Pir Ahmad Shah VS Secretary Ministry of Interior etc

JUDGMENT SHEET

ISLAMABAD HIGH COURT, ISLAMABAD

JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

Writ Petition No.4194 of 2025

Pir Ahmad Shah

Versus

The Secretary, Ministry of Interior and others

Petitioner by: Syed Talha Safa and Mr. Abdul Wahab Khan, Advocates.

Respondents No.1&2 by: Mian Muhammad Faisal Irfan, Deputy Attorney General along with Syed Hammad Hassan, S.O (Arms), M/o Interior.

Respondents No.3, 4 & 5 by: Mr. Farooq Azam, Ms. Memoona Sagheer and Ms. Janaan Gull, State Counsels along with Irshad Awan,

S.I.

Date of Hearing: 10.09.2026.

INAAM AMEEN MINHAS, J. Through the instant writ petition, the petitioner has challenged the order dated 11.07.2025 passed by respondent No. 3 [District Magistrate, Islamabad], and the order dated 24.07.2025 passed by respondent No. 2 [Section Officer, M/o Interior], whereby his arms licenses were cancelled.

2.Brief facts are that the petitioner is a law-abiding citizen and was nominated in FIR No.342/2025 dated 21.06.2025, registered at Police Station Secretariat, Islamabad, under sections 506, 324 and 337-H(ii), PPC. During investigation, his duly licensed firearms, including an SMG rifle, pistols and 12-bore guns, were taken into custody, though according to the petitioner, they had no connection with the alleged occurrence. The petitioner was granted post-arrest bail on 24.06.2025 and, after submission of the challan, moved an application under section 249-A, Cr.P.C, which was accepted, and he was acquitted from the said case. Thereafter, the

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petitioner sought Superdari of the licensed weapons, and the learned Trial Court directed their release upon furnishing surety of Rs.400,000/-. However, the weapons were not returned, and during contempt proceedings it came to light that the competent authorities had cancelled the petitioner’s arms licences without prior notice, opportunity of hearing or a speaking order assigning lawful reasons vide impugned orders dated 11.07.2025 & 24.07.2025, passed by respondents No.3 & 2, respectively. Aggrieved, the petitioner challenged the cancellation orders before respondent No.1 [Secretary, Ministry of Interior], Section Officer Arms and respondent No.4 [Deputy Commissioner, Islamabad] through representations dated 30.09.2025, but no decision was made thereon.

3.The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the impugned cancellation of his arms licenses is unlawful and without jurisdiction, as the respondents failed to satisfy the requirements of Section 12 of the Pakistan Arms Ordinance, 1965 and the relevant Arms Rules, 2022; that the licenses were cancelled merely on the basis of allegations arising from FIR No.342/2025, without establishing any lawful ground for cancellation, conducting a proper inquiry, issuing a show-cause notice, affording the petitioner an opportunity of hearing, or passing a reasoned and speaking order; that the petitioner was subsequently acquitted by the competent Court, yet the respondents neither considered the acquittal nor examined the judicial record and instead treated the FIR allegations as sufficient for cancellation; that it is settled law that an FIR is merely an accusation and cannot by itself be treated as proof of guilt; that the requirement of notice and hearing before cancellation has also been recognized in the cases reported as 2001 MLD 94, 2010 YLR 1044 and 1970 P Cr. L J 647; that the impugned orders thus suffer from non-application of mind, violation of the principles of natural justice and exercise of statutory power beyond the manner prescribed by law and that the cancellation orders are arbitrary, ultra vires, without lawful authority and of no legal effect, besides offending the petitioner’s rights to lawful treatment and due process guaranteed under Articles 4 and 10-A of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan,

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4.On the other hand, the learned Deputy Attorney General and the learned State on behalf of the respondents contended that three arms licenses were issued to the petitioner, Pir Ahmed Shah, but were subsequently cancelled by the Interior Division on the basis of a written complaint/report of the ICT Police dated 11.07.2025. It was submitted that FIR No.342/2025 had been registered against the petitioner and, although he was subsequently acquitted by the competent Court, his request for restoration of the licenses was again referred to the ICT Police for comments in accordance with the applicable Arms Rules; that the ICT Police recommended against restoration on the basis of the petitioner’s conduct and previous record. Reliance was placed upon Rule 5(d), under which a person considered unsuitable by the local police on account of his conduct or previous record may not satisfy the eligibility requirements for an arms license, as well as Rule 14 and the relevant provisions of the Pakistan Arms Ordinance, 1965 concerning suspension or revocation. It was also submitted that the petitioner was afforded an opportunity of personal hearing but failed to provide a satisfactory explanation, therefore, the cancellation was neither arbitrary nor mechanical but based on the adverse police report and concerns relating to breach of peace, maintenance of law and order, and prevention of crime, particularly in a sensitive area.

