Ali Waheed Khan VS Fop etc

JUDGMENT SHEET

ISLAMABAD HIGH COURT, ISLAMABAD

JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

1. WRIT PETITION NO. 4837 OF 2025

ALI WAHEED KHAN

VERSUS

FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN THROUGH SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF COMMERCE AND

ANOTHER

2. WRIT PETITION NO. 4842 OF 2025

ESSAM ANWAR KHOKHAR

VERSUS

FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN THROUGH SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF COMMERCE AND

ANOTHER

3. WRIT PETITION NO. 4843 OF 2025

ASIM REHMAN

VERSUS

FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN, THROUGH SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF COMMERCE

AND ANOTHER

4. WRIT PETITION NO. 4844 OF 2025

KHAN BAHADUR WATOO

VERSUS

FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN THROUGH SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF COMMERCE AND

ANOTHER

5. WRIT PETITION NO. 4897 OF 2025

SYED FAWAD ALI SHAH

VERSUS

FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN, THROUGH THE SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF COMMERCE

6. WRIT PETITION NO. 486 OF 2026

FAHAD ALI CHAUDHARY

VERSUS

FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN, THROUGH THE SECRETARY MINISTRY OF COMMERCE

AND ANOTHER

7. WRIT PETITION NO. 5523 OF 2025

INAYAT MALIK

VERSUS

FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN THROUGH SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF COMMERCE AND

OTHERS

8. WRIT PETITION NO. 1351 OF 2026

ASIM REHMAN AND OTHERS

VERSUS

FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN, THROUGH THE SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF COMMERCE

AND ANOTHER

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9. WRIT PETITION NO. 902 OF 2026

INAYAT MALIK

VERSUS

FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN THROUGH SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF COMMERCE AND

OTHERS

M/s Kashif Ali Malik, Qaisar Abbas Gondal, Barrister Gul Share Ali Advocates in writ petition No. 4837/2025.

M/s Barrister M. Saad Buttar, Muiz Gul, Tahir Hussain Anchan, Barrister Danyal Sohail and Muhammad Fayaz, Advocates in writ petitions No. 4842, 4843 and 4844 of 2025, 1351 of 2026.

Petitioners by:

Mr. Syed Hasnain Ibrahim Kazmi and Mr. M. Saleem Iqbal, Advocates in writ petitions No. 4897 of 2025. Mr. Misbah ul Mustafa Safeer, Advocate in writ petition No. 486 of 2026.

Mr. Hassan Ali Khan Advocate in writ petition No. 5523 of 2025 and 902 of 2026.

Mr. Fahad Khan Tareen, AAG along with Kashif Manzoor Respondents Malik J.S. (HRM) and Israr Mashal Khan S.O. (T.O-I) No. 1 and 2 by:

Ministry of Commerce.

Respondent Qazi Ghulam Dastgir, Advocate. (In writ petitions No.3 by: No.5523/2025 and 902/2026.)

Muhammad Yahya Khan Niazi, Judicial Law Clerk and

ASSISTED BY:

Muhammad Fahad Research Intern.

DATE OF

HEARING:

INAAM AMEEN MINHAS, J.- This common judgment shall decide the afore- titled writ petitions, as they involve similar questions of law and facts.

2.In first six (06) afore-titled writ petitions from Sr. No. 1 to 6, the petitioners have assailed the order dated 13.11.2025 (“Impugned Order”) passed by the Secretary, Ministry of Commerce, whereby the petitioners’ representations were dismissed. The petitioners also seek a direction to the respondents to complete all remaining formalities, including the issuance of the final appointment letter and diplomatic passports, to enable the petitioners to assume their posts abroad.

3.In the writ petitions listed at serial No. 8 i.e. W.P. No. 1351/2026, the petitioners, in addition to the afore-referred prayers, have also sought a

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declaration that the decision of re-advertisement of the vacant post pertaining to the Trade and Investment Officers for Trade Missions abroad approved by the Competent Authority (Prime Minister) vide summary dated 22.12.2025 (“Impugned Decision”) is without lawful authority and no legal effect.

4.In the writ petition listed at serial No. 7 i.e., W.P. No. 5523/2025, the petitioner, Inayat Malik approached this court seeking the direction to the respondents to fill the vacant positions from waiting list as per 2024 Policy Guidelines, and writ petition listed at serial No. 9 i.e., W.P. No. 902/2026, he again approached this court to declare the Impugned decision being illegal.

5.The common facts in these petitions are that the Respondent Ministry, vide advertisement dated 05.12.2024, invited applications from officers (BS-18 to BS-20) as well as private-sector candidates for appointment as Trade and Investment Officers at Pakistan’s Trade Missions abroad, clearly stipulating the eligibility criteria and the prescribed selection mechanism. In furtherance thereof, comprehensive Policy Guidelines dated 17.12.2024 (“2024 Policy”) were duly notified, providing that applications would be shortlisted by a Selection Committee constituted by the Secretary, Ministry of Commerce, followed by a Written Test and Psychometric Test carrying 60% weightage, and an Interview by a duly constituted Interview Board carrying the remaining 40% weightage. The Policy further mandated the preparation of a merit-based final list for submission to the Honourable Competent Authority for approval, the allocation of stations to successful candidates strictly in order of merit, and the maintenance of a waiting list to meet any subsequent contingencies. In pursuance of the said process, the Petitioners were duly shortlisted, granted a No Objection Certificate by the Federal Board of Revenue on 23.12.2024, successfully cleared the written and psychometric tests conducted at LUMS on 05.01.2025 and 18.01.2025, respectively, and was thereafter interviewed on 30.01.2025. Upon successful completion of all stages, a final list of 28 selected candidates was submitted to and approved by the Honourable Competent Authority. Consequent upon approval and acceptance of the provisional offer by the Competent Authority, the Respondent Ministry, vide Office Memorandum dated 16.04.2025, directed the Federal Board of Revenue to relieve the selected officers for mandatory training at the Pakistan Institute of Trade & Development

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(PITAD), which the petitioners duly attended and successfully completed. Simultaneously, the Respondent Ministry initiated further pre-departure steps by seeking options regarding transportation of household effects, determination of diplomatic status, and banking details, all of which were promptly furnished by the Petitioners, thereby demonstrating substantial and irreversible progress towards their foreign posting. Despite lapse of more than three months after completion of training, the Respondents inexplicably failed to undertake further routine and ministerial pre-departure formalities, including issuance of the final appointment letter and diplomatic passport, while similarly placed candidates were processed and posted, leaving the Petitioners in an unexplained state of limbo. Repeated grievances, including a detailed representations, elicited no response, compelling the Petitioners to invoke the constitutional jurisdiction of this Court. During the proceedings, the Respondents for the first time attributed the delay to undisclosed adverse vetting reports, whereupon this Court, vide Order dated 17.09.2025 in Writ Petition No. 3411/2025, directed the Respondents to decide the Petitioner’s representations after affording due hearing and in accordance with settled law, however the Respondent Ministry dismissed their representations through the Impugned Order, based on secret intelligence reports, in manifest violation of the principles of natural justice.

