Zafar Mehmood & Others VS NIRC etc.

Form No: HCJD/C-121

JUDGEMENT SHEET

IN THE ISLAMABAD HIGH COURT, ISLAMABAD

(JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT)

W.P. No.4664/2018

Zafar Mehmood and others Versus National Industrial Relations Commission (NIRC), Islamabad and others Petitioners by: Mr. Abdu Rehman Khan, Advocate.

Respondents by: Mr. M. Shoaib, Advocate for the respondent No.2.

Dates of Hearing: 10.09.2026.

JUDGEMENT

UMAIR MAJEED MALIK, J: Through this petition under Article 199 of the Constitution, the petitioners have called in question the orders dated 30.08.2016 and 06.06.2018 (“Impugned Orders”), whereby learned Single Bench of the National Industrial Relations Commission (“NIRC”) dismissed their petition under section 33 of the Industrial Relations Act, 2012 (“IRA 2012”) for want of jurisdiction and their appeal under section 58 of the said Act was also dismissed by the Full Bench of NIRC.

2.The petitioners are former employees of respondent No.2, Central Ordnance Depot, Rawalpindi. They claim to have served as daily-wage employees since 1986 and were terminated on 31.03.2015. Their case before the NIRC was that they were workmen within the meaning of the Industrial and Commercial Employment, (Standing Orders), Ordinance, 1968 and that their services were of a

permanent nature. Reliance was also placed upon a judgment dated 08.05.2009 passed by the Labour Court, Rawalpindi, in the case of Farooq Mehmood, whereby similarly placed tailors were regularized.

That judgment was maintained by the Labour Appellate Tribunal and, according to the petitioners has attained finality.

3.Learned counsel for the petitioners contended that the petitioners performed the duties of tailors, their work was of a permanent nature, and the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 was applicable to them. Reliance was placed upon Hameed Akhtar Niazi v. The Secretary, Establishment Division (1996 SCMR 1185) and Government of Punjab v. Sameena Perveen (2009 SCMR 1). It was argued that the NIRC erred in invoking section 1(3)(a) of the IRA 2012 without first examining the applicability of the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 and the effect of the earlier judgment concerning similarly placed employees.

4.Learned counsel for respondents, on the other hand, submitted that the labour laws do not apply to persons employed in the Defence Services or in services or installations exclusively connected with the Armed Forces of Pakistan. Central Ordnance Depot is a military logistics installation. Its function is to receive, store and issue stores exclusively for the Pakistan Army. The petitioners were engaged against allocations made by the General Headquarters (GHQ) and, in any event, their engagement was casual and for periods of less than one year. The NIRC, therefore, lacked jurisdiction at this threshold.

5.I have heard the arguments of learned counsels for the parties and perused the record with their able assistance.

6.The controversy must be resolved in correct perspective. The first question is not whether the petitioners were permanent workmen, nor whether their duties as tailors were of a permanent nature. The determinative question is whether the IRA 2012 applies to them at all. If the statute itself excludes their employment from its operation, no question of substantive relief under that statute can arise. Jurisdiction must therefore be determined before the merits.

7.In order to determine the above question, it is essential to examine the provisions of section 1(3)(a) of the IRA 2012 provides:

“1. Short title, extent, application and commencement.-

(1)This Act may be called Industrial Relations Act, 2012.

(2)Subject to sub-section (3), it extends to whole Pakistan.

(3)It shall apply to all persons employed in any establishment or industry, in ICT or carrying on business in more than one province, but shall not apply to any person employed—

(a)in the Police or any of the Defence Services of Pakistan or any services or installations exclusively connected with the Armed Forces of Pakistan including an Ordnance Factory maintained by the Federal Government;”

[Emphasis added]

8.The language of the exclusion is plain. The Act does not apply to “any person employed” in a service or installation “exclusively connected with the Armed Forces of Pakistan”. The exclusion is directed to the character of the employment and the installation. It is not confined to uniformed personnel. Nor does the statute create an exception for a person merely because his particular trade, such as

tailoring, is otherwise capable of falling within the ordinary concept of industrial employment.

