Zafar Ullah etc Vs Ahmedno etc

Cr,Vc)4

I

u

JUDGMENT SHEET

I]{ THE PESHAWAR HIGH COURT

ABBOTTABAD BENCH

(ludicial Department) C. R No. 58-A/2023

Zafa, Ulluh & others.

Petitioner(s)

VS

Ahmedno and others.

Respondent(s)

Presenl Mr. Muhammad Rafique Yousa/,' Advocale, for petitioners(s).

Respondents are not present being a motion case.

Date of hearing: 26.04.2024

JUDGMBNT

MUI{AMMAD KHAN, J.- Through the

instant civil revision, the petitioners have prayed as under:-

"It 13, therefore, prayed that on acceptance of instant revision petition the judgments and decrees oJ'both the q learned lower courts muy grsciously Y be set-aside snd the suit of petitioners/plaintiffs be deueed in their favour with cost througltoltt-" 2 Precisely, the facts of the casc are that the petitioncrs/plaintiffs zafar Ullah and another Muharnmad Tlriq (S.l].) tlon'blc )lr..ltrsticc Iltthammad ljaz Khan

filed a suit for declaration to the effect that they are owners of the suit properly commonly known as Markahni Bari, the description of which are fully mentioned in the heading of the plaint and that the respondents/defendants are their mortgagee and that they have no right to claim ownership of the suit property. The respondents/defendants were summoned and they submitted their written statement whereby they out rightly denied the claim of the petitioners/plaintiffs and stated that they arc the owners of the suit property since their forefathers and also denied their status as mortgagee. In view of the above, the learned trial Court framed as many as seven issues and the parties were required to produce their respective evidence which they have accordingly led and ultimately the suit of the petitioners/plaintiffs was initially dismissed by the learned trial Court vide judgment and decree dated 24.10.2020. Being aggrieved of the aforesaid order and judgment the ,t petitioners/plaintiffs filed an appeal before the learned District Judge, Torghar, however, the same was also dismissed vide second impugned judgments & decrees dated 13.09.2022' l'he petitioners/plaintiffs bcing aggrieved of the Muhamrna.l 'fariq (S.8.) Hon'trle NIr' Justice !Iuhammatl Ijaz Khtn

a

aforesaid judgments & decrees have now challenged the same before this Court through the instant revision petition.

3.Arguments of learned counse I for the petitioners were heard in considerable detail and the record perused with his able assistance.

4.It is the case of petitioners/plaintiffs that the suit property was the ownership of their predecessor-in-interest alongwith the proforma re spondent/defendant namely Isfanosh, however, he in the year 1969 is in his life time had mortgaged the same to the predecessor-in-intercst of the respondents/defendants, in consideration of the mortgaged amount of Rs.1800/-. As against this the stance of the respondents/defendants is that they are owners of the suit property, since their forefathers and they have out rightly denied their status as mortgagee.

5.In order to aPPreciate the

p controversy(ies) between the parties on the basis of evidence produced by both the parties, it is relevant to mention here that the suit properly is situated in District Torghar where till date no settlement of land has taken place and as such there is no revenue NluharnmadTariq(s.8.)I{on,lrlc]!Ir.JusticeMuhammadljazKhan

record with respect to the suit property, therefore, both the parlies have not been able to bring on record any documentary evidence on the basis of which they could claim the ownership of the suit property, therefore in such state of affairs the possession of a party is to be considered as a decisive factor for the determination of ownership , ,) of course subject to certain exception of the party

and it is settled jurisprudence that in such eventuality title will follow the possession and thus if the aforesaid yardstick is applied to the present case then it is a respondents/defendants who are in possession of the suit property since their forefather and thus a heavy burden would lie on the petitioner/plaintiff to prove that respondents/ defendants are their mortgagees.