5.I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and carefully examined the record with their able assistance.

6.The stronger legal formulation is that a police report is not, by itself, an independent statutory ground for cancellation. It may provide information to the licensing authority, but the authority must independently determine that the facts disclosed bring the case within one of the grounds in Section 12 of the Pakistan Arms Ordinance, 1965 and Rule 35 of the Pakistan Arms Rules, 2022, and ordinarily must give the licensee a reasonable opportunity of hearing. Rule 35 itself expressly requires such an opportunity.

7.The principal question arising for determination is whether the cancellation of the petitioner’s arms licenses by the Additional Deputy Commissioner through impugned order dated 11.07.2025 and subsequently

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by the Ministry of Interior/competent authority through impugned order dated 24.07.2025, merely on the basis of a report furnished by the Deputy Inspector General of Police and conveyed through letter dated 28.06.2025, was lawful and sustainable under the Pakistan Arms Ordinance, 1965 and the Pakistan Arms Rules, 2022. The further question is whether such cancellation could legally be ordered without issuing a show-cause notice, without affording the petitioner a reasonable opportunity of hearing, and without recording an independent finding that his case fell within any statutory ground permitting cancellation of an arms licence.

8.The relevant statutory framework must first be noted. Section 12 of the Pakistan Arms Ordinance, 1965 deals specifically with cancellation and suspension of arms licenses. The provision authorizes cancellation or suspension by the competent authority where, for reasons to be recorded in writing and after giving the license holder an opportunity to show cause against the proposed action, the authority considers such action necessary for the security of the public peace. Section 12 thus contains substantive and procedural safeguards: first, a legally relevant reason connected with the statutory purpose must exist; second, reasons must be recorded; and third, the license holder must ordinarily be afforded an opportunity to show cause before adverse action is taken.

9.The statutory position has been further regulated by the Pakistan Arms Rules, 2022, notified on 30.12.2022 in exercise of powers under Sections 11 and 11-A of the Ordinance. Rule 35 deals specifically with cancellation of licenses. Under Rule 35(1), the issuing authority may cancel a license on its own information or upon receipt of a complaint, but such power is not uncontrolled or unlimited. Cancellation must fall within one or more of the specified grounds: where the licensee, after being given an opportunity of hearing, fails to remove or satisfactorily answer an objection; where an act constituting a ground for suspension is repeated; where the arms entered in the license have been used for commission of an offence; or where the licensee has contravened the Ordinance, the Rules, a condition of the license, or lawful instructions issued by the concerned Division. Rule 35(2)

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separately provides that a license shall not be cancelled without giving the licensee a reasonable opportunity of being heard.

10.Rule 35(3) does create a limited exception to the requirement of prior hearing, but that exception cannot be treated as a general license to dispense with due process, which is guaranteed under Article 10-A of the Constitution, and this principle is applicable before all proceedings, whether legal, quasi-judicial, or executive authority. The issuing authority may dispense with the opportunity of hearing only in extraordinary circumstances or where, in its opinion, delay would lead to continuation of an illegal activity. Such exceptional circumstances must necessarily be identifiable from the record and reflected in the decision itself. An authority cannot first omit the mandatory hearing and thereafter attempt to justify such omission by relying upon a general allegation or police communication which does not record the statutory satisfaction contemplated by the Rules.

11.It follows from the above statutory scheme that receipt of a police report may certainly provide information to the competent authority and may cause the authority to examine whether proceedings for suspension or cancellation are warranted. However, Rule 35 does not mention a police report as an independent or self-executing ground for cancellation. The report is merely a source of information. Before cancelling the license, the competent authority must apply its own independent mind to the material, identify the particular statutory ground, which stands attracted, record reasons supporting that conclusion and follow the procedure prescribed by law.