9.The corresponding provision in the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 (“IRO 1969”) was contained in section 1 (3) (a) of the IRO 1969, which reads as follows:

“(3) It shall not apply to any person employed –

(a)in the Police or any of the Defence Services of Pakistan or any services or installations connected with or incidental to the Armed Forces of Pakistan including an Ordnance Factory maintained by the Federal Government;” [Emphasis Added]

10.The IRO 1969 was repealed by the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 2002 (“IRO 2002”). The IRO 2002 was essentially a re-enacted law dealing with industrial relations and labour matters.

Section 1 (4) (a) and (b) of the IRO 2002 also contained similar provisions which excluded the application to all those persons employed in the Defense Services of Pakistan or in the installations of the Armed Forces. Section 1(4)(a),(b), ibid reads as follows:- “(4) It shall apply to all persons employed in any establishment or group of establishments or industry except those employed (a) in the Police or any of Defence Services of Pakistan, (b) in any installations or services exclusively connected with the Armed Forces of Pakistan including Ministry of Defence lines of the Railways;”

[Emphasis Added]

11.The IRO 2002 was then repealed by the Industrial Relations Act, 2008, which as a result of sunset clause was automatically repealed and after the 18th amendment in the Constitution, the

subject of industrial relations and labour matters devolved to the provinces, except the Federation retained a right to legislate on the industrial relations and labour matters dealing with the trans- provincial establishments i.e. organizations operating in more than one province. The Federation promulgated different Industrial Relations Ordinances from 2009 till 2011, and eventually the Parliament re-enacted the Industrial Relations Act, 2012, which is in vogue.

12.The above re-enacted statutes occupy the same legislative field. They regulate industrial relations, and prescribe the persons and establishments to which the industrial relations regime extended or extends. These statutes contain a specific exclusion in respect of employment connected with the Armed Forces. They are, therefore, statutes in pari materia and must be read as parts of the same legislative system, while giving full effect to the language subsequently chosen by the legislature.

13.The principle is explained in N.S. Bindra’s Interpretation of Statutes, 10th Edition, at page 713 in following terms:

“Words defined in a statute may have the same meaning in another statute, which is in pari materia therewith. What do we mean by the statute, in pari materia? Where acts are so related as to form a system or code of legislation and when they relate to same persons or things or to the same class of persons or things or have the same purpose or object, the statutes are called in pari materia. Courts while construing a provision of an enactment often follow the decisions by the courts construing similar provision of an enactment in pari materia. The word 'par' must not be confounded with the word ‘simili’. It is used in opposition to it as in the maxim magis paris sunt quam similes: intimating not likeness merely but identity. It would, however, be a mistake to expect identity in the language of the Acts. They may be independent and amendatory in form, they may be complete enactments

dealing with a single limited subject matter or sections of a Code or provision or they may be combination of these. It must be remembered that in order to be in pari materia, the Act need not have been enacted simultaneously or that they should refer to one another.”

14.This principle was further explained at N.S. Bindra’s Interpretation of Statutes, 10th Edition, at page 714 in following terms:

“However, where different statutes deal with identical subjects at different times or deal with a person or thing for the same purpose, they are in pari materia and they should be taken and considered together as one system and as explanatory of each other. Where words and expressions in a statute are taken from earlier statute in pari materia, which have received judicial construction, it must be assumed that the legislature was aware of such interpretation, and intended it to be followed in later statutory enactments.”

15.The proposition is important here. A difference in language between the earlier and later enactments does not, by itself, destroy their pari materia character. Nor is simultaneous enactment, or an express cross-reference, a prerequisite. What matters is their relationship within the same legislative field, their common subject and class, and their common legislative purpose.

16.Crawford, in Construction of Statutes, states the same principle. Statutes dealing with the same subject are considered as framed upon one system and having one object in view. Crawford explained this principle as follows:-

“In the preceding section, we have stated that the resort to statutes in pari materia can be justified on the ground that it may be assumed that all statutes which relate to the same subject matter were enacted in accord with the same general legislative policy, and that together they constitute a harmonious or uniform system of law. And it is obvious that only by construing every statute treating the same subject matter together is it possible to maintain this harmony. Unless

every statute relating to the same subject is taken to constitute collectively one system, o r construed as constituting one general statute or law, a uniform system would be impossible, and hopeless inconsistencies would exist, and it would be impossible for one to know what the law was under a given set of circumstances.”