6.Now the next question would be as to whether the petitioners being plaintiff in the present case have been able to prove all those facts which * they have pleaded in their plaint or not, the answer to the aforesaid question is a big NO' As petitioners/plaintiffs have not brought on record any material whatsoever, to prove that their forefathers had remained the owner of the suit N{uhammad Tarkl (S.B.) Hon'blc Mr.,lrrsticc Muhammad Ijaz Khan

property and that it was he who had mortgaged the suit property to the respondents/defendants. As when they produced their evidence in the Courl they remained inconsistent and for away from the required standard for the proof of oral assertion.

Needless to mention here that an oral assertion could oniy be appreciated in favour of the par-ty if such party succeeds to bring on record a convincing, trustworthy and confidence inspiring evidence, however, when the petitioncrs/plaintiffs appeared and produced their evidence they relied on the heresay evidence. It would also be relevant to mention here that petitioner/plaintiff No.1 appeared in the witness box as PW-3 for himself as well as an attomey for his brother i.e plaintiff No'2 namely Minhaj Khan and who has made thc following admissions - :

oJ 4i !t c.tt* s+ 1 #.a11979 0* oful-,L,., g"-lu o-r;. o# dq crh!13 4 ; dW,Pl o'tJl3 6;u^

t 7. Similarly, he in his examination in chief has though stated that in the past he had submitted an application for the redemption of the suit property to the Political Tehsildar Torghar against the predecessor*in-interest of the Muhammad Tariq (S.B.) Hon'ble Mr..lustice lVluhammad ljaz Khan

respondent/ defendant Derwaiza in which a Jirga was also convened and in that Jirga, the predecessor-in-interest of the defendants had admitted the factum of mortgage, however, in his oross-examination he has admitted that:- C o"l !S -61 j; t5 cu.rl3A;.r ds,+3ilJl 0U il cl L# &+ J -ir1 C1,- _,,c-r3i "SjJ*S d u# cl! e--rrr. ,;tS -f 6* Ll# gc t# JJI l-Et di:L JnJJi 5-lLr+-,, "Jts*-l

In view of the above aforesaid admission on thc part of nobody else but the petitioner/plaintiff himself would show that his whole claim qua the subject property being mortgaged to the responclent by their father, is standing in vacuum and thus he has not been able to prove all those facts through any positive and affirmative evidence which hc has pleaded in his plaint and thus the two Courts below have rightly discarded his evidence.

8.It is relevant to mention here that the burden of proof on the parL of the plaintiff is V enrooted inArticle 117 of The Qanun-e-Shahadut Orcler, 1984, which is reproduced below;- 11I. Buldcn oI UooI.- (1) desires anY to give judgment as to any lcgal right of liability dependent on the existence of facts which he asscrts, must provc that those faots exist.

Muhanrtnad Iariq (S.B.) IIon'ble Mr' Justice Muhamntad Ijaz Khrn

(2)When a person is bound to prove the existence of any fact, it is said that thc burden of proof lies on that pcrson." l'he aforesaid Article of The Qunun-e- Shahudat Order, 1984 declares that any person who desires a Court to issue a judgment in his f'avour has to prove all those facts which he/they has/have pleaded in his/their plaint, however, the record would reveal that petitioners/plaintiffs have not proved the existence of all those facts on which they have based their plaint. During the course of arguments, learned counsel for the

petitioners/plaintiffs tried to pin-point the weakness, lapses and lacunas in the evidence of respondents/ defendants, however, it may be clarified that party has to succeed on the basis of his own evidence and it cannot derive any benefit from the evidence of his rival. In this case petitioners/plaintiffs have not proved their claim through any cogent and confidence inspiring eviclence, whereas respondents/ defendants have t7 proved their case. In the case of "Nisur Ali v/s Muh t, reported as 2022 SCMII

