v. Senior Superintendent of Police, Shikarpur and others (2025 MLD 165) does not warrant a different conclusion. There, the learned Court was dealing with

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allegations of a specific physical occurrence involving firearm injuries and medical material. The principle laid down therein that the Justice of Peace is not required to conduct a detailed fact-finding inquiry is fully acknowledged. The present case, however, does not require such an inquiry. The issue here is whether the learned forum considered the existence of the civil litigation, the pending demarcation proceedings and the conflicting revenue particulars before directing registration of an FIR. These circumstances were relevant to the exercise of judicial discretion and did not require a final determination of disputed facts.

25.The cumulative effect of the above discussion is that the learned Ex- Officio Justice of Peace was required to exercise his discretion upon consideration of the factual context and material available on record. The criminal process cannot be set in motion mechanically where the record itself discloses circumstances requiring judicial consideration before such process is invoked. Section 22-A, Cr.P.C. undoubtedly provides a statutory remedy against the failure or neglect of the police in accordance with law; however, its exercise must remain within the parameters of judicial discretion and cannot be permitted to substitute or prejudge the determination of disputed civil and revenue questions which are already pending before the competent forums.

26.In the facts and circumstances of the present case, the learned Ex- Officio Justice of Peace failed to adequately consider the material circumstances referred to above. The Impugned Order, therefore, suffers from non-application of mind and cannot be sustained.

27.For the foregoing reasons, the instant petition is allowed. The Impugned Order dated 28.07.2026 passed by respondent No.1/learned Additional Sessions Judge-V/Ex-Officio Justice of Peace, Islamabad, is set aside and the application filed by respondent No.4 under Sections 22-A and 22-B, Cr.P.C. is dismissed.

28.It is, however, clarified that nothing contained in this judgment shall be construed as an expression of opinion on the title, ownership, possession, identity or demarcation of the property in question. All such

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questions are left open to be determined by the competent Civil and Revenue forums in accordance with law. Likewise, this judgment shall not preclude respondent No.4 from availing any other remedy available to her under the law, should an independent cognizable offence be disclosed on the basis of material subsequently emerging in accordance with law.

(SHAHRUKH ARJUMAND)

JUDGE

Approved for reporting.

JUDGE

Asif Mughal/*