12.This distinction is important. If a police report establishes, for instance, that the weapon entered upon the license was actually used in the commission of an offence, Rule 35(1)(c) may become relevant. Similarly, if the material establishes contravention of the Ordinance, the Rules or a condition of the license, Rule 35(1)(d) may be invoked. But the mere fact that an FIR has been registered against a license holder, or that the police has recommended cancellation, cannot automatically be substituted for the statutory determination required from the licensing authority. The competent

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authority cannot surrender its statutory discretion to the police. It must itself examine whether the circumstances satisfy the law.

13.The distinction between registration of a criminal case and proof of a statutory ground for cancellation is also significant. An FIR represents an accusation requiring investigation and determination under criminal law; it is not, by itself, a finding of guilt. Where Rule 35(1)(c) is invoked, the authority must at least address the material showing that the particular arms entered upon the license were used in the commission of the offence. A mechanical reference to an FIR, without recording how the licensed weapon was involved or which provision of Rule 35 has been attracted, cannot substitute for the reasoned satisfaction required from a statutory authority.

14.In the present case, the foundation of the impugned action appears to be the report submitted by the Deputy Inspector General of Police and conveyed through letter dated 28.06.2025 in connection with FIR No.342 of 2025 registered at Police Station Secretariat, Islamabad. On the basis thereof, the Additional Deputy Commissioner passed the first order dated 11.07.2025, followed by the order dated 24.07.2025 of the Ministry of Interior/competent authority. However, the impugned orders do not show that before cancellation of the licenses the petitioner was issued a show- cause notice specifically informing him of the proposed cancellation, the statutory ground relied upon, and the material against him, or that he was afforded an effective opportunity to submit his explanation.

15.This omission is not a minor procedural irregularity. The requirement of hearing is expressly incorporated in the governing law itself. Section 12 of the Ordinance requires an opportunity of showing cause, while Rule 35(2) provides in mandatory terms that a license shall not be cancelled without giving the licensee a reasonable opportunity of being heard. Where the legislature or rule-making authority makes hearing a condition precedent to exercising adverse power, compliance with that requirement becomes part of the jurisdictional process. An order passed in disregard of such mandatory protection is legally defective.

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16.It is also important that reasons must be recorded. A reasoned order demonstrates that the authority has considered the relevant material, identified the law applicable to the case and independently reached its conclusion. It also enables the affected person to understand why an adverse action has been taken and enables a Court exercising judicial review to determine whether the authority acted within the bounds of law. An order merely reproducing or endorsing the recommendation of another department, without independently relating the facts to the statutory grounds of cancellation, suffers from non-application of mind.

17.The impugned orders, therefore, cannot be sustained merely because they were made by officers, who otherwise possessed administrative authority in relation to arms licenses. Competence of the officer and lawful exercise of power are separate questions. Even a competent authority must exercise its power only for the purposes, upon the grounds, and in the manner prescribed by the parent statute and the rules framed thereunder. Where the law specifies the circumstances in which an arms license may be cancelled, the authority cannot create an additional ground through executive practice or administrative correspondence.

18.It is a well-recognized principle of administrative law that where a statute confers a power and prescribes the manner in which that power is to be exercised, the authority must follow that manner. Executive discretion cannot travel beyond the statute from which it derives its existence. An executive authority cannot enlarge its own jurisdiction by administrative interpretation, nor can an opinion expressed by the police confer a power, which the governing law itself does not confer.

19.The Pakistan Arms Rules, 2022 reinforce this principle. Rule 33 permits suspension in specified circumstances and requires an opportunity of hearing, subject to narrowly framed exceptions. Rule 34 deals with restoration, while Rule 35 separately governs final cancellation. This sequence shows that the Rules contemplate a structured decision-making process rather than automatic cancellation upon receipt of adverse information.

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20.Therefore, even where the competent authority receives adverse information from law-enforcement agencies, the proper course is to examine the material against the statutory grounds, issue notice where required, call upon the licensee to explain his position, consider that explanation and then pass a speaking order identifying the relevant ground and the reasons for arriving at the conclusion. A police recommendation cannot replace this statutory exercise.