6.The facts in writ petition No. 5523/2025 listed at serial No. 7 are that the petitioner also applied for the same programme, passed the Written and Psychometric Tests, appeared in the interview. The Petitioner was shortlisted and appeared in the interview on 30.01.2025. A final list of 28 selected candidates along with a Waiting List inclusive of the Petitioner was approved by the Prime Minister. Upon one selected candidate, Mr. Khurram, declining his provisional offer for Baghdad, the vacancy was offered to Mr. Zeeshan Asif from the Waiting List; however, Mr. Zeeshan Asif was suspended on 14.07.2025 and Efficiency & Discipline proceedings were initiated against him, rendering him ineligible for foreign posting under the 2024 Policy. Despite this, the Respondent Ministry issued him a Final Appointment Letter on 29.07.2025. When the Petitioner sought information, the Ministry replied on 10.12.2025 that the selection cycle remained incomplete. Aggrieved by the appointment of an ineligible candidate and the Ministry’s failure to consider the next eligible candidate on the Waiting List, the Petitioner has preferred the instant petition.

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7.The learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the Impugned Order has been passed in patent violation of the directions issued by this Court vide order dated 17.09.2025, whereby the matter was remanded with a categorical mandate to decide the same within a stipulated period in light of the settled law cited therein. However, instead of undertaking an independent and reasoned determination, the respondent merely reproduced and converted the reports earlier placed before the Court into the Impugned Order, without any meaningful application of mind or adherence to the binding directions. Furthermore, the contents of the Special Vetting Agencies reports were neither disclosed nor confronted to the petitioners, in direct contravention of the remand order, nor was any reference made to the cited precedents, rendering the exercise perfunctory and legally unsustainable. Learned counsels submitted that the Impugned Order is further vitiated by non-compliance with Section 24A of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (“GCA 1897”), as it lacks clarity of reasons, fails to identify any deficiency in the petitioner’s service records or performances, and rests solely upon a bare “not suitable” recommendation, the contents whereof were neither known to the Respondents nor supported by any disclosed material. They argued that it is well settled that reasons must be intelligible, based on cogent material, and capable of satisfying the test of a reasonable person; reliance on undisclosed and unverified intelligence inputs amounts to hearsay and conjecture, which has consistently been deprecated by the superior Courts.

8.Learned counsel for the petitioners further submitted that the respondents have acted in violation of the settled principles of natural justice by failing to confront the petitioners with the adverse material relied upon, thereby denying them a fair opportunity of defence in breach of Articles 4 and 10A of the Constitution. The non-disclosure of such material renders it legally worthless and incapable of forming the basis of any adverse action. The Impugned Order also reflects an impermissible exercise of unfettered discretion, whereby the respondents have assumed unbridled authority to disregard the entire structured selection process, including written examinations, psychometric assessments, interviews by a high-powered board, and final approval by the competent authority, and instead substitute it with an unreasoned reliance on intelligence reports. Such discretion is required to be structured through transparent procedures, reasons, and objective criteria, all of which are conspicuously absent

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in the present case. Learned counsels submitted that the petitioners have successfully completed the prescribed process, secured approval, and accepted their appointments, and thus acquired vested rights and a legitimate expectation to be posted in accordance with the governing policy, which does not contemplate reliance on undisclosed vetting reports or deviation from the prescribed procedure. The selective and inconsistent application of such criteria, including instances where similarly placed candidates have been appointed despite adverse recommendations, further establishes discrimination in violation of Article 25 of the Constitution. The reliance on inapplicable statutory instruments upon intelligence agencies to effectively veto a duly completed selection process not only undermines the rule of law but also constitutes a colorable exercise of power. In these circumstances, the Impugned Order, being arbitrary, unlawful, and violative of fundamental rights, is liable to be set aside.

9.In addition to the above submissions, Barrister Saad Buttar on the issue of the Impugned Decision, contended that the same is ex facie arbitrary and suffers from a fundamental legal infirmity inasmuch as it is a non-speaking order, rendered in clear violation of Section 24A of the General Clauses Act, 1897 as well as the settled dicta of the superior Courts, which mandate that every administrative or executive action adversely affecting rights must be supported by cogent reasons. He submitted that paragraph 38 of the summary neither discloses the nature of the posts sought to be re-advertised nor clarifies whether such posts pertain to those already held or offered to the petitioners, thereby rendering the approval a nullity in the eyes of law. Furthermore, the respondents have failed to disclose the complete summary despite repeated requests and have instead furnished only selective extracts, including a concluding paragraph and a portion proposing withdrawal of provisional offer letters, without any supporting reasoning or material. Such partial and opaque disclosure not only defeats the very purpose of a reasoned decision but also infringes the petitioners’ fundamental right to information under Article 19A of the Constitution. He argued that the absence of reasons demonstrates that the decision to re-advertise posts already subject to pending litigation before this Court has been taken without lawful authority and is against the principle of lis pendes. It was further submitted that the Impugned Decision violates the principles of natural justice, particularly audi alteram partem, and the fundamental right to a fair trial

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guaranteed under Article 10A of the Constitution, as the Petitioners were afforded no opportunity of hearing prior to the adverse decision. The action of the Respondents also infringes Articles 25 and 19A of the Constitution and is liable to be struck down on this score alone. The Petitioners, having successfully undergone a rigorous selection process, secured approval from the competent authority, accepted their offers, and completed mandatory training, had acquired vested rights which could not lawfully be rescinded in view of the principle of locus poenitentiae read with Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. The impugned action further violates the doctrine of legitimate expectation, as the Petitioners were led to reasonably expect appointment in accordance with the 2024 Policy, which does not contemplate re-advertisement after completion of the selection process and instead provides for a waiting list mechanism. The arbitrary departure from the Policy, coupled with discriminatory treatment whereby similarly placed candidates have been allowed to proceed while the Petitioners have been singled out, reflects mala fide intent and colourable exercise of authority. The Respondents’ conduct, including non-disclosure of the Impugned decision based on summary during court proceedings, failure to follow due process under the Rules of Business, and attempts to undermine pending judicial proceedings, further vitiates the impugned action. In these circumstances, the Impugned decision based on summary is not only illegal and without lawful authority but also violative of the Petitioners’ fundamental and vested rights, and thus liable to be set aside.