1054 it was held by Hon'ble Apex Court that according to the Article ll7 of the Qanun-e- Shahadat Order, 1984, if any person desires a court Muhammad 'I ariq (S.8.) Hon'blc Mr. Justicc N'Iuhammad Ijaz Khan

to give judgment as to any legal right or liability, depending on the existence of facts which he asserts, he must prove that those facts exist and burden of proof lies on him. The terminology and terrn of phrase "burden qf proof ' entails the burden of substantiating a case. The meaning of "onus probandi" is that if no evidence is produced by the party on whom the burden is cast, then such issue must be found against him. The burden of proof for the deceitful transaction rests normally on the person who impeaches it. In a suit for dcclaration alleging that the sale was fictitious, the onus is on the plaintiff to prove the same. Where the evidence of plaintiff was self-contradictory and not confidence inspiring then he must fail and where the case is doubtful, the decision must be given in favour of defendant rather than the plaintiff. It is a well settled exposition of law that the plaintiff must succeed on the strength of his own case rather than the weakness of the defendant' The lawsuits are .vI <letermined on preponderance or weighing the soale of probabilities in which Court has to see which pafty has succeeded to prove his case and clischargecl the onus of proof which can be scrutinized as a whole together with the N,luhnmmad Tariq (S.8.) IIon'ble N'[r' Jrrstice Nluhanrnrad Ijaz Khan

contradictions, discrepancies or dearth of proof. It is the burdensome duty of the Court to detach the truth from the falsehood and endeavor should be made in terms of the well-known metaphor, "separate the grain from the chaff'which connotes and obligates the Court to scrutinize and evaiuate the evidence recorded in the /ls judiciously and cautiously in order to stand apart the falsehood from the truth and judge the quality and not the quantity of evidence Similarly, in the case o1' Muhummud Latif vs. Bashir Ahmed and 7 others repo(ed as 2004 CLC 1010, the Lahore IJigh Court has held that it is settled proposition of law that a parly has to succeed on the basis of his own evidence and not on account of lapses in the case of his adversarY.

9.As against this the stance of the respondents/defendants in their written statement was that they are owners of the suit property and are in possession of the same since their ,y forefathers. In support of the aforesaid assertion they have appeared and remained stick with their aforesaid stance and as such no favourable material could be bror.rght from their mouth which could benefit the present petitioners/plaintiffs' Muharnmad Tariq (S.8.) Hon'ble Mr. Justice Muhammad Ijaz Khan

10.Though during the course of arguments learned counsel for the

petitioners/plaintiffs instead of making any reference to the evidence produced by the petitioners/plaintiffs made reference time and again to the lacuna in the evidence of the respondents/defendants, however, it is settled jurisprudence that it is plaintiff who has to prove his own case and as such a plaintiff could not draw any benefit from the lacuna in the evidence of thc deflendants. Similarly, any admission if made in the cross-examination of the defendants witnesses would not ipso-facto absolve the plaintiff from the discharge of his burden/onus of proof to prove all those facts which he has pleaded in his plaint' As against this the respondents/defendants through their evidence have discharged their burden of proof by proving all those facts which they have (\ pleaded in their written statement couple with the admitted position that they are in possession of the suitpropertysincetheirforefathers'Theaforesaid burclen on such person is enrooted in Article 119 of

The Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, which is reproduced below ;-

N,luhamlnad lariq (S.B.) IIon'blc NIr. Justicc N{uhammad Ijaz Khatt

il

119.Burden of proof as to partioular fact: l'he burden of proof as to any particular lact lies on that person who wishes thc Court to believe in its existcnce, unless it is provided by any law that the proof of that lact shall lie on any particular person. Illustrations (a) A prosecutes B for theft, and wishcs thc Court to believe that l] admitted the theft, to C. A must prove the admission. (b) B wishes the Court to believe that at the time in question, he was elsewhere. I-Ie must prove it The aforesaid provision unmistakably cast duty on the respondents/defendants to prove all those facts which they have taken/agitated in their written statement qua the fact that they are in possession of the suit properly since their forefathers. In the case of (a Noorani Travels Kuruchi v/s

Muh ammud & ers" reported as 2008

SCMR 1395 it was held by the Apex Court that as per Article 119 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, burden of proof as to any particular fact lies on that person who wishes to believe the Court in its existence unless it is provided by law that proof of that fact lies on another Person'

1 1. During the course of arguments another question though not dilated upon by thc ,q two fora below but this Courl confronted to the learnedcounselforthepetitioners/plaintiffsthat whether at oral mortgaged could be enforced through the process of the Court and what should