21.The record also reveals an important subsequent circumstance. The petitioner’s arms license had initially been taken into custody in connection with FIR No.342 of 2025, Police Station Secretariat, Islamabad. However, the learned Illaqa Magistrate, through order dated 25.07.2025, directed the handing over of the licenses to the petitioner on Superdari. The order of Superdari does not, by itself, finally determine the validity of the license or absolve the petitioner of any criminal allegation; nevertheless, it is relevant in showing that custody of the license in criminal proceedings and administrative cancellation of the license are legally distinct matters. The criminal Court dealt with custody of the property, whereas cancellation remained subject to the statutory requirements of the Arms Ordinance and the Arms Rules.

22.Thus, the competent authority could not treat mere confiscation or seizure during investigation as equivalent to lawful cancellation. Seizure during criminal investigation is ordinarily provisional and connected with the criminal proceedings, whereas cancellation permanently affects the status of the license. Such an adverse administrative consequence can therefore be imposed only after the governing law’s prescribed conditions are satisfied.

23.The requirement of prior notice in arms-license cancellation proceedings is supported by consistent judicial precedent. In Malik Nazim- ud-Din Nazim vs. Government of Punjab and another, (2001 MLD 94), the Lahore High Court examined cancellation under Section 12 of the Arms Ordinance and held that cancellation could not lawfully be ordered without

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first giving the license holder an opportunity of showing cause. The cancellation orders were declared to be without lawful authority and of no legal effect and were set aside, while leaving the competent authority free to proceed afresh in accordance with law.

24.Likewise, in Sardar Akhtar Jan Mengal vs. Government of Pakistan, through Secretary, M/o Interior, Islamabad, (2010 YLR 1044), the Balochistan High Court held that an arms license could be cancelled under Section 12 only after the license holder had been afforded an opportunity of showing cause. As no notice or opportunity of hearing was given and the cancellation orders were vague and did not assign cogent reasons, the Court held the orders unsustainable and set them aside. The Court further held that the existence of an appellate remedy did not bar constitutional jurisdiction, where the impugned order was itself without jurisdiction and without lawful authority.

25.Earlier judicial authority also emphasizes that cancellation power is circumscribed by the statute. In Ch. Ghulam Ali vs. Commissioner, Lahore Division, Lahore, (PLD 1981 Lahore 368), it was observed that although grant of an arms license does not confer an indefeasible vested right, once the privilege has been granted its withdrawal must conform strictly to the legal procedure governing cancellation. The authority must act upon material relevant to the statutory purpose and cannot withdraw the licence arbitrarily.

26.The same legal principle underlies the authorities cited by learned counsel, including Ghulam Abbas vs. Federal Government, Ministry of Interior, (1989 P Cr. L J 1936) and Muhammad Sadiq vs. Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Khanpur Sub-Division, (1995 MLD 1101), which state that where an adverse statutory power affecting an existing license is exercised, the procedure laid down by law and the requirements of natural justice cannot be ignored. These authorities are consistent with the subsequently reported judgment (2010 YLR 1044) Supra, which expressly relied upon the earlier line of cases governing cancellation of arms licences.

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27.The principle of audi alteram partem assumes particular significance in the present case because the cancellation rested upon adverse information furnished by the police. Where an administrative authority proposes to act upon material supplied by another agency, fairness requires that the person likely to be adversely affected be informed of the substance of the allegation and afforded an opportunity to explain or rebut it, unless the statute lawfully permits dispensing with such opportunity in clearly established exceptional circumstances.

28.No such extraordinary circumstance appears to have been recorded in the impugned orders. Rule 35(3) does permit dispensing with hearing in exceptional situations, but exercise of that power itself requires application of mind to the existence of extraordinary circumstances or to the likelihood that delay would permit continuation of illegal activity. The exception cannot be presumed merely because a criminal case has been registered. If the authority seeks to rely upon Rule 35(3), the order must disclose the basis upon which the statutory exception was attracted.

29.A statutory authority is also required to distinguish between the existence of material capable of initiating proceedings and material sufficient to justify final cancellation. A police report may be adequate to put the administrative machinery into motion, and in an appropriate case may justify interim action if the statutory requirements for suspension are fulfilled. However, final cancellation requires satisfaction of Rule 35 and observance of the mandatory procedure prescribed therein.

30.In the present case, the impugned orders do not demonstrate that the authorities carried out such exercise. They do not identify with sufficient clarity whether cancellation was ordered under Rule 35(1)(a), (b), (c) or (d); nor do they record how the facts supplied through the DIG Police’s report fulfilled the ingredients of the particular clause. The absence of such statutory linkage gives the decision the character of a mechanical endorsement of the police recommendation rather than an independent exercise of the licensing authority’s discretion.