10.Mr. Hassan Ali Khan appearing for the petitioner in Writ Petitions at serial No. 7 and 9 contended that the Impugned Decision is in patent violation of the Rules of Business, 1973 which mandate that no important policy decision may be taken except with the approval of the Competent Authority (Prime Minister), and further obligate that any illegality or deviation from law or policy be expressly pointed out to the competent authority. However, in the instant case, the Ministry of Commerce initiated and processed the summary in clear derogation of the Policy Guidelines dated 17.12.2024 by unlawfully bypassing the mandatory mechanism for appointment from the waiting list, thereby fettering its own discretion and misrepresenting material facts before the Competent Authority (Prime Minister). He submitted that the summary failed to comply with Paragraph 49(i) of Appendix E to the Secretariat Instructions, 2021,

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as it neither presented a complete, objective and self-contained statement of facts nor disclosed that a duly approved waiting list existed which was required to be exhausted strictly on merit. Consequently, the approval dated 22.12.2025 stands vitiated by non-disclosure of crucial facts. He argued that the subject matter of the summary squarely fell within the domain of the Establishment Division, and in the absence of mandatory prior consultation as required under Rules 8 and 11 of the Rules of Business and Instructions 31 and 38 of the Secretariat Instructions, the entire exercise is rendered ultra vires the Constitution and without lawful authority, particularly in view of the admitted disagreement of the Establishment Division regarding re-advertisement of posts without completion of the ongoing recruitment cycle.

11.Mr. Hassan Ali further submitted that the Policy Guidelines dated 17.12.2024 do not envisage re-advertisement of posts prior to exhaustion of the waiting list, nor does the Impugned Decision disclose any lawful authority for such deviation, rendering the same arbitrary and liable to be set aside in terms of binding precedent since the same is against the settled law laid down by the superior Courts, including the principle that vacancies arising during a recruitment cycle must be filled from the existing merit list and cannot be carried forward or subjected to a fresh process, thereby conferring a vested right upon the petitioner for appointment once the vacancy arose. He also argued that the respondents have bypassed the mandatory consultation requirement, suppressed material facts, and acted in disregard of prescribed procedure, which demonstrates apparent bias and mala fide, thereby vitiating the entire decision- making process. Lastly, he submitted that the petitioner has been subjected to discrimination which is a violation of Article 25 of the Constitution, as similarly placed candidates have either been appointed or considered, whereas the petitioner has been unlawfully excluded through an irregular and procedurally defective process and in these circumstances, the Impugned Decision is without jurisdiction, lawful authority, and liable to be declared void ab initio.

12.On the other side, the respondents vehemently denied the contentions of the petitioners and contended that the entire process was concluded strictly in accordance with the law and the provisional offer letter dated 07.04.2025 for posting as Trade and Investment Officer to Pakistan Trade Mission Abroad

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clearly contains the conditions of security vetting performa and as per the security agency, the petitioners were declared not suitable for posting abroad and the respondents have no powers to over role, interfere with, or ignore such assessment and further contended that the competent authority rightly passed the order for re-advertisement and finally prayed for dismissal of the writ petitions. Moreover, the learned AAG raised an objection that the aforetitled writ petitions are not maintainable on the ground that the matter is related to internal administrative function and executive policy domain, and the petitioners are civil servant, the bar under Article 212 of the Constitution is also attracted.

13.I have given anxious consideration to the arguments of the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record with their able assistance.

14.Before entering upon the merits of the matter, it is necessary to first address the objection as to the maintainability raised by the learned Assistant Attorney General who contended that these petitions are not maintainable under Article 199 of the Constitution, as the matter pertains to internal administrative functioning, executive policy domain, and interdepartmental processing of a summary before the competent authority. He further contended that no vested, accrued, or indefeasible right has been created in favour of the petitioners, and the provisional offer letters were conditional in nature and subject to fulfilment of codal formalities, including security clearance and administrative approval. There is no cavil to the principle that the Courts should exercise restraint and defer in matters of policy and security.1 The reason being that the policy and administrative issues (often referred to as polycentric issues) requiring specialized expertise are left to the discretion of competent authorities who are better positioned to record opinions on such matters, and courts should exercise restraint on such matters; however, these are subject to judicial review if any glaring illegality or violation of fundamental rights exists.2 Moreover, this Court in the case of Muhammad Irfan Wahid vs. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Commerce, Islamabad and another, (2024 PLC (C.S.)

556)has held:-

Muhammad Azam v. Province of Punjab etc., (2022 CLC 532), Muhammad Umais v. Cantonment Board Rawalpindi and others, (PLD 2022 Lahore 148) and Syed Faisal Mehboob v. Federation of Pakistan and others, (2022 CLC 1153)

Ibid

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“It is trite law that matters pertaining to the terms and conditions of a civil service are to be dealt with by the Service Tribunal constituted under Service Tribunal Act, 1973 pursuant to Article 212 of the Constitution and no court, including this Court, can exercise jurisdiction in such matters. It is also an established law that transfer and posting is a term and condition of service and case law relied upon by the respondents is apt and instructive. Reference can be made to cases reported as Altaf Hussain Khuhro and 3 others v. Federation of Pakistan and 6 others (2023 SCMR 796) and Dr. Muhammad Saleem v. Government of Balochistan and others (2023 SCMR 2119), however, the facts, in the instant case, are different and it is not a matter of transfer and posting within the meaning of the concept as provided in section 10 of Civil Servants Act, 1973. In somewhat similar circumstances, a challenge was made to the appointments of civil servants at Trade Missions Abroad through a petition under Article 199 of the Constitution in case reported as Sajid Mehmood Raja and another v. Federation of Pakistan and others [2013 PLC (C.S.) 864] and an objection was raised regarding maintainability of petition, which was dealt with by this Court in paragraph-17 of the judgment and opined that since the petitioners who are civil servants are seeking remedy of being posted abroad on the basis of policy, which did not form part of terms and conditions of service, hence the petitions are not for implementation of terms and conditions of service, therefore, bar under Article 212 of the Constitution had no application in the present case; the petitions were held to be maintainable... The Lahore High Court, in case reported as Dr. Masood Saleem v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Establishment Division and another [2013 PLC (C.S.) 1062], was confronted as to the transfer and posting on the basis of rotation policy notified on 22.07.2000. The Lahore High Court adopted the same reasoning as was given by this Court in case [2013 PLC (C.S.) 864] supra in holding that petition is maintainable, as the matter pertains to transfer policy, hence bar under Article 212 of the Constitution, is not attracted. The Lahore High Court went on to observe that where a particular mode is laid down for doing an act and there is no impediment in adopting the procedure laid down, a deviation from that procedure amounts to being unreasonable and can be labeled as being arbitrary. It was observed that if the policy is to be deviated, cogent reasons are to be given for doing the same. Similar view was taken by this Court in decision in case titled as 'Muhammad Adil Khan and others v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Overseas Pakistanis and Human Resource Development and others (W.P.No.3055-2019) and case reported as Zaigham Abbas and 10 others v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of OP and HRD and 14 others [2021 PLC (C.S.) 486]. This Court, while holding that when appointments are to be made pursuant to a specific policy and change in policy after interviews have been conducted, creates vested right to be dealt with in accordance with the policy, as it originally existed, allowed the petition.”