Muhannrad Tariq (S.8.) IIon'blc Nilr. Justice Nluhanrnrad ljaz Khttti

be the standard for the proof of an oral mortgage, however, he was unable to wriggle out of the same and rightly so as an oral mortgage has no sanctity under the law and thus the same could not be enforced through the process of Court. In this regard the relevant law would be Section 59 of The Transfer of rty Act, 1882 as well as Section 17 read with Section 49 of The Resistration Act, 1908 as admittedly in the alleged oral mortgage, the consideration amount was Rs.1800/- as pleaded by the petitioners/plaintiffs in their plaint. The aforesaid provisions being relevant are reproduced below:-

"59. Mortgage When to be bv assurance.-Where the principal money secured is one hundred rupecs or upwards. other than a by deposit of title deeds can be effectcd onl), instrument mortsagor and bv at least two witnesses.

Whcre the principal money securcd is less than one hundred rupees. a mortgage may be effected eithcr by a registcrcd instrumcnt signcd and attcstcd as aforesaid, or (except in the case of a il simple mortgage) by delivcry of thc property.

17.Documents of Which registration Is compulsory.--(1).. . .

a) instruments of gift of immovablc propcrly; b) other non-testamcntary instrumcnts which purport or opcrate to creatc. dcclarc, assign. limit or extinguish, whether in present or in futurc, any right, title or interest, whethcr vestcd or contingcnt, of thc of ru to or in immovable property;

Explanation.--Inthe case of an assignment ofa the on for thc

I{uhamuaC Tariq (S.8.) Hon'ble Mr.,Itrstice Vluhammad Ijaz Khan

the value for I{egistrationl c) d) e)

(2)Nothing in clauses (b) and (c) of subsection ( I ) applies to:- l.

ii.

iii.

iv.

V. any document not itself crcating. dcclaring. assigning. limiting or cxtinguishing any right. title or interest of thc value of onc hundrcd rupees and upwards to or in immovable property" but merely creatinu. a rieht to obtain another document which will. when executed. creatc. dcclare. assign. limit or cxtinguish an), such right. title or intcresl: or vl.

vii vii i.

ix.

x.

xi. any endorsement on a morlgage decd acknowledging the payment of the whole or an)u part of the mortgage money. and an), othcr receipt for payment ql money due undcr a mortgage: or xll xll1.

49.Effect of non-registration of documents required to bc registered.-- No document required to bc rcqistcrcd under this Act or under anlz earlicr law p{avldlnc for or relatins to resistration of documents shall:- a) operate to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish, whether in present or in futurc, any right, title or interest, whether vesled or contingent, to or in immovable property, or b) confer any power to adopt, unlcss it has bccn registered."

The aforesaid provisions are clear in their fr language, which declare that a mortgage for a consideration of one hundred rupees and above must be effected by a registered instrument signed by the mortgagor and attested by at least two Muharnmad lariq (S.B.) [Ion'ble NIr. ,lustice ]Iuhammad Ijaz Khan

wrtnesses. Similarly, under Section 17 of the Registration Act, anlr instrument of transfer which ac CS

above has to be registered or otherwise under Section 49 of the said Act, the same could neither create extinsuish y riqht in of thc beneficiary. When seen on the above touchstone the petitioners/plaintiffs have not acted in a manner as required by law, therefore on this score too, the alleged mortgage could not be treated as a valid one and thus the suit of the petitioners/plaintiffs is liable to be dismissed. In the case of Boddu Ramulu ys' Gokarla Ramaswamy and others, the Orissa High Court of India has held as under:- 'I'he point for examination is as to whether in vicw oI the legal provisions, it is open to the plaintilfs to sue for redemption on the basis of an oral mortgage. Such a question has become the subject-matter of judicial consideration in sevcral cases and as it appears, Courts in this country have taken the view that redemption cannot bc on the basis of In the case of Ma LItwe v. Maung Lun, t\IIl. l9l7 ff Low Bur 128 (FB), the rclcvant facts of thc casc as are available from the order are as under: "'l-his is one of numerous cases in which a plaintiff slres a defendant in possession sceking to redeem land on the ground of its having becn mortgaged only and the delendanl resists the suit on the ground that thc land had been sold out right to him. The transaction took placc long aflcr Sections 54 and 59 of the'I'ransfer of Property Act had becn brought into force in lower Burma. The amount advanced on mortgage or according to thc dcfendant's version of the transaction the price paid was Rs. l50l-. No instrument in wriling cmbodying the terms of the transaction was executed and registered; consequcntly thc plaintiff Muhanrnad T3riq (S.8.) Hon'ble NIr.,Iustice Muharnrnad Ijaz Khan