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31.The rule of law requires every public authority to identify the legal source of its power and remain within its limits. Where an administrative decision affects a citizen adversely, it must be traceable to a statutory provision. The executive possesses no inherent power to cancel an arms license independent of the governing Ordinance and Rules. If the action cannot be justified with reference to the grounds and procedure laid down therein, the decision cannot be saved merely on the basis of administrative necessity or recommendation of another public authority.

32.The Court is mindful that possession of an arms license is subject to regulation and that public safety constitutes an important consideration. The State is fully entitled to regulate, suspend or cancel arms licenses, where the requirements of law are satisfied. Judicial review in such matters does not prevent the authorities from protecting public peace. It only requires them to exercise that power lawfully, fairly and for the statutory purposes for which it has been conferred.

33.Thus, the Court is not holding that information supplied by the police can never form the basis of proceedings against an arms license. The correct legal position is that such information may trigger statutory proceedings, but the competent authority must thereafter independently determine whether any ground specified in Section 12 of the Ordinance and Rule 35 of the Rules exists. Unless an applicable ground is established and the mandatory procedural safeguards are observed, a police report alone cannot operate as a substitute for the statutory requirements.

34.The distinction is particularly necessary in the present case because the impugned orders have serious civil consequences for the petitioner. Once the licenses had been lawfully issued, their cancellation affected an existing legal privilege and therefore could not be undertaken casually or mechanically. The Courts have consistently required strict observance of the procedure governing such withdrawal. In 2001 MLD 94 and 2010 YLR 1044 Supra, the Courts held that cancellation without the required opportunity of hearing was unsustainable.

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35.The impugned orders suffer from three material defects. Firstly, no prior show-cause notice or reasonable opportunity of hearing was afforded to the petitioner, despite the express requirement of Section 12 of the Ordinance and Rule 35(2) of the Rules. Secondly, the impugned orders fail to demonstrate an independent and reasoned application of mind to the statutory grounds of cancellation and appear to proceed mechanically upon the police report. Thirdly, no clear finding has been recorded connecting the petitioner’s conduct with any particular ground contained in Rule 35(1), nor have extraordinary circumstances been recorded, which could lawfully justify dispensing with the hearing under Rule 35(3).

36.Such defects go to the legality of the decision-making process itself. Where mandatory statutory requirements are ignored, the resulting order cannot be treated merely as an irregular exercise of otherwise valid jurisdiction. The power has to be exercised in the manner authorized by law. Exercise of statutory power on grounds not recognized by the statute, or without satisfaction of mandatory conditions attached to that power, constitutes an excess of jurisdiction and renders the resulting decision vulnerable to judicial review under Article 199 of the Constitution.

37.It is settled law that executive authorities are creatures of the Constitution and statute and must remain within the four corners of the powers entrusted to them. They cannot supplement statutory grounds through administrative practice, nor can they treat the opinion of another executive agency as binding upon an authority required by law to form its own satisfaction. Where an authority acts mechanically upon a recommendation without independently applying the statutory test, the discretion conferred upon it remains legally unexercised.

38.Consequently, this Court is satisfied that the impugned orders dated 11.07.2025 and 24.07.2025, whereby the petitioner’s arms licences were cancelled, cannot be sustained in their present form. The cancellation was effected without the mandatory opportunity of hearing, without a properly reasoned determination of the statutory grounds under Rule 35 of the Pakistan Arms Rules, 2022, and without demonstrating that the competent

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authority had reached the independent statutory satisfaction required under the Pakistan Arms Ordinance, 1965. The mere existence of the DIG Police’s report communicated through letter dated 28.06.2025 could initiate consideration by the licensing authority but could not, by itself, constitute an independent legal ground for cancellation.

39.Accordingly, the instant constitutional petition is allowed. The impugned orders dated 11.07.2025 and 24.07.2025, cancelling the petitioner’s arms licenses, are hereby set aside having been passed without lawful authority.

(INAAM AMEEN MINHAS)

JUDGE

Announced in open Court on 16.09.2026.

JUDGE

APPROVED FOR REPORTING.

R. Anjam.