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15.The objection to maintainability is not tenable, the instant petitions do not pertain to transfer and posting within the meaning of Section 10 of the Civil Servants Act, 1973, nor do they seek enforcement of terms and conditions of service so as to attract the bar under Article 212 of the Constitution. As regards the objection of executive policy domain, it is well-settled that where a specific policy has been notified and acted upon, and a selection process has been conducted thereunder, any deviation from that policy without cogent reasons is arbitrary and unreasonable, hence amenable to judicial review. A vested right accrues to candidates to be considered in accordance with the policy as it originally existed. Therefore, in view of the above dictum by this Court, these petitions are also maintainable.

16.Briefly recapitulated, the petitioners were provisionally appointed for the post of Trade and Investment Officer and were granted posting abroad. However, despite fulfilling all legal, procedural, and merit-based requirements for posting, the respondents failed to issue the Final Appointment Letters to the petitioners, thereby compelling them to invoke the constitutional jurisdiction of this Court. During the proceedings, it transpired that the delay was due to the undisclosed adverse security reports by the vetting agency. Hence, vide order dated 17.09.2025, this Court directed the respondents to decide the petitioners’ representations after affording due hearing and in accordance with settled law, however the respondents dismissed the representations vide the Impugned Order. Thereafter, the Competent Authority (Prime Minister) vide the Impugned Decision allowed the re-advertisement of the vacant posts. While considering the background of the petitions, the grounds raised by the parties and the question of law involved, the following questions need adjudication by this Court:-

i)Whether the Impugned Order dated 13.11.2025, dismissing the petitioners’ representations on the basis of undisclosed Intelligence Bureau reports, is arbitrary, non-speaking and violative of Section 24-A of the General Clauses Act, 1897?

ii)Whether, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the Impugned Decision is liable to be set aside and the petitioners including those in the waiting list are entitled to the relief of issuance of final appointment letter and completion of pre- departure formalities?

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17.This Court shall now address the first question framed. It is evident from the record that Secretary Commerce dismissed the petitioners’ representations vide the Impugned Order on the solitary ground of a “Not Suitable for Posting Abroad” recommendation received from the Special Vetting Agency i.e. Intelligence Bureau. The sole reasoning provided was that security clearance is an independent statutory precondition for all foreign postings for which reliance was placed on S.R.O. 801(I)/2022 dated 17.06.2022, wherein the Intelligence Bureau has been notified as the Special Vetting Agency for officer’s category for initial appointment, induction, certain postings abroad and specific promotions and on Establishment Division’s O.M. dated 18.07.1983 which states that all government personnel being posted abroad on governmental appointments or on deputation with other agencies will have to be cleared by the intelligence agencies. The Impugned Order fails to identify any other ground, such as whether it was the petitioners’ service records which were found wanting, their performance in the selection process, or any adverse entry, penalty, or pending disciplinary proceedings. The Impugned Order, at its core, states that the Intelligence Bureau has declared the petitioners unsuitable and, on that basis, has declined the appointments/postings. Thus, it needs to be seen whether the Impugned Order meets the test of a speaking order under section 24A of the GCA, 1897.

18.Section 24A of the GCA, 1897 stipulates that statutory power must be exercised reasonably, fairly, justly, and for advancement of the purpose of the enactment. The Superior Courts have dilated upon section 24 of the GCA, 1897 and enunciated the principle that the executive authorities, while exercising discretion, must give reasons for their decision through a speaking order. The requirement to articulate reasons is neither a mere procedural ritual nor a bureaucratic formality; rather, it is a substantive safeguard designed to demonstrate that discretion has been exercised judiciously, objectively, and with due application of mind. A reasoned order is the instrument by which the decision-making authority demonstrates that it has applied its mind to the matter, considered the relevant material, and arrived at a conclusion that a reasonable person, placed in the same position, could arrive at.

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19.A perusal of the Impugned Order reveals that it is noticeably silent with regard to the contents of the intelligence reports and fails to disclose or even reference the grounds which purportedly formed the basis of such an adverse recommendation. It is a principle that a decision rendered without disclosure or consideration of the underlying adverse material cannot be regarded as reasonable and can only be classified as irrational3, since when an administrative decision is bereft of any cogent, tangible, or record-based foundation, the same constitutes misuse of discretion and actions that fail to meet this threshold are regarded as arbitrary.4 A bare perusal of the Impugned Order reflects that the respondents have not read the intelligence reports in their entirety and, remarkably, they admit that they acted upon a bare “Not Suitable” recommendation without perusing the underlying material. The Impugned Order neither discloses the nature of the adverse findings nor identifies the specific conduct or attributes of the petitioners that are alleged to be deficient. It further fails to explain how the Intelligence Bureau's conclusion can be reconciled with the petitioners’ unblemished service records and the categorical certification from their respective parent departments confirming the absence of any pending disciplinary proceedings. An authority that does not itself know the contents of the report; therefore, the impugned order was passed without considering the crucial material of the report and only reproducing the statutory precondition of security clearance mandated under S.R.O. 801(I)/2022 dated 17.06.2022, and Establishment Division’s O.M. dated 18.07.1983.