could not prove the mortgagc nor could thc defendant prove a sale 1o him."

Mr. Fox, C. J. referred the following qucstion to the Full Bench:- "In a suit l'or in wh the

the and scts urr a salc to can

reason ofthe provisions ofthc fransfcr o1 Property Act the plaintilf cannot prove the mortgage sued on and the dcfendant cannot prove thc sale relicd on by him." The Full Bench held that relicf could be siven, 16. An identical qucstion agam came up lbr consideration before another Full llench of thc sanre High Court in the case of Maung San tr[in v. Matrng Po lllaing, AII{ 1925 l\ang 291. 'l'hc question that thc Full Bench was callcd upon to answer was:

"When a alleses that POSSESSION has the defendant as security for a loan of Rs. 100/- or upwards. but without thc execution of any rcgistercd instrument. is oral evidence admissiblc to prove thg transaction )) While giving the answer to the said question, it was held:

"The reason why diflerent principlcs apply to the admissibility of evidcnce to prove a contract to mortgage and a contract to scll is that in the latter the defendant is entitlcd to claim specific performance and in formcr case, hc is not. 'l'hc answcr to thc question referrcd is in thc ncgativc. ...." l2 A similar question again came before another Full Bench of the Rangoon High Court in the case of Ma Kvi v. Maung Thon, AIR 1935 Rang

230 (FB):

Ut U/ "Where a person has been put into possession of land as usulructuary moftgagee, and the mortgagc is invalid for want of a registercd documcnt, is the truc owner of the land in a suit for possession entitled to recover possession without payment of the amount of the debt?" ......an Ilnglish equitable doctrine affecting the provisions of an Ilnglish statute relating to thc right to sue upon a contract, should be applied by analogy to such a statute as the Transfer of Propcrty Muharnmad Tariq (S.8.) [Ion'ble NIr..ruslice ]Iuhammad l.jaz Khan

T6

Act and with such a rcsult as to crcatc without any writing an intcrest which thc statute says can only be created by mcans of a registered instrumcnt, appears to thcir Lordships, in the absence of some binding authority to that effect to be impossiblc ,....,.,,rr.

and proceeded to conclude that lgliel could not be given to the plaintiff. A similar matter again came up for consideration before another Full Bench of the Rangoon I{igh Court in the case of Maung Lu Pe v. Maung San Myo, AIR 1940 Rang 11, where it was held that the petitioners/plaintiffs who sued for redemption in similar circumstances was bound to lose. This question has also come up before many other High Courts in India. In the case of Ningappa Awwappa v. Danappa Sharnanna, AIR 1947 Born 206 followed the cases of the Rangoon High Court referred to above and held that where a usufructuary mortgage for more than Rs. 100/- is not registered. the owners of the land cannot file a suit for redemption but they may be entitled to treat the mortgagee as a trespasser and evict him without 3 repaying the loans advanced by him. In the case of Zulfigar Ali Mubashar vs. Muhctmmad Mumtaz Alam through Legal Heirs reported as PLD 2013 Sindh 327,the Sindh High Court has held as under "5 1. In the prcsent case, thc suit is based upon the mortgage dccd dated l6-3-1998 [Exh. 1519) and it clearly contains all thc Muhammad Tariq (S.8.) IIon'ble NIr. ,lustice Muhammad l_jaz Khan

terms and conditions of bargain bctwccn the parties i.e. Mortgagor and Morlgagcc. Assuming for the sake of arguments that Exh. l5l9 is a genuine documcnt and the bargain thereunder has also taken-place, then too such document in my view is compulsorily registerable under Section 17 of the Registration Act tlv of 19081. Going through the contents of so-callcd moflgage deed datcd 16-3-199U [I{ahan Nama], I am of the considered opinion that this document falls within the mischicf oI Section 49 of Registration Acr llv 19081 which lor ready reference is reproduccd as under;

u49.