17.Crawford further explains this principle in relation to the re- enacted statutes in following terms at pages 437 and 439 of the Construction of Statutes:

“Generally, where a statute, or a provision thereof, has been re-enacted by the legislature in the same or substantially the same, language, the law-makers are presumed to have adopted the construction placed upon such statute or provision by the court of last resort in the state, unless the statute as re-enacted clearly indicates a different intention.”

“As a result, it is proper for the court to resort to the prior enactment in order to determine the meaning of the re- enactment, for, after all, the re- enactment is declaratory of a continuance of the legislative intent as expressed in the prior act.”

18.The above principles of statutory interpretation do not permit the Court to disregard the words of the later enactment. It permits the Court to read the successive enactments as parts of one legislative scheme and to use the earlier statutory framework, together with its authoritative judicial exposition, to illuminate the corresponding provision in the later enactment.

19.The Hon’ble Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed this principle in The Intelligence Officer, Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation, FBR v. Abdul Karim (2025 PTD 795). The Court, while considering corresponding provisions of different enactments, expressly held:

“Where two provisions are pari materia, by applying doctrine of statutory construction, there cannot be a different interpretation for them.”

20.The judgment is significant for present purposes because it expressly relied upon Commissioner Inland Revenue v. Panther Sports (2022 SCMR 1135). The latter decision emphasized a harmonized reading of provisions forming part of the same statutory scheme. The recent Hon’ble Supreme Court jurisprudence therefore confirms that pari materia provisions are not to be construed in isolation, but in a manner that preserves coherence between corresponding statutory provisions.

21.The principle has particular force here because the provisions of the IRO 1969, IRO 2002 and IRA 2012 are successive enactments dealing with the same subject and containing corresponding exclusions relating to the Armed Forces.

In this context, the provisions of section 1(3)(a) of the IRO, 1969, section 1(4)(a)(b) of the IRO, 2002 and sections 1(3)(a) of the IRA, 2012 are pari materia.

22.In order to determine the legislative policy behind the exclusion contained in section 1 (3) (a) of the IRA 2012, the earlier judicial construction of provisions section 1 (3) (a) of the IRO 1969, containing exclusion of establishments connected with the Armed Forces, is instructive. In Rehmat Gill v. Quetta Cantonment Board (PLD 1983 SC 133), the Supreme Court held:

“The management and administration of the Cantonments vest in the Cantonment Boards. The Cantonments themselves being the quarters of the Armed Forces, their management and upkeep is necessarily a service which is directly concerned

with the Armed Forces, and only incidentally with civil population. The employees of the Cantonment Board are therefore excluded from the application of Industrial Relations Ordinance.”

23.The Court’s reasoning in Rehmat Gill case is functional. It did not confine the exclusion to persons directly serving as soldiers.

What mattered was the character and purpose of the service. In Canteen Stores Department Employees Welfare Union v. Canteen Stores Department (1983 SCMR 1101), the Supreme Court, again dealing with the exclusion contained in section 1 (3) (a) of the IRO 1969, similarly held:

“After the decisions given by the Sind High Court (Writ Petition No. 332/1973) and the Peshawar High Court there remains no conflict in views on the subject. Besides the object of C. S. D. when it was a government undertaking and even after it ceased to be so was and has been not only to supply the entitled personnel with articles of standard quality of daily use, but what is more important to "form the basis of an efficient Canteen Organization is peace and war for troops located anywhere in the country and operational areas during the war." This aspect of the purposes of C. S. D. clearly makes it out to be an Organization connected with Armed Forces, and hence covered by exemptions prescribed in subsection (3) of section 1 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance.”

24.In Controller Stationery and Forms v. Registrar Trade Unions (PLD 1991 SC 353), the Supreme Court made the same point in broader terms in relation to the exclusion contained in section 1 (3) (a) of the IRO 1969:

“From the above-cited case, it is evident that in order to bring an employee within one of the categories excluded by subsection (3) of section 1 of the I.R.O. it is not necessary that the finances or the funds should come from the Government or installations should be under the control and management of a Government department and not under the management and control of a corporate body, but what is important is, whether the person is employed inter alia in any of the Armed Forces of

Pakistan or in services or installations connected with or incidental to the Armed Forces of Pakistan or in the administration of the State.”

25.Similarly, in Haji Malik Aman v. Federation of Pakistan (1993 SCMR 1837), the Supreme Court observed:

“The word ‘including’ mentioned in clause (a) of section 1(3) of the Ordinance has wide connotation. Its meaning is not restricted rather it extends the scope of the provision. Though the appellants are not members of the Armed Forces but their services are directly concerned with Armed Forces.”

