Amanat Shah Vs The State

JUDGMENT SHEET

IN THE PESHAWAR HIGH COURT

ABBOTTABAD BENCH

(Judicial Department)

Cr. M (BBA) No. 893-A/2025

Amanat Shah son of Suleman Shah.

(Petitioner/s)

VS

The State and another.

(Respondents)

Present: Mr. Mazhar Khan Jadoon, for petitioner.

Respondents are not represented being a motion case.

Date of hearing: 22.12.2025

JUDGMENT

AURANGZEB, J. Through the instant petition, the petitioner, Amanat Shah son of Suleman Shah, seeks the concession of ad-interim pre-arrest bail in respect of FIR No. 625 dated 30.10.2025, registered under Sections 324/353/186/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, read with Section 15-AA KPK at Police Station Sikandarabad, District Abbottabad.

2.Precisely stated, the facts of the case, as narrated in the contents of the FIR, are that on 30.10.2025, at the road leading to Banda Sher Khan, the accused/petitioner, in furtherance of a common intention with the co-accused, allegedly opened fire upon a police

party, thereby obstructing them in the lawful discharge of their official duties by creating fear and deterrence. It is further alleged that upon the police giving chase, the accused/petitioner managed to flee from the place of occurrence by taking advantage of darkness, whereas the co-accused was found lying at the spot in an injured condition. Upon conducting a search of the co-accused, the police allegedly recovered 4,125 grams of heroin and a Kalashnikov rifle along with five cartridges.

3.After registration of the aforesaid FIR, the present accused/petitioner approached the learned trial Court by filing an application seeking ad-interim pre-arrest bail; however, the same was dismissed.

4.Arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner were heard in considerable detail, and the record was perused with his able assistance.

5.During the course of arguments, learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently contended that the petitioner has been falsely implicated in the instant case with mala fide intention and ulterior motives, and that his nomination as an accused is the outcome of a deliberate design to harass and humiliate him rather than a bona fide effort to enforce the law. It was argued that the petitioner has been dragged into the case on the basis of false and frivolous accusations, without any independent

corroboration, and that the entire prosecution story is tainted with ill-will. However, the record, reveals that the accused/petitioner had earlier approached the Court of the learned District & Sessions Judge, Abbottabad, seeking the concession of pre-arrest bail, which application was considered and declined vide order dated 27.11.2025. The allegations levelled against the petitioner are not of a trivial nature; rather, they pertain to an incident involving the alleged opening of fire upon a police party, thereby obstructing public servants in the lawful discharge of their official duties by creating fear and deterrence. Allegations of this nature strike at the very authority of the State and the rule of law, as they involve not merely a private dispute but an alleged attack upon law enforcement personnel performing their statutory functions. Such accusations, by their very character, demand a cautious and restrained approach while examining any prayer for discretionary relief.

6.It is a well-settled exposition of law that the grant of pre-arrest bail is an extraordinary and exceptional relief, which is not to be granted as a matter of course. Its underlying object is to safeguard the liberty of an innocent person in those rare and exceptional cases where the Court is satisfied that the criminal proceedings have been initiated with mala fide intention, ulterior motives, or for

purposes of harassment. The jurisprudence developed around pre-arrest bail consistently emphasises that it is not intended to shield the guilty from the consequences of law, nor to impede a lawful investigation. While applying for such relief, the petitioner bears a heavy burden to satisfy the Court that the basic conditions envisaged under Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (“Cr.P.C.”), stand fulfilled, namely that there exist reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of the offence alleged against him, or that the case calls for further inquiry. Mere assertions of false implication, without prima facie support from the record, are insufficient to attract the indulgence of the Court. In the case of “Ahtisham Ali vs. The State” reported as 2023 SCMR 975 the Hon’ble Apex Court has held that “Grant of pre-arrest bail is an extraordinary relief which may be granted in extraordinary situations to protect the liberty of innocent persons in cases lodged with mala fide intention to harass the person with ulterior motives. While applying for pre-arrest bail, the petitioner has to satisfy the Court with regard to the basic conditions quantified under section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 ("Cr.P.C.") vis-à-vis the existence of reasonable grounds to confide that he is not guilty of the offence alleged against him and the case is one of further inquiry”.