of non-rcsis tion of documents required to bc rcgistcred.-- No document required to bc registorcd under this Act or under any earlier law providing for or relating to rcgistration of documents shall-- a) operatc to create, dcclare, assign, limit or extinguish, whether in prcsent or in future, any right, title or intcrcst whether vested or contingent, to or in immovable property; or b) confcr any power to adopt, unlcss it has bcen registered.

52.As being un-registered documcnt is not admissible in evidencc so also does not creatc any right or intercst in thc suit property in favour of thc plaintifflmortgagee cven if it is supposed to be genuine document.

53.In view the above position, I havc come to the conclusion that mortgage dccd dated 16-3-1998 [Rahan Namal besides forged, fabricated is without any consideration. Even otherwisc, same bcing unregistered documcnt does not creatc any right or interest in favour of the plaintiff vis-a-vis suit property."

The weight of authority seems to be in support of the proposition that on the basis of an oral

G

(,/ mortgage, a suit for redemption is not maintainable In view of the above exposition of the reievant law on the subject, it is held that redemption cannot be granted on the basis of an oral mortgage Nluhammad Tariq (S.8.) Ilon'ble \'[r.,]usticr ]Iuhanrrnad Ijaz Kharr

13.It is also settled law that civil cases arc to be decided on the basis of preponderance of evidence. In the present case the same surely tilts in favour of respondents/defendants and as against this, petitioners/plaintiffs could not have succeeded to put any legal weight in their scale so as to turn it in their favour and thus they have to face its conseq uences. In the case of "Abdul Rehmun & others v/s Mst. Allah Wusui & others', reported as 2022 SCMR 399 the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that in civil dispensation of justice, courts are tcr adjudge the /is on the standard of preponderance of probability of evidence produced by the parties And the decision of the court would tilt in favour of the party having preponderance of evidence. As for the burden of proving a fact is concerned, it gains importance and relevance, only when no evidence is led by the concerned party or the Court is unable to take a decision, one way or the other, on the basis of evidence available on record of the case. (\t b/ 14 In this case, the two Courts below have concurrently recorded their findings of facts and law as against the present petitioners/plaintiffs and in favour of the respondents/defendants, which this Court found them as perfectly in accordance Muhanrnad l ariq (S.8.) Ilon'ble IlIr. ,lustice Muhammad Ijaz Khau

t9

with the available evidence of the parties and thus the same neither suffer from any misreading or non-reading of evidence nor the same suffer from any illegalities or material irregularities, so as to warrant the interference of this Court in a revisional jurisdiction under section 115 CPC. The scope, extent and domain of revisional jurisdiction of this Court has elaborately been dilated upon by the Hon'ble Apex Court in its recent judgment titled Nasir Ali vs. Muhammud Asghar reported as 2022 SCMR 1054, it was also held that section 115, C.P.C empowers and mete out the High Court to satisfy and reassure itself that the order of the subordinate Court is within its jurisdiction;

the case is one in which the Court ought to exerclse jurisdiction and in exercising jurisdiction, the Court has not acted illegally or in breach of some provision of law or with material irregularity or by committing some error of procedure in the course of the trial which affccted { the ultimatc decision. If the I{igh Court is satisfied that aforesaid principles have not been unheeded or disregarded by the Courts below, it has no power to interfere in the conclusion of the subordinate Court upon questions of fact or law.