26.The Supreme Court has likewise recognized that provisions which are pari materia should not ordinarily receive different interpretations merely because they occur in separate enactments.

The same approach is reflected in Army Welfare Sugar Mills Workers’ Union v. Army Welfare Sugar Mills (2009 SCMR 202), where the Court compared the corresponding provisions of the section 1 (3) (a) of the IRO 1969 and section 1 (4) (a)(b) of the IRO 2002, and noticed the deliberate narrowing of the latter exclusion.

After examining all the previous judgments on the subject of exclusion contained in section 1 (3) (a) of the IRO 1969, the Supreme Court held that Army Welfare Sugar Mills was not exclusively connected with the Armed Forces and held in its concluding paragraph 16 as follows:

“16.⁠ ⁠In view of the above, we are of the considered opinion that for claiming an exemption under section 1(4) a functional connection with the Armed Forces as to activities performed in the establishment where a person is employed must be established. At the same time, the functions of the Armed Forces are clearly spelled out in Article 245 of the Constitution and, therefore, only an installation which is directly connected with such function i.e. defence of Pakistan against external aggression or to act in aid of civil power if called upon to do so

must be shown. We are, therefore, clearly of the opinion that the mills in question is neither rendering services exclusively to the Armed Forces nor can it be treated as an installation of such forces.

27.It can be easily deduced from Army Welfare Sugar Mills Workers’ Union case supra that after the re-enactment of the Industrial Relations laws, under section 1 (4)(a)(b) of the IRO 2002, the exemption from provisions of the IRO 2002 was only found to be available to those installations which are exclusively connected with the Armed Forces. The Supreme Court laid down ‘exclusive’ function test, i.e. only those establishment and installation can claim exemption who can establish an exclusive functional connection with the Armed Forces as to the activities performed in the establishment”. This Supreme Court judgment, read with its earlier decisions of the Supreme Court, supports the conclusion that the earlier enactment and its judicial exposition may illuminate the latter provision, while the later enactment’s altered language must receive its full effect. This Court has noticed that there was a difference in the language of section 1 (3) of the IRO 1969 and section 1 (4)(a)(b) of the IRO 2002. However, the words and language of section 1 (4)(a)(b) of the IRO 2002 and section 1 (3) (a) of the IRA 2012 are similar.

28.The above distinction is decisive. The Court is not importing provisions of section the IRO 1969 into the IRA 2012. Nor is the expression “connected with or incidental to” being substituted for “exclusively connected with”. The latter language must be respected. The relevance of the earlier authorities lies in the fact

that they explain the nature of the connection which the legislature regarded as sufficient to remove an employment relationship from the ordinary industrial relations regime. The question under the present enactment is whether that connection is exclusive. If it is, the exclusion operates. Thus, the judgment of Army Welfare Sugar Mills Workers’ Union case supra is more instructive.

29.The provisions of section 1 (3) (a) of the IRO 1969, section 1 (4)(a)(b) of the IRO 2002 and section 1 (3)(a) of the IRA 2012 are in pari materia and they should be taken and considered together as one system and as explanatory of each other. Where words and expressions in a statute are taken from earlier statute in pari materia, which have received judicial construction, it must be assumed that the legislature was aware of such interpretation, and intended it to be followed in later statutory enactments. The above- discussed judgments of Supreme Court, read through the pari materia principle, illuminate the legislative concept carried from the IRO 1969 into the IRO 2002 and then into the IRA 2012. But the stricter statutory language of the IRO 2002 must still be applied. The distinction is between a merely incidental or general relationship with the Armed Forces and an installation whose very function is exclusively directed to the Armed Forces.

30.Now, we examine the function of respondent No.2 (Central Ordnance Depot) and apply the exclusive function test. The exclusive function of respondent No.1 is the receipt, custody, management and issue of stores for the Pakistan Army. Its purpose is not general civil supply. Its function is not merely ancillary to an

otherwise civilian establishment. The military logistics function is the very reason for its existence. Its relationship with the Armed Forces is therefore direct, functional and exclusive. Indeed, on the facts pleaded by respondent No.2, the connection is more immediate than that found sufficient in the cases concerning Cantonment Boards 1 , the Canteen Stores Department 2 and other supporting establishments.