7.In this context, it is also pertinent to underscore that allegations involving the use of firearms against a police party prima facie attract serious penal consequences and ordinarily fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497, Cr.P.C. In such cases, the threshold for grant of pre-arrest bail is considerably higher, and the Court must be satisfied, on the basis of tangible material, that the accusation is patently false or actuated by mala fides. The mere fact that the petitioner disputes the prosecution version or asserts his innocence cannot, by itself, justify the invocation of this extraordinary jurisdiction, particularly where the allegations disclose an offence of a grave nature.

8.At this juncture, it is necessary to examine the statutory framework governing the exercise of bail jurisdiction, particularly the limitation imposed by Section 498-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The said provision places a clear and unambiguous restriction on the exercise of jurisdiction by the Courts in matters relating to bail. It clarifies that nothing contained in Sections 497 or 498, Cr.P.C. shall be deemed to authorise the grant of bail to a person who is neither in custody nor present before the Court, or against whom no criminal case stands registered at the relevant time. The provision thus embodies a legislative mandate that the grant of bail presupposes the

existence of a registered criminal case and the physical custody or personal appearance of the accused before the Court. Furthermore, it emphasises that any order granting bail is strictly confined to the particular case or FIR specified therein and does not operate as a general or blanket protection against arrest in other cases, whether existing or prospective. This statutory limitation is designed to ensure that bail orders remain case-specific, grounded in concrete facts, and are not extended to hypothetical or future contingencies. Section 498-A Cr.P.C being relevant is reproduced below;

"498-A. No bail to be granted to a person not in custody, in Court or against whom no case is registered, etc.: Nothing in section 497, or Section 498 shall be deemed to require or authorize a Court to release on bail, or to direct to be admitted to bail, any person who is not in custody or is not present in Court or against whom no case stands registered for the time being and an order for the release of a person on bail, or a direction that a person be admitted to bail, shall be effective only in respect of the case that so stands registered against him and is specified in the order or direction."

A plain reading of the above provision leaves no manner of doubt that Section 498-A, Cr.P.C. places a statutory restriction and prescribes a mandatory precondition for the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court in matters relating to pre-arrest bail, namely, the personal appearance of the petitioner before the Court.

In the absence of such personal presence, the Court is not empowered to grant bail, and the petition is liable

to be dismissed on this ground alone. The legislature, in its wisdom, has deliberately imposed this requirement to prevent abuse of the process of law and to ensure that the extraordinary concession of pre- arrest bail is not invoked by absconders or persons who seek to evade the jurisdiction of the Court. At the same time, the provision recognises a narrow window of judicial discretion where a plausible and satisfactory explanation for non-appearance is placed on record. In such circumstances, the Court may, if it finds the explanation convincing, exempt the petitioner from personal appearance for that particular day and adjourn the matter for a short period. However, even in such cases, the statute draws a clear line by prohibiting the Court from proceeding to examine the merits of the bail petition in the absence of the petitioner. The reason for this limitation is self-evident: once the Court embarks upon a merits-based examination, it necessarily assumes the option either to allow or to dismiss the petition, whereas the statute expressly prohibits the grant of bail in the absence of the accused. Any departure from this mandate would defeat the object and spirit of Section 498-A, Cr.P.C., and render its safeguards illusory. In the present case, however, the record clearly reflects that the

petitioner/accused was duly and personally present before the learned trial Court on the date when his application for pre-arrest bail was taken up for hearing and was ultimately dismissed on merits. The statutory requirement of personal appearance, as contemplated under Section 498-A, Cr.P.C., was thus fully satisfied.

The learned trial Court, having the benefit of hearing the parties and considering the material available on record, exercised its discretion to decline the extraordinary relief sought by the petitioner. This decision, rendered after due application of mind, cannot be lightly brushed aside, nor can it be circumvented by adopting indirect means.

9.It is also of significance that the present petition before this Court arises out of the dismissal of the application for pre-arrest bail by the learned trial Court on 27.11.2025. Once such relief is declined by a competent Court of law, the accused stands exposed to arrest in accordance with law, subject to any express order of protection passed by a superior Court. The record, however, reveals that despite the dismissal of his pre-arrest bail application, the petitioner remained at large for a considerable period, during which no effective steps appear to have been taken by the police to secure his arrest. This state of affairs warrants