Muhalnmad'[ariq (S.8,) [Ion'blc Mr. Justice Muhammad ljaz Khan

fhe scope of revisional jurisdiction is limited to the extent of misreading or non-reading of evidence, jurisdictional error or an illegality of the nature in the judgment which may have material effect on the result of the case or if the conclusion drawn therein is perverse or conflicting to the law. Furthermore, the Fligh Court has very limited jurisdiction to interfere in the concurrent conclusions arrived at by the courts below while exercising power under section 115, C.P.C. Similarly, in the case of li and others ummad Din em

others reporled as PLD 2022 treme Court 353, it was also held that a revisional Court cannot upset a finding of fact of the Court(s) below unless that finding IS the result of misreading, non-reading, or perverse or absurd appraisal of some material e vidence. 'I'he revisional Court cannot substitute the finding o[ r the Court(s) below with its own merely for the reason that it finds its own finding more plausible than that of the Court(s) below. Similar view also reiterated by the Hon'ble Apex Court in casc titled Muhsmmud Sarwar emd others vs. Hushmsl Khan und others reporled as PLD 2022 Supreme Muhammad'Iariq (S.8.) Ilon'ble Mr.,lustice Muhamnrad Ijaz Khan

2t

Court 13, where in para-6 it was held that it is well seffled exposition of law, deducible from plethora of dictums laid down by superior Courts that section 115, C.P.C. empowers and meted out the High Court to satisft and reassure itself that the order of the subordinate court is within its jurisdiction; the case is one in which the Courl ought to exercise jurisdiction and in exercising jurisdiction, the Court has not acted illegally or in breach of some provision of law or with material irregularity or by committing some error of procedure in the course of the trial which affected the ultimate decision. If the High Courl is satisfied that aforesaid principles have not been unheeded or disregarded by the Courts below, it has no power to interfere in the conclusion of the subordinate Courl upon questions of fact or law. It was also held by the Hon'ble Apex Courl in para-10 of the judgment rendered in the case of Mst. Zarsheda vs. Nobut Khan reported as PLD 2022 Supreme Court 21, that in the case of Shahbuz Gul and others v.

P Muhammud Younas Khqn and others (2020 SCMR 8671. this Court declared that where two different interpretations were possible of the evidence brought on record, then appraisal of facts Muhammad Tariq (S.8.) I{on'ble Mr. Justice Muhammad Ijaz Khan

of lower Courts should not be overturned by the High Court in its revisional jurisdiction under section 115 C.P.C. Between two possible interpretations, the one adopted by the trial and appellate Courts should have been maintained keeping in mind the limited scope of revisional jurisdiction. In the case of Khudadud vs. Svecl Ghazanfar Ali Shah alias S. Inaam Hussuin and others reported as 2022 933, it was also held by the Hon'ble Apex Court that the High Court has a narrow and limited jurisdiction to interfere in the concurrent rulings arrived at by the Courts below while exercising power under section 115, C.P.C. These powers have been entrusted and consigned to the High Court in order to secure effective exercise of its superintendence and visitorial powers of correction unhindered by technicalities which cannot be invoked against conclusion of law or fact which do not in any way affect the jurisdiction of the Court but confined to the extent of misreading or non-reading of evidence, jurisdictional error or an illegality of the nature in the judgment which may have material effect on the result of the case or the conclusion drawn Muhammad Tariq (S.B.) Hon'ble Mr. Juslice lVluhammad ljaz Khan

therein is perverse or contrary to the law, but interference for the mere fact that the appraisal of evidence may suggest another view of the matter is not possible in revisional jurisdiction, therefore, the scope of the appellate and revisional jurisdiction must not be mixed up or bewildered.

15.In view of the above discussion, the impugned judgments & decrees of two Courts belorv respectively dated 13.09.2022 and 20.10.2022 neither suffer from misreading of evidence nor the same is the result of non-reading of evidence nor any material irregularity(ies) have been comrnitted by the fora below, therefore, the samc are upheld and maintained and accordingly the instant rcvision petition being berefl of any merits is hereby dismissed in liminc.

Announced

JUDGE

Muhammad fariq (S.8.) IIon'ble NIr.,luslicc Nluhanrrnad ljaz l(han