31.The fact that the petitioners worked as tailors does not alter the character of the establishment. Section 1(3)(a) of the IRA 2012 employs the expression “any person employed” in the excluded service or installation. The statutory exclusion, therefore, does not depend upon the employee performing a military function as a member of Armed Forces. Once the establishment itself falls within the statutory exclusion, the provisions of the IRA 2012 does not apply to an employee of such establishment or institution and he cannot invoke the jurisdiction of NIRC merely by describing his particular trade as civilian in character.

32.This Court must also avoid statutory interpretation rendering section 1(3)(a) of the IRA 2012 redundant. The legislature expressly excluded a class of persons and installations from the application of the IRA 2012. A statutory construction which nevertheless brings such persons within the jurisdiction of NIRC would deprive the exclusion of practical effect. It is a settled principle of statutory interpretation that every word and provision Rehmit Gill v. Quetta Cantonment Board, PLD 1983 SC 133 Canteen Stores Department Employees Welfare Union v. Canteen Stores Department, PLD 1983 SC

is to be given meaning and effect, and that the Court should not adopt a construction which makes any part of the enactment superfluous or nugatory3.

33.Nor can jurisdiction be founded upon considerations of equity, convenience, parity or perceived hardship. Article 175(2) of the Constitution makes it clear that no court shall have jurisdiction save as conferred by the Constitution or by or under law. In Khalid Mehmood v. Chaklala Cantonment Board (2023 SCMR 1843), the Supreme Court reiterated that jurisdiction is a creature of law and cannot be assumed on the basis of judicial discretion or considerations of good conscience. Likewise, in Jameel Qadir v.

Government of Balochistan (2023 SCMR 1919), it was reiterated that jurisdiction cannot be conferred by consent, acquiescence or conduct, and proceedings before a forum lacking jurisdiction are coram non judice.

34.The judgment of the Labour Court in Farooq Mehmood’s case, relied by the petitioner, cannot enlarge the jurisdiction conferred upon the NIRC by the IRA 2012. Even assuming that the earlier judgment attained finality between the parties to that litigation, it cannot override an express statutory exclusion or confer jurisdiction where the legislature has withheld it.

Jurisdiction is foundational to substantive entitlement. A previous order cannot create jurisdiction which the statute does not confer.

35.The same answer applies to the petitioners’ reliance upon the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) East and West Steamship Co. v. Queens Land Insurance Co., PLD 1963 SC 395; Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-I, RTO Sialkot v. White Gold Steel Mills 2025 SCMR 1521;

Ordinance, 1968. The applicability of that enactment presupposes that the employment in question falls within the statutory industrial relations framework. An expressly excluded establishment cannot be brought within that framework indirectly by first characterizing the employee as a workman and then using that characterization to confer jurisdiction upon the NIRC. The sequence cannot be reversed.

36.The question whether the petitioners were permanent workmen, whether their engagement was of a casual nature, and whether they were entitled to regularization would arise only after the competent forum had jurisdiction to entertain their claim. Those questions cannot be used to create jurisdiction. The NIRC correctly treated jurisdiction as the threshold issue.

37.The fact that the IRA 2012 extends to establishments or industries operating in more than one province does not alter this conclusion. The trans-provincial character of an establishment is subject to the express exclusions contained in section 1(3) of the IRA, 2012. A general conferment of jurisdiction cannot override a specific statutory exclusion. To hold otherwise would be to read the words “but shall not apply” out of the statute, which this Court is not permitted to do.

38.For these reasons, respondent No.2, Central Ordnance Depot, is an installation exclusively connected with the Armed Forces of Pakistan within the meaning of section 1(3)(a) of the IRA 2012. The petitioners, being persons employed in that installation, fall within the statutory exclusion. The NIRC consequently lacked

jurisdiction to entertain their petition under section 33 or the appeal arising therefrom. Its conclusion that it lacked jurisdiction is therefore unexceptionable.

39.In view of the foregoing, the petitioners have failed to make out any case warranting interference by this Court in the impugned orders in exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution. The constitutional petition is, accordingly, dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.

(UMAIR MAJEED MALIK)

JUDGE

Announced in open Court on ___/10/2026

JUDGE

Approved for Reporting.

Shafqat*/