20.There is no cavil to the principle that the Courts should exercise restraint and defer in matters of policy and security.5 The reason being that the policy and administrative issues (often referred to as polycentric issues) requiring specialized expertise are left to the discretion of competent authorities who are better positioned to record opinions on such matters, and courts should exercise restraint on such matters; however, these are subject to judicial review if any The ground of irrationality, as classically expounded by Lord Diplock in Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374, denotes a decision which is so outrageous in its defiance of logic or of accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at it. This formulation is commonly denominated as Wednesbury unreasonableness, which originated from the celebrated English authority in Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corporation [(1947) 2 All ER 680], also cited as [1948] 1 KB 223.

Montgomery Flour and General Mills Ltd., Montgomery vs. The Director, Food Purchases, West Pakistani (PLD 1957 Lah, 914) and Abid Hasan vs. PIAC, (2005 SCMR 25)

Muhammad Azam v. Province of Punjab etc., (2022 CLC 532), Muhammad Umais v. Cantonment Board Rawalpindi and others, (PLD 2022 Lahore 148) and Syed Faisal Mehboob v. Federation of Pakistan and others, (2022 CLC 1153)

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glaring illegality or violation of fundamental rights exists6. The illegality apparent on the face of the record is the impugned order dated 13.11.2025 passed by the respondent’s failure to exercise independent judgment and statutory discretion vested in him. What the Impugned Order presents as a decision is, in substance, the delegation of the respondent’s decision-making function to an intelligence officer whose report has not even been read, much less evaluated. Moreover, the Impugned Order mechanically disregards the confrontation of the intelligence reports with the petitioners by relying on the Right to Information Act, 2017, and the Official Secrets Act, 1923. However, both the Impugned Order and the learned counsel for the respondents have failed to point out any provision of law, notification, or binding directive whereby such material has been declared classified by a competent authority. The claim of confidentiality must rest upon a demonstrable legal foundation. In the present matter, no such foundation has been established. No notification, order, or document has been placed on record to establish that the reports of the Special Vetting Agency fall within any protected or classified category. Even if such a claim were to be raised, it would necessarily be subject to recorded reasons justifying such classification, and further, to the well-recognised principle that disclosure may still be warranted where the harm from disclosure does not outweigh the overriding public interest. Even otherwise, the contention that the reports of the Special Vetting Agency are immune from disclosure cannot be accepted as an absolute proposition of law since this Court has time and again held that confidentiality cannot be invoked as a cloak to defeat the requirements of fairness, transparency, and due process.

21.More importantly, such action offends the well-settled principles of natural justice, in particular the rule of audi alteram partem, i.e. no one should be condemned unheard. It is manifest from the record that, despite the petitioners’ repeated requests and references to precedents, they were neither confronted with any adverse material nor afforded an opportunity to peruse the intelligence reports. Had the respondents acted fairly and justly, they would have adopted this process, granted the petitioners a meaningful opportunity to respond to the allegations in the reports, since the principles of natural justice mandate that a person must first be confronted with the adverse material/allegation, and Ibid

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afforded an opportunity to explain or disprove its accuracy. At the very least, the petitioners ought to have been confronted with the substance of the intelligence report, even if in a limited or confidential manner, such as in camera or for their eyes only, so as to enable them to demonstrate the falsity or irrelevance of the material relied upon, and the conclusion reached. It is trite law that audi alteram partem has to be applied in all judicial and non-judicial proceedings. Failure to confront the officer with such material amounts to a clear violation of the settled principle of audi alteram partem and any departure therefrom would suffice to vitiate even the most solemn of proceedings.7 However, the Impugned Order addresses this violation in a purely mechanical manner. Even otherwise, the Courts have consistently held that adverse action based on a negative report from intelligence agencies, especially when the civil servant was not confronted with the report, is illegal. The principles governing the use of adverse intelligence material in matters affecting the rights of civil servants are well-settled, and there is no need to expound upon them at length. It suffices to state the governing propositions and to apply them to the facts of the present case. Reliance is placed on, 2017 PLC (CS) Note 66, para 94; 2017 SCMR 969; 2025 PLC (CS) 555; WP No. 421/2022 (judgment dated 24.06.2022); PLD 1986 SC 162.8 The Supreme Court in PLD 1986 SC 162 upheld the decision of the Labour Court that an incumbent condemned on the basis of secret reports, without the evidence being brought on record or disclosed, had been denied a fair hearing; it held that evidence against an officer facing adverse action must either be brought on record or disclosed to him if already on record.

22.Even otherwise, this Court, in order to ascertain the veracity of the intelligence reports, sought the same to be made part of the record. However, the reports have not been produced or placed before this Court despite specific judicial direction to that effect. In such circumstances, the only inference that can be drawn is that the reports either do not exist in any form capable of withstanding judicial scrutiny, or that their contents are so bereft of substance Hazara (Hill Tract) Improvement Trust through Chairman and others vs. Mst. Qaisra Elahi and others, (2005 SCMR 678), and Raziuddin vs. Chairman, Pakistan Airlines Corporation and 2 others, (PLD 1992 SC 531).

Secretary, Establishment Division, Government of Pakistan vs. Dr. Muhammad Arif and others, (2017 PLC (CS) Note 66), Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Establishment Division and others vs. Dr. Muhammad Arif and others (2017 SCMR 969), Muhammad Tahir Hassan vs. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Establishment Division and 2 others (2025 PLC (CS) 555), Government of the Punjab and another vs. S. Tassadaq Hussain Bokhari (PLD 1986 SC 162), Yousif Hyder Sheikh vs. Establishment Division etc (WP No. 421/2022, Islamabad High Court).

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that the respondents have consciously elected not to produce them. Either way, the consequence in law is the same: a decision that purports to rest upon a document which the decision-making authority has not read, which it cannot produce before the Court, and the contents of which remain wholly undisclosed to the persons adversely affected, is a decision that rests upon nothing. It is not a decision in any legally cognizable sense; it is an exercise in form without substance, and the Court cannot lend its imprimatur to a process so conducted.