serious reflection, as it touches upon the proper understanding and implementation of judicial orders by the investigating authorities. It is, therefore, necessary to clarify that any practice whereby police authorities treat the mere filing of a petition before the High Court as an implied stay or bar to arrest, despite the dismissal of pre-arrest bail, reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of the purpose and scope of pre- arrest bail. This relief exists as an exceptional measure to protect individuals against arbitrary or mala fide arrest, where circumstances clearly warrant such protection. Once a competent Court has declined pre- arrest bail, it has necessarily determined, at least prima facie, that no such exceptional circumstances exist and that arrest is lawful and necessary to ensure an effective investigation. To allow the mere act of filing another petition to operate as a de facto stay of arrest would render that judicial determination meaningless, undermine the authority of Court orders, and defeat the objective of ensuring prompt, fair, and effective investigation of criminal offences. Such an approach would also risk abuse of the process of law by enabling accused persons to indefinitely evade arrest without any legal basis, merely by approaching different forums in succession. The administration of criminal

justice cannot countenance a situation where judicial orders are treated as provisional or ineffective unless expressly enforced. Judicial orders must remain binding and enforceable unless and until a competent Court expressly orders otherwise. Interim protection against arrest is not automatic; it must be specifically sought and expressly granted. In the absence of such an order, a refusal of bail remains fully operative and must be implemented promptly and in good faith by the investigating authorities. In the case of “Zahid Khan and others vs. The State and another” reported as PLD 2025 SC 866 it has been held that “It is necessary to clarify that any practice whereby police authorities treat the mere filing of a petition before the Supreme Court as an implied stay or bar to arrest, despite the dismissal of pre-arrest bail, indicates a misunderstanding of the purpose of pre-arrest bail.

This relief exists as an exceptional measure to protect individuals against arbitrary or mala fide arrest, where circumstances clearly warrant such protection.

Once a competent court has declined pre-arrest bail, it has necessarily determined that no such exceptional circumstances exist and arrest is lawful and necessary to ensure an effective investigation. Allowing the mere act of filing another petition to operate as a de facto

stay would render that judicial determination meaningless, defeat the objective of ensuring prompt and fair investigation, and risk abuse of process by enabling accused persons to indefinitely evade arrest without any legal basis. Therefore, judicial orders must remain binding and enforceable unless and until a competent court expressly orders otherwise. It must be remembered that interim protection is not automatic; it must be specifically sought and expressly granted. Absent such an order, a refusal of bail remains fully operative and must be implemented promptly and in good faith by investigating authorities”. Further reliance is placed on 2021 SCMR 352 wherein it has been held that “The job of the Police is to protect the community by fighting and preventing crime, as well as maintaining law and order. It is the Police who strive to keep the community safe by reducing the fear of crime and improving the overall quality of life of the citizens. The Police is supposed to perform its duty independently without taking any external pressure. So far as the arrest of proclaimed offenders, who have not been arrested despite rejection of pre-arrest bail, the Additional Inspector General is directed to complete the process of law and submit a report for our perusal in chambers

within one week. The DPO Sargodha is also directed to complete the process of law regarding the petitioner and submit a report within one week for our perusal in chambers.”

10.For the foregoing reasons and in view of the settled principles of law discussed hereinabove, this Court finds no legal infirmity, perversity, or arbitrariness in the impugned order dated 27.11.2025 passed by the learned District & Sessions Judge, Abbottabad, whereby the petitioner’s application for pre-arrest bail was dismissed on merits. The petitioner has failed to bring on record any exceptional or extraordinary circumstance warranting interference by this Court in the exercise of its discretionary jurisdiction. The allegations levelled against the petitioner are grave in nature, involve the alleged use of firearms against a police party in the discharge of official duties, and prima facie attract the prohibitory clause of Section 497, Cr.P.C. The conduct of the petitioner, coupled with the absence of any tangible material demonstrating mala fides or abuse of process, disentitles him from the extraordinary concession of pre-arrest bail. Consequently, the instant petition is found to be devoid of merit and is hereby dismissed.

11.Before parting with the order, it is directed that a copy of this judgment be transmitted forthwith to the Inspector General of Police, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Hazara Division, Abbottabad, and the District Police Officer, Abbottabad, for strict compliance and implementation in accordance with law. The said authorities shall ensure that judicial orders declining pre-arrest bail are given due effect promptly and in good faith, without treating the mere pendency of proceedings before a superior Court as an implied restraint on lawful arrest, unless expressly so ordered by a competent Court.

Announced

Tahir Saleem

JUDGE