23.The above discussion leads to the irresistible conclusion that the pre- departure formalities required after completion of the selection process cannot be equated with the eligibility or disqualification criteria prescribed under the Policy, 2024. Such formalities are merely administrative and procedural in nature, intended to facilitate the implementation of the appointment process, and do not constitute substantive conditions governing eligibility for selection. Once the petitioners had successfully passed all stages of scrutiny, assessment, and selection, and their cases had been duly recommended by the relevant authorities and ultimately approved by the Competent Authority (Prime Minister), their right to be considered for foreign posting had crystallized in accordance with the Policy. It is observed that once a candidate has successfully passed through all stages of scrutiny, evaluation, and selection, and his case has been duly considered and approved by the competent authorities in accordance with the applicable policy and law, the selection process attains finality. In such circumstances, any procedural or administrative formalities required to be completed after the selection cannot be treated as conditions affecting the validity of the selection itself. These post-selection requirements are intended only to facilitate the implementation and execution of the decision already taken by the competent authority and do not constitute substantive criteria governing eligibility or entitlement. Therefore, such procedural requirements cannot be permitted to supersede, defeat, or nullify the final decision lawfully reached by the competent authority. To hold otherwise would result in a situation where administrative formalities are elevated above the substantive decision-making process, thereby allowing a completed and duly approved selection to be frustrated on grounds that were never prescribed as eligibility conditions. Such an approach would be contrary to the principles of fairness, reasonableness, and legal certainty. Once the competent authority has exercised its jurisdiction and

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rendered a final decision after due consideration of all relevant factors, that decision cannot be rendered ineffective merely because certain subsequent procedural steps remain to be completed. Administrative procedures are meant to give effect to a lawful decision, not to override or invalidate it. Accordingly, post-selection formalities must remain subordinate to the final approval granted by the competent authority and cannot be used as a basis to deprive a selected candidate of the benefit of a selection already validly made in accordance with law.

24.A careful examination of the Policy, 2024 further reveals that the grounds of ineligibility have been specifically identified and exhaustively enumerated by the rule-making authority. The Policy excludes from consideration only those officers who fall within the expressly stated categories, including officers facing disciplinary proceedings, those subjected to major penalties under the Efficiency and Discipline Rules, 1973, beneficiaries of Plea Bargain or Voluntary Return, officers who fail to apply through the proper channel, those lacking the prescribed Performance Evaluation Reports, officers who have already completed the maximum permissible foreign tenure, and those previously recalled from foreign assignments on account of unsatisfactory performance. Significantly, the Policy nowhere provides that non-compliance with any pre- departure requirement shall render a selected officer ineligible or unsuitable for appointment abroad. It is a settled principle of law that where a policy or statutory instrument expressly specifies particular grounds of disqualification, no additional condition may be introduced through implication, interpretation, or administrative practice. Therefore, in the absence of any provision declaring non-completion of pre-departure formalities to be a disqualification, such requirements cannot be elevated to the status of a controlling condition capable of defeating a duly approved appointment.

25.The record further demonstrates that, apart from the conditions expressly prescribed under the Policy, 2024, the respondents have failed to identify any lawful basis for denying the petitioners the benefit of their selection. The only additional requirement relied upon by the respondents consisted of the submission of a health declaration form, security vetting proforma, notarized undertaking, and personal profile. These requirements surfaced only after the

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petitioners had successfully completed the entire selection process, had been found eligible under all prescribed criteria, and had already secured approval from the competent authority. At that stage, the selection process had effectively concluded, the final list of selected candidates had been issued, and even the waiting list had been finalized. However, despite the completion of all substantive requirements, the petitioners were abruptly prevented from proceeding further solely on the basis of a security clearance opinion declaring them “not suitable for posting abroad.”

26.The respondents sought to justify their action by relying upon SRO 801(I)/2022 dated 17.06.2022 and Clause 17.4 of the Office Memorandum dated 18.07.1983, which requires that officers proposed for foreign postings be cleared by the Intelligence Bureau before proceeding abroad. However, a plain reading of Clause 17.4 shows that the names of such officers must be forwarded to the Intelligence Bureau 10 to 12 weeks before their scheduled departure so that the requisite vetting process may be completed in a timely manner. The material available on record does not indicate strict adherence to this prescribed procedure. The apparent failure to obtain and process the relevant reports within the stipulated period raises serious concerns regarding consistency, transparency, and procedural fairness, particularly when the alleged ground of unsuitability is not recognized as a disqualification under the Policy, 2024 itself. It is well settled that when the law provides a specific procedure for doing a particular act, such act must be performed strictly in accordance with that procedure. Any departure from the prescribed method is impermissible in law and renders the resulting action void, illegal, and without lawful effect.

27.More importantly, the preliminary inquiry report submitted by respondents No.1 and 2 before this Court contains a significant admission. The respondents acknowledged that the Intelligence Bureau had declared eighteen selected candidates as having no adverse security-related information against them, whereas ten candidates, including the petitioners, were merely declared “not suitable for posting abroad.” The respondents further admitted that the reasons underlying such declaration were known only to the Intelligence Bureau. This admission clearly establishes that neither the actual intelligence reports nor the material forming the basis of the declaration were ever forwarded to

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respondent No.1 or placed before the competent authority for independent consideration. Consequently, the decision affecting the petitioners was not based on an examination of any adverse material by the competent authority, but merely on a bare conclusion communicated by the vetting agency.

28.It is noteworthy that despite repeated directions of this Court, the Respondents failed to place the intelligence reports on record, the very documents relied upon to justify the impugned action, thereby attracting an adverse inference against them. The Respondents further conceded before this Court that the said reports contained no allegation of misconduct, corruption, criminal activity, indiscipline, or inefficiency against the Petitioners, and merely recorded a bare conclusion of “unsuitability” without disclosing any supporting facts, evidence, or reasons. It is well-settled that administrative decisions affecting valuable rights and legitimate expectations must rest upon relevant material, cogent reasoning, and lawful consideration, and that a bald declaration of unsuitability, unsubstantiated by any disclosed material, cannot acquire legal sanctity merely by virtue of its source. Where a candidate has successfully cleared every prescribed stage of a competitive selection process and has been duly approved by the competent authority, any subsequent decision to withhold appointment must rest upon cogent and legally sustainable grounds demonstrating a supervening ineligibility or disqualification, mere invocation of “not suitable,” divorced from any disclosed factual basis, is neither a substitute for evidence nor sufficient legal justification for reversing a completed selection process, and the impugned action is accordingly unsustainable in law.

29.Furthermore, although the respondents attempted to argue that no adverse or punitive action had been taken against the petitioners, the practical consequences of the impugned decision demonstrate otherwise. The petitioners, after successfully qualifying through a transparent and merit-based process and securing final approval from the highest competent authority, were denied foreign posting solely because of the undisclosed intelligence reports. Such denial carries undeniable civil consequences. It deprives the petitioners of an appointment earned on merit, adversely affects their professional reputation, and casts a shadow upon their future prospects of being considered for foreign assignments. The respondents have taken the position that the Intelligence

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Report does not adversely affect the petitioner’s career prospects. However, this stance is self-contradictory, as the same report has been relied upon to declare the petitioner ineligible for posting abroad. If the Intelligence Report carries no adverse consequences for the petitioners service career, there is no lawful basis to use it as a ground for denying them an overseas appointment. The respondents cannot simultaneously contend that the report has no bearing on the petitioner’s rights while, at the same time, relying upon it to deprive him of a valuable service opportunity. Such inconsistent and contradictory positions amount to approbating and reprobating at the same time, which is not permissible in law.

30.In these circumstances, the Court is of the considered view that an undisclosed and unsupported declaration of “unsuitability,” unaccompanied by any adverse material, cogent evidence, or lawful reasoning, cannot be permitted to override a completed selection process conducted strictly in accordance with the Policy, 2024 and culminating in approval by the competent authority. Such action is inconsistent with the principles of transparency, fairness, natural justice, and good governance. Administrative authorities are required to act on the basis of relevant material and lawful considerations and cannot deprive citizens or public servants of accrued rights and legitimate expectations on the basis of secret, unexplained, and unsubstantiated opinions. Consequently, the impugned action lacks lawful justification and cannot be sustained in the eyes of law.

31.This Court shall now address the second question, i.e. whether the Impugned Decision is liable to be set aside and the petitioners, including those in the waiting list, are entitled to the relief of issuance of final appointment letter and completion of pre-departure formalities? In this regard, this Court has no hesitation in holding that the petitioner’s rights in the present matter did not remain at the level of a mere expectation at any material time after the Competent Authority’s approval of the merit list. By the time the Impugned Order was passed and decision for re-advertisement was taken, the following events had occurred: the petitioners had been selected on merit through a rigorous and exhaustive process; the Competent Authority had approved their appointments; provisional offer letters had been issued; those offers had been unconditionally accepted; the petitioners had been relieved from their parent departments for

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mandatory training and had furnished all pre-departure requirements. At each of these stages, the petitioners acted in reliance on the representations made to them by the respondent Ministry. The cumulative effect of these facts is that vested rights had accrued to the petitioners that cannot be rescinded by executive fiat. The Supreme Court, in PLD 1969 SC 407 and 1992 SCMR 16529 has authoritatively held that the power to rescind an order under section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, is extinguished once that order has taken effect and vested rights have been created in reliance upon it. Eighteen of the twenty-eight selected candidates have been posted abroad pursuant to the same Competent Authority approval; the offers to those candidates have been acted upon and cannot now be rescinded. The offers to the petitioners, made pursuant to the same approval and accepted on the same terms, stand on no different legal footing.

32.The doctrine of legitimate expectation reinforces this conclusion. The petitioners applied for and participated in the selection process in the reasonable and legitimate expectation that they would be treated in accordance with the Advertisement and the 2024 Policy. That Policy said nothing of intelligence vetting as a condition of appointment. That Policy said nothing about post- selection disqualification based on undisclosed reports. The petitioners' expectation that they would be appointed if they successfully completed the prescribed process and secured approval from the Competent Authority (Prime Minister) was not fanciful; it was founded on the express terms of the governing policy framework. The Supreme Court has held that where a policy so framed gives rise to a legitimate expectation, the authority may not act arbitrarily or in a manner contrary to that policy; 2022 SCMR 694; 2024 PLC (CS) 556.10 The respondent’s conduct in the present case is, in each of its material aspects, a departure from the 2024 Policy that cannot be justified on any disclosed ground.

33.Furthermore, the Impugned Decision for re-advertisement stands on a weak technicality. The Impugned Order was passed by the Respondent No. 2 on 13.11.2025, after which the respondents apprised the Competent Authority by submitting a Summary dated 14.11.2025 for soliciting further directions. In this Pakistan through the Secretary M/o Finance vs. Muhammad Himayatullah Faruqhi (PLD 1969 SC 407), Messrs Army Welfare Sugar Mills Limited and others vs. Federation of Pakistan and others (1992 SCMR 1652) Uzma Manzoor and others vs. Vice Chancellor Khushal Khan Khattak University, Karak and others (2022 SCMR 694), Muhammad Irfan Wahid vs. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, M/o Commerce, Islamabad and another (2024 PLC (CS) 556)

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regard, the respondents submitted that at the time of submission of the Summary to the Competent Authority on 14.11.2025, the matter was not pending adjudication as the petition turned representations had already been conclusively decided by the Respondent No.2 vide the Impugned Order and these writ petitions were filed after the submission of the Summary to the Competent Authority. However, the Competent Authority passed the Impugned Decision on 22.12.2025. During this time, no subsequent summary was moved to apprise the Competent Authority of the status of the matter. This reflects that the discretion exercised by the Competent Authority was incomplete since the matter was sub judice before this Court. Hence, the posts were naturally the subject of pending proceedings before this Court, in circumstances where the petitioners have already completed the full selection process, their appointments have been approved by the Competent Authority, and vested rights had accrued. In this regard, it can be appropriately said that the discretion exercised was fair and complete since a decision reached without application of mind to the complete factual matrix is a decision made in abdication of the jurisdiction conferred. Such a decision cannot stand, no matter that the body may have acted in good faith.

34.A holistic look at these facts leads to the inference that the Impugned Decision is a direct attempt to render these proceedings infructuous by changing the subject matter through executive action without informing the Competent Authority of the factual matrix. That is a course of conduct that this Court cannot countenance. An executive authority that moves a summary approving re- advertisement of posts that are the subject of pending litigation, conceals that approval from the court during the hearing of the same litigation, and then relies upon it as a fait accompli is not acting in accordance with law; it is acting in defiance of it. The Impugned Decision by the Competent Authority) that is not based on a complete, objective, and self-contained statement of facts as mandated by law and the Secretariat Instructions, 2021, and that fails to disclose the existence of pending litigation cannot be said to represent a lawful and fully informed exercise of the Competent Authority. The approval secured upon such a summary is vitiated by the suppression of material facts and does not carry the legal character of an informed decision of the competent authority.

23 Writ Petitions No.4837, 4842 to 4844, 4897 of 2025, 486 of 2026, 5523 of 2025, 1351 and 902 of 2026.

35.Moreover, no discretion vested in an executive office is an absolute discretion. The discretion is vested for a public purpose and must be exercised to attain that purpose.11 As such, in the instant matter, discretion was to be exercised with a view to attaining the objective of selecting trade and investment officers for trade missions abroad; however, the discretion was exercised beyond its scope. Clause 1(l) of the 2024 Policy provides a waiting list mechanism for any vacancies that arise during the recruitment cycle. The Impugned Decision, by directing re-advertisement without exhausting the waiting list and without any reasoning or legal basis, violates the 2024 Policy, since it renders the waiting list mechanism nugatory. Discretion is the power given to a person with authority to choose between two or more alternatives, when each of the alternatives is lawful. However, when one of the alternatives is not lawful, there is no discretion to choose it. Even though it may be chosen in practice. It essentially translates that discretion is limited to what is authorized, legal and within the effective limits of the officer’s powers. It is settled law that when some candidates do not join, and certain posts remain vacant, it was imperative that the remaining candidates (on the waiting list) be considered for appointment against the said posts.12 In the present matter, the Competent Authority, instead of proceeding in accordance with the 2024 Policy, ordered re-advertisement without any cogent reasoning.

36.Moreover, it is evident from the record that one, namely Mr Zeeshan Asif from BS-19, has been appointed as TIC (Baghdad) from the waiting list after the refusal of the provisional offer by one candidate, i.e. Dr Muhammad Khurram. Mr Zeeshan Asif was first rendered ineligible due to the disciplinary proceedings initiated against him by his parent department, i.e. the Federal Board of Revenue. However, after being exonerated from the disciplinary proceedings, the officer has been allowed to complete all pre-departure formalities and has been scheduled to join his place of posting. This being an admitted position, is a shocking revelation since it is incomprehensible how one of the candidates from the waiting list has been appointed, whereby the remaining candidates of the waiting list have been denied the same relief. It is relevant from the record that Montgomery Flour and General Mills vs. Director Food, (PLD 1988 Lah. 725) Government of N.W.F.P. through Secretary Education Department, Peshawar vs. Qasim Shah (2009 SCMR 382) and Government of Punjab through Secretary Cooperative Societies Department, Lahore and others vs. Asad Abbas, (2022 SCMR 739)

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the petitioner from the waiting list has not been considered various posts which have been rendered vacant. This is a classic case of discrimination and a violation of Article 25 of the Constitution, which ensures equality before the law and equal protection of the law and states that there shall be no element of discrimination. It is a matter of grave concern that the competent authority has allowed Mr Zeeshan Asif to be appointed at his post from the waiting list vide the Impugned Decision; however, in the same breath, it has ordered for the re- advertisement of the remaining posts. There is no provision in the 2024 policy that allows either the Ministry of Commerce or the competent authority to re- advertise the posts that have remained vacant, and the summary approved by the competent authority does not refer to the relevant provision that allows the posts to be re-advertised without completion of the current recruitment cycle. The discriminatory application of an ostensibly uniform criterion of ineligibility, applied stringently against some and waived without a disclosed reason in favour of others, is a textbook instance of arbitrary executive action and a clear violation of Article 25 of the Constitution, which guarantees equality before the law and equal protection of the law. Where a policy is applied to one of the candidate but not to others in identical circumstances, without any change in criteria or without justification, the constitutional guarantee of equality is not satisfied by the mere assertion that the authority has discretion, since a discretion exercised without application of policy on same classification of candidates is not a discretion; it is a preference, and the Constitution does not protect preferences.

37.The foregoing discussion, taken in its entirety, leads to one inescapable conclusion. The respondents have, at every stage of these proceedings, acted in a manner that is conspicuous for its departure from the requirements of law, fairness, and institutional good faith. The Impugned Order was passed without reasons, without confrontation of adverse material, and without application of mind. The Impugned Decision was approved on the basis of a summary that suppressed the factual matrix of the existence of pending litigation and same was never placed before competent authority to reflect the sub judice status of the matter before this Court, and same must be viewed with the fact that the respondents counsel simultaneously represented in open Court that the posts would remain vacant as an instrument to render these proceedings infructuous. The 2024 Policy prescribes a waiting list mechanism specifically designed to fill

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vacancies arising during the recruitment cycle without recourse to fresh advertisement; that mechanism has been bypassed without any reasoning. These procedural improprieties taken in its entirety are not a collection of isolated procedural missteps; it is a pattern of arbitrary exclusion, selective application of criteria, suppression of material facts before the competent authority, and executive overreach in the face of pending litigation that this Court cannot allow to stand.

38.Moreover, the intelligence reports, when specifically directed to be produced before this Court, were not placed on record, thereby depriving the Impugned Decision of its evidentiary value and foundational backing. Even otherwise, suitability is determined by the selection process, which was designed, with deliberation and at considerable institutional expense, to assess candidates against criteria of professional competence, intellectual ability, and personality through a written examination, a psychometric assessment, and a rigorous interview before a board of the most senior executive officials. The Prime Minister/Competent Authrority approval of the final merit list is the apex of this process and represents the competent authority’s definitive determination that the selected candidates are suitable for the posts to which they have been appointed. An intelligence agency’s “Not Suitable” recommendation, furnished without reasons and without reference to any specific finding of pending proceedings or criminal conduct, cannot undo what the Competent Authority has approved. To hold otherwise would be to vest in an intelligence officer the power to veto the judgment of a selection board and the approval of the Competent Authority a proposition that is, in terms, a negation of the rule of law and of the principle of structured and accountable exercise of authority.

39.This conclusion is reinforced by an examination of what the mandate of the Special Vetting Agency actually is? SRO 801(I)/2022, on which the respondents place exclusive reliance, empowers the Intelligence Bureau to conduct vetting for the purposes of determining whether any pending inquiry, criminal proceeding, or investigation exists against a candidate. It confers authority to discover and report facts of a specific and objectively verifiable character the existence or otherwise of proceedings against a person. It does not confer, and cannot be read to confer, authority to pronounce upon the

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professional suitability, competence, or fitness for appointment of a candidate; those are evaluative judgments that lie wholly within the domain of the selection machinery established by the 2024 Policy.

40.In view of the above discussion, all the petitions are allowed. The Impugned Order dated 13.11.2025 and the Impugned Decision approved vide Summary dated 22.12.2025 are without lawful authority and are hereby set- aside. The respondent Ministry of Commerce is directed to issue final appointment letters to the petitioners, who have already been granted provisional appointment letters within fifteen days of the date of receipt of copy of this judgment, and thereafter to complete all pre-departure formalities within thirty days, so that the petitioners may assume their postings at their respective Trade Missions abroad without further delay. If any vacancy arises, the officers from the waiting list shall be considered. The waiting list shall be exhausted strictly in order of merit before any fresh advertisement for these posts.

(INAAM AMEEN MINHAS)

JUDGE

ANNOUNCED IN OPEN COURT ON 25.05.2026.

JUDGE

M. YAHYA KHAN NIAZI, L.C.